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ROPER, et al.
(putative class
representative)
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SUMMARY:

Cert to CA .S ~ ~
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~II-( G4 •v-.~-t.•~
(concurring) ../.... ~ ./.-~ ~ ~ ..
& Rubin)
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The primary issue is whether named

plaintiffs, who purport to represent a class for 'tvhich
certification was denied>and to whom the derendant has
tendered all the relief they seek, may appeal the denial
of class certification.

- 2 -

(
2.

FACTS:

This is a suit by resps as credit card

holders to recover for violations of state usery statutes
to the extent provided by the National Bank Act.

Resps

sued as named plaintiffs on behalf of a class vf 90,000.

_

The DC denied -.._..,
class certification
on numerous grounds:
__,

resps

were unable or unwilling to finance adequate representation;
the class was unmanageable; individual suits would be less of
a burden on the courts and less of a threat to the solvency
of the involved bank; and a class action would undercut state
substantive law prohibiting the aggregation of usery claims.
Petr subsequently tendered to resps their monetary demands,

___________.,

interest, and court costs.

The DC dismissed the action without

prejudice to the rights of the unnamed class members.
On an appeal by resps, theCA first found that the
case was not moot and resps could appeal.

Since in these

circumstances there was no obligation to notify the class of
the dismissal, resps and the DC had a duty to ascertain that
there would be no prejudice to the interests of the class.
Since an unnamed class member could intervene and appeal in
these circumstances, and since a named plainttff could appeal
the denial of class certification even if he had won on the merits
of his individual claim, there is still a controversy over class
certification at least be-tween the putative class and the defendant.

Thus, the only question is who has standing to appeal.

Since the named plaintiffs here have a stake in class-wide relief
and have a sufficient nexus with the class, the appeal is proper.

- 3 -

(
Class actions often involve small individual claims and
defendants should not be able to cut off every appeal of
a denial of class certification just by tendering relief
to the named plaintiffs.

On the merits of the certification

issue, the CA found that the DC had abused its discretion.
Resps had offered to finance the litigation and
guarantees of their ability to do so.

provided

A class action was

superior because of the numerous identical small claims.

The

DC did not cite any management problems that do not exist in
every class action.

Indeed, management here would be easier

than in most cases because all the necessary information was
in the bank's computer.

There appear

to be no issues that

were not common to all members of the class.

There is no

indication that· in creating this ground for liability, Congress
intended that it be limited where the bank has done so much
wrong that relief would be devastatingo

Moreover, "[i]f it be

assumed • • o that courts should heed hurricane warnings about
potential disasters to defendants and use them as a reason to
evacuate class

~ctions,

then we consider this to be less than

catastrophic" because the bank's assets far exceed
tential liability.

the po-

Finally, the CA found that although

Mississippi law labels usery claims as penal and aggregation of
such claims "legal fraud" by borrowers, this is not really aggregation since recovery for each individual class member is
sought.

In any event, the federal claim in federal court must

be governed by federal procedure.

- 4 (
Judge Thornberry joined fully in the discussion
of class certification, and specially joined the other
holding on the ground that where the named plaintiffs do
not voluntarily accept the tendered relief there is no
true settlement; the class action is not terminated by
"tendering a few dollars to a putative class representative."
3.

CONTENTIONS:

(1)

Petr argues that its tender

mooted the case after certification had been denied and that
the CA has denied defendants their traditional right to buy
peace.

Members of the class have no legal interest in tile

case after certification is denied.

Once the dispute between

the named plaintiffs and the defendant died, there was no case
or controversy left for theCA to deal with o Thus, it was
error for the CA to revive the class and the controversy by
bootstrapping the named plaintiffs' continuing personal stake
in litigating the propriety of class treatment on the basis of
the possibility that class treatment is proper.

Winokur v.

Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271 (CA 7 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1507 (1978), is in direct conflict with
the decision below, as

are Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825

(CA 10 1976), and VunCannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096 (CA 9
1977).

Sec also

Las~

Vo

~in1an,

558 F.2d 1133 (CA 2 1977).

But see also Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197
(CA 6 1974).
Moreover, says petr, the decision below is inconsistent
with numerous decisions of this Court.

In Sosna v.

Iow~,

- 5 -

419 U.So 393 (1975), the Court indicated that a live
controversy continued after the named plaintiff's individual
interest expired because the class had been certified.

In

Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975),
the Court learned at oral argument that the named plaintiffs
no longer had an interest in the controversy.

The Court ruled

that "[t]he case is therefore moot unless it was duly certified
as a class action pursuant to Fedo Rules Civ. P. 23, a controversy still exists between [defendants] and the present members
of the class, and the issue in controversy is such that it is
capable of repetition yet evading review o""''
v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977).

See also Kremens

("It is only a 'properly

certified' class that may succeed to the adversary position of a
named representative whose claim becomes moot!').

VJeinstein v.

Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) ,_ says petr, is quite like the case
at bar.

Class action status had been denied, and by the time

the case got here the named plaintiff no longer had a personal
interest.

The Court vacated with instructions to dismiss the

complaint.
Though resps do not discuss this Court's cases cited
by petr, they distinguish Winokur on the ground that there was
no indication there, as there is here, that the defendant would

*The implication that the claims must be capable of repetition
yet evading review, even though the class was certified, was
rejected by Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976).

..
- 6 (

intercept any attempt to appeal the denial of class
certification by paying off any intervenor who happened
to appear.

Petr rejected a counter-offer by resps that

would have preserved review of certification.

Moreover,

resps still have a personal interest in class action status
since that would allow them to distribute their litigation
expenses among a far larger number of plaintiffs. They
.
in
also have the intangible interest/avoiding the situation
where they hold themselves up as class champions and then
are bought off without any benefit for the class.
Resps rely largely on United Airlines, Inc. Vo
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).

In that case the Court stated:

"To be sure, the case was 'stri~ped of
its character as a class action upon
denial of certification by the District
Court. Advisory Committee's Note on
1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 28 U.S.C.
App., p. 7767. But 'it does not . • •
follow that the case must be treated as
if there never was an action brought on
behalf of absent class members.'" Id.,
at 393.
Most crucially, _ though the named plaintiffs there had settled
their case with the defendant, and though the case consequently
had been dismissed, the Court found that "[t]he District Court's
refusal to c-ertify was subject to appellate review after final
judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs, as United concedeso"

Ibid.

The dissent argued that the fact that the action

ended in a settlement meant that the named plaintiffs could not
appeal the denial of certification since "[t]he settlement of an

- 7 -

(

individual claim typically moots any issues associated
with it."

Id., at 400.

The majority rejected that approach,

and this case would seem to fall within the rule stated by
the majority.
(2)

Petr repeats its argument that Mississippi

state substantive policy would be undercut by allowing this
class action.

It is no answer that this is federal law because

the federal law was intended to integrate state law on usery
and the procedural rules were not intended to change substantive
law.

Mississippi state courts have concurrent jurisdiction under

the Act, and they would never allow this type of action.

It is

anomalous for the federal courts to do so.
Resps do not discuss this issue.
(3)

Petr finally argues that the CA did not properly

respect the discretion of the DC in dealing with the certification
issue.

The DC, which should know best, said there were management

problems, and theCA should not attempt to substitute its judgment
unless the DC was patently arbitrary.
Resps do not discuss this either.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Issue 3 involves no

g~neral

question of

law, appears _correctly decided, and is not certworthy.

Issue 2

initially hinges on whether the CA was correct that this is not
really prohibited

aggreg~tion

on Liddell v. Litton Systems,

under Mississippi law.
Inc.~

Petr relies

300 So.2d 455 (Miss. 1974),

which is contrary to theCA's analysis, but it is still a narrow
question.

If you decide that state law does prohibit this, petr

- 8 -

cites no conflict on the CA's interpretation of the National
Bank Act with regard to situations in vlhich state substantive
law is argued to conflict with a federal procedural rule.
The first issue is the most interesting oneo

Winokur

and other CA cases are directly in conflict, except that the·r e
is no indication that the plaintiffs in any of them argued an
interest in spreading litigation costs.

Resps' point ·that here

the defendarit was intent on buying off everyone who could appeal does not seem material.

Some of this Court's cases also

spell trouble for the CA, though there is no indication in any
of them that the named plaintiffs asserted a personal interest
in spreading litigation costs.

Moreover, in Weinstein, other-

wise the closest case to this one, it appears that the named
plaintiffs did not appeal the denial of class certification.

In

Jacobs, the class had not been properly certified, and there is
no indication that the named plaintiffs had attempted to get it
properly certified.

does have rather strong

The CA

support in dictum in McDonald • .

Although the lawyers

involved have not been tremendously informative, I recommend
granting the "mootness" issue (questions I an9 II).
There is a responseo

1/10/79
ME

Burman

CA opinion in
petition
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THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

RE:

78-572 - U. S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty

~

Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper

78-1008 - Satterwhite v. Greenville, Texas

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I vote as follows:
78-572 - U.S. Parole Commission v.
Geraghty

- Grant in full

78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National
Bank v. Roper

- Grant Questions 1 and 2

78-1008 - Satterwhite v.
Greenville, Texas

- Hold for 78-572 and
78-904.

Regards,

\..IVUit.
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FROM:

Ellen

DATE:

September 12, 1979

RE:

United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty
No. 78-572: and Deposit Guaranty National Bank
v. Roper, No. 78-904

The principal issue in these straight-lined cases is

-

whether a class action is mooted when all of the named plaintiffs'
..-c:

individual claims become moot after the denial of class
certification but before the merits of the individual claims are
finally resolved.

This Court's previous decisions are clear

beyond cavil that the named plaintiff in these circumstances
cannot appeal the merits of the decision below in the absence of a
properly certified class.

It is less clear that the denial of

class certification itself is thus

insu~ated

from review.

CA3

and CAS held below that it is not.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Geraghty.

The named plaintiff in this action filed his challenge to

2.

the validity of the United States Paro,le Commission's guidelines
for determining when prisoners may be released on parole as a
class action because he was aware that a previous test case filed
by another prisoner had become moot on appeal.

The DC denied

class certification, relying in part on the mistaken notion that
~

the action was in the nature of habeas corpus, so that Rule 23 did
not apply.

Applying a "necessary and appropriate" standard

fashioned by courts in habeas cases, the DC held certification
"inappropriate" on several grounds.
resp.

Certain issues were unique to

Although the validity of the guidelines was an issue common

to all class members, resp's claims were not typical of the class
because of conflicts among the class members' interests in the
guidelines:

some would be released earlier and thus prefer the

new system.

Finally, the court did not have habeas jurisdiction

over all members of the class.

In the same opinion, the DC ruled

against resp on the merits.
After filing an appeal but before oral argument, resp was

~·
(~
~~

~
~~

~~r
t-

~).

~LA 3

released on parole.

personal interest in the case.

----

Petr argued to CA3 that this made

the case moot, but CA3 disagreed.

~ ited

v/

Drawing on Gerstein v. Pugh and

Airlines v. McDonald, the court held that the absence of a

certified class does not inevitably require dismissal when the
named plaintiff's claim becomes moot.

Instead, the question is

whether there is a real, concrete controversy in the sense,

~~ apparently
_., 1-.
~·

He does not argue that he retains any

, of a hotly disputed issue between defendants and

certifiable class.

Since there was such a controversy in

Geraghty, Article III was satisfied.

Turning to the discretionary

3.

elements of the mootness decision, fou,r

-

factors militated against

(1) the action "shares many characteristics with the

dismissal:

cases denominated 'capable of repetition, yet evading review'":
(2) the improper denial of certification would otherwise be
unreviewable:

(3) the attorneys retained their vigor and in fact

represented another plaintiff seeking to intervene: and (4) the
issues on the merits were not affected by resp's release.
Accordingly, the mootness of resp's claim did not bar
adjudication, provided that class certification was appropriate.

CA~ ~
properly
f>C..

~

On the certification issue, CA3 noted that the action was
brought for declaratory judgment, not habeas corpus.

~-~ Rule 23 was thus applicable, and the DC applied the wrong

~ ~dard.

..).b

UJ'~
-~

~~

Moreover, the trial court's reasons for concluding that

a class was "inappropriate" were not well taken, because he should

____

have selected out the issues appropriate to adjudication on a

.,..
class
basis, and created subclasses to deal with the conflicting

-rrM-J-

interests of the members of the proposed class.

~~

the court correctly pointed out that the alleged invalidity of the

,~-~L-~

In particular,

parole guidelines was an issue common to all class members, and

~t

those prisoners whose

"cu~ ·release

dates" :nder the

guidelines fall beyond the last day of their sentences would share
resp's interest in invalidating the guidelines and thus comprise a
proper subclass.

The class was thus certifiable in this limited

certification, and the case was not moot.
To prevent the "improvident dissipat[ion of]
effort", CA3 went on to consider the merits.

' <

.

'

judicial

Although the case

4.

was remanded for development of a fact,ual record, the only real
point of contention involves the extent of individualized
consideration given prisoners . under the guidelines.
guide~ines

application of the

Assuming the

to be as described by resp, the

court concluded that they were invalid under the Parole Commission

.

and Reorganization Act because they failed to allow consideration
of length of sentence.

Furthermore, they were impermissible ex

post facto legislation as applied to prisoners sentenced before
their adoption.
~

Unlike Roper, this does not have the appearance of a

"1411 ' J--'

11

lawyer's case 11

~~ He

.c

-

~

•

Respondent was and remains acutely interested.

appeared as an amicus in a similar case. Moreover, at least

f~ve oth~ners have sought _t~ interve~e, although it is not
clear that any of them retains a live claim at this time
for resp, at 37-38 & n.38).

(Brief

What is clear is that there is no one

who sought to intervene before Geraghty was released and still
~
~

maintains a live claim.

~~v.

JY?VV
tr1 ~

But this is surely a case like Gerstein

------

Pugh, in which the constant existence of an interested class is

assured.

ff1; ---

~v

B.

Roper.

This is a consumer class action alleging violations of

~~ Mississippi's

usury laws.

The complaint alleged a rather

technical violation of those laws.

As I understand it petr bank

~

participated in the Bankamericard credit card system, pursuant to
which a monthly service charge of 1 1/2% was assessed on the
unpaid balance of each account.

The customer was given 30 days

5.

from the date of each bill to pay the
incurring a service charge.

~harges

billed without

This meant that if merchandise was

charged one day before the closing date of a bill, the customer
would only have 31 days "free credit".

On the other hand, if it

was charged one day after the closing date, he would have 59 days.
This meant the effective rate of interest varied for each customer
for each month.
(

Those at the higher end of the scale were

contended to be usurious.
After 4 years of discovery and other legal maneuvers, the

.
representatives because

DC denied class certification on two grounds:

(1) Plaintiffs were

-----------~

inadequate

they had failed to show that

they were willing or able to finance the costs of a class action
(a minimum of $9,000 - now $15,000 - for the costs of the initial
notice alone, when the individual recovery sought was well under
$1000); and (2) a class action was not superior to other methods
of adjudication in that small claims courts were available, the
defendant would suffer a "horrendous penalty", the law of
Mississippi bars aggregation of usury claims, and the resolution

.

of 90,000 claims would be unmanageable in a single action.
.......
--------..

Seven

months after the order denying certification was entered, the
~

defendant formally offered judgment in the full amount demanded by

~~e

two named plaintiffs, plus legal interest and court costs (for

~ total
~

~t__

of $889.42 and $423.54), but without an admissio of

.~ iability.

~

Plaintiffs refused to accept this sum, and made a

counter-offer of judgment (presumably with an admission of
The court accepted

6.

~~M

1\ defendant's ~fer

~nd

entered judgment, in its behalf.

The money

was thereupon paid to the clerk of the court, and for all that
appears in the record remains there to this day.
-··-·~-~

Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal, not on their
own behalf but "on behalf of all others similarly situated to
themselves and on whose behalf the named Plaintiffs sought class

1U> J.Af.

~

ction treatment".

Nothing in the record gives a clue as to the

named plaintiffs' attitude toward this appeal.

--unnamed

The attitude of

_..-..

the the

class members is reflected by the absence in the

:rr~ ~

record of any indication that any of them has ever sought to

~

'ntervene or to participate in any way in this action.

.:~J..
~

/j,U> ~ ~

CA5 reversed in an opinion containing very little

~~ysis.
1

The basic thesis was that the satisfaction of a named

___ vV"'

plaintiff's claim neither precludes him from appealing nor excuses
his duty of doing so.

Noting that a plaintiff who pursues the

case to judgment may appeal the adverse class determination
whether he wins or loses on the merits (citing court of appeals
authority), CA5 found that a constitutional controversy still
exists.

These plaintiffs should be entitled to pursue it because

they have a personal stake in procuring class-wide relief.

This

would be true whether or not they accepted the settlement.
Otherwise, the erroneous class denial would be reviewable only
upon the intervention of an unnamed class member, who is not
entitled to notice that the action has been settled.
On the merits of the certification issue, CA5 found that
the DC had abused its discretion.

Of particular interest because

7.

of its bearing on the plaintiffs' interest in the case is CAS's
conclusion that plaintiffs were willing to finance the case and
able to do so through an advance offered by counsel.

Plaintiffs

had apparently agreed to sign a note evidencing that debt, and to
secure it by a mortgage on real property.

Because the DC had

erred on the certification question, the case was remanded.

Judge

Thornberry concurred specially to disassociate himself from the
broad dicta of the majority opinion.

He felt the case was not

moot because no true settlement had taken place.
II.

THE COMMON MOOTNESS ISSUE
A.

The Authorities.

This Court has dealt with the issue of mootness in a
class action context on a number of occasions.

is ~osna

v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), in which the Court relied

on two factors in holding that the case was not

~

~ Court

_
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First and foremost

,,

moot. ~

,,

When the District Court certified the propriety of
the class act 1on, the cl"ass o'£ unnamed persons
described in the certification acquired a legal
status sep§rate from the interest asserted by
a~pe~l~nt.
Weffare of the view thdat thi~ fa~tor
s1gn1f1cantly a ects the mootness eterm1nat1on.
FN 8:
[Certification] has important consequences
for the unnamed members of the class.
If the suit
proceeds to judgment on the merits, it is
contemplated that the decision will bind all persons
who have been found at the time of certification to
be members of the class . . • • Once the suit is

~~r~t~!~~s=~ :i~~~~~ ~~!i~~~r~~a~a;fn~~eb~o~~~~led

~ ~~e

Court relied on prior cases holding that Article

the

8.

III permits adjudication notwithstanding apparent mootness
when the controversy is "capable of repetition, yet evading
review".

That situation was not presented as to the named

plaintiff, but did apply to the unnamed members of the class.
Accordingly, the case did not "inexorably become moot by the
intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named
plaintiffs."

Explaining that this conclusion in no way

detracts from prior Article III jurisprudence, the Court
said:
There must not only be a named plaintiff who has
such a case or controversy at the time the complaint
is filed, and at the time the class action is
cerltfied by the District Court pursuant to Rule
23,
but tQere must be a live controversy at tne
t~me
this
Court reviews the case.
Th e controversy
\
may exist, however, b et we en a named defendant and a
member of the class represented by the named
plaintiff, even though the claim of the named
plaintiff has become moot. [citation omitted]
There may be cases in which the controversy
involving the named plaintiffs is such that it
becomes moot as to them before the distrct court can
reasonably be expected to rule on a certification
motion.
In such instances, whether the
certification can ' be sa ~~o "relate back" to the
filing of the complaint ~ depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case and especially /{
t~ ~eality of the cl~ m that otherwise the issue
WOUld evade reVleW.

Footnote 11 bore fruit almost immediately, in
(

~erstein

v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).

In footnote 11 of

-

~

that decision, you wrote for the Court that the case belonged
to the "narrow class" in which the termination of the named
plaintiff's claim does not moot the claims of unnamed class

•·.

~

9.

members.

Because of the inherently temporary nature of

pretrial detention, the claim was distinctly capable of

-------~------------

repetition, yet evading review.

The record did not reveal

whether any of the named plaintiffs were in detention (and
thus members of the class) at the time the District Court
certified the class.

Although that showing "ordinarily would

be required to avoid mootness under Sosna," Gerstein fell
within the FN 11 exception because it was impossible to be
sure that any named plaintiff would be in pretrial custody
long enough for a district judge to certify the class.

In

addition, the constant existence of an appropriate class was
certain, and the named plaintiffs' attorney had other clients
with a continuing live interest in the case.
again applied in Swisher v. Brady, 438
N.11

u.s.

Footnote 11 was
204, at 213-214

(1978), dealing with a double jeopardy question raised

by state juvenile court practice.
On the same day it decided Gerstein, the Court
applied the Sosna test to order a case dismissed for
mootness.

u.s.

~polis

128 (1975).

School Commissioners v. Jacobs, 420

In its brief per curiam opinion, the Court

noted that all of the named plaintiff high school students,
who were contesting restrictions on their school newspaper,
had graduated.

The case was therefore moot unless it was

"duly certified as a class action", a controversy still
existed between the school and present members of the class,
and the issue was capable of repetition, yet evading review.

1 0.

Although the District Court had said in the course of ruling
on a motion for a preliminary injunction that the plaintiffs
were qualified as proper representatives, there was no other
effort to certify a class.

The case was therefore remanded

with instructions to dismiss as moot.
In the next major case, the Court eliminated the
"capable of

~}?etiti..Qnf_y__et

evading review"

criter~on

as a

~
~

prerequisite to avoidance of mootness through class actions.
Franks v. Bowman

Transportation~,

~

424 U.S. 747 (1976).

Justice Brennan wrote for the Court that that criterion was ~ ,4t

~

\\

...-

merely a factor in the discretionary determination whether ~ ~~~
reach the merits of a particular case.

,.,t.G,~

"Given a properly

certified class", the constitutional minimum is provided by

~

an adversary relationship between unnamed class members and ~v
the class opponent sufficient to fulfill the function of
sharpening the issues for presentation to a court.

In your

concurring opinion, you agreed that the case was not moot,
and that "in the context of a duly certified class action,"
the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" criterion was
discretionary.
The next major new development was United Airlines,
_________M_c_D_o__
n_a_l_d, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), the meaning of which
is something of a puzzle.

Justice Stewart never addressed

the mootness question, skipping over it by asserting that
eded that the named plaintiffs could have a

;)~

~~
~

ea

the class action determination despite having settled their

d ~

11.

individual claims.
to jurisdiction.

In any case, the parties cannot stipulate
Accordingly, the

Co~rt

ruled sub silentio

that the denial of class certification is not an insuperable

-_____
---------------------------------------------------------·
___........_-._....
barrier
to adjudication
all of the named plainti f fs'
ap~e

member.

{A,v~

~

~ fter

claims become moot.

~

At least, the denial of certification is ~

behest of an intervening unnamed class
ll

The SG attempts to explain this rather peculiar

~~
• -u-~
~~

L 1 .'.l
h~lding..." by reference to footnote 14, in which the Court says U+--~'

that the characterization of the resolution of the action as
a "'settlement' could be slightly misleading".

If the Court

viewed the case as a litigated victory for the named
plaintiffs, there is authority for the proposition that the
case is not moot and they could appeal the adverse class
determination.

This is a rather strained reading of the

United, however, since a settlement - unlike a litigated
judgment on the merits - is intended to resolve the entire
dispute, and apparently did so in United since none of the
named plaintiffs sought to appeal.
Whatever United stands for, it cannot mean that the
Article III requirement of Sosna has now been stripped of the
"certification" criterion as well as the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" criterion.

The former

criterion has been too well established in too many decisions
to be eliminated in such an offhand manner.
invoking it are:

The other cases

~

~~

~-

Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney, 409
U.S. 540 (1973). Although the plaintiff purported

1 2.

to represent a class adversely affected by Indiana's
hearing procedures regarding ~nemployment benefit
cutoffs, the named plaintiff had been paid.
In a
one page per curiam, the Court vacated and remanded
for consideration of mootness.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). The
Court heard this case arising from the California
state courts and treated there as if it were a class
action.
However, it noted that if the case had come
from the federal courts, there would have been
serious doubt as to whether it could have proceeded
as a class (and, presumably, whether the Court could
have heard it). Id., at 39.

./

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975).
In a
brief per cur1am op1nion, the Court ordered this
prisoner action dismissed as moot. The respondent
had sued the North Carolina parole board, seeking
due process procedural protections in parole
decisions.
The district court refused to certify
the action and dismissed the complaint. Since the
respondent had been released,the Court said he could
have no interest in the procedures. The case was
"not a class action", and it did not satisfy the
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" test.
This case puts to rest any argument resp Geraghty
may have that his individual claim is not moot under
that criterion.
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, at 310 n.1
(1976).
The Court rejected a mootness claim in a
prisoner suit challenging disciplinary procedures.
One named plaintiff had been released and the other
had died. Although the DC treated the action as a
class action, it failed to certify it. The Court
said that "without such certification and
identification of the class, the action is not
properly a class action," citing Jacobs. The case
was saved, however, by the intervent1on of another
inmate.
It is not at all clear whether the
intervenor arrived on the scene prior to the mooting
of the original plaintiffs' claims, and it is
therefore possible that the Court allowed a "dead"
action to be "revived". The parties have argued
this point back and forth, but I would not be
inclined to rely on it either way, as it was
obviously not considered in Baxter ••
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427
424, 430 (1976). The Court rejected a mootness
claim in this desegregation action brought by
schoolchildren who had since graduated, but only

u.s.

~~~-~J-.~~ 13.
~~~~~""'~
becatusethe United States had intervened. Alt~oug~--------~
all the parties had treated ~he action as a class
action and counsel argued the failure to obtain
certification was a "meaningless verbal recital",
the Court found that because there had been no
certification the case was clearly moot.
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 u.s. 19 (1977).
Because the
certif1ed class had been "fragmented" by amendment
to the applicable civil commitment statute, the case
was remanded for redefinition of the class,
exclusion of moot claims, and substitution of new
class representatives.
The Court rejected the
contention that the mere fact of certification
required adjudication on the merits. Doubting that
the class could satisfy Rule 23 under the amended
statute, the Court pointed out that it is "only a
'properly certified' class that may succeed to the
adversary position of a named representative whose
claim becomes moot", citing Jacobs. This is a
somewhat peculiar result, because the case was
remanded for further proceedings despite the
asserted mootness. Apparently, even a defective
certification will save the case, but the merits
cannot be adjudicated until the defects have been
corrected.

~ Memphis

1

Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1 (1978). Because the Court of Appeals had
affirmed the District Court's refusal to certify a
class, the existence of a continuing case or
controversy depended entirely on the named
plaintiffs' individual claims (which were not moot
because damages were sought).

---

In light of all of these cases, it is clearly too
late in the day to argue, as does the amicus in Geraghty,

-

that certification is a mere technicality that cannot
allowed to dictate jurisdictional results.

ge

Resps simply

ignore this mass of authority in arguing that Rule 23

;t;;:::L

procedures such as certification cannot in themselves enlarge
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and that the
Constitution does not require any particular form of class
determination.

'·

.•.

CA3's view that the crucial question is

1 4.

I

C./I '5

whether a class was "certifiable" seem,s to spring from this

In ~
~

"mere technicality" argument, and thus must fall with it.
addition, I would question the wisdom of basing the
jurisdiction of an appellate court on such a fact-specific
determination, which it may be incapable of making on the
record made below.
I find CAS's argument that a named plaintiff has a

--- -

-

duty to the class notwithstanding denial of certification
equally unpersuasive.

l1A~

6v

If he does, he is placed in an

intolerably ambiguous position.

He has been denied the right

to represent the class, yet he retains some sort of fiduciary
duty to them, the extent of which is wholly undefined.
makes no sense.

This

It is also inconsistent with this Court's

emphasis on certification as the turning point in a class
action.

If the named plaintiff should choose to appeal the

class certification issue after pursuing his claim to
judgment, so much the better for the unnamed class members.
But that is a windfall for them, just as the initial filing
of the action is a windfall.

They have no right to either,

and the courts should impose no corresponding duty.
It is also much too late to assume CA3's position

----

-----~----------------------------------#

that the question is simply whether there is real

--------~-------------------------------~

adverseness, and that class certification is merely one
factor in that analysis.

That battle has already been

~~ ~

~
~ ~
.

~~
('~~ II-JJ

fought, and the Court has elected to lay down a framework of
relatively bright line rules:

C/f :5

The cases clearly show that a

~)

1 5.

~1\ named

plaintiff must have a live claim at the outset of the

case, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1973), and at the
time of class certification unless the facts fall within FN
11, Gerstein v. Pugh.

If a class is certified, it succeeds

to the named plaintiff's adversary position and the case
survives the mooting of his individual claim unless the
certification is subsequently overturned.

Under Kremens, it

may survive even though the class must later be redefined.
If, on the other hand, the named plaintiff fails to obtain a
ruling on the certification issue or if he loses on that
issue and fails to appeal it, and if in addition his claim
subsequently becomes moot, then the case is over under
Jacobs, Weinstein, Baxter, and Spangler.
Petrs say these cases are dispositive here.

The

Court's actions in Jacobs and Kremens, together with its
statements in Richardson, Weinstein, Baxter, and Spangler
that the case would be moot but for some intervening factor
not present here, all support petrs.

Petrs are also correct

in dismissing the "relation back" argument as a legal fiction
which simply serves as a shorthand for the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" category of non-mootness in
the context of class actions.

There is simply no argument

that the claims raised in either of these cases fall within
that category because of their transient nature.

Weinstein

disposes of that claim for Geraghty, and Roper is a damage
action.

.• '

16.

United Airlines gives petrs mpre trouble.

As noted

above, they seek to distinguish it on the ground that it did
-...

~

'-

not really involve a settlement.

Several courts of appeals

have ruled that a named plaintiff who wins on the merits may
appeal an adverse class determination, and petrs read United
the same way.

They reason that the prevailing party does not

lose his stake in the controversy simply by winning, if there
are collateral consequences of significance.

If a named

plaintiff has suffered because of an adverse class action
determination, he has not obtained all the relief he sought
and may appeal.

He may suffer from that denial because of _an

'--

~------------------------

inability to spread costs among the class, as resps in Roper
contend.

Even if the resolution of United could properly be

characterized as a litigated judgment, there is a problem
with this logical construct: it applies equally to Mr.
Geraghty and to Messrs. Roper and Hudgens.

Neither has

actually "settled" the case upon a basis fully acceptable to
him, although each has received or been offered all of the
relief he individually sought.

If he have suffered because

of an adverse class action determination, why can't he appeal
it?
If United were the only sticking point in an
otherwise solid front of authority and reasoning, it would be
possible simply to limit it to the post-judgment intervention
situation.

I am not so sure, however, that this Court's

other decisions compel the result sought by petrs here.

B.

The arguments

The gap in petrs' impressive . show of authority is ~.
that this Court has never addressed the mootness issue in a
case in which the named plaintiffs sought to appeal an
adverse class determination.
__...,-

In Memphis Light, the

plaintiffs had appealed that determination to the CA, but
there is no indication they continued to do so in this Court.
When the named plaintiffs continue to contest an

.

adverse class determination, there is obviously a live issue

-)lh.;l

for decision.

Arguably,

~

however, ~ the_J?~~intiffs

have no

more -~

interest in the class determinatio~ than they do in the
merits, once their own claim becomes moot.

The Roper petrs

say their personal stake is provided by a desire to share
costs with class members, and the Court indirectly endorsed

1Ti~

~

F.2d 279, 283 (CA9 1976), in United Airlines, 432 U.S. at 393

~~

It is not, however, a satisfying one, particularly in

plaintiffs in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action such as Roper,
without any guarantee of a return.

It is also unpersuasive

in Geraghty, where resp's attorney appears to be working pro
bono.
If the Court finds that the named plaintiffs have no

more personal stake in the class determination controversy
than they do in the merits, the various resps suggest that

---------------- .

_____________________________

two other theories may support jurisdiction in these cases.

,.

~

~~
~~

light of the enormous cost burden imposed on the named

I

~ Jk4$;)·~

this rationale by citing Share v. Air Properties G. Inc., 528

n. 14.

-:7

~

~

~----_..

-~
Y!u_

~?
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1.

Insulation of the class certification issue
from review~

~

Resps argue that the defendant in a class action

review simply by giving a few individuals the relief they
This is a defensible position that could be

from the FN 11 strain of analysis.

~

from ~~

ought not to be able to insulate the class determination

sought.

t1

~~

derive~

If a defendant is

ab ~~

~~

"buy off" or parole the named plaintiffs seriatim, then the

4

class determination issue will be capable of repetition yet

~

evade review.

Since this Court rejected the "death knell"

doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463

lT-5
('~~E)

(1978), and Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 473
U.S. 478 (1978), a defendant can prevent review of a denial
of class action status simply by paying off each individual
-----~
._~
~ ........
plaintiff.
Although the claim on the merits may be capable
of decision in innumerable individual actions, the question
of the propriety of a class action will never proceed beyond
the initial district court decision.
Additional support for this position is drawn from
United Airlines, in which intervenors were allowed to
resurrect the class certification issue for purposes of
appeal.

Given the theoretical justification outlined above,

the Court could clarify United and straighten out its
anomalous position in mootness jurisprudence by holding the
class determination to be appealable on the basis of the
"capable of repetition, yet avoiding review" rationale and
Coopers & Lybrand.

~

~

19.

Although this analysis is

de~ensible,

there are

------------~-------------------~

strong arguments against it.

First, as a practical matter it

would place the case in a rather strange posture.

If, as in

Roper, there has been no decision on the merits below, the
situation is not intolerable.

Assuming that the class denial

is reversed, the named plaintiffs can simply go back to the
lower courts and pursue the merits.

They will presumably

have little personal stake in the action, but the situation
is no worse than the case of a named plaintiff whose claim is
mooted after certification of a class.

,__________
---- _

- -

-

Although this sort of

-------------

headless class action raises strong suspicions of

being~

lawyers' case, the courts have universally approved
....

----------------------------------- - -

representation by plaintiffs with moot claims provided they
-------------o.~r
were mooted ee£oro certification. FN 11 itself contemplates

---

_.....,..

that this sort of thing may occur.

Moreover, the district

court may in its discretion seek new named plaintiffs to
intervene.

The problem is more acute when, as in Geraghty,

the case has been pursued to judgment in the district court
and the named plaintiff has lost on the merits.

The

appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits
under this Court's decisions.

When the issue is one that

will be dispositive of all of the class members' claims, it
would be peculiar to reverse the class determination and send
the case back for litigation in a court that has already
decided the merits against the class.

As CA3's decision

shows, the appellate court will necessarily have to reverse

20.

the merits in order to justify its

re~and.

In these

circumstances, then, the effect of resp's argument is in fact
to circumvent the clear authority holding that there is no
jurisdiction to consider the merits.

______...,__ -

--

On a more theoretical
- plane, this analysis carries
FN 11 far beyond its present status.

The Court in Sosna said

that courts should examine the

~ alit y

the claim would evade review.

This suggests a case-by-case

of the suggestion that

inquiry rather than a per se rule of non-mootness in these
situations.

I~

such an inquiry were pursued in these cases,

I have no doubt they would fail to qualify.

In a damage

action like Roper, there would have to be much more of an
indication that the defendant was pursuing a policy of
avoiding class-wide liability by evading review, rather than
merely settling a single case.

Similarly, in Geraghty,

there would have to be a showing either that no potential
plaintiff is likely to stay in jail long enough to pursue the
appeal (clearly not the case) or that the Parole Commission
is deliberately using involvement in the case as a factor in
paroling inmates who might otherwise take an appeal.
Except for those cases that qualify under the caseby-case analysis as cases where mootness would inevitably

~

intervene to prevent an appeal, there would appear to be no
need to fear that denials of certification will evade

~ ~

revi~ ~

The issue will be reviewable under United if some other
plaintiff prevails on the merits.

~~

name~

If all named plaintiffs

~

Vk...~
,.,~

~

1-f z...u._

~
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lose on the merits, the court of

appe~ls

can review the

adverse class determination, although the result would
probably be foreordained under East Texas Motor Freight v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).

In this sense, class action

denials in losing causes will effectively be insulated from
review.

Review on the merits is clearly available, however,

--

and it seems a bit silly to propose a rule of non-mootness

~
in ~

order to preserve the rights of unnamed class members to
participate in actions finally determined to be nonmeritorious.

In sum, since the class action denial would be

reviewable at the instance of a winning plaintiff, it is not
without more an issue that is capable of repetition, yet
avoids review.

This reasoning could also supply a

justification for the United result.

If a winning plaintiff

could not appeal, the class action denial would indeed always
evade review in the case of a meritorious claim.
Accordingly, United falls within an expanded reading of FN
11.

____

There are two difficulties
___..... with this approach:
First, it rewrites United to some extent, since
notwithstanding the SG's view and the Court's footnote, that
case was in fact settled.

Second, it is not clear that there

is a logically justifiable distinction between prevailing and
mooted plaintiffs.

Neither has any real stake in the case on

appeal. The prevailing plaintiff has tradition on his side,
as he would ordinarily be allowed to appeal collateral

22.

rulings after final judgment.

There is also a stronger case

for evasion of review, as a class action in a meritorious
cause would always escape review if appeal were denied.
Finally, as a matter of policy, it makes sense to allow
prevailing but not mooted plaintiffs to appeal in order to
encourage settlement, allow finality when the parties
contemplate it, and vindicate the defendant's traditional
right to "buy peace".

For these reasons, the better rule

would appear to be one in which the prevailing plaintiff may
appeal but the mooted plaintiff may not.
2.

The role of intervenors.

Resp in Geraghty strenuously objects to the SG's
characterization of United as a litigated judgment, and as
noted above I agree that that case was in fact settled.

The

case was therefore moot, but, resp says, the intervention of
unnamed class members promptly after the settlement was
sufficient to revive the action in the unique context of a
class action and for the limited purpose of appealing the
adverse class determination decision.
more in accord with the United opinion.
support in Weinstein v.

~radford,

I find this reading
It also finds some

where the Court didn't seem

particularly interested in finding out whether the
intervenors had managed to file their papers before the case
became moot.

The proposed rule has the advantage of avoiding

reliance on the fortuity of particular dates of settlement or
release and dates on which unnamed class members learn of

23.

such events.

It is also attractive

i~

that it allows cases

to continue when there is shown to be some interest outside
the named parties and avoids the practical repercussions of
dismissal in just those cases where they are likely to be
significant.
In general, I find these practical arguments to be
vastly overstated.

There is a valid judicial economy

argument in cases like Roper where the parties have built an
enormous record on the class action issue, if you believe
that certification was erroneously denied.

If there is

enough interest in the case to obtain new named plaintiffs,
however, that body of information could presumably be used in
a subsequent case which, under the District Courts' related
case rules, would be assigned to the same judge.

Resps also

suggest that unnamed class members may have been relying on
the named plaintiffs to appeal.

Since the class was not

certified, they receive no notice of mootness and may not be
aware that they could intervene to continue the action; yet
if they do not do so their claims may be barred by
limitations.

-

Again,

i~ anyo~s

really interested, they

will, like the intervenors in United, keep in sufficient

------------

touch to be aware of significant developments of this nature.

--

------------

If settlement or release on parole is impending and will moot
the case, they should be able to intervene in sufficient time
to protect their interests.
Despite the probable insignificance of these
concerns in most cases, I can envision situations where they

~~;£r - ~ ~·

idll.-

~

1.4--

would be of considerable importance.

~ ~ £iZ, ~

A rule barring named

plaintiffs from appealing when their own claims become moot
but allowing intervenors to do so even if they intervene
after the event causing mootness (but within the time allowed
to take an appeal) could pick up just those situations.
The problem with this entire line of thinking is
that it assumes mootness is controlled by practical concerns.
The Court in Richardson v. Ramirez rejected that proposition.
41· 8 --U_._S_.__' __a_t__3_6__. ___U_nder Sosna and its progeny, the absence of
a _case or controversy between an uncertified class and a
defendant is an Article III problem - not an aspect of the
Court's discretionary decision to hear a case.

The parties

have cited no authority allowing a court to resurrect a dead
case simply because a new party has shown an interest in it,
and the SG has cited a number of lower court cases holding to
the contrary (Brief at 42-43).

Accordingly, a rule allowing

intervenors to revive a case after it has become moot is
difficult to square with Article III.
3.

Lower court

authority. (~~)

Much effort in the briefs has been devoted to an
analysis of the Court of Appeals' decisions in this area.
general, I find those decisions unhelpful.

In

On the issues

raised in these cases, the conflict is between CA3 and CAS
(in the decisions below) on the one hand, and CA9, CA10,and
CA7 on the other.

The other circuits have taken no position

on the issue, and their decisions in related areas are

I
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unenlightening since they simply

appl~

this Court's

precedents in a straightforward way.
CA9 has held that this Court's precedents deprive it
of jurisdiction whenever a named plaintiff's claim is moot
and no · class was certified below.

VunCannon v. Breed, 565

F.2d 1096 (1977)(reserving, however, the issue of
jurisdiction when the named plaintiff's effort to obtain
jurisdiction was "frustrated" by the district court); see
also Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334
(1977).

CA10 and CA7 have both ordered dismissal for

mootness even when they believed that certification was
erroneously denied below.

Neither the merits nor the adverse

class determinations were reviewable.

Napier

v~

Gertrude,

542 F.2d 825 (CA 10 1976); Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings &
Loan Assn., 560 F.2d 271

(CA7 1977).

Some support for a more flexible analysis may be
found in CA7's subsequent decision in Susman v. Lincoln
American Corp., 587 F.2d 866 (1978).

When a defendant sought

to moot the class action prior to certification by tendering
the amount claimed by the named plaintiff, CA7 held that FN
11 allowed the court to rule on the certification motion,
provided it had been pursued with reasonable diligence.

That

footnote requires that courts always have a reasonable
opportunity to consider certification motions, in CA7's view.
The same reasoning would appear to support a limited
exception to mootness on appeal, and CA7's citation to Roper
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suggests that its view may have
Winokur.

chang~d

since it decided

CA6 has come to the same conclusion regarding

precertification tenders, Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp.,
499 F.2d 1197 (1974), but CAS has disagreed, Bradley v.
Housing Authority of Kansas City, S12 F.2d 626 (CAS 197S).
CAS stated that its conclusion was compelled by Article III
as interpreted in Jacobs and Sosna, but went on to analyze
the case as if it had some discretion, listing three factors
militating against mootness:

the DC had failed to act on the

plaintiffs' motion for certification, the defendants
"deliberately mooted the issue to avoid judicial review", and
substantial discovery had been undertaken.

Because the

challenged statute had been amended and the class would have
to be redefined, however, CAS concluded that the interests of
all concerned would be best served by requiring the remaining
class to being anew.

At least some of the factors considered

by CAS would be relevant in a case by case analysis to
determine whether the case did in fact fall within FN 11's
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" rubric.
Except insofar as these pre-certification decisions
support resps, the decisions below are the only Court of
Appeals authority in resps' favor.

There is dictum in a

previous CAS decision in which the Roper holding is perhaps
more fully explained.
F.2d 9S7 (197S).

Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, S7S

CAS there says that the class should be

allowed to continue when certification is denied and

27.

plaintiff subsequently loses his claim, because there is a
record on which a reviewing court can determine whether or
not the denial was improper, the named plaintiff has done all
he could to obtain certification, and the DC's error will go
uncorrected if the case is moot.

This reasoning is

symptomatic of CAS's balancing test for mootness, a test
which I find inconsistent with this Court's precedents.
fact,

In

the entire opinion is a morass, indicating that the

balancing test is not of much use in practice.

c.

Conclusion. ( //)A...~~~~ ''~~..... p~

For the reasons given, I would reject petrs' view
that mootness is inevitably required by this Court's past
decisions.

:0:41 ~

~--7

There is some room for flexibility in cases

falling within the FN 11 rationale; that is, where the class
certification issue would in reality escape review if the
mootness of the named plaintiff's claim mooted the entire

~ s is a case-by-case inquiry,
these~-----------------cases falls within the category

action.

however, and neither

of

described.

also reject resps' broad arguments against mootness.

I would
Except

for the limited FN 11 exception, the mooting of the named j
pl ~

the _____.,._...,
entire action.

after

d~of

certificat1on should moot

I would hesitate to endorse the

"resurrection by intervention" exception proposed by resps.
On the other hand, it is difficult to explain United Airlines
any other way.

The SG's explanation is somewhat

disingenuous, but it is defensible in light of the United

~
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footnote and may be the best way to

e~plain

that otherwise

inexplicable case.
III.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES

v

A. Roper.
1. Absence of a complete settlement.
If the Court decides the common issue in favor of
mootness, there is a secondary issue as to whether these
individual claims are really moot.
It appears that the Roper and Hudgens have never ~
accepted the proffered money, although that
confirmed at argument.

fact ~ou~~ be ~~
)4-d .. ~

~~ 4-r., Ll,-~

If they have not, there is some

question as to whether a settlement sufficient to moot their ~ ~
claims has really occurred here.

~

all issues are resolved and both parties come to an
agreement.

~ ~

In a genuine settlement,

~

Here, the defendant has agreed to pay the

~

individual claim, but has not agreed to give up its

~

opposition to the collateral issue of class representation. ~.
Nor have Roper and Hudgens agreed to relinquish it.

---

Ordinarily, of course, this would not be a true sett lement
and the case could continue as to the remaining issue.

The

problem is that the named plaintiffs don't seem to have a
legally cognizable personal interest in this particular

-

collateral issue, and the class does not have a "legal
existence" sufficient to allow it to assert its interest.
As noted above, I do not find resps'

"sharing costs"

theory of a continuing stake in the litigation particularly
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convincing.

The only possible intere9t is a moral or

political one - in seeing justice done, or in making sure the
bank "pays for its sins".

This sort of interest has never

been thought sufficient to supply the adverseness required by
Article III.

Consequently, I would conclude that these

plaintiffs' refusal to accept the proffered settlement does

~

------------~-----------------------

not affect the mootness of the action.

If they could point

to any other collateral consequences not resolved in the
settlement, they could continue.

But when the only issue

-

~

~~

sought to be appealed is the class determination, the absence
of agreement on that point adds nothing to the analysis
outlined above.
2.

Amendment to the usury statute.

If the Court should decide that the action is not
otherwise moot, petr has another string in its bow.

It

points to an amendment in the Mississippi usury statute that
clearly validates the practices challenged here. Petr also
says that the statute is retroactive.

If so, of course, the

action is moot without regard to Part II's analysis.

But the

statute (Petr's Brief at 46) does not appear to be
retroactive.

~

Finance charges imposed before the effective

date of the statute will be valid only if they comply with
"the provisions of this act or other law then in effect."
"This act" would appear to be modified by "then in effect",
especially since the statute goes on to say that loans that
are modified after the effective date will be governed by the
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amendments - a provision that would

b~

unnecessary if the

entire statute were retroactive.
Although the amendment makes the violations alleged
incapable of repetition, it is not retroactive and
accordingly cannot moot this damage action.
B. Geraghty_.

~/- ~ 1 ~

e::t-J-4.. ?-U>

If the Court should decide that the

~ ~

aqtio~

is

~oot,

there are no more issues and the case should be remanded for

-

dismissal.

If the case is not automatically moot by reason

of Geraghty's release, there are several possibilities.

If

the rationale depends on the presence of intervenors, then
the action should be remanded for a determination whether
there are any timely intervenors with live claims left to
pursue the action.

Before doing so, however, the Court

should probably take a preliminary look at the class
determination issue and the merits.

If the denial of

certification or the denial of relief on the merits was
clearly correct, it would indeed be a waste of resources to
remand for a replay of the trial on behalf of a class.
To return to the rationale for mootness, if the
Court decides that Mr.

Geraghty himself may appeal despite

the mootness of his own claim, the issue of certification is
properly before the Court and should be decided.

If the

class should have been certified, it would again be
appropriate to review the merits to determine if there is
enough there to justify litigation on behalf of a class.

If
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the denial of certification was correct, then the case is of
course moot:
1.

there was no class.
Denial of class certification.

There is no question that the DC applied the wrong
standard:

Rule 23 was applicable.

Resp contends that this

alone requires reversal and that the "subclassing" issue is
not properly before the Court.

However, the DC's conclusion

that a class was "inappropriate" tracks the requirements of
Rule 23.

If Geraghty's claim was indeed atypical or the

questions raised not common to the members of the class, then
the denial can be affirmed on that basis.
the class sought was much too broad.

It is obvious that

It included issues

unique to Geraghty, and it included prisoners whose interests
were directly contrary to his.

It is equally obvious that

there probably was an appropriate subclass:

those prisoners

whose sentences would expire in full before the date of their
recommended release under the guidelines.

The only question

is whether the DC was obliged by rule 23 to narrow the class
and the issues to an appropriate subclass on its own motion.
Resp has not addressed this issue, believing it to
be irrelevant to the case.

Nothing in Rule 23 suggests that

~!7

d-uc--y

the court has a duty to create subclasses sua sponte, and the #2(.,

CuwA-

only authority cited by CA3 is one of its own prior decisions ~
involving a decertification motion.
Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991

(CA3 1976).

Samuel v. University
Contrary to petr's

suggestion, however, CA3 does not seem to have created a

of

~
~-

~
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of law requiring district courts to consider and rule out the
possibility of subclasses in every case.

Although the

opinion is not entirely clear on this point, the court
appears to have held only that the failure to do so in the
circumstances of this case was an abuse of discretion.
The SG does not really contend, and I doubt that the
Court should hold, that a district court can never abuse its
discretion by failing to consider subclasses.

There are

clearly situations in which the facts of the case simply cry
out for subclassing.

In such instances, the contours of the

appropriate subclass emerge without additional effort from
the court's delineation of the the conflicts of interest and
uniqueness of issues that make a broader class inappropriate.
If the court is able to say that petr's claim conflicts with
the interests of a certain subset of the class, it can also
say that that subset ought to be excluded from the
appropriate class.

All of the problems with the remaining

class are likely to have been raised by the defendant already
as part of its effort to defeat the larger class.
Accordingly, the court can very often rule without further
briefing.

It could also, however, tentatively certify the

smaller class and ask for additional briefing or factual
submissions concerning that class.
Neither alternative imposes the horrendous burden
described by the SG.

There might be, as the SG contends,

some problem with certifying more than one subclass, since a
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single petr is unlikely to be able to ,represent both.

It is

thus somewhat misleading to speak of "subclassing" rather
than simply of narrowing the proposed definition of the
class.

And there would certainly be an unacceptable burden

if the obligation to narrow the issues for the parties was
imposed in every case, no matter how poorly briefed or how
complex the facts.

On a case-by-case basis and subject to

review under the "abuse of discretion" standard, however, I
see no problem with this rule.
It is less clear that the denial of certification
was properly reversed on this record.

The SG points out that

resp never argued that a narrower class should have been
certified.

Indeed, he has failed to so argue even in his

brief in this Court.

Arguably, this contention was waived.

The SG also says the obligation imposed by CA3 is
inconsistent with the adversary system.
this is so in every case.

I do not agree that

Courts have taken an activist role

in class action litigation, and Rule 23 gives them fairly
broad discretion in the management of class actions.

As a

practical matter, the class determination is similar to the
fashioning of equitable relief:

the alternatives are

infinite and the court should be free to design the class in
accordance with the dictates of the Rule and of
manageability, even if the parties have failed to suggest the
most appropriate solution.
In the circumstances of this case, I doubt that it
was necessary for resp to have raised his "objection" (in the
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form of a proposal for subclasses) in the district court in
order to raise it on appeal.

Since the district court ruled

on the merits in the same order denying class certification,
there was no point in asking for reconsideration of the class
question or seeking a narrower class.

The SG may be right,

however, that CA3 has gone beyond the limits of the adversary
system in this case, when resp failed to suggest the narrower
class even on appeal.
In addition, the SG argues that even the narrow
class described above would not have been appropriate,
largely because decisions are sometimes made outside the
guidelines, and some members of the class might have been
released early on that basis.

This is unconvincing since

such prisoners would probably also have been released early
in the absence of the guidelines.

The SG's argument that it

is impossible to predict what would have happened to any
given class member before the guidelines is also
unconvincing, since no member of the narrow class suggested
could have done any worse in the absence of the guidelines.
On this record, then, it is probable that a single, narrowly
defined class would have been appropriate.

It is difficult

to make such fact-specific determinations at this rarified
level of review, but I would be quite prepared to affirm the
CA3 on this point were it not for resp's failure to raise or
argue the issue.

Since resp has failed to do so, I believe

the issue could go either way, if, of course, the case is not
otherwise moot.

35.
2.

The merits.

Because I doubt that the Court should reach the
merits, I will treat them rather summarily.

The two issues

are those reserved last term in Addonizio v. United States,
47 U.S.L.W. 4628.

In general, it appears that CA3 has erred

in adopting resp's view of the Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act, and in finding a significant ex post
facto law issue in the case.
The short answer to the ex post facto clause
argument is that even if the guidelines could be viewed as an
ex post facto law as applied to some members of the putative
class, resp himself is not among them.

It is not disputed

that resp was resentenced in October, 1975, for the sole
purpose of taking the

~ffect

of the guidelines into account.

The district judge reduced his sentence from 4 years to 30
months because it concluded that application of the
guidelines would frustrate its previous expectations.

I am

at a loss to understand how resp can claim in these
circumstances that he has been denied an opportunity for more
lenient punishment.

Since petr has not suffered from the

alleged infirmity in the challenged practice, he is simply
ineligible to represent a class of persons who did.
Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, supra.

East

Accordingly, there

was no error in failing to certify a class on this issue, and
there is no reason to remand for certification of such a
class even if such a remand is otherwise proper.

Finally,
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even if intervenors can "revive" a dead case under United
Airlines, they certainly cannot at this point insert an issue
that could never have been raised in the first place.
If the Court should disagree and wish to consider

------

the merits of the ex post facto claim, I believe that it
borders on the ~ous.

There is certainly authority for ~

the proposition that parole eligibility is an aspect of
punishment and that official post-sentence action
eligibility for parole would be invalid.
61a.

~

delaying ~~

Pet. App. at 59a-

But those principles simply do not apply to this case,

as every other circuit to have considered the point has held.
Zeidman v. US Parole Commission, No. 78-1590 (CA7 1979);
Rifai v. USPC, 586 F.2d 695 (CA2 1977);

Shepard v. Taylor,

556 F.2d 648, 654 (CA2 1977); Ruip v. United States, 555 F.2d
1331, 1335-1336 (CA6 1977).

Rodriguez v. USPC, No. 78-2051

(CA7 1979), holding that denial of a hearing at the 1/3
sentence point violated the ex post facto clause, is not to
the contrary even if it was correctly decided.
As petr has argued, the guidelines do not deny a
prisoner eligibility for parole.

They are simply one aspect

of the exercise of the Commission's discretion.

The prisoner

has a right to the exercise of informed discretion, just as
he always did.

The Commission says it makes that informed

decision in every case.

Resp contends that the low figure of

decisions outside the guidelines (6-10%) rebuts that
assertion.

f.o

I do not find his contention persuasive, since
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the presence of any decisions at all

~utside

the guidelines

seems to me to demonstrate that they are not automatically
applied.

CA3's suggestion that the guidelines would be valid

if 60% of the decisions went outside them but are invalid
because only 6% go outside seems to me absurd.

It seems to

require only that the Commission adopt less helpful
guidelines.

But even if the guidelines are "automatic" in

some cases, it is difficult to find in the ex post facto
clause any reason to require the Commission to exercise its
discretion on an individual rather than a class basis.

The

prisoner was and is entitled to the exercise of discretion.
He has never had any expectation of any particular exercise
of discretion at any given time.
The absurdity of the argument is demonstrated when
one tries to imagine what relief could be granted.

Should

the Commission be ordered to exercise untrammelled discretion
without regard to what it now considers to be the best
knowledge in the field (embodied in the guidelines)?

Should

it be ordered to reach different results in cases it would
otherwise find similar under the guidelines?

Neither resp

nor the CA3 has answered these arguments, and I find them
unanswerable.
For the reasons stated, the ex post facto issue is
insubstantial.

------~---------------The question of the
validity of the

~

guidelines is somewhat more difficult, although it appears
that CA3 has erred on this score as well.

Nothing in the

.

,,...

.
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language of the Parole Commission and ,Reorganization Act
supports resp's claims, see petr's Brief at 60, and CA3 found
that the statute could be read either way, ptn. app. 38a.
However, the legislative history cited in petr's brief, at
61-69, strongly suggests that Congress intended to endorse
the Commission's use of the guidelines as practiced at the
time.

CA3 found that the guidelines were improper under the

Act because they failed to provide for sufficient
individualized consideration and because they do not allow
consideration of the length of the sentence imposed.

On the

first point, petr argues that individualized decisions are in
fact made in each case.

But CA3 held that the small number

of decisions made outside the guidelines, together with
resp's assertion that they were automatically applied, raised
a factual issue for trial.

CA3's reasoning seems directly

contrary to at least two statements from the Conference
Reports:
The promulgation of guidelines to make parole less
disparate and more understandable has met with such
success that this legislation incorporates the
system into the statute • . . .
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, at 20; H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
94-838, at 20.
If decisions to go above or below parole guidelines
are frequent, the Commission should reevaluate its
guidelines.
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, at 27; H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
94-838, at 27.
Resp may be correct that the Senate's wholesale adoption of
the Commission's practices was compromised in the conference.
Yet these statements from the Conference Report indicate that
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the use of guidelines was still wholeheartedly endorsed, and
that Congress did not contemplate that departures from the
guidelines need be made in a large number of cases.
The history is less clear on the need to consider
the length of sentence imposed.

A specific provision

authorizing the Commission to disregard which of the
sentencing alternatives was selected by the court was deleted
in Conference, as was a reference in the Senate Report to
parole as an "extension of the sentencing process."

On the

other hand, the Conference Reports emphasized that "parole
has the practical effect of balancing differences in
sentencing policies and practices between judges" and that
"it is important for the parole process to achieve an aura of
fairness by basing determinations of just punishment on
comparable periods of incarceration for similar offenses
committed under similar circumstances."
supra,, at 19, 26.

Conference Reports,

These statements strongly suggest that

the Commission is performing a standardizing function
mandated by Congress.

Although it could certainly exercise

its discretion to consider the length of sentences, I doubt
very much that the statute requires it to do so in every
case.
Although the legislative history cited by petr seems
to refute CA3's view of the statute, it could nevertheless be
argued that the DC erred in granting summary judgment.

If

the guidelines were applied blindly, without any regard to
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individual circumstances, the Commissi'o n would probably
violate the Act.

Resp contends that they are applied in just

this automatic a manner.

However, he cannot stand on bare

assertions on motion for summary judgment if petr has
produced affidavits or evidence contradicting those
assertions.

Apparently, petr failed to come up with

affidavits.

I wonder, though, if the mere fact that some 6

to 10% of the cases are decided outside the guidelines is
sufficient to refute the bare assertion that the guidelines
are applied so mechanistically as to violate the statute.
Does anyone seriously contend that the Commission exercises
no discretion at all?

If not, summary judgment may have been

proper.
/

The final question is the constitutionality of the
guidelines.

Resp challenges them on three grounds: that the

Commission is usurping the function of the Courts in
violation of the separation of powers; that Congress has
improperly delegated, without sufficient guidance,

its

function of assigning punishment in criminal cases; and that
the guidelines deny prisoners due process.

The last argument

is of course foreclosed by Greenholtz v. Inmates, 47 U.S.L.W.
4581

(1979).

The others simply disregard the appointed roles

of courts, Congress, and the Commission in the sentencing
process.

Congress defines offenses and limits the range of

sentences a court may impose.

The court fixes the sentence

and in so doing establishes minimum and maximum terms of
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imprisonment which the Commission must respect.

Within those

limits, the Commission exercises virtually absolute
discretion under explicit congressional direction.

The

discretion is channelled, however, by specified criteria.
U.S.C. §§4206, 4207.

18

There is no basis whatever for finding

a constitutional violation under any traditional analysis,
and CA3's decision to the contrary is simply inexplicable.
IV.

RECOMMENDATION
As stated in the conclusion to Part II above, I

--

think these cases became moot when the named plaintiffs'
.....-.

-

claims were mooted.

------avoid mootness
settlement.

.

I do not believe Roper and Hudgens can

by refusing to accept the proffered

Accordingly, I would remand Roper with

instructions to dismiss as moot.

Finally, I am not convinced

that the Court should allow intervenors to revive Geraghty
even if an intervenor with a live claim could be found.

I

would therefore come to the same result in Geraghty without
reaching any of the issues treated in Part III.

If the Court

should find that the case is not moot, I would find that CA3
was correct on the class certification issue, but wrong on
the merits.

Because there would be no point in remanding for

class certification and further litigation in a losing cause,
I would hold that the issues raised are too insubstantial to
warrant any further expenditure of judicial resources.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Ellen

DATE:

September 21, 1979

RE:

Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, No. 78-904

Petr has filed a reply brief in which it reargues the
case.

Only two points deserve mention.

First, if these named

plaintiffs continue to have an individual personal stake in the
controversy because of their desire to spread non-taxable costs
among class members and because of their loss of "personal
respect and credibility", no class action will ever die.
Second, petr says that the desirability of class actions
generally is no reason to ride roughshod over the mootness
doctrine in these cases.

The decision below embodies CAS's

"class at any cost" approach, which sees class actions as per se
desirable.

In fact they are not.

!

With the potential of

enormous benefits come potential enormous damages - to class

members as well as defendants.

Since class members may be

irreparably harmed by being bound to a judgment litigated by
inadequate representatives, I would emphatically reject the

-

"class at any cost" attitude.

So ~ fl~
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class action pursuant to Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (a) and
(b)(2), and further stated that "[p]laintiff class members are all high school students attending schools managed, controlled, and maintained by the Board of School
Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis." At the time
this action was brought, plaintiffs were or had been involved in the publication and distribution of a student
newspaper, and they alleged that certain actions taken by
petitioner Board or its subordinates, as well as certain of
its rules and regulations, interfered or threatened to interfere with the publication and. distribution of the newspaper in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs (respondents here) prevailed
on the merits of their action in the District Court, 349
F. Supp. 605 (SD Ind. 1972), and the Court of Appeals,
one judge dissenting in part, affirmed, 490 F. 2d 601
(CA7 1973). Petitioners brought the case to this
Court, and we granted certiorari, 417 U. S. 929 (1974).
At oral argument, we were informed by counsel for
petitioners that all o the named plaintiffs in the action
lt_ad grad ~ei! from the In Ianapo IS sc ool system; iri
these circumstances, it seems clear that a case or controversy no longer exists between the named plaintiffs
and the petitioners with respect to the validit~ the
~ was ' jJ._.,~-L
rules at issue. The case is therefore -~ot ~
duly ce~ed as a class action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ.
l , ,
Proc. 'J!f/K controversy still exists be1J&.6{1 petitioners and CtttC ._ ' "'\
1
the present members of the class, ~- jlhe issue in con- \
troversy is such that it is capable of repetition yet evading revie~ Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). Because in our view there was inadequate compliance with
the requirements of Rule 23 (c), we have concluded that
the case has become moot.
The only formal entry made by the District Court below purporting to certify this case as a class action is con-
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

I

Enclosed is the proposed opinion in the above case.
I
have placed the holding on the narrow grounds of the named
plaintiffs' economic interests leaving to later cases the
development of just what are the "representative"
obligations, if any, owed to an uncertified class when
property interests are involved.
I would p r efer to ke ep the holding narrow and await
developments in the other courts.
Harry's opinion in
Geraghty deals with liberty interests and may be on a
broader ground.
If so, some accommodation may be called
for.
I doubt there will be any conflict.
Regards,

lo: Mr. Justic~ Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Kr . Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Kr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Re hnqui st
Kr. Justice Stevens

Zrom: The Chief Justice
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-904

I

Deposit Guaranty National Bank,' On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Robert L. Roper et al.
Circuit.
[November -, 1979]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a tender to named
plaintiffs in a class action of the amounts claimed in their
individual capacities, followed by the entry of judgment in
their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objection,
moots the case and terminates their right to appeal the denial
of class certification.
I
Respondents, holders of credit cards issued on the "BankAmericard" plan by petitioner Deposit Guaranty National
Bank, sued the bank in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Mississippi; seek to represent both
their own interests and those of a class of similarly aggrieved
customers. The complaint alleged that usurious finance
charges had been made against the accounts of respondents
and a putative class of some 90,000 other Mississippi credit
card holders.
Respondents' cause of action was based on sections 85 and
86 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C.§§ 85 and 86, which
permit banks within the coverage of the Act to charge interest
"at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or
District where the bank is located," § 85; and, in a case where
a higher rate of interest than allowed has been "knowingly"
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charged, allow a person who has paid the unlawful interest
to recover twice the total interest paid, § 86. 1
The modern phenomenon of credit card systems is largely
dependent on computers which perform the myriad accounting functions required to charge each transaction to the
customer's account. In this case, the bank's computer was
programmed so that, on the billing date, it added charges,
subtracted credits, added any finance charges due under the
BankAmericard plan, and prepared the customers' statements.
During the period in question, the bank made a monthly service charge of l'th% on the unpaid balance of each account.
However, customers were allowed 30 days within which to
pay accounts without any service charge. If paymeut was
not received w1thin that time, the computer added to the customer's next bill 1~% of the unpaid portion of the prior
bill, which was shown as the new balance. This charge is
alleged to have been usurious because under certain circumstances the effective annual interest rate of the 1 lj:!% monthly
service charge allegedly exceeded the maximum rate permitted
under Mississippi law.
The effective annual percentage rate of the finance charge
macle against each account would vary from customer to
customer because the same 1 lj:!% service charge was assessed
against the unpaid balance 110 matter when the charged
trausaction actually occurred within the 30-day period prior
to the billing date. In additiou, the actual finance charges
paid by each customer would vary depending on the stream
of transactions and the repayment plan selected.
There was evidence before the District Court that it was
possible to tabulate both the finance fees charged to each
cardholder and the fees each actually paid during the period
eucompassed by the complaint. There also was evidence
1 Rt•;;pondeut:s' complaint also all!'ged a cau:se of action bm:;ed on the
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1640 et seq., but that claim wa::;

di:::mis~:~ed

with preJudwc at re:;pondent::;' requc:;t,

1
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that it would be possible to reconstruct each account in full
by again processing all the transactions. 2
The District Court qenied re~ondents' motion to certify
the class, ruling that the circumstance& did not meet all the
requmiments of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (3) .3 The District Court certified the order denying class certification for
discretionary interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
~ 1292; the proceedings were stayed for 30 days pending possible appellate review of the denial of class certification.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denied respondents' motion for interlocutory appeal. The
bank then tendered to each named plaintiff, in the form of an
"Offer of Defendants to Enter Judgment as by Consent and
Without Waiver of Defenses or Admission of Liability," the
maximum amount that each could have recovered. The
amounts tendered to respondents Roper and Hudgins were
$889.42 and $423.54 respectively, including legal interest and
court costs. Respondents declined to accept the tendet' and
made a counter offer of judgment in which they attempted to
reserve the right to appeal the adverse class certification
ruling. This counteroffer was declined by the bank.
2

The

partie~

di::;agrecd on the costs al:lsociated with thrSl' operations.
ranged from $45,575 to $125,000 for computation of tlw financo
charges and from $367,700 to $3,432,000 for reconstruction of tlw 90,000
account. The potential total liability of thr defendant::;, :>hould plaintiffs
suceePd on bl•half of the cardholder ela::;::;, was variou:sly estimated a::; betwren $12 million and $14 million .
a The Dl::;fnct Court fauna that the requirements of Rule 23 (b) (3)
were not met beeause the putative clas::; rPpre~entatives had failed to e::;tablish the predominance of question!:! of law and faet common to class
members, and beeau;,;e a cla~s al'tion wa:s not JShown to be a l:iUperior
method of adjudication due to (1) the availability of traditional procedures for proHecuting individual claims in Mi:ssJ:sl:iippi courts; (2) the
"horrendoul:i penalty," whch could rr~ult in " de~truction of the bank" if
claill1i' were succe,.;~fully aggrrgated; (3) the Hub"tantive law of Mi::;si::;sippi
which view:; the aggregatiOn of usury claiml:i a,.: undesirable; and (4) the
tremendous bmden of handling 90,000 claim,;, particularly if l'ounterclaint.,; were filed.
E~timates
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Based on the bank's offer, the District Court entered judgment in respondents' favor, over their objection, and dis'
D
missed the action. The bank deposited the amount tendered
~ ~
into the registry of the court, where it remains. At no time
~ did any putative class members seek to intervene either to
~ J...,/
litigate tlie illerits o;to appeaTtlie certifiCatJ;iu ruling. It
~ U''
appears that by the time the District Court entered judgment
VI~ · _.
and dismissed the case, the statute of limitations had run on
l,~ _~.
_,..Jthe individual claims of the unnamed class members. 4
"~Y ~n • When respondents sought review of the class certification
f'l~
ruling in the Court of Appeals, the bank _argued that the case
/)'IAV
hl!d J.leen moote<L!?Y the entry ohude;~1t in respondents'
~Arav?y ~ing the bank's contention, the court relied
wv ~ on V nited Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
.fl -V ~
There we held that an adverse determination on the class
Y~.1" ~~-.A.. certification question could be appealed notwithstanding a
~~-ru,- favorable entry of judgment on the merits. The Court of
~f-V"Appeals also relied on holdings of other courts of appeals. 5
~
Two members of the panel read Rule 23 as providing for a
-:~.J~
fiduciary-type obligation of the named plaintiffs to act in a
t:J"Yr'' : J
representative capacity on behalf of the putative class by
seeking certification at the outset of the litigation and by
.#...r-.
appealing an adverse certifica.tion ruling. In that view, the
.vr,
District Court also had a responsibility to ensure that any
dismissal of the suit of the named plaintiffs did not prejudice
putative class members. One member of the panel, concurring specially, limited the ruling on mootness to the circumstances of the case, i. e., that, after filing of a class action,
r

tf'

r .

'j

I

_

4

HPver::ml of the

Di~trict

Court '::; denial of certification by the Court
of Appeals would relate back to the time of the original motion for certification for the purposes of tolling the ::;tatute of limitations on the
elaim::; of the elm;~ member::> . See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432·

u. s.

885 (1977) .

5

Gl:'lman v. Westinghouse Electric C'm·p., 556 F. 2d 699, 701-702 (CA3
1977) ; Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F . 2d 94 (CAlO 1968), cert. denied, 394

u. s. 928

(1969) .
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the mere tender of an offer of settlement to the named plaintiffs, without acceptance, does not moot the controversy so
as to prevent the named plaintiffs from appealing an adverse
certification ruling.
Having rejected the bank's mootness argument, the Court
of Appeals reviewed the District Court's ruling on the class
certification question. It concluded that all the requisites
of Rule 23 had been satisfied and accordingly reversed the
adverse certification ruling; it remanded with directions to
certify the class and for further proceedings.
Certiorari was sought to review the holdings of the Court of
Appeals on both mootness and class certification. We granted
the writ limited to the question of mootness, to resolve con- '
flicting holdings in the courts of appeals. 6 440 U. S. 945.

II
We begin by identifying the interests to be considered when
questions touching on justiciability are presented in the class
action context. First i~est of the named plaintiffs:
their personal stake in the substantive controversy and their
related right as litigants in a federal court to employ the
procedural device of a Rule 23 class action in appropriate
circumstances to pursue their individual claims. A separate
consideration, distinct from their private interests, is the respousibility of named plaintiffs to represent the collective
interests of the putative class. Two other interests are
i~: the rights of putative class membe;;-ag potential intervenors, and the re~onsibi~ a._ district COl!.!:,t to
protect both the absent class a.udthe integrity of the judicial
process by surveillance of the a.ctions of the parties before it.
The Court of Appeals did not distinguish among these distinct interests. It reviewed all possible interests that in its
view had a beariug on whether an appeal of the deuial of

-

6 Winokw· v. Bell 'Federal Saviugs and Loan Assn., 560 F . 2d 271 (CA7
1977) , cert. denied, 435 U . S. 932 (1978).
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certification should be allowed. These diverse interests ar~
interrelated, but we distinguish among them for purposes
pf analysis, and conclude that resolution of the narrow question presented requires consideration only of the private
interest of the named plaintiffs.
-------------~

III
A

The critical iuquiry, to which we now turu, is whether re-:
spondents' indiviaual and private case or controversy became
~noot by reason ~e entry of judgment in their faVOr.
Respondents, as holders of credit cards issued by the bank,
plaimed damages in their private capacities for alleged
usurious interest charges levied iu violation of federal law 1
Their complaint asserted that they had suffered actual damage ,
as a result of illegal acts of the bank. The '~omplaint ' ~
satisfied the case or controversy requirement of Art. III of the
Constitution.
As parties in a federal civil action, respondents exercised
their option as putative members of a similarly situated card-.
holder class to assert their claims under Rule 23. Their right
to assert their own claims in the framework of a class
action is clear. However, the right of a litigant to employ
Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation
of substantive claims. Should these substantive claims become moot in the Art. Ill sense, by settlement of all personal
claims for· example, the court retains no jurisdiction over the
controversy of the individual plaintiffs.
The factual context in which this question arises is important. At no time did the named plaintiffs accept the tender
in settlemeut of the case; instead, judgment was entered iu
their favor by the court and the case was dismissed over their
continued objections. 7 Although a case or controversy is

--

7

The ;;ettlemeut of all i:iUb::;tantive clairru; in a. litigation typically moots
13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper.

~thy i"':sueil associated with it.
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mooted in the Art. III sense upon payment and satisfaction of
a final. binding judgment, a decision that is "final" for purposes of appeal does not absolutely resolve a case or controversy until the time for appeal has run. Nor does a
confession of judgment by defendants on less than all the
issues moot an entire case; other issues in the case may be
appealable. We can assume that a district court's final 'ud me11t which ful y satis es name plamtift's' )rivate substantive c aims wou preclude their ap )eal 011 that aspect of the
b'ilaf']Udgi"nent; ~er, it does not follow tfi'a't this ci~um
stance -would terminate the named plaintiffs' right to take an
appeal on the issue of class certification.
Congress has vested appellate jurisdiction in the courts of
appeals for review of final decisions of the district courts. 28
U. S. C. § 1291. Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a
j udgme11t or order of a district court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom. A party who receives all that
he has sought is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the
relief and cannot appeal from it. Public Service Comrn'n v.
Brashear Freight Lines Inc., 306 U.S. 204 (1939); New York
Telepho·ne Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645 (1934); Corning v.
Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 15 How. 451 (1853); J. W. Moore,
Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3533, p. 271 (1975). Under this rule, a
voluntary settlement of the named plaintiff~' individual substantive claims
would prerlude them from appealing the vrocedural ruling on elas:s cPrtification in their individual rapacitie~. Sec United Ail'liues, luc . v.
McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 4()(}-401 (Hl77). We note, however, that Hule
23 (e) pre~cribe;:; cert.aiu reHponsibilit ie;:; of a cli;:;t rict eomL in n c:a.~e
brought. a~ a elm;s artiou: n clu~:s action may not be "di~mi:;~(·d or l'Ulllpromist>d without the approval of the court, <llld notice of tlw ]>ropo~ed
di~mi~sal or compromi~e ::;hall be given to all member~ of the !'Ia:-:~ in ~u('h
manner as the court dirrcts." Tlwre muy be circum,.;l<HW<',;, whidt np~·d
not be dPfinecl hrre. wlwre the di~trid court ha~ a reRpon;,:ibility, prior
to nrceptanrc of a settlement and iti:l cli;:;mi~sal of thr ela~:> nc·t ion, to
providr au opportunit.y for iutPrvcntion by a membPr of tlw putative
cla::;s for the purposP of appealing the dPrwtl of etas::; rcrtifieation. StH·h
intervention ocrurr<>d in McDonald.

J

~
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Federal Practice para. 203.06. The rule is one of federal appel~
late practice, however, derived from the statutes granting
appellate jmisdiction and the historic practices of the appellate courts; it does not have its source in the jurisdictional
limitations of Art. III. In an appropriate case appeal may be
permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on '
the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed in
the lower court, even though the appellant is not directly
affected by the adverse ruling.
In Electrical Fittings Corp. v. 'Phomas & Betts Co., 307
U. S. 241 (1939), respondent sued petitioner for infringemf'nt
of a patent. In such a suit. the defense may prevail f'ither
by successfully a.ttacking the validity of the patent or by successfully defending the charge of infringement. In Electrical
Fittings the decree of the District Court adjudged the patent
valid but dismissed the complaint for failure to prove infringement. The respondents did not appeal, but petitioners sought
review in the Comt of Appeals of so much of the decree as
adjudicated the patent valid. Respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal "based on the ground that the appeal can
raise no questions not already moot because of the fact that
the [petitioners] have already been granted in the dismissal
of the bill all the relief to which they are entitled." 100 F.
2d, at 404. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on
this ground after ruling that the decree of the District Court
would not in subsequent suits, as a matter of collateral estoppel
or otherwise, influence litigation on the issue of the patent's
validity. On review here, this Court did not question the
view that the ruling on patent validity would have no effect on
·ubsequent litigation. Nevertheless, a unanimous Court
allowed the appeal to rf'form the decree :
" A party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in
his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a review of the
findings he deems erroneous which arc not necessary to
support the decree. But here the deeree itself puqJorts.

1
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to adjudge the validity of [the patent], and though the
adjudication was immaterial to the disposition of the
cause, it stands as au adjudication of one of the issues
litigated. We think the petitioners were entitled to have
this portion of the decree eliminated, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, as we have held
this Court has, to entertain the appeal, not for the purpose of passing on the merits, but to direct the reformation of the decree." 307 U. S., at 242 (footnotes
omitted).
Although the Court limited the appellate function to ref·ormation of the decree. the holding relevant to the instant
case was that the federal courts retained jurisdiction over the
controversy notwithstanding the District Court's entry of
judgment in favor of petitioners. This Court had the question of mootness before it, yet because policy considerations
permitted an appeal from the District Court's final judgment,
the case was still live and dismissal was not required by Art.
III. The Court perceived the critical distinction between the
definitive mootness of a case or controversy, which ousts the
jurisdiction of the federal court and requires dismissal of the
case, a11d a judgment in favor of a party at an intermediate
stage of litigation, which does not in all cases terminate the
right to appeal. 8
In our view, the denial of cl!lss certification similarly is an
example of a }roc.e.dural rulmg, collateral to the merits of a
li~on, but one that is appealable after the entry of final
BIn a ::;ense, the petitioner in Electrical Pittings sought review of the
Dist.riC"t Court's procedural error. Tlw District Court was correct in
inquiring fully into the validity of the patent, Sinclair <(: Carroll C'o. v.
lntachemical Corp., 325 U. S. 327, 330 (1945), hut wn:s incorrect to adjudge the pateut. valid after ruling that then• had bN•n no infringement.
By doing so the District Court llftd dPcided a hypothetical eontrover:;y,
Altvater v. llreeuwn, 319 l l. S. 359, 368 (194a); yet petitioner cmtld take
the apJX'al to correct. thi:s error becau:;e there had been an advPr~e de•cision on the litiga,ted issue.

7S-904-0PTNION
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juclgnH'nt." The denial of class c<'rtifieation stands as an
adjudication of on<' of tlH' issu<'s litigat<'tl. As in h'lectr£cal
F-ittings, W<' think tht' p<'titiml<'rs here W<'f'<' C>ntitkd to lu:tv<'
this portion of th<' District Court's judgnWJlt r<'vi<'"'C'<l. and
w.Q_ l:glil that the Couri_0 Aruwals ha d juri§ilir.tion to C'ntcrtain tll C' appPal to rrvi<'\\' thC' ass<'rtr<l p rocPdural C'rror of
th; ~1rt. but nof1(n' th<' purpose '7>f passin g on
the merits of the substanti,·c controversy.

1/)

tJ .I . .'i ~

~

B
Pt>rhaps because the question was not ti1ough t to he open
to doubt we havr stat<'cl in tlw past, without <'XtC'Il(kd disetlssion. that "an ord<'r df'nying class certification is suh.i<'Ct to
efi'<'ctiw review after final judgment at the })(']wst of the
na11wd plaintiff . . . . " CoO])ets & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U .• '. 463. 469 (1078). The ap]walahility of the issue of class
certification after final judgment ou the nwrits war; an im-:
porta11t ingrPdient in our unanimous r<'jcction in Livesay of
tht> argumrn t. advanced in favor of afforcli ng interlocutory
app<'al as a matter of rioht, that au adverse class C<'rtifieation
ruling came within tlw "collateral order" <'XC<'ptiolt to the
fi11al-judgment rul<'. For the Livesay proposition. tlw Court
cit('(] United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 4:32 F .• '. 38.1 ( 1D77).
ThaL easC' involved, as docs this. a judgment enkn'd on the
merits in favor of the named plaintiff. The ~vicDouald Comt \ ~ ~
assumed that the named plaintift' would have been entithl to
appeal a dPnial of class rNtification.
The usc of the class action procedure for litigation of in-

I

~

tJ

9 In tr;;;;pers c~· Lybrand Y. Livesay. 437 F. 8. 4G:l (1078). we• held that
the <'i:ts;-"c!'rtific·ation rulin~ did not fall within that ll:t!T0\1' c·:lfl'p:OI·~· of
cin·tuu,.:tnnc·<•;o: whrrc inl<'rlo('nto'r~· a ppc•:tl wa,.; :tllowc•d a;o: a 111:11 t l'l' of
right. .Howc·\·c·r, our rulin~ in Lybm11d \\';t:;; not iJttt•ndC'd to pre<·ludc'
motion~ :<('('kin~ di~t·n·tionar~· intNlo<'utor~· appPal for n·,·ic•w of the·
<'<'rtifiea1 ion nding. In ~onw ra,.:c•;o: ~u<'h :lll ap]H.':tl would pmnli"c' substantial ;o:aYin~;o: of time and re;,;oun·c,; or for other n•a;o:oJI;o: ~hould be
viewed lto,.,pitably.

1
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dividual claims may offer substantial advantages for named
plaintiffs, which may motivatR them to bring cases that for
ecollomic reasolls might not be brought otherwise. 10 It is
clear that there has been a growth of litigation stimulated by
contingency-fee agreemf'nts and the role this type of fee
arrangf'ment has played in vindicating the rights of iudividuals who otherwise might 11ot find it economically feasible to
seek or obtai11 legal redress. The prospect of such fee a.rrangements offers advallta es for litigation T) a named laintiff
in ~tions as well as or t 1e1t· attoD,leys. 11 The financial
inceu tive that class actions offer to the legal profe"SSioilis a
nat~outgrowth of the increasing reliance on Tile ' 'private
attoruey gmlCral" for the vindication of legal rights; obviously
this development has been facilitated by Rule 23. The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a class-wide suit
is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries
umemedied by the regulatory action of government. Where
it 1s not econmmciilly fi~as161e to o6ta.iu relief withi11 the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for
damages, aggrieved persons may be without any efl'ective
redress unless they may employ the class-action device.
The district court's ruling on the certification issue is often
the most significant decision rendered in such a class-action
10 A l'ignifieant. bcm•fit. to elaimants who chooi"C to litignte their individual elaim.~ in a ela,;,;-aetion eon! ext i~ the pro~pt•ct of reducing; their cc::;t~
of litiga tiou, part ieularJ~r attorney~' fl'('>', h)::ill orating ,;uch co;,; I:, among all
nwmbc:fS of tlw class who betwfit ftmn any rPcovrry. Typically, t.he attorneys' frr~ of the' nanwd plaintiff~ proceeding without rrliatH"<' 011 Hulr 23
could rxrred thr valur of the individual judgment in favor of any onr
plaintiff. Hen' I lw damagr~ elaimed by tlw two named ]llaintiff:o totaled
$1 ,006.00. Such plaintiff" would he unlike!~· to obtain legal rrdre>'S at an
aC'erpt;lbiP cost, mtle~s coun~el were motivatrd by the ft-r-sprrading incP!ltive and proceeded on a, eon! ingency-fee basis. This, of cour~r, i~ a
cent raJ rourept of Rule 23 .
11 This cas<• doc·~ not raise auy que~tion a ~ to the propriety of con•
tingrncy-fce agreements.
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proceeding. 12 To deny the right to appeal simply becaus<' the
named defendant has sought to pay off the individual private
claims of the named plaintiffs, would be contrary to sound
judicial administration. Requiring multiplr plaintiffs to
bring separate actious, which effectively could be "picked off"
by a defendant's tender of judgment before an affirmative
ruling on class certification could be obtained, obviously
would frustrate the objectives of class actions; moreover it
would invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating successive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement. It
would be in the interests of a class-action defendaut to forestall any appeal of denial of class certification if that could
be accomplished by tendering the individual damages claimed
by the named plaintiffs. Permitting appeal of the district
court's certification ruling-either at once by interlocutory
appeal, or after entry of judgment on the merits-also minimizes problems raised by "forum shopping'' by putative class
( representatives attempting to locate a judge perceived as
sympathetic to class actions, That small individual claims
f otherwise might be limited to local and state courts rather
than a federal forum does not justify ignoring the overall
problem of wise use of judicial resources. Such policy considerations are not irrelevant to the determination whether an
adverse procedural ruling on certification should be subject
to appeal at the behest of named plaintiffs. Courts have
certain latitude in formulating the standards that govem the
appealability of procedural rulings even though, as in this
case, the holding may determine the absolute finality of a
judgment, and thus, indirectly, determine whether the controversy has become moot.
'\\'P conclude that on this record the District Court's entry
of judgment in favor of uamed plaintiffs over their objections
did not moot their private case or controversy, and that re1
~ Sec Miller, An Overview of Fecl<·ral Class Action::;: Past, PretSeut, and
Fuwre 12 (Federal Judicial Center 1978) .
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sponden ts' individual in terpst in tho litigation-as distinguished from whatever may bf' their representative responsibilities to the putative class '"-is sufficient to permit their
a1))peal of the adverse. certification ruling.
Affirmed,

DifTieult qu(•:;tions arise a,: to wlw.t, if any, arr thP named plaintiffs'
rcspon,;ibilitic:; to thf' putative class prior to certifi!'ation ; this crt. e does
not, rrquiw u:; to rca('h these t11l<'Htion1'1.
13
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Ellen

DATE:

November 2, 1979

RE:

No. 78-904

Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper

I find this opinion extraordinary.
single one of the Sosna line of cases.

It nowhere cites a

Of the Court's recent class

action mootness jurisprudence, it cites only McDonald, and then only
in passing.

The real holding is found at page 7-8, to the effect

that there is no Article III problem here at all.
is plainly wrong.

This proposition

The only authority cited in support is the

Electrical Fittings case, a 1939 one-page opinion which in fact
stands for the opposite conclusion.

As the language quoted on page 9

shows, the Court held that there was in fact no jurisdiction to
consider the merits (presumably because of Article III, although no
rationale is stated).

The Court of Appeals could take jurisdiction

only for the extremely limited purpose of ordering the District Court
to delete an unnecessary holding from the decree.
deleted holding were not to be decided.

The merits of the

Electrical Fittings would be

controlling if the only relief sought on appeal were to have the
order denying class certification expunged from the record.
Obviously, that is not this case.
The policy considerations cited at pages 10-12 have little
if anything to do with the Article III question.

On their merits, I

believe the "private attorneys general" theory on page 11 is probably
wrong as a matter of Rule 23 policy.

The judicial administration

argument on page 12 is more properly addressed to the Coopers &
Lybrand result than to this case (in fact on page 10 n.9 the opinion
invites discretionary interlocutory appeals despite Coopers &
Lybrand).
Finally, the opinion concludes that it rests entirely on the
plaintiffs• individual interest.
~J

Yet I find no identification

anywhere as to what that individual interest is.

The only interests

cited are social interests.
In short, the opinion is a "sitting duck."

I would not

consider joining it even if our tentative dissenting position does
not "write" well.
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 5, 1979

Re:

78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank
__.:_v ~[ Roper __

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

TL
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

/ '

.:%uvuntt <qotttf of flp~ ~ltiUlt .:§t1ifcg
'J)ltriH>lyi:tt:gton. lfl. <!f. 2!l.;TJ1.~
CHAMBERS OF

~

November 6, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper
Dear Chief:
I shall withhold my vote in this case until I am able to
circulate a proposed opinion in No. 78-572, United States
Parole Commission v. Geraghty.
I think it desirable that
these cases be considered together. This, of course, merely repeats what I stated in my note of October 9 to you.
Sincerely,

;!Ji.
"---

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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CHAMB E RS OF

November 6, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

j
Re: No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper
Dear Chief:
I shall withhold my vote in this case until I am able to
circulate a proposed opinion in No. 78-572, United States
Parole Commission v. Geraghty.
I think it desirable that
these cases be considered together. This, of course, merely repeats what I stated in my note of October 9 to you.
Sincerely,

;/!fl.

""'

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

.•'

'•'

"''

•.
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I
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CHAMI!5ERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 6, 1979

Re:

78-904 - Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper

Dear Chief:
Although I agree with your opinion as presently
written, I shall withhold my vote until Harry•s
opinion in the Geraghty case is circulated. The
two cases are, as Harry says, necessarily related,
and very probably accommodations will have to be
made in both opinions.
Sincerely yours,
') ~ .
I •

/
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.ittprtmt C!Jqnrl qf flrt ,~b .im±t~
~as~~. C!J. 20~~~

November 6, 1979

CHAMBERS 01'"

JUSTICE Wt<. J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

No. 78-904 Deposit Guaranty National Bank v.
Roper

Dear Chief:

II

I agree.

I

Sincerely,

j
II
I

I
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

,ju.prttttt {!fttltrl of Urt ~tb j)tatts

jilasfri:n:gton. ~. <!f. 211~'1$
CHAMBERS O F

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 6, 1979

Re:

No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v.
Ro er

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your present draft.
I think that
I disagreed more than some of the Conference with the treatment of Geraghty by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
and I don•t think Harry•s earlier forecast that the two
opinions may not dovetail is totally unfounded. I say this
becau.se I doubt that I could join an opinion affirming
Geraghty for the reasons that the Court of Appeals did. So
I deliberately use the words this draft of your opinion.
If it were to be revised to indicate approval of CA 3•s
treatment of Geraghty, I reserve the right to jump ship ..
on you!
11

11

11

Sincere 1y

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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Dear Chief:
In accord with my vote at
circulate a dissent in due time.
Sincerely,

......

lfp/ss
cc:

The

"

'
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'l'Daalringtctt. ~. <!f. 20.?>~2
CHAMBE:RS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

November

Re:

s,

1979

No. 78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National
Bank v. Roper

Dear Chief:
I shall withhold my vote until Harry's
proposed opinion iti Geraghty is circulated.
Sincerely,

/.J'n.
T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

November 9, 1979

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National
Bank v. Roper, et al.

Dear Chief,
Please join rrie.

'

'

Sincerely yours,

The Chief. Justice
Copies to the Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

I

No. 78-904

Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Robert L. Roper et al.
Circuit.
[November -, 1979]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a tender to named
plaintiffs in a class action of the amounts claimed in their
individual capacities, followed by the entry of judgment in
their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objection,
moots the case and terminates their right to appeal the denial
of class certification.

I
Respondents, holders of credit cards issued on the "BankAmericard" plan by petitioner Deposit Guaranty National
Bank, sued the bank in the United States District Court fot
the flouthern District of Mississippi, seeking to represent both I
their own interests and those of a class of similarly aggrieved
customers. The complaint alleged that usurious finance
charges had been made against the accounts of respondents
and a putative class of some 90,000 other Mississippi credit
card holders.
Respondents' cause of action was based on sections 85 and
86 of the :National Bank Act. 12 U.S. C. ~~ 85 and 86. Section 85 permits banks within the coverage of tlw Act to charge
interest "at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bauk is loeatecl." In a case where
a higher rate of interest than allowed has been "knowingLy'r /

I

----
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charged § 86 allows a person who has paid the unlawful inter~
est to recover twice the total interest paicJ.l
The modern phenomenon of qredit card systems is largely
dependent on computers, which perform the myriad accounting functions required to charge each transaction to the
customer's account. Iu this case, the bank's computer was
programmed so that, on the billing date, it added charges,
subtracted credits, added any finance charges due under the
BankAmericard plan, and prepared the customers' statements.
During the period in questiou, the bank made a monthly service charge of 1%% on the unpaid balance of each account.
However, customers were allowed 30 days within which to
pay accounts without any service charge. If payment was
not received within that time, the computer added to the customer's next bill 11/2 % of the unpaid portion of the prior
bill, which was shown as the new balance. The actual finance
charges paid by each customer varied depending on the stream
of transactions and the repayment plan selected. In addition,
the effective annual interest rate paid by a customer would
vary because the same 1lh% service charge was assessed
against the unpaid balance no matter when the charged transactions occurred within the 30-60-day period prior to the
billing date. This llh o/r monthly service charge is asserted to
have been usurious b€'cause under certain circumstances the
resultiug effective annual interest rate allegedly exceeded the
maximum interest rate permitted under Mississippi law.
The District Court denied respondents' motion to certify
the class, r·uling that the circumstances did not meet all the
requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. · Proc. 23 (b) (3) .t The DisRespondents' complaint also alleged a cause or action based on the
Tmth in Lending Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1640 et seq., but that claim wa
dismis:sed with prejudice at respondents' reque:st.
@rlw Di8trict Court found that the requircmentR of Rule 23 (b) (3)
were not met because the putative class repre:;cntatives had· failrd to establish the predominance of que:stions of law and fact common to cla~s
1

I
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trict Court certified the order denying dass certification for
discretionary interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1292 (b) ; the proceedings were stayed for 30 days pending
possible appellate review of the denial of class certification.
The Ullited States Court of Appeals for· the Fifth Circuit
denied respondents' motion for interlocutory appeal. The
bank then tendered to each named plaintiff, in the form of an'
"Offer of Defendants to Enter Judgment as by Consent and
Without Waiver of Defenses or Admission of Liability," the
maximum amount that each could have recovered. The
amounts te11dered to respoudents Roper and Hudgins were
$889.42 and $423.54 respectively, including legal interest and
court costs. Respondents declined to accept the tender and
made a counteroffer of judgment in which they attempted to
reserve the right to appeal the adverse class certification'
r-uliug. This counteroffer was declined by the bank.
Based on the bank's offer, the District Court entered judgment in respondents' favor, over their objection, and dismissed the action. The bank deposited the amount tendered
into the registry of the court, where it remains. At no time
did any putative class members seek to intervene either to
litigate the merits or to appeal the certification ruling. It
appears that by the time the District Court entered judgment
and dismissed the case, the statute of limitations had run on
the individual claims of the unnamed class members. 3
members, and becauHe a class action wa~ not shown to be a supenor·
method of adjudication due t,o (1) the nvailability of traditional procedure:; for pro::;ecuting individual clairrt1:1 in Mi~:>~:>i~:>~>ippi courts; (2) the
"horrt>ndous p<>nalty," whirh rould re:mlt in "de::;truction of tht> bank" if
claims were successfully aggregated; (3) the substantive law of Mississippi
which views the aggr<>gation of usury claim:; as unde1:1irable ; and (4) the
tremendous burden of bundling 90,000 claims, pa.rticularly if counterclaims were filed .
,.
@Rrvrrsal of tlw District Court':; d(•nial of C<'rtification by thr Court)
of Appt>als would rt>late baek to tlw timr of the original motion for cer- ,
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\Vhen respondents sought review of the class certification
ruling in the Court of Appeals, the bank argued that the case
had been mooted by the entt•y of judgment in respondents'
favor. In rejecting the bank's contention, the court relied in
part on United Airlines, Inc. -v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385
(1977). There we held that a member of the putative class
could appeal the denial of class certification by intervention,
after entry of judgment in favor of the named plaintiff, but
before the statutory time for appeal had run. Two members
of the panel read Rule 23 as providing for a fiduciary-type
obligation of the named plaintiffs to act in a representative
capacity on behalf of the putative class by seeking certification at the outset of the litigation and by appealing an
adverse certification ruling. In that view, the District Court
also hac! a responsibility to ensure than any dismissal of the
suit of the named plaintiffs clicl not prejudice putative class
members. One member of the panel, concurring specially,
limitccl the ruling on mootness to the circumstances of the
case, i. e., tha.t. after filing of a class action, the mere tender
of an offer of settlement to the named plaintiffs, without acceptance, does not moot the coutroversy so as to prevent the
namE'd plantiffs from appealing an adverse certification ruling.
Having rejpcted the bank's mootness argument, the Court
of Appeals reviewed the District Court's ruling on the class
certification question. It concluded that all the requisites
of Rule 23 had been satisfied and accordingly reversed the
adverse certification ruling; it remanded with directions to
certify the class and for further proceedillgs.
Certiorari was sought to review the holdings of the Court of
Appeals on both mootness and class certification. We granted
the writ limited to the question of mootness, to rPsolvc conflicting holdings in the courts of appeals.4 440 U. S. 945.
<'laim~

of the clas:< member~. See United Airlinl's, Inc. v. ll!cDonald, 432'
u.s. as5 (1977).
VJWinvkur v. Bell Federal Savinys awl Loan Assn., 550 F . 2d 271 (CA7
1977.), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978).
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We begin by identifying the interests to be considered when
questions touching on justiciability are presented in the class
action context. First is the interest of the named plaintiffs:
their personal stake iu the substantive controversy and their
related right as litigants in a federal court to employ in appro...
priate circumstances the procedural device of a Rule 23 class
action to pursue their individual claims. A separate consideration, distinct from their private interests. is the responsibility of named plaintiffs to represent the collective
interests of the putative class. 'Two other interests are
implicated: the rights of putative class members as potential intervenors, and the responsibilities of a district court to
protect both the absent class and the integrity of the judicial
process by monitoring the actions of the parties before it.
The Court of Appeals did not distinguish among these dis-'
tinct interests. It reviewed all possible interests that in its
view had a bearing Oll whether an appeal of the denial of
certification should be allowed. These diverse interests are
interrelated, but we distinguish among them for purposes
of analysis, and conclude that resolution of the narrow question presented requires consideration only of the private
interest of the named plaintiffs.

III
A
The critical inquiry, to which we now turn, is whether respondents' individual and private case or controversy became
moot by reason of the entry of judgment in their favor.
Respondents, as holders of credit cards issued by the bank,
claimed damages in their private capacities for alleged
usurious interest charges levied in violation of federal law.
Their complaint asserted that they had suffered actual damage
as a result of illegal acts of the bank. The complaint

/

J
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satisfied the case or controvf'rsy requirement of Art. III of the
Constitution.
As parties in a federal civil action, respondents exercised
their optiou as putative mf'mbers of a similarly situated cardholder class to assert their claims under Rule 23. Their right
to assert their own claims in the framework of a class
action is clear. However. the right of a litigant to f'mploy
Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to thE' litigation
of substantive claims. Rhould these substantive claims become moot in the Art. Ill sPnse, by settlement of aU personal
claims for example, the court retains no jurisdiction over the
controversy of the individual plaintiffs.
The factual context in which this question arises is important. At no time did the named plaintiffs accept the tendel'
in settlemeut of the case; instf'ad, judgment was e11tered in
their favor by the coui't and the case was dismissed over their
continued objections. 5 Although a case or controversy is
mooted in the Art. III sense upon payment and satisfaction of
a final, unappealable judgment, a decision that is "final" fol'
purposes of appeal does not absolutely resolve a case or couCYThr 1-'ett!ement of all sub8tantive claims in a litigntion typically moots
any i~stte;; associated with it. 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 353:3, lJ. 271 (1975). Under this rule, a
voluntary srttlement of the named plaintiffs) individual substantive claims
would prPchlde them ftonl appeallng the procrdural ruling 011 class certification in their individuai capacities. See VnitPd Airlines, Inc. v.
McDonald , 432 n. s. 385, 400-401 (1077) (.POWELL, .J., dissenting). We
notP, however, thnt Rule 23 (e) pre:-;cribes certain re::;ponsibilitirs of a district rourt in a <'Hsc brought as a clas::; action: a ela;;s action may not be
"uismi~~ed or cou'lproml;;rd without the approval of the comt, and notice
of the proposed dl;;mis&'ll or rompromlse ;;hall be given to all member;; of
the cia~::; in :s1ich manner a;; the court directs ." There may be circum'stane<>i<, which need not be defined here, where thP district court has <~
responl"ibility, prior to acceptance of a sPttlement and its di~mis::;al of the
clar:;.~ artion, to provide an opportunity for intervrntion by a member ot
th<' putativ<:> clas~:< for the purpo,;e of appealing the d<:>nial of clas;; certifi<'LL~tiou. Such inil'rvention oceurrrd in McDonald .

•
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troversy until the time for appeal has run. Nor does a
confession of judgment by defendants on less than all the
issues moot an en tire case; other issues in the case may be
appealable. We can assume that a district court's final judg~
ment fully satisfying named plaintiffs' private substantive
claims would preclude their appeal on that aspect of the
final judgment; however. it does not follow that this circum~
stance would terminate the uamed plaintiff's' right to take an
appeal on the issue of class certification.
Congress has vested appellate jurisdiction in the courts of
appeals for review of final decisions of the district courts. 28
U. S. C. § 1291. Ordinarily. only a party aggrieved by a
judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom. A party who receives all that
he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it. Public Service
Comm'n v. Brashear Freight Lines Inc., 306 U.S. 204 (1939);
New York Telephone Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645 (1934);
Corning v. 'Pray Iron & Nail Factory, 15 How. 451 (1853);
J. W. Moore, Federal Practice para. 203.06. The rule is one
of federal appellate practice, however, derived from the statutes granting appellate jurisdiction and the historic practices
of the appellate courts; it does not have its source in the jurisdictional limitations of Art. III. In an appropriate case
appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to
the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has
prevailed on the merits.
In Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307
U. S. 241 (1939), respondent sued petitioner for infringement
of a patent. In such a suit, the defense may prevail either
by successfully attacking the validity of the patent or by successfully defending the charge of infringement. In Electrical
Fittings the decree of the District Court adjudged the pateut
valid but dismissed the complaint for failure to prove infringetnent. The respondents did not appeal, but petitioners sought.

/
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l

review in the Court of Appeals of so much of the decree as
adjudicated the patent valid. Respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal "based on the ground that the appeal can
raise no questions not already moot because ·of the fact that
the lpetitioners] hiwe already been granted in the dismissal
of the bill all ..the re~ief to which they are entitled." 100 F:
2d, at 404. The Oourt of Appeals .9ismissed the appeal on
this ground after ruling that the decree of ·the District Court
.would not in subsequent suits, as a matter of collateral estoppel
or otherwise, influence litigation on th\'l ·issue of the patent's
validity. On review here, this ·court did not question the
view that the ruling on patent validity would have no effect on
subsequent litigation. Nevertheless;· a unanimous Court
allowed the appeal to reform the decree i
"A party may not appeal from a judgment or decree iri
his favor,'· for the "T)urpo~e pf obtaining a review of
findings. he deen1s , erroneou~;? ·which are not necessary to
support the decree. But here the de~r.ee itself purports
to adjud~e the validity- ~{ [the p~ten,t], and though the
adj1,1dication was immaterial . to _the disposition of the
cause, .it stands a& an adjudipation of one of the issues
litigated. . We think the petitioners were entitled to have
this portion of the . decree eliminated, -and that the Cir~
cuit Court of Appeals had. jurisdiction, as we have held
this Court has, to. entertain the appeal 1 not for the purpose of passing on the merits, but to direct the reforma~
tion of the decree." 307 U. S., at 242 (footnotes
omitted).
Although the Court limited the appellate function to ref-:
ormation of the decree, the holding relevant to the instant
case was that the federal courts retained jurisdi·ction over the
controversy notwithstanding the District Court's entry of
judgment in favor of petitioners. . This Court had the question •of mootn~ss befbre it, yet because policy considerations.
pemil.tted an aiJpeal from the District Court's final judgment~

)

78-904-0PINION
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

9

the case was still live and dismissal was not required by Art.
III. The Court perceivrd the critical distinction between the
definitive mootness of a case or controversy, which ousts the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and requires dismissal of the
case, and a judgment in favor of a party at an intermediate
stage of litigation, which does not in all cases terminate the
right to appeal. 6
In our view, the denial of class certification similarly is an
example of a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a
litigation, that is appealable after the entry of final juclgment.7
The denial of class certification stands as an adjudication of
one of the issues litigated. As in Electrical Fittings, we think
the petitioners here were entitled to have this portion of the
District Court's judgment reviewed, and we hold that the
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal to
review the asserted procedural error of the District Court, but
not for the purpose of passing on the merits of the substantive
controversy.
'ijhn a sen::;<>, the petitionrr in Electrical Fittiugs sought review of OlC
Dist.rict Court'~> procedural error. The Dit~trict Court was correct in
inquiring fully into the validity of the patent, Sinclair & Carroll Co. v.
lnterchemical Corp., 325 U. S. :327, 330 (1945), but wa::; incorrect. to adjudge the patent valid after ruling that there had been no infringement.
By doing so the Dit~t.rict Court had decicl<>d a hypothetical controversy,
Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359, 363 {1943); yet petitioner could take
the appeal to correct this error because there had been 311 adverse deriHion on a litigated i'it~Ue, petitioner wa,\; continuing to as:s<>rt an intPrest
in thr ont comP of that i&me, and for poliey reasons thi:s Courl considered
tlw procedural question of ::;uffici<>nt importance to allow an appeal.
, {?>In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), we held tha~
the class certification ruling did not fall within that. narrow category of
circumstances where appeal was allowed prior to final judgment at~ a matter of right undrr :2!-1 U. S. C. § 1291. HowPvrr, our ruling in Livesay was
not int<•ndrd to prrcludr motion~ under 2R U. S. C. § 1292 (b) :scrking
diHcretionary intrrlocutor~ ' nppral for rrvif'w of thr certification mling.
Ser 4:37 U. S., at 474-475. In ~onw <'Hk<'~' l'uch nn np]wnl would promi:;<'
I'UIJ:,tantial ~:wing~ of tinw :wd rf>Rourr<'~ or for othrr rea~on,; ~hould be
v~ewed ho~l1itahly.

I
/
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B
Perhaps because the question was not thought to be open
to doubt we have stated in the past, without extended discussion, that "an order denying class certification is subject to
efl'ective review after final judgment at the behest of the
11amed plaintiff. . . ." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U. S. 463, 469 ( 1978). The appealability of the issue of class
certification after final judgment on the merits was an important ingredient in our· unanimous rejection in Livesay of
the argument, advanced in favor of affording preJudgment
appeal as a m,atter of right, that an adverse class certification
ruling came within the "collateral order" exception to the
final-judgment rule. For the Livesay proposition, the Court
cited United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
That case involved, as does this, a judgment entered on the
merits in favor of the named plaintiff. The McDonald Court
assumed that the named plaintiff wou1d have been entitled to
appeal a denial of class certification.
The use of the class action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for named
plaintiffs, which may motivate them to bring cases that for
economic reasons might not be brought otherwise. 8 It is
clear that there has been a growth of litigation stimulated by
contingency-fee agreements and an enlargement of the role
this type of fee armngement has played in vindicating the

~ignifirant brnf'fit io rlnimnnts who rhoosr to Jitigatr thrir individual daim.~ in a cla.-:>-actwn ronfext i~ the 1)rospect, of reducing their costs
of lit.igRtion, pa.rticnlarly aitornryR' fer.-<, by allocating o;uch co::;t,.: among all
member:; of the clas,; who bf'Iwfit from any recovf'ry. Typica1ly, the attorneys' ff'e::; of the named plamtiffH proceeding without reliance on Rule 23
could f'XCPE'd the value of fhe individual judgment in favor of any one
phtintiff. }lrre tlw dnmagf'H claimed by thE' two named plaiutiffs totaled
$1,006.00. Suc11 plaintiffs would be unlikely to obtain legal rcdre&; at an
accept<tble cost, unlcs~ coun::;el were motivated by thE' ff'e-sprE':tding incentive and proceeded on a contingency-fee b.asib. This, of 1course, js .a
centra1 'Concept of Ru1c '23.

(JA

J
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rights of individuals who otherwise might uot fine! it economically feasible to seek and obtain legal redress. The prospect (
of such fee arrangements offers advantages for litigation by
11amed plaintiffs in class actions as well B.S for their attorneys. 0
The financial incentive that class actions offer to the legal profession is ~ natural outgrowth of the increasing reliance on the
"private attorney general'' for the vindication of legal rights;
obviously this development has been facilitated by Rule 23.
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.
Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the
traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual
suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.
The distdct court's ruling on the certification issue is often
the most significant decision rendered in these class-action
proceedin;10 To deny the right to appeal sirnply because
the defen'Jant has sought to pay off the individual private
claims of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound
judicial administ-ration. Requiring multiple plaintiffs to
bring separate actions, which effectively could be "picked off"
by a defendant's tender of judgment before an affirmative
ruling on class certification could be obtained, obviously
would frustrate the objectives of class actions; moreover it
would invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating successive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement. It
would be in the interests of a class-action defendant to forestall any appeal of denial of class certification if that could
be accomplished by tendering the individual damages claimed
by the named plaintiffs. Permitting appeal of the district

I

@Thi:,; case does not misr any question as to the propriety of contl!3.&.ency-fee agreements.
\(?Srr Miller, An Overview of FPdrral Cla<l::l Action~ : Pa;-:i , Present, and
Future 12 (Federal J11dicinl Center 1978).

?'8-904-0PINION
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court's certification ruling-either at oncP by interlocutory
appeal, or after entry of judgment on the merits~also mini~
m.izes problems raised by "forum shopping" by putative dass
representatives attempting to locate a judge perceived as
sympathetic to cl~,ss actions. That small individual claims
otherwise might b~ limited to local and state courts rather
than a federal forum does not justify ignoring the overall
problem of wise use of judicial resources. su'cp policy con~
siderations are not irrelevant to the determination whether an
adverse proced4ral ruling on certification should be subject
to appeal at the behest of nameq plaintiffs. Courts have a
certain latitude in formulating the standards that govern the
appealability of procedural rulings even thollgh, as in this
case, the holding may determine the absolute finality of a
judgment, and thus, indirectly, determine whether the con~
troversy has become moot.
We conclude that on this record the District Cotlrt's entry
of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over th~ir objections
did not moot their private case or controversy, anq that re-.
spondents' individual interest in the litigation-as distin~
guished from whatever rnay be their representative responsi~
bilities to the putative class 11 -is sufficient to permit their
appeal of the adverse certification ruling.

Affirmed,

@Difficult que~Stions ari~;o as to what, if any, arf' tho named plaintiffs;
responsibilities to the putative class prior to certification ; this case does
not tequire us to reach these questions,

.:§\ 14trttt1 c <q onrt !1f Up• ~ttiir b $'it atr s
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November 16, 1979
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Re:

No. 78-904 -Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,
et al.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Attached is a revised draft of the opinion with
editorial changes throughout .
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OF

,JIJSTICI-: liNlRY A. AI.ACKI•1U N

Dear Chief :
Re :

No. 73 -·904 -· Oc:posit G11ar0nLy Na.U.ona l ~~ .. nk v. RopE r
No. 78 ·-") /2 · Unil:_cd ;:;_t:at:_es [';::nolc_CoJ,1fl1'n_ v~G_,,r_<,rJhl._y

Changes mad e in the last two drafts of your opinio n in
J3:<?_p_e.I._ require some mino r chan')cs in my proposed opinio n in
Gcr ~ighty .
The is p:r i !nar i.ly
oc;"llSC I (1uo i·e d nopP~ an d made
rcp(~al:ed citations to it.
I t;1i11k you wil l fin<1 those 111ino r
changes acce ptable .

L.

There is, in my view , one point of tension that remains
between the two opinions .
In my footnote 10, I stat e flatly
tha t we intimate no v j evv as to whether a n.l,nod plaintif f,
wh o se ttles his individua l claim afte r den i a l of class
certification, ma y appea l from that denia l.
I mu ch prefer
to retain that "no view" posture.
In footnote 5 of your
November
28 recirculation of Roper, however,
the Court
decides this i ss ue.
The basic authority for this is Lewis'
dissent in United Airlines which you an d Bryo n joined.
In
that diss e nt he states flatly that "this question has not
been decided by this Court," although he further states that
"the answer on principle is clear."
432 u.s., at 400.
As I
indicated in my letter of November 17, I am not convinced
that "the settlement situation is all that easy and clear."
I, for one, would not resolve the question by dictum, and I
would prefer that it be left open until it is specifically
presented to us.
I therefore could not join footnote 5 of
Rope r and would concur only in your result in that case if
that footnote remains.

Since;;;,

The Chief Justice
cc:
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TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM: Ellen
RE:

No. 78-904, Roper
1. Page 2, second full sentence.

I have changed this to

accord better with the Court's definition of the issue quoted on
page 4.

~

See what you think.
2. Page 2, first line of first full paragraph.

I do not

think there are any differences between the cases "material" to the
question presented here.

But the analysis differs slightly because

of potential economic interests in Roper.

I suggest we say only

that there are "some differences."
3. Page 4, last sentence of Part I.
to refer to a "client-less" class action.
the lawyer that has no "client."

It seemed odd to me

It is not the action but

Would "headless" do?

I stole

that phrase from an earlier dissentinq opinion from the CAS.
4.

Page 5, third sentence of first full paragraph.

fA~

-d'
I

phrased the "critical distinction" this way because it is much
closer to the language actually used by the Court (slip op. p. 9)
than what I had said in

~qhty,

which was: "between mootness

deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting from events
extrinsic to the litigation."

..

I still think that the language on

2.

}1A.Jo

page 5 is more

accurate. /-~-~

also serves us better here by setting

up the issue of "appealability" to which the Court (and the
dissent) then turn.

If you still prefer the other phraseology, we

__

.....___.,_
can simply lift it from 6eraqhty.

5.

Page FN1, notes 2 & 3.

The respondents asked the DC

to order an award of attorney's fees comprising 25% of the "funds
and judgment to be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly
situated."

Note 2 is intended to show only that the attorney's

-------

fees were not in · addition · to the damage recovery.

Note 3 then goes

on to attempt some reconstruction of what the actual fee
qrrangement is and whether the respondents would benefit by paying
a smaller proportion of their iudgment in fees if the class
recovers.

Although the arrangement is not entirely clear, it

appears to be a strc:~~~-~-2_~_%~~~~~e of whatever is

--.

recovered by plaintiffs
or the class. I do not believe they are
-···--· ....
__.... ,----.-_..,.. ~.

_

inconsistent, and have reworded note 2 to try to remove the
ambiguity.

6.

Page FN9, note 19.

I have changed this around

somewhat, mainly in the interest of brevity.
substantive concern.

- - -------------------------

But I have one

I'm not sure that the DC can exercise

equitable discretion for the petitioner in the class certification
ruling.

If it is assumed that the bank has violated the law and

the requirements of Rule 23 otherwise are met, I am not sure that a
DC should refuse to certify simply because the liability is too
~

large or because class members have taken no individual action

3.
while the class action was pending.

At least, it seems that there

is more room for equitable discretion on the question of tollinq of
the statute of limitations, which would arise if the DC were to
conclude that these respondents could not represent the class.
~~
footnote as written now is s qmewhat open-ended,- b6t refers
~ I)

specifically only to the tolling issue.

----------~..-....__--~-'-

r

If you want to refer

The _~

9~~

~~.

specifically to the certification issue, we might omit reference to
tolling altogether and put back in, at the beginning of the last
sentence, "When acting on today's mandate to reconsider class
certification, • • •
7.

"

I have inserted A and B headings in Part II, and also

the headinqs you had placed in Part III.
sections.

But that makes a lot of

Since Part II~ /2 paqes long, do you think we

could do without the subparts there? · Or, alternatively, what about
iust part A (comprising present parts A and B) and B (now C)?

~

CJ..

TO:

2/1/80

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM: Ellen
RE:

No. 78-904

Roper

David's review of the Chambers Draft in this case
provided some stylistic improvements, which I have marked on pages
2, 4, 7, and 8 of the draft, and correction of one minor inaccuracy
on page 2.

There is also a typo on page 6.

All of these could be

corrected on a second draft after circulation.

But David had two

somewhat more substantive concerns which I felt were well-taken.

-------·--

First, on pages 10-11, he was confused by the sudden jump
from the discussion of Electrical

Fittin~s

and Altvater as cases in

which there was no personal stake to the conclusion referring back
to the part of Electrical Fittings in which there was such a stake.
I have added a sentence that we both feel solves this problem.
Second, on pages 14-15, he felt the paragraph dealing with the
problems created by the Court's result was jumpy and unclear.

On

reflection, I agree, and have drafted a revised and I believe
clarified version of that paragraph.

(Rider A).

David also suggests that we strike the second paragraph
of Note 19, because the mere introduction of legislation is a slim
reed on which to rely.

In this instance, the bill we describe

would commit substantial resources of the Justice Department to

.'

2.

oversight of the new actions, a move that may not be popular in
Congress these days.

The bill may also have due process problems

in eliminating pre-judgment notice in some of these actions, but
providing that class members will be bound by the judgment.

I tend

to agree with David on this too.
I would recommend that we have the draft reprinted to
adopt the changes, together with any others you may wish to make,
and circulate on Tuesday.

February 6, 1980

No. 78-904

Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper

· Dear Bill:
·~

.

I now have my dissent in this case ready for
circulation.
In view, howpvor, of the tPnsion that may exist
between your "join" in this case and your being good enough
to join my Geraghty opinion, I am delivering two copies to
you before circulating it to other Chambers.
Althouqh I
doubt that I could make maior changes, if you have
suggestions as to language I certainly will consider them
sympathetically.
In your join note to me you stated that there is
some authority supporting Harry's position in Geraghty.
I
think on ~ can s a y that Geraghty mer9ly continued the process
in class actions of eroding Articl~ I I I that commenced in
Sosna and Bowman. One also must say, 1 think, that Geraghty
accelerates an~ significantly Pxtends that process - perhaps
to the point of making Article I I I meaningless in class
actions.
I do agree that dicta in McDonald and Coopers &
Lybrand support the result in Geraghty.
Again, however, - as
stated in my note 10 in Roecr - the dicta hardly ca.n be
viewed as r.efl0cting any considered judgment by the Court.

But back to the problem at hand, if you have
thoughts about changes in Roper do let me know.
ln view of
Harry's understandable discomfort, I would like to circulate
my dissent in Rope~ fairly promptly.
Sincerely,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
LFP/lab

~ttp-rtntt ~onrlttf

Hrt ~lt ~fattg

'Jfa,g~ ~. ~ 2llgf'l-~
CHAMBERS O F"

J USTICE POTTER STEWART

February 8, 1980

Re:

No. 78-904, Deposit Guaranty Nat.
Bank v. Roper

Dear Chief,
Lewis Powell •s dissenting op1n1on has
persuaded me that the issue in this case
is analytically almost identical to that
presented in the Geraghty case. Accordingly,
I have decided to join his dissenting opinion.
My regret for this shift from my previously expressed tentative view is mitigated
by the fact that it will in no way change the
result.
Sincerely yours,

ne

/.

'

\ I

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

/

/

~,_- ~~~_,s#:s~
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Jfa;gfri:ttgLm. ~. <1}.
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CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 8, 1980

Re:

No. 78-904, Deposit Guaranty Nat.
Bank v. Roper

Dear Lewis,
Please add my name to your dissenting
opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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Juetioe Powell

Mr. Ju.et1ce 'Bebnqu1SI

Fr ona U:F. Justice S'teY8tll!
C" ,..,..~Jle.ted ~

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.

FEB 1 l ,.,

In his dissenting opjnion MR. JUSTICE POWELL states that,
because the District Court erroneously refused to certify the
class and because no member of the class attempted to
intervene, the respondents "are the only .plaintiffs arguably

'

'

present in court."

Post, at 2.

I respectfully Clisagree.

In

my opinion, when a proper class action compla i nt . is filen, the
absent members of the class automatically become parties to the
case or controversy for purposes of the court's Article I I I
jurisdiction.

If the district judge fails to certify the

class, I believe they remain parties until a final
determination has been made that the action may not be
maintained as a class action.

Thus, the continued viability of

the case or controversy, as those words are used in Article
III, does not depend on the district judge's initial answer to
the certification question; rather, it Clepends on the
plaintiffs' right to have a class certifieo.~/

1/ The adoption of MR. JUSTICE POWELL's pos i tion woulo make
an-erroneous failure to certify a c l ass unreviewable even in a
case in whjch the name0 pJaintiff prevailed on the merits or

.
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Accordingly, even if the named plaintiff's personal stake
in the lawsuit is effectively eJiminater~l, no question of
mootness arises simply because the remaining aoversary parties
are unnamed.

Rather, the issue which arises is whether the

named plaintiff continues to be a proper class representative
for the purpose of appeaJing the adverse cJass determination.
See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
( s 1 i p . op. , at J 6) •

u.s.

In my judgment, in thjs case, as in

Geraghty, the named plaintiffs clearly remained appropriate
representatives of the class at least for that Jimited purpose.
I therefore join the opinion of the Court.

1/ (continued)
his claim.
Post, at ]1. Nothing in ejther Article III or Rule
23 of the Feaeral Rules of Civil Procedure requires the ~ourt
to reach such a counterproductive result. Rule 23 simply
establishes procedures for managing class actions~ it roes not
purport to determine whether the erroneous denial of class
certification may destroy the interests of absent class members
for purposes of Article III jurisdjction. Ana I fail to see
how the constraints imposed by Article III would be offenCier by
an appellate court's adjudication of a live controversy over
the right of absent class members to share in the jurgment won
by the class representative.
2/ I agree with the Court's determination in this case ana
in-Geraghty that the respective named plaintiffs continue to
have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to satisfy
Article II! requirements. See ante at 1.2~ Geraghty,
u.s.,
1
at
( s 11 p op. , at 15) .
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F:romt U:F. lootice SteY81'1S

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.

c~ ..,,..~1 lat.oo:

FEB 1 l "M

In his dissenting op j nion MR. JUSTICE POWELL states that,
because the District Court erroneously refused to certify the
class and because no member of the class attempted to
intervene, the respondents "are the only plaintiffs

'

present in court."

Post, at 2.

a~guab1y

I respectfully Cljsagree.

In

my opinion, when a proper class action compla i nt is file0, the
absent members of the class automatical l y become parties to
case or controversy for purposes of the court's Article ITI
jurisdiction.

If the district judge fails to certify the

class, I believe they remain parties until a final
determination has been made that the action may not be
maintained as a class action.

Thus, the contjnued viability

the case or controversy, as those words are used in Artjcle

~

answer (~

III, does not depend on the djstrict judge's initial
the certification question; rather, it Oepends on the

~)'1

plaintiffs' right to have a class certified.~/

~

~
~

ci.

1/ The adoption of MR. JUSTICE POWELL's pos i tion woul(! make~
an-erroneous failure to certify a c l ass unreviewable even in a -A:•
case in which the name~ plaintiff preva i Jed on the merits of· t.Ac.~
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Accordingly, even if the named plaintiff's personal stake
in the lawsuit is effectively eliminate0~1, no question of
mootness arises simply because the remaining aoversary parties
are unnamed.

Rather, the issue which arises is whether the

named plaintiff continues to be a proper class representative
for the purpose of appealing the adverse class determination.
See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
( s 1 i p .op. , at J 6 ) •

u.s.

In my judgment, in this case, as in

Geraghty, the named plaintiffs clearly remained appropriate
representatives of the class at least for that Jimited purpose.
I therefore join the opinion of the Court.

1/ (continued)
claim. Post, at 11. Nothing in either Article III or Rule
23 of the Feaeral Rules of Civil Procedure requires the ~ourt
to reach such a counterproductive result. RuJe 23 simply
establishes procedures for managing class actions~ it ooes not
purport to determine whether the erroneous denial of class
certification may destroy the interests of absent class members
for purposes of Article III jurisdiction. Ana I fail to see
how the constraints imposed by Article III would be offen~e0 by
an appellate court's adjudication of a live controversy over
the right of absent class members to share in the ju0gment won
by the class representative.
hi~

2/ I agree with the Court's determination in this case and
in-Geraghty that the respective named plaintiffs continue to
have a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to satjsfy
Article III requirements.
See ~nt~ at 12~ Geragh!Y, __ u.s.,
1
at
( s 1 i p op. , at 15) •
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurrjng.

In his dissenting opinion MR. JUSTICE

POWE~L

states that,

because the District Court erroneously refused to certify the
class and because no member of the class attempted to
intervene, the respondents "are the only plaintiffs arguably
present in court."

Post, at 2.

This position is apparently

based on the notion that, unless class members are present for
all purposes (and thus may be liable for costs, bound by the
judgment, etc.}, they cannot be considered "present" for any
purpose.

I respectfully disagree.

In my opinion, when a

proper class action complaint is filed, the absent members of
the class should be considered parties to the case or
controversy at least for the limited purpose of the court's
Article III jurisdiction.

If the district judge fails to

certify the class, I believe they remain parties until a final
determination has been made that the action may not be

J

,. .

..
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the case or controversy, as those words are used in Art. III,
does not depend on the district iudge's initial answer to the
certification question: rather, it depends on the plaintiffs'
right to have a class certified.!/

J/ There is general agreement that, if a class has been
properly certified, a case does not become moot simply because
the class representative's individual interest in the merits of
the litigation has expired.
In such a case the absent class
members' continued stake in the controversy is sufficient to
mainta~n its viability under Art. III.
In a case in which
certification has been denied by the district
CQUrt of appeals cannot determine whether the
class continue to
'n the ou
determ1ne whether the action can pro erly be maintained as a
class actiop.
I
1t 1s not a proper class act1on, then the
entire case is moot.
If, on the other hand, the district
court's refusal to certify the class was erroneous, I believe
there remains a live controversy which the cou~ts have
jurisdiction to resolve under Art. III.
I recognize that there is tension between the approach T
have suggested and the Court's sua sponte decision in
Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 u.s. 128. See also
FaSadena City Bd of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430.
As MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN po1nts out 1n Un1ted States Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, ___ u.s. ___ , ____n. 7 (slip op. at 12, n.
7), that case is distinguishable from this case because it
involved an attempt to litigate the merits of an appeal on
behalf of an improperly certified class.
I agree that the
Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits until
the threshold question of whether a class should have been
certified was resolved.
However, I disag~e with the Court's
conclusion that the entire action hacr-to be dismissed as moot.
In my view, the absent class members remained sufficiently
present so that a remand on the class issue would have been a
more appropriate resolutJon.
Just as absent class members whose status has not been
fully adjudicated are not "present" for purposes of litigating
the merits of the case, I would not find them present for
·
purposes of sharing costs or suffering an adverse judgment.
If
a class were ultimately certified, the class members would, of
course, retain the right to opt out.

*
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Accordingly, even if the named plaintiff's personal stake
in the lawsuit is effectively eliminated~/, no question of
mootness arises simply because the remaining
are unnamed.

adve~sary

parties

Rather, the issue which arises is whether the

named plaintiff continues to be a proper class representative
for the purpose of appealing the adverse class determination.

u.s.

Cf. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
( s 1 i p . op. , at , 6) •

In my judgment, in . thjs case, as in

Geraghtl, the named plaintiffs clearly remained appropriate
representatives of the class at least for that

1

jmite~

purpose.}/
I therefore jojn the opjnjon of the Court.

2/ I agree with the Court's determination in thjs case and
in-Geraghty that the respective named plaintiffs continue to
have a sufficient personal stake jn the outcome to satisfy
Article III requirements.
See ante at 12; Geraghtl, ___ U.S.,
at
( s 1 i p op. , at 15) •
3/ My view of the jurisdictional issue would not necessarily
enlarge the fiduciary responsibilitjes of the class
respresentative as MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests, see post, at 16
n. 2.
In any event, I do not share his concern abou~e
personal ljability of a class representative for costs and
attorneys' fees if the case is ultimately lost. Anyone who
voluntarily engages in combat--whether in t~e courtroom or
elsewhere--must recognize that some of his own blood may a 1 so
be spilled.
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MR. CHIEF JusncE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
lA
.L
We granted certiorari to decide whether a tender to named ~
zA / v~plaintiffs in a class action of the amounts claimed in their ~~ '\-~": ~individual capacities, followed by the entry of judgment in
~ ~fl their favor on the basis of that tender, over their objection, 4. ~
1 _ )A/- - -I
moots the case and terminates their right to appeal the denial ~
~,- .of class certification.
_
.f-V"\.;-

.

·

.

w~

.. .
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1
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Respondents, holders of credit cards issued on the "Bank- ~.f.
~
,
Americard" plan by petitioner Deposit Guaranty National J--.:-.--:::~=--:---------11
~
Bank, sued the bank in the United States District Court for
-"'
the Southern District of Mississippi , seeking to represent both ~
./lA~
their own interests and those of a class of similarly aggrieved /1..-~
1
~!ft.,
customers. The complaint alleged that usurious finance ~ ~
j ~~ _.
charges had been made against the accounts of respondents
/f) l 1
and a putative class of some 90,000 other Mississippi credit
~- 7
V'
card holders.
~ ~1
Respondents' cause of action was based on sections 85 and ~ ~
"'~ ·
S6 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C.§§ 85 and 86. Sec•
-I -~on 85 permits banks within the coverage of the Act to charge ?t, ~ y/fl 7
A~ •
~~terest "at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Terri-_ _ _ _ _ _ __
/{ -- /J .•~
\-tory, or District where the bank is located." In a case where
~ _ D~~
ighe~at~ of interest than allowed has been "k~owingl¥'~
~ '--

tJ

/}

i

q
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charged § 86 allows a person who has paid the unlawful inteF"
est to recover twice the total interest paid. 1
The modern phenomenon of credit card systems is largely
dependent on computers, which perform the myriad account.,
ing functions required to charge each transaction to the
customer's account. In this case, the bank's computer was
programmed so that, on the billing da.te, it added charges,
subtracted credits, added any finance charges due under the
BankAmericard plan, and prepared the customers' statements.
During the period in question, the bank made a monthly service charge of 1 Y2 % on the unpaid balance of each account.
However, customers were allowed 30 days within which to
pay accounts without any service charge. If payment was
not received within that time, the computer added to the customer's next bill llh% of the unpaid portion of the prior
bill. which was shown as the new balance. The actual finance
charges paid by each customer varied depending on the stream
of transactions and the repayment plan selected. In addition,
the effective annual interest rate paid by a customer would
vary because the same 1Jh% service charge was assessed
agaiust the unpaid balance no matter when the charged transactions occurred wl.th1n the 30-60-day period prior to the
billing date. 'this 1 ~% monthly service charge is asserted to
have been usurious because unrler certain circumstances the
resulting effective annual interest rate allegedly exceeded the
maximum interest rate permitted under Mississippi law.
The District Court denied respondents' motion to certify
the class, ruling that the circumstances did not meet all the
requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (3). 2 The DisRespondents' complaint also alleged a cause of action based on the
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1640 et seq., but that claim was
dismis~ed with prejudice at respondents' request.
2 The District Court, found that the requirements of Rule 23 (b) (3)
were not met becau,;e the putative class representatives had failed to est~bnsh the predolhinance of questions of law and fa~t common to claS&
1
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trict Court certified the order denying class certification for
discretionary interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1292 (b) ; the proceedings were stayed for 30 days pending
possible appellate review of the denial of class certification.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denied respondents' motion for interlocutory appeal. The
bank then tendered to each named pHtihtiff, in the form of an
"Offer of Defendants to Enter judgment as by Consent and
Without Waiver of Defenses or Adniission of Liabiiity," the
maximum amount that each couid have recovered. The
amounts tendered to respondents Roper and Hudgins were
$889.42 and $423.54, respectively, inciuding legai interest anJ
court costs. Respondents declined to accept the tender and
made a counteroffer of judgment in which they attempted to
reserve the right to appeai the adverse class certificatiort
ruling. This counteroffer was deciined by the bank.
Based on the bank's offer, the District Court entered judg.o
ment in respondents' favor, over their objection, and dis·
missed the action. The bank deposited the amount tendered
into the registry of the court, where it remains. At no time
} has any putative class member sought to intervene either to
litigate the merits or to appeal the certification ruling. It
appears that by the time the District Court entered judgment
and dismissed the case, the statute of limitations had run on
the individual claims of the unnamed class members. 3
members, :md because a class action was not shown to be a superior
method of adjudication due to (I) the availability of traditional procedures for prosecuting individual claims in Mississippi courts; (2) the
"horrendous penalty," which could result in "destruction of the bank" if
claims were successfully aggregated; (3) the substantive law of Mississippi
which views the aggregation of usury claims as undesirable; and (4) the
tremendous burden of handling 90,000 claims, particularly if counterclaims were filed.
3 Reversal of the District Court's denial of certification by the Court
of Appenb may rcla1e back to the time of the original motion for certification for the purposes of tollin_g the st{ttule of lin;) ita tions op the
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When respondents sought review of the class certification
ruling in the Court of Appeals, the bank argued that the case
had been mooted by the entry of judgment in respondents'
favor. In rejecting the bank's contention, the court relied in
part on United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385
(1977), in which we held that a member of the putative class
could appeal the denial of class certification by intervention,
after entry of judgment in favor of the named plaintiff, but
be{ore the statutorx time for armeal had_.!2!n. Two members
of the pa'iief read Rule 23 as providing for a fiduciary-type
obligatiou of the named plaintiffs to act in a representative
capacity 011 behalf of thr putative class by seeking certification at the outsrt of the litigation and by appealing an
advers(' certification ruling. In that view, the District Court
also had a responsibility to ensure than any dismissal of the
suit of the named plaintiffs did not prejudice putative class
membrrs. One member of the panel, concurring specially,
limited the ruling on mootness to the circumstances of the
case, i. e., that, after filing of a class action, the mere tender
of an offer of settlement to the named plaintiffs, without acceptance. does not moot the controversy so as to prevent the
named plan tiffs from appealing an adverse certification ruling.
Haviug rejected the bank's mootness argument, the Court
of Appeals reviewed the District Court's ruling on the class
certificatiou question. It concluded that all the requisites
of Rule 23 had been satisfied and accordingly reversed the
adverse certification ruling; it remanded with directions to
eertify the class and for further proceedings.
Certiorari was sought to review the holdings of the Court of
Appeals on both mootness and class certification. We granted
the writ limited to the question of mootness, to resolve conflicting holdings in the courts of appeals. 4 440 U. S. 945.
claims of the clas,., members. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432
U. S. 385 (1977)
1 E. g .. Winokur v. Bell Federal Savwgs and Loan Assn., 560 F. 2d 211
€CA7 1977}, C'ert. dt>vitrl, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) .
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· ~

We begin by identifying the interests to be considered when
questions touching on justiciability ~ presented in the class
action context.L!)'irst is the interest of the named plaintiffs:
their personal stake in the substantive controversy and their
related right_ as lli,i~ts in a federal court to employ in appropriate circumstances the procedural device of a Rule 23 class
action to pursue their individual claims. A sepa~ consideration, distinct from their private interests, i~ &
sponsibility of named plaintiffs to represent the collective
interests ~the putative class. Two other interests are
implicatcc@ th e righ~s 9J.. putative class members as potential intervenors, and tft#fesponsibilities of a district court to
protect both the @sent cl!§.s ~d the ij; tegrity of the judicial
process b~litori;"g the actions of the parties before it.
The Court of Appeals did not distinguish among these distillct interests. It reviewed all possible interests that in its
view had a bearing on whether an appeal of the denial of
certification should be allowed. These diverse interests are
interrelated, but we distinguish among them for purposes
of analysis, and conclude that resolution of the narrow ques/J ~
tion prcsen ted requires consideration only of the rivate '\ I~~
i~sl of the namec p aintiffs.
) ~ ~
I
~
A
IA.A/~
The criti~Unquirl, to which we now turn, is whether retrt~711
spol!_,dents' i~~nd prixaje c~r controversy became
moot hy reason of petitioner's tender or the entry of judgment
in respoud(•n ts' favor. Rcsponden ts, as holders of credit canis
issued by tlw ba11k , claiuwd damages in their private capacities
for alleged usurious interest charges leviPcl in violation of federal law. Th<'ir complaint asserted that they had sufi'er<'cl
actual dan1age as a result of illegal acts of the bank. The
complain L satisfied the case or con trovcrsy requiremeut of
Art. Il1 of the Constitution.

78-904-QPINION
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As parties in a federal civil action, respondents exercised
their option as putative members of a similarly situated cardholder class to assert their claims under Rule 23. Their right
to assert their own· claims in the framework of a class
action is clear. However, the right of a litigant to emnloy
Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillar~ to the litigation
of substantive cla1ms. Should these substantive claims be~
come moot~ the Art. III sense, by settlement of all personal
claims for example, the court retains no jurisdiction over the
controversy of the individual plaintiffs.
The factual context in which this question arises is important. At no time did the named plaintiffs accept the tender
in settlement of the case; instead, judgment was entered in
their favor by the court and the case was dismissed over their
continued objections. 5 Although a case or controversy is
mooted in the Art. III sense upon payment and satisfaction of
a final, unappealable judgment, a decision that is 11final" for
purposes of appeal does not absolutely resolve a case or controversy until the time for appeal has run. Nor does a ~
confession of judg~nt by defen:dants on ·1 :ss than all _the
is~s moot- an entii~case; other J.ssu~ iii the case may be
appealable. We can assume th~ judgme nt f ully satisfyin ~plaintiffs' private substantive
cla1ms
preclude t eir appeal on t at aspect of the
,___., wo
final judgment; however, it does not follow that this circum5 We note that Rule 2:3 (e) prc:;cribe:; certain responsibilitic:; of a district
court in a eaHe brought a:; a cia~;::; action: once a c.!iu>~ i:; certified, a clas~:;
action may not. b<-' "dismi,;sc•d or compromi:;l:'d withont:the flJ)provaJ of the
court , and notirr of the propo:;ed di::;mi:-;;;a] or compromil:le shall be given
to all m<'mbc· r~ of the cia~ in such manner as the court direct:;." Coneeivably, there abo may bt• eirrum:;tanct'ti, which need n2,t l!.e define~ ,
where the diHt rid rourt ha:s n re,.;pon:sibility, prior to approval of a l:lettlcment and it" di~miH:saJ of the clas:; actiou, to provide an opportunity for
intervention b~· a member of the putative cla:;s for the purpose of appealing the denial of cla::;s certification. Such intervention occurred in United'
4irliues, !lie . v. lvfcDunaltl, 432 U.S. 3~5 (1977).
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stance would terminate the named plaintiffs' right to take an
appeal on the issue of class certification.
Congress has vested appellate jurisdiction in the courts of
appeals for review of final decisions of the district courts. 28
U. S. C. § 1291. Ordinarily, o,gly a 12arty aggrieved by_a
judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statuto?y right~al ilierefrom. A party who receives illthat
henas sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and ca.nnot appeal from it. Public Service
Comm'n v. Brashear Freight Lines Inc., 306 U.S. 204 (1939);
New York Telephone Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645 (1934);
Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory, 15 How. 451 (1853);
J. W. Moore, Federal Practice para. 203.06. The rule is one
of federal appellate practice, however, derived fron1 the stat~
utes graining appe1late jurisdiction and the historic practices
of the appeTiat e court8;1t "does not h ave its source in the juris~
diciloil ar llmit~s of Art. III. In· an appropriate case
appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to
the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has
prevailed on the merits, so long as tl_!.at 2,art~ retains a s)&ke
in _{he a,pp~eaJ satisfying the requirements of Art. IIV'
An illustration of this principle in practice is Electrical Pilt'ings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 ( 1939). In
that case. respondents sued petitioners for infriHgement of a
patent. In such a suit. the defense may prevail either by
successfully attacking the validity of the patent or by sue~
cessfully defending the charge of infringement. In Electrical

~

~~
~
~,c~
e-v~~
~)~
~~

~J-tu...t'

a Tlw di~til'llt t'on,:tru<:':s tlw l\otiel• of App<'al as a complete abaudomueut
by re~<pmH.Ients of tlwir Art. Ill pl'l'sonal stake in the appeal. Pust, nt 3.
Such il:' not tlw ea~e. Indeed, th!' ap]l!'al wars taken by the named plaintjiL-:, nlthough it:-: onl.\' ]HII'JlOS(' Wll~ to !'CCIII'(' class certi fication. Tl~ugE
out thi~ litigation, r<':-:pondenti'i havl' a:;:<Prted as their Jersoual ~tak<' iu the
a •· t H'ir dP:<in· to ~ uf t J •• ·c· •,.;,;fnl elaRs 1tigants a portion of those
-fe<'s and expenH'" that have be· n incurred in t is Ihgatimi anil for which
thC'~' Hl:'sC:rtH ~ontinning oblig t.tion. See Plaintiffs-Appellant:;' Brief in
Oppo,:ition to Motion to Di~ml."' Ap]wul uud Reply Brief in No. 76-:~600,,
01ed in the C<>mt <>f Apt""'" f ,. tho Fifth Ci<euit 4, 12, 16, 17, . ~

~s~~

~·~~
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Fittings the decree of the District Court adjudged the patent
valid but dismissed the complaint for failure to prove infringement. The respondents did not appeal, but petitioners sought
review in the Court of Appeals of so much of the decree as
adjudicated the patent valid. Respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal "based on the ground that the appeal can
raise no questions not already moot because of the fact that
the [petitioners] have already been granted in the dismissal
of the bill a.ll the relief to which they are entitled." 100 F.
2d, at 404. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on
this ground after ruling that the decree of the District Court
would not in subsequent suits, as a matter of collateral estoppel
or otherwise, influence litigation on the issue of the patent's
validity. On review here, this Court did not question the
view that the ruling on patent validity would have no effect on
subsequent litiga.tion. Nevertheless, a unanimous Court
allowed the appeal to reform the decree:
"A party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in
his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a review of
findings he deems erroneous which are not necessary to
support the decree. But here the decree itself purports
to adjudge the validity of [the patent], and though the
adjudication was immaterial to the disposition of the
cause, it stands as an adjudication of one of the issues
litigated. We think the petitioners were entitled to have
this portion of the decree eliminated, and that the Circuit Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, as we have held
this Court has, to entertain the appeal, not for the purpose of passing on the merits, but to direct the reformation of the decree." 307 U. S., at 242 (footnotes
omitted) .
Although the Court limited the appellate function to reformation of the decree, the holding relevant to the instant
· case was that the federal courts retained jurisdiction over the
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controversy notwithstanding the District Court's entry of
judgment in favor of petitioners. This Court had the question of mootness before it, yet because policy considerations
permitted an appeal from the District Court's final judgment
and brcause petitioners alleged a stake in tho outcome,
the case was still live and dismissal was 110t required by
Art. IlL The Court perceived tho distinction between the
definitive mootness of a case or controversy, which ousts the
jurisdiction of the federal courts and requires dismissal of the
case, and a judgment in favor of a party at an intermediate
stage of litigation, which does not in all cases terminate the
right to appeal. 7
B
'We vit>w the cl('llial of c1as~ certification as an example of a
procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a liti ·ation, th;t'
is appeal~brc:-;ftt>r Uw Pntry of nal JU gment." The Jenial
of class certification stauds as an adj uclicatiou of one of the

tn a ,.;pn"'e, tht• pc•titioner in Elecirical Fittings ~ought review of the
Distrirt Court'· prorPdural error. The Di~trict Court was correct in
inquiring fully into the v:~lidity of the patent, Sinclair & Carroll Co. v.
Interchemical Corp., 325 U. S. 327, 3:30 (1945), but was incorrect to adjudge the patent valid after ruling that there had been no infringement.
By doing so the District Court had decided a hypothetical controversy,
Altvater 1. Freeman. ;~JD F. R :3.'59, ;{():3 ( Hl·!:l): yet petitioner:; eould take
the appeal to correct this error because there had been an adverse de{ ci~ion on a litigated i~suc, they eontinuecl to a~~crL an interc~t in the outcom<> of that i~u<•, and !'or poli<·~· n·a~on ~-; this Court <·on~idercd the procedural quc•stion of sufficient importan<·P to allow an appeal.
s ln Cl!~l!l'li ct· L!fbrand '. Li'l'l.'8a!f. ,n7 U. ~. -!0:3 (1978), we held that
the clas CE'rtificatfon r uling did not fail Within that narrow category of
circumstnnrP~ where appeal wa;; allowNl pnor to final judgment as a matter of right under 28 F. S. C. § 1291. However, our ruling in Livesay was
not intPndrd to precludP motion;; undC'r 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (h) Rrrking
discrrtionary interloeutory appeal for revil'\1' of the rrrtificntion ruling.
See 437 U. S., at 474-475. ln 'omr ra.~rs ;;ueh an appeal would promise
substantial saving" of time and resources or for other rrason~ should be
viewed hospitably.
7
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issues litigat<'cl. As in Electrical Fittings, the respondents
h<'re. who assert a continui1lg stake• in the ou come of the
appeal, \\'er<' entitled to hav<' l£.h'is porti01 o th..L.]2istrict
Court's judgm<'nt reviewed. TVe hold tha th<' C'ourt of
Appeals i1ad .lui~ cti~to entertaiu the app al only to review
the ass<'rted procedural <'rror, not for the urpose of passing
on the n1('ri ts of th<' substantive con trover y.
vVe agrrP "·ith th<' dissent. post, at 9, t at federal app<'llatc
ju,risdrctionl~lhJlit!'d l )y_J h<' ap12ellant' personal stake in _the
appeal. I~~)OJ~H ts J;';V(. ;;7'~tained throughout this appelIat;'litigation that thry rrtai1~a continuing individual int(•rest
in thr rc•solution of tlH' rlass certification question. Ree n. 6,
supra. This individual intNest may be satisfied fully once
effect is giv<'ll to tlw dc•eision of the Court of Apjwals setting
a!'lidr what it hrld to b<' a11 erronrous District Court ruling on
class c<'rtification. In Electrical I~~ittings, supra, the petitioners assc>rtcd a concc•rn that their success in some uuspccifiPtl
future li LigaLion would be i mpaircd by stm·e decisis or collateral estoppel applieation of thP District Court's ruli11g on
patent validity. This concern supplied the personal stake in
the appeal rc•quirPd by Arl. III. lt. was satisfied fully \vlwn
the p<'Litionc'rs srrured an ap]wllatc- dC'cision elimillating tho
erroneous ruling from the decree. After the drcree in Electrical Vittinys was rC'fol'llwd. the tlwn unreviewable judgnwnt
put an C'lHl to th<' litigation. mooting all substantive claims.
Here the procC'rdings aftc•r remand may follow a diffrcnt pat~
tern. but tlwy are goYNlH'cl by tlw samC' principles.
\Ve cannot say (h•finitively what will becorne of respondents' continuing personal iuterest in their own substantive controversy with the p<'titioncr when this case returns to the District Court. Petitioner has denied liability to thP respondC'nts,
but tendC're<l \vhat tlwy appear to regard as a "nuisance settlement.., Hesponden ts ha vc' JH•ver accepted the tender or
judgment as satisfactio11 of tlwir substantive claims. C'f.
Oover v. ~I' IW'artz, 1:~:~ F. 2d 541 (CA2 HJ42) , cikd by the

, r, '"'
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dissent, post, at 10, a11d n. 12. The judgment of the District
Court accepting petitioner's tender has now been set aside by
the Court of Appeals. We ueecluot speculate on the correctness of the action of the District Court in accepting the tender
in the first instance, or on whether petitioner may now withdraw its tender.
Perhaps because the question was not thought to be open
to doubt we have stated in the past, without extended discus- /
sion, that "an order denying class certification is subject to
effective review after final judgment at the behest of the
named plaintiff. . . ." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U. S. 4()3, 4()\) ( Hl78). In Livesay, we unanimously rejected
the argunwnt. advanced in favor of affording prejudgment
appeal as a matter of right, that an adverse class certification
ruling came within the "collateral order" exception to the
final-.i udgment rule. The appealability of the class certification qu<'stion after final judgmrnt 011 the merits was an inlportaut ingrcdit>11t of our ruling in Livesay. For that proposition,
the Court cit<·d United Airl-ines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S.
385 (lD77). That case involved, as does this, a judgment
enten'd on the merits i11 favor of the named plaintifl'. The
McDonald ( 'ourt assumed that the named plain tift' would have
been en titled to appeal a dPnial of class certification.
The use of the class action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for named
p1aintift's; it may motivate them to bring cases that for
economic reasons might uot be brought otherwise. 9 Plainly
A ~ignific·nnt h·nefit to claimant~ who ehoo~c to litigatt> thPir individual claim · in a class-action context is the prospect of reducing their costs
of litigation, particularly attorneys' fees, by allocating such costs among all
members oJ the elass who benefit from any recovery. Typically, the attorneys' fees of a nnmNI plaintiff pro<'l'<'ding without reliance on Hulc 23
could excped the value of the individual judgment in favor of any one
plaintiff. Here the damap;Ps claimed by the two named plaintiffs totaled
$1,006.00. Such plmntlifs wo1.Jld be unlikely to obtain le~al .redress at a~
0

~
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there has bPen a geowth of litigation stimulated by contingentfee ageeemcuts and all enlargement of the role this type of
fee arrangement has played in vindicating the rights of
iJI(lividuals who otherwis(• might not consider it worth the
cancll(• to embark on litigation in which the optimum result
might be more than consumed by the cost. The prospect of
such fee arrangements offers advantages for litigatioll by
nanwd plaintiffs in class actions as well as for their attomeys. 10
For l)('ttcr ot· worse, the financial inc<>ntive that class actions
offer to the legal profession is a natural outgrowth of the
increasing reliance on tlw "private attonwy general'' for the
villdication of legal rights; obviously this development has
bee11 facilitatPd by H ule 23.
TlH' aggregation of individual claims in the context of a
class-wide suit is all evolutionary response to the cxiste11Ce of
injuries umemediPd by tlH' regulatory action of government.
Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the
traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual
suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.
That there is a potential for misuse of the class action mechanism is 1obvious. Its benefits to class members are often
nomii1al 1and symbolic, with persons other than class members becdming the chief beneficiaries. But the remedy for
abust>s doPs not liP in denying the relief sought here, but with
re-examination of Ruk :2:3 as to untoward consequences.
The district court's ruling on the certification issue is often
the most significant decision rendered in these class-action
prOC('<'ding. 11 To de11y tlw right to appeal simply lwcause
acceptable cost, unless counsel were motivated by the fee-spreading incentive and proceeded on a contingency-fee basis. This, of course, is a
central concept of Rule 23.
fu 'l'hi,; c ·u~e dor,: not rai"(' un~ que,:1ion m; to the propne1y of t;on-

1 tingen1-fl'('

ag rcl•mcnt~ .

:u Sl'(' >\li!IPr , A11 0Vl'I'VH'W of Fed(•nd C'la~~

Future 12 (Federal Judicial Center 197 ) .

Aetions:

Pa~t , Prc~cnt, m1ct

'I
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the defendant has sought to "buy off" the individual private
claims of the named plaintiffs would be contrary to sound '
judicial administration. Requiring multlp1e plaintiffs- to 1
bring separate actions, which effectively could be "picked off".
by a defendant's tender of judgment before an affirmative
ruling on class certification could be obtained, obviously
would frustrate the objectives of class actions; moreover it
would invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating successive suits brought by others claiming aggrievement. it
Would be in the interests of a class-action defendant to forestall any appeal of denial of class certification if that could
be accomplished by tendering the individual damages claimed
by the named plaintiffs. Permitting appeal of the district
coures certification ruling-either a.t once by interlocutory
appeal, or after entry of judgment on the merits-also minimizes problems raised by 1'forum shopping, by putative das~
representatives attempting to locate a judge perceived as
sympaUwtic to class actions.
F.rhat s111all individual claims otherwise might bP limited to
local and state courts r-ather than a federal forum does not
justify ignoring the overall problt-m of wise use of .i udicial
rc'sourc<'::;. Such policy considerations art- not irrelevant to the
determi11ati0l~·he£fier an iW"v<'rse procNlural ruling on certification should be subject to appeal at the behest of named
plaintiffs. Courts have a certain latitude in formulating fhc
standards that govrrn the app<'alability of procedural ruli11gs
cveJl though, as in this cas<>, the holding may determine the
absolute finality of a judgment. and thus, iudirectly, det<'nnine
whether the controversy has become moot.
We conclude that on this record the District Court's entry
of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over their objections
did not moot their private case or controversy, and that respondents' individual interest in the liti a 'on-as distinguished fromw hateve"'; JXta y be eir representative responsi-

----

~~~
~
~~
,.....--.
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bilities to the putative class 12-is sufficient to permit their
appeal of the adverse certification ruling.
Affirmed.

'
i
I

.
::.

c .fDiilicult qup;;tiou:; arise HH to what, if any, are the namrcl plaintiffs'
rcspon>;ibil it ie:s to the putative class prior to certification; this cas_e d.ors.
not require tt$ to rcac:h these qpestioos

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Brennan
M'r. Justice Stewart
Ur. Justioe ib1 te
~r. Ju~ tioe lersball
Mr. J w Uoe Blaokmun
Mr . ,J\ta t7 <'13 Powell
U.r . J t:..R';t0 e ~lmquist
F~m:

Mr . Justice Stevens
,..,.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

I

No. 78- 904

Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson , Mississippi, Petition er,
tf.1e United fltates Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Robert L. Roper ct al.
Circuit.
[February - , 1D80]

Mrt.

JtrSTICJ<J, ''l'EVL r s,

eoncurring.

In his dis enting opinion 1\IH. JrsTICF.J PowELL states that,
because the District ( 'ourt <'rronc•ously refused to certify t.he
class and because no mcmlwr of the class attempted to intervenE', the respo ndents "arc the only plaintiff's arguably present
in court. •· Post, aL 2. This position is apparently based on
the notion that., un kss class nH•mbcrs arp present for all
purposrs (and thus may be liable for costs, bound by the
judgment, etc.), tlwy cann ot lw considered "prPsettt'' for any
purpos<'. I respectfully disagreP. In my opinion, when a
proper class-action complaint is filed, the absent members of
the cla~s should h<' considerPd parti<'S to the case or controversy at least for tlw limited purpose of the court 's Art.
ITI jurisdiction. If the district judge fails to certify thr class,
I believe they remain parties until a final determination ha.S
b0en mack that th<' action may not be maintainrd as a class
action. Thus. th<> conti nued viability of the case or controversy, as those words arc used in Art. II[ , does not depend on tlH" district judge's initial answ<'r to the• certification
question ; rather, it. depPtHls 011 th<:' plaintiffs' right to have a
class ccrtificcl.1
There is grneral agrrrmE'nt. that, if n eln»ti has IX'rn propE'rly certifird,
lhP ra~<' do\'~< not l! C'C'O ilH' moot s imp!~ · h<•rausr th\' <'lfl"" n •prP~<·nlativl' 's
indiYidual intcn·~t in th r merit,- of thr litigation ha ~ <'xpilwl. ln ~<llth a
ra.~n tlw ah:<rut class mrmi><'r::;' eontintH•d stak<• in thr rolltrov<·r~~- is
··ufficicnt to mai11tnin it::; viability undrr Art. Ill. Iu a ra~<l' i11 which
1
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Accordingly, even if the named plaintiff's personal stake in
the lawsuit is effectively eliminated,~ no question of mootness
arises simply because the remaining adversary parties are
unnamed. Rather, the issue which arises is whether the
named plaintiff continues to be a proper class representative
for the purpose of appealing the adverse class determination.
Cf. East 'l'exas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 }
U.S. 395, 403-406; United States Parole Comm'n v. Gerayhty,
U. S. - , - (slip op., at 16). In my judgment, in this
crrtification has been denied by the }listrict Jl'o urt , however, a court of
appeal:;; cannot determine whether the members of the class continue to
have a. stake in the outcome until it has determined whether the action
can properly be maintained as a class action . If it is not a proper class
:tction, then the entire case is moot. If, on the other hand, the y{istrict
ylourt ':; rpfu"al lo crrtify the class was erroneous, I believe there remains
a live controversy which the court~ have jurisdiction to resolve under
Art. III.
I recognizE' t hat there is tension between the approach I have suggested
and the Court's sua sponte decision in Indianapolis School Comm'rs v.
Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128. See abo Pasadena City Bd. of Education v.
Spangle~', 427 U. S. 424, 430. As MR. Ju s'l'ICE BLACKMUN points out in
Uf!-ited States Parole Comrn'n v. Geraghty, U. S. - , - , n. 7 (slip
op., at 12, n . 7), that ca~(· i~ distinguishable f rom this case bPcause it
involVE'd an attempt to litigat e thr merits of au appeal on behalf of an
improprrl)· crrtified cla!:'~. I ag ree that the Court could not properly
consider tht> merit>< until the threshold question of whether a class should
ha~e been certified wa~; re~olvrd. However, I di~a gree with the Court's
eorlclu ·ion that the mtirP artion had to be dismi~sed a::; moot. In my view,
the absrnt rla~s member~ rrmained ::;ufficiently present ~o that a remand
011 the cia::;:; i~::;ue would hav(• been a more appropriate re::;olution.
Just as absent cla><S member::; whose status has not been fully adjudicated
are not "prPsent" for purpc~;es of litiga ting the merits of the case, I
would not find them present for purposes of sharing costs or suffering an
adverse judgment.. If a cla:;s were ultimately certified, the class members
would, of course, retain the right to opt out.
~I agree with the Court'~ detcrmina tion in this case and in Geraghty
that the respective named plaint iffs continue to have a sufficient personal
st~1 ke in the outcomr to satisfy Art.. III requirements. See ante, at 12;
Gerayhty, - U. S,, a t - (slip op., ttt 15).

f
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case, as in Geraghty, the named plaintiffs clearly remained
appropriate representatives of the class at least for that limited
purpose. 8
I therefore join the opinion of the Court.

8 My view of the jurisdictional issue would not necessarily enlarge the
fiduciary responsibilities of the class repre::;entative as MR. JusTICE PowELL
sugge::;t::;, see post, at 16, n. 2. In any event, I do not share his concern
about the personal liability of a clru;s repre::;entative for co<>1:s and attomeys' fees if the case is ultimately lost. Anyone who voluntarily engages
in combat-whether in the coul'troom or el::;ewhere-must recognize that
some of hi ~ own blood may be spilled.

-er 2/21/80

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM: Ellen
RE:

Nos. 78-572 and 78-904 Roper and Geraghty
The Chief's revision of the Roper opinion

substantially changes his analysis.

In his new page of text, in

the new FN 6, and in a number of new qualifying phrases
throughout the opinion, the Chief now rests squarely on the

---------- -

--

respondents' alleged interest in sharing costs with a prevailing
class.

~

Much of the rest of the opinion, including the entire

discussion of the Electrical Fittings case is, I believe, now
entirely surplusage.

In fact he now says that "[wle agree with

the dissent, post, at 9, that federal appellate jurisdiction is

I

limited by the appellant's personal stake in the appeal." P. 10.
In light of these changes, I think that our discussion
of the Court's unprecedented elimination of Art. III
requirements from the realm of appellate jurisdiction, and our
explanation of Electrical Fittings, are now unnecessary.

We

will also have to redo our summary of the Court's analysis, and
I believe that we should now put our refutation of the "cost( spreading interest" analysis in text.

Fin~lly,

we will need to

change our discussion of Roper in Geraghty, since the Court no
longer appears to rest on the "critical distinctiOn" we

2.

identified there.

The Court does not use the language "critical

dis.tj. nction" a ~ -IDG-fe.---se e ·p~ 9.

More significantly, its

present reliance on an asserted personal stake in the outcome
makes it unclear that there is any distinction at all.
In short, I believe that substantial adjustments are
necessary because

--

points.

th~

Chief has accepted one of our major

There need be no substantive changes, however, and the

adjustments will be largely deletions. I am proceeding on this,

subject to your approval, but we certainly will not be ready to
bring it down on Monday.

'·

/

.:§u.prtmt Qitmri of t4t 1fuitt~ ~taltg
Jfagltittghtn. ~. <!}. 2llgt'l>~
C HAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

February 25, 1980

Re:

/

78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper

Dear Lewis:
Re your February 25 memo, I agree my February 21
draft has more than the form and stylistic changes of
all the preceding drafts, but it hardly rises to
the levels of a "new analysis."
should try to meet

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

I concluded that I

strong February 13 dissent.

February 25, 1979

78-904 Deposit Guaranty v. Roper

Dear Chief:
The fifth draft of your opinion, recirculated on
Thursday, substantially rewrites its analysis.
rl''

This will require equally substantial rewriting of
my dissent. As we are in the middle of our February arqument
sessions, I may not be able to recirculate until the end of
this week.
Sincerely,
I"

,.:;

•:,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

,,

er 3/3/80

TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM: Ellen
RE:

No. 78-904 Roper.
I have made the language changes you suggested, and

rewritten Part liB based on a combination of your proposed redraft
and footnote.

The result shortens my dr a ft by about a

also somewhat shorter than your first proposal.

page~

it is

I have tried to

make less of an issue of attorney•s fees by combining the costs and
fees issue.

I believe this is an accurate way to view the case:

fees are simply one other item of the "expenses" that are claimed
in the vaguest terms and in any event legally irrelevant.

I have

made these two points generally about the entire expense question.
As redone, I don•t think the "cannot be traced" section is overly
long, and I don•t think it is marginally relevant.
as a matter of

fac~

I suspect that,

there are some costs that have not been

a~tt 1

recou?edJ that would be sufficient - if petr were liable for them to satisfy Art. III under the Court•s precedents.

Consequently, I

would recommend that we leave in text the few remaining sentences
in this draft that explain what would happen if the record did
support the Court•s assumptions.

1 ~r7 Mo.d.L 0 #I tl 0V o/1 CIM.f
tsJ- s~~·P.M~ DF f~ f-· ]lL~ ·
[I~~

0'"-.

fd 1
I

LFP/lab

3/3/80

u.

S. Parole Commission v. Geraqhty

Remind me to talk to Ellen about the possibility of
adding a footnote with a Cf. reference to HAB's dissent in
Vitek in which he addresses the subject on Article III
requirements.

.,.· J'

March 10,

Guaranty v. Roper

Dear
Here is the proposed revision of my dissent in this
case.

~""·'4.,,'(~,~~
l; .

Althouqh the rationale has not been chanqed, I have
made substantial revisions to meet the Chief's even more
substantial chanqes in his opinion for the Court. In his
present draft, the Chief - unlike Harry's opinion in Geraqhty
- recoqnizes what I have thouqht were settled Article III
principles. He then misapplies them, as I view it, by
findinq the continuinq "personal stake" in the sharinq of
fees and expenses. But the fee arranqement was a 25%
continqency, and no present expenses are identified for which
petitioner has any responsibility.

.f;

I send this to you before circulatinq as you are my
only constituent. If you find it to be satisfactory, I will
recirculate promptly and possibly these cases can be brouqht
down next week.
I hope you had a qood trip to San Francisco.
SincerES>ly,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss

·(

,jupumt <!}curl~tf tlft ~a .§bdtg
JbtsJri:nghttt. ~. Q]'. 2.0:.;t'!'
CHAMBERS

0~

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 10, 1980

Re:

No. 78-904, Deposit Guaranty v. Roper

Dear Lewis,
Your revised dissenting op1n1on seems
fine to me, and I am glad to continue to add my
name to it.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell

~-~~~~
Qfttnrl of t~t ~ b .:%>tatt11
~as-fri:nghrn. ~. Qf. !W,?)~2

;%>u.pumt

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 13, 1980

Re:

78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE :
The opinion circulated March 12 is being amended as
follows:
Line 4, second paragraph, page 6, by inserting
after "court" "without their consent"
Line 5, second paragraph, page 6, by inserting
a new sentence:
"Neither the rejected tender nor the dismissal
of the action over plaintiffs' objections mooted
the plaintiffs' claim on the merits so long
as they retained an economic interest in class
certification."

;§u.pumt Q}ou.rt ttf tqt 'Jtlnitt~ .§tatts
~asqingtan, ~ . (!}. 2!1.?'~2
CHAMB E R S OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTI CE

March 14, 1980

Re:

78-904 - Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
A small change in this op~n~on is made to add
the essence of note 6, on page 7, to a sentence on
page 10, line 5, first full paragraph, following
the word "question":
"in their desire to shift part/, of the costs of
litigation to those who will share in its
benefits if the class is certified and
ultimately prevails."

.:§u.prnnt

<!Jaurt llf t4.t ~b .§taic£l

~a.sipngtllt4 ~.

<!f.

211~)!.~

CHAMB E R S OF

TH E CHI E F ..JU S T ICE

March 14, 1980

Re:

N~i~

v~

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

~)~~ '
.~UAA~

(l)C\ V\U

A small change in this opinion is made to add
the essence of note 6, on page 7, to a sentence on
page 10, line 5, first full paragraph, following
the word "question":
"in their desire to shift part/, of the costs of
litigation to those who will share in its
benefits if the class is certified and
ultimately prevails."

~
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March 14,
~, "

JJ•

'

Deposit Guaranty v. Roper
Dear John:
I did not see your new footnote 3 until after we
adjourned today. Perhaps my use of the term "fiction" did
not convey my thought.

'> ,

You have now added citations to cases that require
some response, and I also take this opportunity to clarify
the use of the term "fiction". I have trie~ to make clear
that it seems to me you would r.reate 11 leqal fiction for the
purpose of achieving review of denial of certificAtion. This
might be one way to achieve this purpose, although I would
prefer that it be worked out more can:• fully in a much needed
revision of Rule 23.
I suggest, that you and I agree on our "battle of
.,, ·
footnotes" before we recirculat~. An~, if you would prefer
that I omit the word "fiction", I will bP most happy to do
so.

Sincerely,

..
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Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

Respondents are two credit card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Banking Act and Mississippi law.1/

They filed this

action in late 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for a total of$ 683.30 and $ 322.70
respectively. App., at 59.

They also sought relief on behalf of

a class alleged to include 90,000 people who are said to be
entitled to some 12 million dollars in damages.

After four

years of litigation, the District Court denied respondents'
motion for class certification.

Seven months later, petitioner

tendered to respondents the full amount of their individual
claims, plus legal interest and court costs.

Over respondents'

objection, the District Court entered final judgment in their
favor.
It is not disputed that respondents themselves have
received everything they could have recovered from petitioner in
this action.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,

2.

however, rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and
reversed the denial of class certification.

This Court affirms

the judgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying a case
or controversy remaining to be ljtigated between petitioner and
respondents.

The Court defines the issue as appealability

rather than mootness, and bases its decision on policy grounds.
But the crucial distinction does not withstand analysis.

Since

the respondents lack a continuing interest in the outcome of the
litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless to hear their
appeal.

Accordingly, I dissent.
I

This case, like United States Parole Commission v.
Geraghty, post, at

, requires us to decide whether putative

class representatives may appeal the denial of class
certification after receiving everything they sought on their
own behalves.

~

'l1..()

Since the District Court refused to certify the

~ ~ ~LI;_ fi; ~~)

~

court. Yet

"'

respondents have no continuing interest in the injuries alleged
in their complaint.

They sought damages only; they have

received those damages in full.

!Y

Respondents have not suggested

that success on the certification motion would entitle them to
additional relief from the petitioner.~/

Their personal claims

to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was

t:jv~~JU)~~ftul-~

~~ · nd.y ~ ~ 3.
~~ ~'lv t. l-t4·11~- ~~~ t.,ll~- ;t,_J'\ ~k-h...l Ut.~~A. •• fL ~~J'-- ~
----::::::::::~~r:.~~k,u_.- ~ ~~ ~ ~
~ k ~...,.. .,_.~e«« J-,;Zi,.,_st
in their own names. I
A::> J4u,-~J.?i;D
~ ..., 14.- .A~L --.. -.. ~k ~~ ,,
In my view, Art. III and the precedents of this ~.._L ·
, .,-~

C1-k./z . s~
a&...a..cA s-.

Court require a dismissal in these circumstances.
(POWELL, J . , dissenting).

post, at

See Geraghty,

There is no

suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable of repetition ,
yet evading review." See Gerstein v . Pugh, 420

~~~h.

t')UL

u. s.

103, 110-111

t>f ~ ~~

JfJ:J. t:Jt:rt!:>

n. 1 1 · (1975) .!1 And ~ putative class member has sought to
intervene in the

~

~ 9ht

years since this action was filed.

United Airlines , Inc . v. McDonald, 432

u.s.

385 (1977).

See
Nor

have the allegedly usurious charges been challenged by informal
complaint or protest over the years . Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 4 .
Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant for
seven months without provoking a response from anyone who
previously may have thought that the class action would protect
We are not told what , if anything, motivates
/

1 L:

·.?*

respondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons

t

i>

~~"'t...-'

who~

~

./... • ....-<..

ha¥e ~vinced no interest in obtaining recovery for themselves .~/
1t!l "

AJ._ _

.1\ . ~~~

·~A,

Tl~· ~ 6. ''c!ZA ·iL&.+ j4&-0c=na ~~:::?-;~:;g;
ffi.dee4,

•uch o¥-erwheJ mi n.q

1 ack

7

~

of intere.st is symptomat ie of the

~~-.~bf~

4...<

~e.-l. ~ ~Lk./

J..U.~r ~ ;,& e..... '

~

4

C11ilf~,.
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4.

wrongs "unremedied by the regulatory action of government."

.

:J

A __ _..

(~~ ~~~-"'~vuLr~~

Ante, at 1 ~·

If this lawsuit ~~ismissed as moot, the Court

~

~A;

l::t£,~ ~
H.-- p*'.v=e-h4"'-f
~ (~, class action defendants will destroy ~it ¢eel by
~

~\

/·

~

deliberately mooting every case in which the individual stakes
are small and the potential liability large.

Id.,at12.

~~is perceive::~:: ~z:;::;;:~l-;;...
J.lcr&iiO~
pr~

~

creat~

a new form of class action not

1\

~

contemplated by Rule 23.~ ·.;.,

u--r•U

~--~ ~W "'1- k~

J..CA<... ;-~~JL Hu-~

~~~~

4-f-~·~ ~ H,.c_..,._
..,..~P(~ 2.,~~ . . n...,c_ ~
ja....... cL.•• .-e.t. J..,..L. .,.........,... ~ ...,._ ~~1
The heart of the Court's analysii is a distinction ~

-n
._

Lil(.~

between a plaintiff who loses his stake in the outcome

throuq~ ~
~

.~
an event extrinsic to the litigation and one who simply obta1ns ~~

a favorable judgment in the trial court.

The Court says

the right to appeal from such a judgment is governed by

tha~
ru~~

policy and practice that may be approached with "a certain
latitude."

Ante, at 12.

The rule that a litigant may not

appeal a ruling by which he is not "aggrieved" is said to have
nothing to do with Art. III.
it may hear this case
~.pe~~nw.l

.......eake

The Court therefore decides that

a~~ly

wi~o~t

i~ t"Re- e1:1te~

objectives. Ante, at 10-12.

re~ara

to tne absence

in order to advance policy

As long as the appeal is proper,

5.

the Court concludes that the judgment is not final and the case
is not moot. Id., at 6-7, 12.

Although the Court's reasoning

serves to avoid an articulated confrontation with Art. III, the
~~-...... t'{

£-..

AAW.Af ~ ~ ..:....,

distinction it draws is unprecedented and unsound.
1\

1\

~ p.tc. ......

,e., 41A-

The Court eites Electrical ~ittings Corp v. Thomas &
Betts Co., 307

u.s.

241 (1939), as a case in which the "critical

distinction" was applied.~/

Ante, at 9.

In that case, the

trial court entered a decree holding a patent valid but not
infringed.

Although the alleged infringer won the case, it

sought to appeal the finding that the patent was valid.

This

Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to
consider the issue of patent validity when the trial court had
found no infringement, because "the adjudication was immaterial
to the cause."

Id., at 242.

Since the decree "purported to

adjudge the validity of [the patent],"

~

the Court of

Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of issuing an
order eliminating the finding of validity from the decree. Ibid.

The

Court~

its reasoning in a single paragraph which

is reprinted in its entirety in the Court's opinion today.
~,

at 8.
While the meaning of Electrical Fittings

i~:fitel~~

subsequent

is~~

decisions~~e

never intended to create the distinction drawn today. In

Court

6.

Altvater v. Freeman, 319

u.s.

359 (1943), the Court explained

that the question of validity was not justiciable in Electrical
Fittings: "To hold

~

patent valid if it is not infringed is to

decide a hypothetical case." Id., at 363.

Mr. Justice Douglas'

opinion for the Court relied on Cover v. Schwartz, a case in
which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered in
some detail the relationship of Art. III to the requirement of
"standing to appeal."
(1943).

133 F.2d 541, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748

Although the appellant in Cover- like the respondents

here and the petitioners in Electrical Fittings -

sought to

appeal from the entry of a judgment which had eliminated his

~

stake in the outcome,~/ the court ~Ao~~e~ that its jurisdiction
)\

was measured by the standards of Art. III. Because the appellant
sought "no relief against anybody before the court • • • but • •

~ #/'
• want [ed] an advisory opinion,"

the~co~H'"&

c:::,a~~ &L..f Ji1!seif "without ~

4-H'• .4c..,

feo.~u~e

~ Ct.L~
discretion" to hear the appeal. Id. at 544, 545._l.Q./.(ihis Court
A

~
L
RSiA

-.1~~-1--, ~~-~,....~

took tbe

sa~e

~~
•
~
4-ttl.-..c. ._A:-11~•-rA.cAJ~
approach iR AltvatQr, permitt _ the action to

1~0.~~
continue because "tne controversy between the parties"\had not
been concluded by the dismissal of

~pl~

the ' ~

319

u.s.,

at 363-

364.
As Altvater and Cover show, the question posed in
Electrical Fittings was whether a case or controversy in the
constitutional sense continued to exist notwithstanding the

4l<a.J-

7.

entry of judgment in favor of the appellant.

Since the

petitioner could obtain no additional relief by prevailing on
the merits, his attempt to litigate the validity question did
not present a case or controversy cognizable in a federal Court
of Appeals.

~'

F.2d 644, 650 (CA9

e.g., Kapp v. National Football League, 586
1978)~

u.s.

Hall v.

Corporation, 476 F.2d 418, 420(CA3

Fiber & Plastics

1973)~

cf. Barry v. District

of Columbia Board of Elections, 580 F.2d 695 (CADC 1978).

i-.,/4-J

the petitioner was injured( as •

p~actical

ma~te•,

But

by the
~ ~~LZ..:f-.

inclusion of the unnecessary and adverse validity
dee~.

ruling~i~e

In re Trimble Company, 479 F.2d 103, 111 (CA3 1973)~

Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 161 (CA2 1950).
11/

~JW. ~·""

J/-,the

Because of this~~~ prejudice
...

J.,.1....-4',.. ~.......::J_,_

Aperson

stake in obtaining

~

reform~tion

~ ~

petitioner~had ~

.J

of the decree.

~

The Court today hJi~d~ itoe~f~ the principles~
«P~ri~~

~

Electrical Fittings. Nothing in that case suggests

that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a
litigation," may be appealed after final judgment merely because
the ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues
litigated."

Ante, at 9.

Such collateral rulings - like other

rulings - may be appealed under Electrical Fittings when the
~ .~..._. 4 - ;a,~ i..,;u

litigant

Aa~etAin~

to

~ain

f~em

a favorable resolution of

1
his appeal and not otherwise.12/ In Electrical Fittings, there

~
q;j J4w --...ze,•v ~ ~ 41'~4.c.A..A..,(t&"
=~>'
~ I>~~..., .a •• ..tJ-fo .'-.e-~

,

B.
~ _.-, - . ~ ~l-lac --..&. ~L..J. ~ ~
Uw.- ~s- ~C.4~ • .! ~ ~~~
/.2 4£,-A:,

~~

-

~ ~ ~ ·~~.u..

was .such an interest; here there is none.

~ ~~.CC,~~C.,f

. . Hc-~
J. 41,.c.IC

Because there is

no ~

~·r~~-.4.
~~

longer a controversy between adverse parties having a personal
~e

stake in the outcome, a federal court

/\

no alternative

l4tc ,

·-~
~•

but to dismiss the case.

in support of such a

~,~

..:;:___

,f\118Ff:i-lo oAOot i.-A~ ftQ.l¥9-u~,. ti.a.t; 1i!:lorl!!

mootness LA

would

j;Ais ciS€

consequences of a finding of

*_.,J-4
be as
~

dire as the Court

""
predicts.

On the other side o

find mootness has

birth to an unusual legal

~59
:E

e

H te

.C~M :::wet~

c:c_

eu ""'F!nd ~~~~-HH~~-"":t-~~"!>!5 <1 ho 1 d i ng

~

would have repercussions in two distinct situations.

First is

1\

the case in which a named plaintiff fails to obtain class
certification but pursues the case to a successful, litigated
judgment. In my view any subsequent attempt to appeal the denial
J4u.. ~ :: .. C.~ '(..r

of certification is barred by Art. III. But t tAis

not

~ ~«-jiJal<l#._, ti'.J4-0'&J ~;•c•/-~~ ~ ,... .,_~,......., ~~~~;J:
a~ 1.1Rmiti~to9--€l'tlo.i.l.

If the

~iQR

san'jht injunctive or

~~JJ-,
declaratory reliefA the absent members of the putative class

.~7::~-tO?:::::d

by force of stare decisis most of the

benefits of actual class membership.

~
action

~

one for

damage~~ as

(~

If ,..-on ~e -etfi~r l"ta-nd;., the

~~~~~~--=--s-~-&:1/
1n this case

~

9.

certification ruling would countenance the same sort of "one-way
intervention" that the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended
to eliminate. Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Amendments
to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-106 (1966); see Comment, Immediate
Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St.
L. J. 441, 470-471

(1979).

Knowing that one plaintiff had

prevailed on an issue common to
class members would be permitte
favorable judgment without assuming the risk of being

Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will
when the defendant attempts a "forced settlement" prior to
judgment, as petitioner did in this case.

tl.--~~

an

~oo~om~c
I\

A

defendan~e
1

incentive to take such action in certain

circumstances.

Th

~

e Court ~ that the result will be the

denial of relief for injuries too small to justify separate
lawsuits
77

'

and th
I

e unnecessary consumption of judicial resources
'

I~ vt_., t.-t<-c(Q?-12. ~~ , - /') ~ LA
L"L- ,
1n the
· ·
·
__. .
~
-, ~tFv~.
- lltlqat1on of succe 1ve su1ts by pu ative class members.
.

c::n.-~

~,at 11-12.

am unts to

A

judicia ~

policymakinq with respect to the adequacy of compensation and
enforcement available for

j

particular substantive claims.

Such

~~/A..._ __ ~ •. -.
ndeed it has been argued that ict ~~~ of Rule 23 ~

I

~

\f

1 0.

~

runs afoul of the Rules Enabling Act.

Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft:
and the ,Substance...;Procedure Dilemma, 4 7

(1974).

At t he very least, resort

Landers, Of

Consumer Class Actions

s.

Cal. L. Rev. 8 4 2, 8 60

~lu:.J2

to~

~

criteria

~tee

~J_
procedura±

~rena mu~

be consistent with the substantive law

1\

giving rise to the claim.

Note, Developments in the Law - Class

Actions 89 Harv. L. Rev. 13..-18, 1358-1359 (1976).

In this case,

both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the
aggregation of usury claims is condemned by Mississippi law.
Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561
~~

~
1f,

The Court's concern

be~

telling il+ a more

,..}-1..A---~
-----.......__~~

( 1941)

·li/

~~~~~

for~ ~

could, of course,

appro~: :::~~~1~

atR ~,..-c • .,..., c ... ~.
"
]Udic1al administration if realA But these problems can and
,

should be addressed by measur'es short

of·~

the law

)~~~4>~~~~~~

of mootness)A ~ imperta~first ~ p~otlld b~ the authorization ~

~~~~t..-(-.~~~k~~

~-

9[ interlocutory appeals from the denial of class certification.

1\
The District Courts ~ already Zempowered to certify such
appeals in appropriate cases under 28

u.s.c.

§

1292(b).

In many

cases both parties will desire to obtain a final settlement of
that

~
question.
-1

~uei~

In others, the District Court may use

its powers of management under Rule 23(d) to require some sort
of notice of the impending settlement or to provide an

~M.w~~},

opportunity for putative class members to intervene)\

See 3 H.

11.

Newberg, Class Actions § _

( 197

)•

Altheugfi

Btlefi

meastites ate y -

t'A~vailability .::J.._e~~~~s

ext"tffine,

--

A

s4g~~terrent

-1

.

a "'---

to the deliberate mooting of class

actions. Indeed, District Court management of the problem by
measures tailored to the case at hand would be

~

the Court's

.1\

-t~J.4_

~~t

"'

far ~

approval of the continuation of the action

in all circumstances.

'

To the extent managerial powers are

lackinq, it is for Congress - not this Court - to correct the
deficiency ·.J.2/
The Court's attempt to "solve" the problem of
deliberate mooting of consumer class actions is ill-conceived as
well as inappropriate.

There is no warrant in Rule 23 for the

appointment of a "quasi-class representative" for purposes of
obtaining class certification only. Since the representative
can gain nothing from a certification order, his participation
in the case can only be intended to benefit the class.

(

Yet he

tn";s~o~o~m~a~e~~Leguards

of

:-:::----...

When 1t:Comes to the ruling on the certification
motion itself, how is the District Court to determine whether

"the claims or defenses of the

repreCn~v~a~s~e

~

typical of the claims or defenses of the class" under Rule
23(a)(3)?

(~)
The most troubling practical implication of the

/\

~-

1 2.

Court's decision is the suggestion that its rule of nonmootness
may not apply if the action is settled voluntarily.
n. 5.

Ante, at 6

If this is so, the class defendant may prevent an appeal

of the class certification ruling by obtaining the named
plaintiff's agreement to the settlement, although he could not
do so merely by paying the named plaintiff's individual claim in
full.

This reasoning invites unscrupulous named plaintiffs to

"sell" their right to appeal for whatever the traffic will bear
- a result thoroughly inconsistent with the equitable
administration of the class action.
~

In ~, 1 the Court's attempted solution to the
problem of "forced settlement" of the consumer class action 4:-s-

J~~~~~

at.,tendod b¥ significant problems of its own.

1\
circumstansQS

~

~~1r;~~~t~i ~
jurisprudence .

Ol?'der tG

"ea:na~"

.. tf1~

c.,a8Q.

i~

I would vacate the judgment of the

Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the
case as moot.

c
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FOOTNOTES

~/

Act, 12

Jurisdiction was premised on the National Banking

u.s.c.

~S

85, 86, and 28

u.s.c. s

1355.

But the

National Banking Act adopts the interest limits set by state
law.
~/

The Court suggests that class action plaintiffs

generally derive a "significant benefit" from certification
because it may ultimately permit them to reduce litigation costs
by allocating them among the members of a prevailing class.
Ante, at 10 n. 8.

As applied to this case, the Court's

suggestion is both factually and legally deficient.
respondent~

First,

have not identified any costs - other than

attorney's fees - incurred to date that are not covered by
v~

petitioner's tend~ with the exception of attorney's fees.
The record does not show whether respondents' lawyers are
proceeding on a contingent fee basis, as the Court implies they

~l

may. Ibid.

If the share of the judgment paid to the lawyers

under such an arrangement is fixed without regard to the number
of claims recovered, respondents' actual recovery might not be
increased even if they were to obtain relief for the class.
Respondents thus have failed to show that this benefit will
accrue to them.

Second, no one has suggested that

petitioner is or ever will be liable for attorney's fees.

The

FN2.

theory must therefore be that the prospect of asserting future
claims against unrelated third parties gives rise to a case or
controversy against petitioner.

Such a theory is unprecedented,

and its consequences are bizarre.

If a named plaintiff obtains

full satisfaction before filing his complaint,

~r

this theory

would still permit him to litigate the class claims in order to

17

recoup legal costs incurred in investigating the violation.
Since class representatives cannot share costs unless they
obtain relief for the class, this theory would require an
appellate court to hear and decide substantive issues in
addition to the class certification question.

But that result

is flatly inconsistent with the Court's express exclusion of
"the merits of the substantive controversy" from the scope of
the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction on remand in this case.

il

The notice of appeal filed with the District Court

that respondents appeal "on behalf of all others
similarly situated • • •

!/

"

App., at 63.

If a class action defendant were shown to have

embarked on a course of conduct designed to insulate the class
certification from appellate review in order to avoid classwide
liability, a court in proper circumstances might find the
Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot.
Miller

& Cooper~

3533, at 171

(1979 Supp.).

See 13 Wright,

FN3.

2/

L44 ..c. .. ~~~
An attempted interlocutory appeal was r:.ehntfe(! by

the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the interim.
~/

As the Mississippi usury statute was amended in

1974 to authorize the charges at issue here, damages are the
only available remedy.

21

I do not suggest that respondent's lawyer acted

improperly in pursuing this case.

His activities have led to

the resolution of a previously undecided question of law.
opinion

ground in the first
step of its analysis, analogizing respondents to plaintiffs
have obtained a litigated judgment.
There

d
~-

is ~

l;u;)w~ue;r:.., considerable authority holding that the tender itself
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. California

Jj,..c.~
~

v. San Pablo & Tulare Railroad, 149

~

u.s.

308, 313-314 (1893);

~.~

~~

Drs. Hill & Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F.2d 204 (CA6

~-~

4U••.. --~

1968); Lamb v. Commissioner 390 F.2d 157 (CA2 1968); A.A. Allen

~~

Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.2d 89 (CA5 1965).

~;,:t..

It-

In each of

t4,.,~
~~

~!

the cited cases the plaintiff refused to accept a proffered

~

settlement, but ~~ court concluded that it was powerless to
review the the abstract questions remaining and dismissed the

FN4.

action as moot.
~/

The appellant in Cover was the losing plaintiff in

a patent infringement action.

After the trial court found the

patent invalid and not infringed, the plaintiff took an appeal
on the validity question without contesting the finding of noninfringement.

By accepting the judgment to that extent, he lost

his right to recover from the defendant - and thus his interest
in the litigation - by "intrinsic" means.

lQI

Judge Frank wrote for the court:

"[W]here there is no 'iusticiable' dispute, there
are no 'merits.'

There is merely an unreal entity

resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis
Carroll immortalized.

Many Supreme Court

decisions teach•us that appellate iurisdiction,
when no iusticiable dispute exists on appeal,
cannot be rested upon the recollection that such a
dispute previously existed when the case was in
the trial court."

Id., at 551 (footnotes

omitted).

~/

The Court did not expressly disagree with the Court

of Appeals' finding that collateral estoppel would be no bar to
relitigation of the validity question.

But the commentators

suggest that reformation could have eliminated future contests
as to the preclusive effects of the decree, a question that was
not free from doubt.

15 C. Wright, A. Miller, and E. Cooper,

FN5.

Federal Practice and Procedure §3902, at 403 (1976): 1B Moore's
Federal Practice' 0.443[5], at 3925 (1974): 9 Moore's' 203.06,
at 716 (1975). As Judge Learned Hand explained, the decree might
create "some presumptive prejudice." Harries v. Air King
Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 161 (1950).
~/

The Court appears to recognize this in passing,

ante, at 9 n. 7, but fails to apply the rule to this case.

The

Court does not show that respondents have any concrete interest
in obtaining class certification, or that they will be adversely
affected by the mere existence of the order denying
certification.

Of course, if the latter interest were the only

one that could be identified, Electrical Fittings would limit
our jurisdiction to

~~

o~def~~

Jt.J--

the order denying certification

expunged from the record.

2il

In the ordinary case brought under Rule 23(b)(3),

the class member must decide at the time of certification
whether or not to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c)(2).
This provision brought an end to the "spurious" class action in
which class members had been permitted to intervene after a
decision on the merits in order to secure the benefits of the
decision.

Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed

Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966).

1!1

Since petitioner is a national bank, its failure

FN6.

to comply with Mississippi's interest limits would violate the
National Banking Act.

12

u.s.c.

~

85.

But the federal statute

seeks to assure that national banks are treated no less
favorably than state banks, and limits the penalty for violating
state usury laws to double the amount of interest paid.
U.S.C. § 86.

12

In light of the plain intent to protect national

banks from undue penalties for usury, the federal statute cannot
be said to displace state policy disfavoring the agqregation of
such claims.
~/

Congress currently has before it a bill that

attempts to remedy the difficulties infecting this troubled
area.

H.R. 5103, 96th Congress, 1st Session (1979).

The bill

/~~~::r~ ~;:t~:mma

and to

eliminate some of the problems of claims too small to justify
individual lawsuits, by creating a federal right of action which
may be obtained in actions brought in the name of the United
States.

The bill also authorizes interlocutory appeals from a

grant or denial of the ruling that will, in the proposed new
form of action, take the place of class certification.

1J. J~6

~~ ~ ~ P-j ~ /2 "~G~4.~
v( ~ ~~ t_f-~ ,__,.,.,~~.....--c

~~~~~~

~ .Lo -~ -~~~~

~'7~-:IIL ~ ~
~~7-

lfp/ss

2/11/80

Rider A,

(Rop~r)

This novel view, for which no authority is

cite~,

cannot he

reconcileo with Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420

u.s.

128 (1975), where an oral certification orner was

hel~

insufficient to identifv the interest of absent class mernbes
for Article III purposes.

The result hardly

coul~

be

different when thP class has not been identifien at all (here
cite Memphis

~iqht,

etc.)

The theorv of automatic oartv statuR
number of interestina nuestions

..

rais~s

a

er 2/12/80

No. 78-904 Roper footnote, second draft.

P.2:
2a/

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS states, in his concurrinq

opinion, that all persons alleqed to be members of a putative
class "automatically become parties to the case or controversy
for the purposes" of Art. III, and that they "remain parties
until a final determination has been made that the action may
not be maintained as a class action."

~'

at

This novel

view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with
Indianapolis - School - eommJrs - v~ - Jacobs,

420

u.s.

128 (1975),

where an oral certification order was held insufficient to
identify the interests of absent class members for Art. III
purposes. The result hardly could be different when the class
has not been identified at all. See also Memphis - Liqht, -Gas - &
Water Div; - v. Craft, 436 U.S.

1, 8 (1978); Baxter - v; · Palmiqiano,

423 U.S. 308, 310 n. 1 (1976); Weinstein - v; -Bradford, 423

u.s

147 (1975); Pasadena City Board - of - Education - v; -Spanqler, 427

u.s.

424, 430 (1976).

.
-

tA-f_

~ t:: ~ ..--. ~-f"tJ,

D ()

,
o ~ "-'L,.e.,._ ~

The proposed rule of automatic party status raises

-""

of unnamed "parties" cannot be extin
who filed the action in
every person who

~· ~

ished at the whim of those

names, the theory must be that

1ates a class action irrevocably assumes a

~ ~~
~~·¢d.<.~

)"-<-

~4

2.

' fiduciary duty to fiqht class certification to the end. Are
respondents, then, required by law to continue this action on
remand?

Must they assume ultimate personal responsibility for

the costs, in excess of $15,000, that will accompany

certificatio~Would

responsible

litiqants ~lv~ f~e

class

actions if they thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary
obligations?

These questions are substantial. They are not

resolved by Rule 23, and I believe they merit careful study by
Congress before this Court - perhaps unwittingly - creates a
major category of clientless litigation unique in our system.

I

lfp/ss

2/11/80
~

~~~-------- Presumably ~ purpose of such a rule would be to
assure that satisfaction of the claims of named parties would
not terminate the litigation.

Nor could the rights of the

unnamed parties be extinguished by the failure of the named
parties to appeal.

Thus, if the rule proposed by Mr. Justice

Stevens is to be meaningful, I suppose that a fiduciary duty
must be imposed upon named parties to continue the litigation
where - as here - the unnamed parties remain unidentified or
failed to intervene.

As fiduciaries, would the respondents

not only be required to continue to litigate, but to assume
personal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees if the
case ultimately is lost?

lfp/ss

2/11/80

Ellen:

What do you think of addinq a note somewhat

Footnote

at

(Roper)

alonq the followinq lines:

____ /

Mr. Justice Stevens states, in

his concurrinq opinion, that all members of a
proper class action "automatically become parties
to the case or controversy for the purposes" of
Article III.

He states that they also "remain

parties until a final determination has been made
that their action may not be maintained as a class
action".

These views pose interestinq and

heretofore unanswered questions.

Assume in this

case that the named plaintiffs had accepted
settlement, and advised counsel that they did not
wish to appeal the denial of certification.

Assume

further that no member of the class souqht to
intervene within the appeal period.

Would the

riqhts of class members then be extinquished?

If

so, does this mean that their riqhts turn on
whether or not the named plaintiff (or counsel
actinq on its own motion) elects to appeal?

Or,

does Mr. Justice Stevens imply that a person who
initiates a class action assumes a fiduciary duty
to fiqht class certification to the end, even

2.

thouqh such party has been paid in full?

Aqain, if

so, who becomes responsible for attorney's fees if
counsel is unwillinq to litiqate on a continqent
fee basis, especially for unidentified clients?
One need not suqqest the riqht answer to
these questions.

They are not resolved by Rule 23.

My view is that the constitutional and policy
considerations are substantial and merit careful
consideration by Conqress before this Court perhaps unwittinqly - creates a type of clientless
litigation unique in our system.

lfp/ss

2/11/80
12b.

Rider · 5; - p; - 11 - (Roper)
The Court attempts to limit the

sweeping consequences that could flow from the
application of these criteria, see infra, at 12-13
and n. 15, by asserting that "[e]ach case must be
~ecided

on its own facts", considering the

"practicalities and prudential considerations".
~'

at 17 n. 11.

The Court long has recoqnized a

difference between prudential and constitutional
(Article III) standing.

I am not aware that the

Court, until today, has ever merged these
considerations for the purpose of eliminating the
constitutional requirement of a personal stake in
the litigation.
this view.

The Court cites no prior case for

Moreover, the Court expounds no

limiting principle of any kind.

Adverse practical

consequences, even if relevant to Article III
analysis, cannot iustify today's holding as none
whatever would flow from a decision of mootness.
See n. 15, infra.

Nor does the Court's reliance

upon a "relation back
11, further analysis.

principle",~'

at 18, n.

Indeed, although this may

provide a shorthand label for the Court's
conclusion, it is hardly a principle and certainly
not a limiting one.

lfp/ss

2/11/80

Footnote - 12a - (Geraqhtv)

The Court states that "respondent
suffered actual, concert iniury

[thatl

continued up to and beyond the time the District
Court denied class certification.
11.

~,

at 18 n.

Apparently this statement is based on the

assumption that "damaqes" were - or could have been
- souuqht.

We need not consider whether the

situation would be different if damaqes had been
souqht, had respondent souqht onlv iniunctive and
declaratory relief.

Indeed, counsel for

respondent, frankly conceded that his client "can
obtain absolutely no additional personal relief" in
this case.

Tr., Oral Arq., at 25.

In view of this

cateqoric concession, I invite the Court to
identify the "actual, concrete iniury" suffered bv
respondent after his unconditional release from
prison.

lfp/ss

2/11/80

Footnote ·-- i - at · (Roper)
'

Ellen:

What do you think of aodinq a note somewhat

alonq the followinq lines:

____ /

Mr. Justice Stevens states, in

his concurrinq opinion, that all members of a
proper class action "automatically become parties
to the case or controversy for the purposes" of
Article III.

He states that they also "remain

parties until a final determination has been made
that their action may not be maintained as a class
action".

This novel view, for which no authority

is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indianapolis
School Comm•rs - v. · Jacobs, 420

u.s.

128 (1975),

where an oral certification order was held
insufficient to identify the interest of absent
class members for Article III purposes.

The result

hardly could be different when the class has not
been identified at all (here cite Memphis Liqht,
etc.)
The theory of automatic party status
raises a number of interestinq questions.

Assume

in this case that the named plaintiffs had accepted
settlement, and advised counsel that they did not
wish to appeal the denial of certification.

Assume

2.

further that no member of the class sought to
intervene within the appeal period.

Would the

rights of such class members then be extinguished
even though they were "parties"?

If so, does this

mean that their rights turn on whether or not the
named plaintiff elects to appeal?

Or, /is it

suggested that a person who initiates a class
action irrevocably assumes a fiduciary duty to
fight class certification to the end, even though
such party has been paid in full?

Again, if so,

who becomes responsible for court costs and
attorney's fees if counsel is unwilling to litigate
for unidentified "parties" on a contingent fee
basis.Certainly these costs and fees cannot be
assessed against non-intervening class emmbers if
the class action is lost.

And would responsible

persons we willing to initiate class actions if
they thereby became fiduciaries with potential
long-term liabilities even after their claims had
been satisfied?
One need not suggest the right answer to
these questions.

They are not resolved by Rule 23.

My view is that the constitutional and policy

3.

considerations are substantial and merit careful
study by Conqress before this Court - perhaps
unwittinqly - creates a maior cateqory of
clientless litigation unique in our system.

...
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SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STAT)S
No. 78-904
I

J~

I

Deposit Guaranty /National Bank, JOn Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
Robert L. Roper et al.
[February -, 1980]

-~

MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi 1aw.1 'They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover 'those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Resp'ondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claim~;J. aggre ..
gating $12 million. After four years of litigation, t~e District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
COl;lrt costs. Over responde1i'ts' objection, the District Court
entered fina] judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputei:i that the petitioner has. tEmdeted everything that respondents could have recovered from 'it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir:- ·
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
tqc denial of Class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the c1;1se or
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties.~
J urisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and .28 TJ. S. ·C.
§1355.
~
1

...
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The Court decideiS that the central issue is not mootness but
appeal:ibility. But the characterization does not withstand
analysis. Sine~ respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

;J-

I
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - ,
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class-certification when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought
ill the action. In this case, as in Gerayhty, the District Court
refused to certify a class. Since no Olle has sought to inter~
vene, responde11ts are the only plaintiffs arguably present in
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in th~
injurie~ alleged in their complaint. They so~ht only dam~
ages; those damages have been tendered in full~ Respondents
have not suggested that success on the certification motiot;1
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner:f
,_3Aithough respondcnte also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint
shows that fee,.: were to be granted only f10m tlw damages ultimately
awarded to them or tltr cla~:>s. App. 13-14.
I#R(·:spon<.lrnts do a!lseit that (Wtification woul<.l enable them to reduce the
rxpPnRc of litigation by a.llocatiug. costs among the members of a prevailing
clasH. Briel' for Hespondf'llt~ 33. Exet'pt for n.tlorney's fees, however,
rcspondetlttl do not iul'nt if.v any cost1:1 incurrt'd · to date t.hat, a.re not
covered by the prt1t10nPr's tPnder. Although the record does not, reveal
the detail~:> of the fl'<' arrangemrnt between respondents and their lawyers,
the complaint suggt't>ts that the lawyers have agr~ed to accept as full compen~ation 25% of the amount recoverrd from the pl'titioner. App. 13-14.
If this j,., the agreement as to · fees, respondt'nts have no continuing interest.
Only ('Ottnl'r! is concPrncd wlwtht'r thl' recovrry is enlarged:
Even if one a~~Ulll(>tl that respondent::;' liability to their lawyers could be
reducro by a da,;~ r(•covery, no one has b'ugge:::ted that petitione·r is or ever
will he liablt' for fPel' that uhima tt•ly may be owed by . re::;pondents: Respondent,.,' jurbchetioual throry appea.rs to be tha.t the mere po&;ibility of
UdRerLillg fut.ure elaimf' for aJt.orne 's fa'::! against other membel'l! of .a

er 2/12/80
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS states, in his concurrinq

opinion, that all persons alleqed to be members of a putative
class "automatically become parties to the case or controversy
for the purposes" of Art. III, and that they "remain parties
until a final determination has been made that the action may
not be maintained as a class action."

-Ante,

---

at --- . This novel

view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with
Indianapolis -School Comm'rs v. - Jacobs, 420

u.s.

128 (1975),

where an oral certification order was held insufficient to
identify the interests of absent class members for Art. III
purposes. The result hardly could be different when the class
has not been identified at all. See also

Memphis · Liaht; · G~

Water Biv. v. - Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter · v; - Palmiqiano,
423 U.S. 308, 310 n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v; - Bradford, 423 U.S
1
147 (1975); Pasadena City Board of - Education v; - Spanqler, 427

u.s.

424, 430 (1976).
The proposed rule of automatic party status -

in this

case for 90,000 unidentified persons - has troublesome and farreachinq implications that could preiudice the brinqinq of class
actions.

Presumably a purpose of such a rule would be to assure

that satisfaction of the claims of named parties would not
terminate the litiqation.

Nor could the riqhts of unnamed

2.

parties be extinguished by the failure of the named parties to
appeal.

Thus, if the rule proposed by Mr. JUSTICE

S~EVENS

is to

be meaningful, I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed
upon named p arties to continue the litigation where - as here the unnamed parties remain unidentified and fail to intervene.
As fiduciaries, would the respondents not only be required to
continue to litigate, but to assume personal responsibility for
costs and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is lost?

Would

responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations?

These

questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23, and
I believe they merit careful study by Congress before this Court
- perhaps unwittingly - creates a maior category of clientless
litigation unique in our system.
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Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned
so completely that uo appeal was taken in their own names.
~
The uotice of appeal filed with the District Court recites tha~
respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly
situa.ted . . . ." App. 63.
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
ou teome of this action, I believe that Art. III aud the precedents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot.
S<'c Oeraghty, post, at - - - (PowELL, J., dissenting).
Tlwre is no suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable
of repetition, yet evading reviev.~' Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. R. 103, 110-111. n. 11 (1975)~ And not a single one of the
allt>ged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in tpe
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Iuc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by inforn)al
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during ·t he seven
mouths in which responcle11ts sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought that the class action would protect
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who

e,

pui<LlivP rlass giv~ ri::;e to a case or controversy against the class defend~
ant. Such u. lhoory i:-l unprecedE>ntcd, [Uld its consequences are biza.rre.
}'or nxample, reRpondents' theory would prm1it. a person to file tt class
nrfion, <'Wll though he had previou,.,ly a.errpted full settlemPnt of hil.l in-~
rli\'irlual cbim, on tlw ground tlw.t. tho fees incurred in anticipation of the
litigntion might ult~ma. trly be ~han•d with the cla.-s.
/If a class-action ·dE>fendant were ,;hown to have E>mbarked on a course
oT'C'ondurt. d<•signPd t.o immhde the cia.,;; cert.ifiea.tion issuf' from appellate
review in order to nvoid classwide !i<Jbility, a court in propC"r circull1Stances
might find the Gerste-in tr:-;l f<atisfiPd 1Uld tlw ea::;e not moot. See Su.srnan v.
Lincoln Arnetican Corp ., 5R7 F . 2cl H6o (CA7 1978); 18 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practir·e nnd ProredurE> § 35:33, a.L 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, C01itinuation and RepreHenfation of Cla~<s Artions Following
pj~.mi~~al of the Clab~ RHpre~entat,ive, 1974 Du~e L. J. 573, 59!}-600,.

,;

.. ·
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for years have evinced no int€rest whatever in obtaining ra..
covery for themselves.b On its face, this appears sin1ply to
be a "lawyer's case."
·
Des}Jite traditiou and policy considerations to the contrary,
~
the Court seems undisturbed that this federal action will be~
litigated on remand _b y a -lawyer ·whose only "clients'' are
unidentifiecj class members who have shown no desire to be
represented by anyone1' ''fhe Court also neglects established
principles of Art. III 'jurisprudence, and remands to the District Court a headless class action that does not meet the
requirements of Rule 23.
II
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or con..
troversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in
their favor." ld., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representative responsibilities to the putative classis sufficient to permit their appeal. .. ." ld., at 12. One
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclus!on
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-actio11
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these
,The Mi:S.'lissippi usury statute was amPnd('C! in 1974, and it apparently
auUwrize:;; the fees cha.rged by JWtitioner. 1974 Mi~s. Gen. Laws, ch~
564, § 7; see Miss. CodE:' Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no 4uestion of
prOl;pective l'elief.
':f I do not suggest, that respondt>nts' htwyer a.cted improperly in pursuing
this ease. Since he has prevuiled both in thi:; Cou·rt and in the Court
of Appeal,;, the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation fa.lls 'Ill~
'the 'feJc'tal coilfts.
!lOW.

J

t

'18-904--DISSENT
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

S

particular respondents can derive any such benefit from thit'J

~

~

action.f

A
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objec~
tion. Id., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in~
spires thP Court to draw a "critical distinction" between
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting
from events extrinsic to the litigation. ld., at 9. The Court
appears to hold that a litigaut who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercisillg his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at 7. If the statutes
and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such
a right, the Court concludes that Art. III requires no more.
Ibid.; see id., at 12.
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the
"formulat[ion] [of] standards . . . govern[ing] the appealability of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two
~Any advantage, that ordinuril) nm:y flow from "the use of the class
action procedure for litigation of individual cljlims," ante, at 10, cannot
accrue to thE-Se reHpondents who will not b:l litigatmg their own claims
on remand. Nor doeb the Couri tdentify nny unrecovered cost of litigation that these re:;pondenb; can rf'duce if they obtain relief for a class.
See td., at. 10, n 8; n . 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondent~
only to point out that. their total damagei:l wpre so ~mall that they "would
be unlikely to obtnin legal redre:;« at. nn acceptable cost" if they could not
do so by mean:, of 11 elm;;, action. Ante, ut 10, n. R We may assume
that r~pondents had ::;ome mterP~t in t.he l'las;;-action procedure as a means
of interesting their Jawyf'r,; in the Cili:>e or ol>tainiug a satisfactory settlement. This may Le a·n intere:;t propf'rly furthered by Rule 23, but once
re~pondent::; obtained both Hl'('e.~:5 to court and full indtvidual relief that
interest dbappeart:d.

~8-904-DISSK
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reasous. Pirst, the certification order is a "procedural ruling1
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," th,at "stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." ld., at 9.
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of
Rule 23. Td. , at 10-12.
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it cor.
~
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled princi~
pies that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this~
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident
lack of intet·est iu thf' outcome. The "critical distinction" by
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually
~nd legally um;ound .

B
As a matter of fact , there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an
intermediate stage of litigation.'; i d., at 9. Petitioner has
never contended that the controversy became moot merely
1
'by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'l favor."
l d. , at 5. Instearl, petitioner argues that its tender of fuli
relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority supports petitioner;s contention that the tender itself
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintifi' has refused to accept a proffered settlement that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
R . Co .. 149 U. S. 3o8, 313- 314 (1893) ; Drs. Hill "& Thomas
Co. v. United States, 392 }'. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Lamb v. Commis.sioner, 390 F . 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
curiam); A. A. Allen RevivAls, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d
89 ( CA5 1965) (per C'Ur-iam ) ';1

1 The Co~\rt make, no diort to di:;tiugubh ihe:,e ca~es.·

Yet it cm1cedes
'that tfie ''i-ight to employ Rule 23'' i~ a ''procedural· right only, ancillary
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in ft:~.vor .9..flrespondents instead of dismissing thei~
lawsuit as moot!2/It is certainly true, ~s the Court observes,
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller, aud Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some
adverse effect in order to confer ustanding to appeal." Ibid.;
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections,- U. S.
App. D. C.-. 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a continuing controversy betweeu adverse parties at
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to
the constitutional command.

c
The Court relies almost entirely on ElectriW~ Fittings Cor-p_.
~
v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307l;. S. 241 (1939)-!!.J But that deci~
lo thl· litigation of ~ub~tantive claim~," and it admitb that "the court
retain>< no jurbdiction over the controven;y" when the "~ubstantive claims
be('ome moot in the Art . III ~cm;e." Ante, at o. If the tender itself
mooted the respondent:,' claim~ without regard to the entry of judgment~
then the Court'~ own unaly~I::I require~ it to conclude that the case is
moot.
l-9:i'he ":;ta.tutor) right" to appeal it.self cannot supply a. personal stake
m the outcome, for C011gre~s cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the
juri:;diC'lion of the ft·deral court:,. Gla1Mune, Realtors v. Village of BellWtJOd, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) .
If, The only other authoritie~ etted by the Comt are United Atrlines, Inc.
v. McDonald, 432 U. S 385 '(1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both case:; stated that the denial of class
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments
by ''vhich no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there
·had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed.
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to
apJwal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lac.ked jurisdic'tion to consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
t·eview of findings . . . which are not necessary to support the
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by including in the decree itself a .ruliug that "purport[ eel] to adjudge
·the validity of j thf' patent] .J' Ibid. Since that ruling "was
immaterial to thr disposition of the cause," the Court of
AppPals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of elimiuating
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid.
The Court reaus Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations permitted an appeal" Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent
that-the petitiouer there asserted a continuing personal stake
in the outcome. As Judge LeatJJecl Hand later explained, the
petitioner in Electncal Fittings was injured in fact because the
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice'' against him in a future
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co. , 183 F. 2d 158, H31
eertifica t iou is sulJjt•et, lo appellate review after final ,judgment n.t the
or llw named plaintiff:>. Neither c·a~t> di~w11~~ed mootne~~. and
neillwt· Hnalyzed tllC' propo:-iition in any way. Indeed, the only aut bority
eitrd in Coopers c~ Lyb1'and wa~:- l'11ited Airluu's, c'(·e 437 U. S., at Min, and
thr oul~ authority rited in Umted Airlhtes wa~ t~ eon<'C'l-i<~ion made• by the
defendant aud a li,.;t of rnRes from the Courts of ApJH'al::;, none of which
dealt. wtth a suggr~tion of mootne~:; m an analo~ou:; 1-iituation, ."ee 482
U. S., ai. a93, and n . 1.4 Surh ,;tatemmts, casually enuut·mh·d without a
~
word of explanahou iu opinion" dealmg wtth unrelated legal que"t wn,, arynot root rollmg or even pen;ua:;ive when they are ~hown on further re!lee-tion to have been incon:-;i:,'t.ellt with c.~tabli:;hed law.

behe~t
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(CA2 ]_95/J); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CAy----3
1973) .!.tf This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformatio
of the decree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly inconsistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
wa.rs told to reform the decree. but expressly forbidden to
considPr the merits of the patent va.Iidity question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years
lat<:>r. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a
deci~:;iou that had re1ied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to
cousider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought decision of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by
contrast, satisfied "th<:> requirements of case or controversy"
be<;ause the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal complaint. 319 U. S .. at '363-366.
Altvater and Elect?-ical Fittinys entil'ely foreclose the
Cour·t's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice~
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942),
cerL. df!nied. 319 U.S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court
of Appeals' for the Second Circ4it discussed at length the
1-.AHhough the Court of Appeals in Electrical Fittings held that collateral e~toppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity que;;tion, 100
F. 2d 403, 404 (CA2 1938), other eourt.~ had taken a dtfferent view 01~
similar i~suPs of collateral estoppel. If the validity finding werE' permitted
_/"
to stand, the petitioner could have brrn forced to litigate the 4uestion of its
preclmnve pffect. in futurr ca~e:; . 15 Wright, Nhller, and Cooper, supra/
n. 4, § 3902, at 403 (1976) ; IB Moore's Federa,l Practice 0.443 [5], at
3925 (1974) ; 9 id., ,[ 2o:3.06, at 7L6 (1975).

,I
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
froltl .~judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out~
come.~ The Court of Appeals emphatically declined to as~
sume jurisdiction over an appe~ which sought "no relief
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an
advi~~ljY opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
544.~ Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of
Appeals coucluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the
app<'al. I d., at 545.
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III
do not change with the "factual context'' in which a suggestion
of mootuess arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing controversy between adverse parties'? In Electrical Fittings, the
ro11troversy continued with respect to the single narrow
issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent validity
properly was incluued in the decree. But nothing in that
case suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits
f6The appellant in Cover v. Schwa1·tz. 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), cert.
~
denied, 319 11. S. "748 (1943), was the lo~iug plaintiff m a patent infringe/
lnt>ut Hrtion. After the trial C'Oilrt found the patent invalid and not
infringPd, the phuhtiff took an appeal on ihc validity que::;tion without
contr:;tmg the finding of nouinfringemeut. By accepting the judgment to
that Pxtent, he lost hi:; right to recover from the defendant-and thus his
int rrc:;t in the litigatio11.
#1Jll(1ge Frank wrote tor tho courf,:
"[W]here there b no 'j u~ticiable' dispute, there arc no 'merits.' There is
nwrely au unrPal entity re:;rmbling that di~embodied smile which Lewis
Catoll immortalized. Many Suprpme Court decisions teach us that appellate juriodiction, wheu no ju::;ticiabiP dispute exi:;t:; on appeal, cannot be
re:slcd upon the recollection that :;uch a dispute previously existed when
the ca"e wa:; in tlw trial eourt." 138 F. 2d, at 551 (footnotet:; omitted).
See a!:so Kapp v. National /l'ootball League. 5~6 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
197&); Hall v. U. S. Fiber & Plast1cs Corp., 476 F . 2d 418, 420 (CA3
1973); cf. Lewis v. United StateiS, 216 U. S. 611 (1\HO) (per curiam).
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of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the
t•trliug "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated.')
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
be appealed only when th~¥tigant has a personal stake in the
__,--resolution of his appeal.~ In Electrical Fittings, there was/""
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the
ease or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this case.

III
It is clea from thP Court's extendf'd discussion of policy
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considera-·
Lions ever• be£ote have inftueuced this CoUl't in determining
whetlwr the Co'nst,itution confers jutisJiction on the federal
courts. fn any event, the consequences of a findiug of moothess w1mld not be as severe as the Court predicts.
A .fill(ling- of' mootuess would have repet·cussions primarily
in two ::;ituations. the fi'rst involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class cel'tiflcation auJ then pursues his case to
a successful, litigateJ· judgment. i believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally wouid· bP barred by Art. 11I. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in this situation would
not b<-' uujust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the cPrtification ruling would enable putative class members to

~urt apvear~

pa~;:;ing,

bu~

I£TIJC
to recognize thi:, in
ante, at 9, n. 7,
fuib to apply the rult> to thitS ca~e. Siuc<· the Court i:)Ugg('Hts that TCI:ipondent::;' int ('fl'l;t in the eertitieation ruling derivel:l from the mere fact that it
":,;land:; as an adjuclication of one of the il'~lw:s litigated," id,, at 9, Electrical J/1ttiny~ Itself would limit u::; to the i~:mance of an order directing that
the oft~nl:-ive rnbng he expunged from the recorql !307 U.S., af, 242.

:
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take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by' an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" tha.~ /
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate!J
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
wheu the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
.iuugment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will haye a substantfal incentiv_e to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement availab1e for particulat· substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, howeJer, the Court never pauses to consider the law "Of
usury. Sinc1l¥ississippi law condeJUns the aggregation of
usury claims,~he Court's concern for compensation of puta-

jilee' Commeht, Immediate Appealability of Order~ Denying Class Cer-

~

tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 0979). In action,; brought under.,............Rule 23 (b) (3), ~ class mt•mber must decidP at the time of certification
whether to "opt put" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision
was designed to 'Qring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members w~re permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to secure the benefits of that deci~ion. Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R D. 69, 105,-106

(1966).
/ILiddell v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowers' elM; action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Missis.;ippi':• interest limitl:l would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S.D.
§ 85. But I do 9ot under;,;tand that the Nntional Bank Act displaces state
lJoli<:y di::;favorin~ the Hggregation of URUI') daims. A primary 1mrpose of

;
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tivc class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worsj, ipconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
~
Act.'if
~
The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do Hot doubt that tbe consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But tbese ·problems can and should
be addressed by measUres sbort of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step
should be the autborization of inteilocutory appeals from t~ /
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.liJ
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(h) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
-defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
·with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of tbe class certification question on
appeal.
·w here a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the Uistrict Court is not powerless. In at
that Act b lo protect national bank;; from discriminatory treatment or
·undue penaltie::; that may bt• imposed by ~ta.te law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
~The Aet provide>; tha.t rule~ of procedure promulgated by this Couy--rt
"~hall not . . . enlarge or modify any sub::;tantive right." 28 U. S. C.
§'2072. Sec American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 53 ,
557-558 (1974); Developmentl; in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
llev. 1318, 1058-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized :Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Con~umer Cia~;~ Actionti and the Sub~;tancePz~edure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev . 842 (l!J74) .
ffln Coopets &· Lybrand' · Livesay. 4:37 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court
]l(•ld Ihat 1ho dcuml of cia::;::; eerhfication is not a ''fuwl dcci::>ion" appeal~
ahle Hl:i of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the
ctanger;; of "indi~erimllla.le " mtrrlocutory review. !d., at 474. Although
Co1~7Jers & Lybrand no\\ !ll'Pveut.~ review in cases in whi?h it w?ulcl. ~~
~
,cl(ll'll'!i.bl(•, Congrf'l% may remed the llrohlem by appropnate legislatlO/
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leasL, some circumstances,-it may require that putative class
mem hers receive some sort of noti-ce and · an opportun.ity to
intervene .within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The
availability <!>f such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, D i s t r i v t
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-end
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress--not, this Court-to correct the
deficiencyle/
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions'' to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for- the
purpose of obtaining class certification. · Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
ean be intended only to "benefit the putative class. Yet theyor· their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court
has certified the class. there has been no considered determination that respondents will fairly ana adequately represent its
members. Nothiug ii) Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule· are not easily adapted to it.
Are respondents menibers of the class they seek to represent'?
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
~C'ongre&> currently has before it a. bill that attempts

to remedy .the
infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103 , 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
( 1979) . The bill, ~up ported by the Department of .Tu~tice, proposes to
bypa;:;:< the Rules Enabling Act problem, see n . 17, supra. and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to ju~tify mdividual lawsuits, b,v
creatiug a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides .for
the enforcement of thi:; right in somE' instance·s through actions brought in
the IH1lllP of the United States. The bill also authorize~ interlocutory
a ppeals from the grant, or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer~
tifir·ation nnder the proposed procedures.
difiicultie~
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40:3--404. (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi..~
cal of lhe cl~tiJhs ... of the class'' within the meaning of Rule
23 (a)(3)?1!/
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced settlelllents," and may even foreclose all settlements, of class
action litigation. See ante, n. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced
by tlw District Court on remand iu this case may not arise
again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's result
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation,
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing
relationship to the putative class than respondents have
Jwre. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way
intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and
n. 15, supra. These tensions. arising from the express terms
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of

re~pondents,

JJI;he District Court properly may conclude on remand that
for llwl't' or other rea~ons, cannot adequatE>Iy represE>nt the cla~s. Should
int1•rvention be proposed. the D1striet Court on equitable grounds might wl'If
~
rcfll>"<' to toll the statute or limitations in order to permit it. Nearly nine,..............
yl'ar:; have passed ,;ince thi:; action wa~ filed and six since the governing'
suht<tautive ~tatute was amended to authorize the challenged conduct. In
it" ordf'r denying certification on SPptembPr 29, 1975, the District. Court
ns,.igned <lS onp of it~ rea::<on~ the po;;~ibl<' "destruction of the [petitioner's]
lJank'' by damage::: then alleg<'d to total §12,000,000 and now potent,ially
augmented by the acerual of inter<'st. App. 47, Se£' ante. at 2, n. 2. The
po::<~1ble de:struction of petitioner's bank is irrelevant to the centntl i~::;ue of
mootne>':;, but ::;Prious mdeed to tlepo:;itors, i:ilockholder:s, 11nd the community
~ervPd . A::; this Court rPliPs f>O heavily ou itb practiral and equitable conN'l'll~ for putative elas::: membPr~, Jt will hardly b<' inappropriate for the
Di~t rict Court on remand to eons1der practicalities and equities on both
sidl'~
lu thl' circ·uiustam•p::; prcsPuted, tlw D1strict Court may well see no
rra~on to exereise it:-; eqllltable disrretion in favor of putative class memfreTSi
wltQ han ~h'I!t on their rights t.hp;oe many year:, ..

·"
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forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unnecessarily creates significant problems. in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the appe&}

~as '~moot.

\

er 2/11/80

No. 78-905 Roper, possible response to Mr. JUSTICE STEVRNS.

P.2:

2a/

MR. JUSTICE STEVP.NS' concurrinq opinion would
i\

hold that the absent members of a putative class are "parties"
to the action for Art. III purposes even after certification is
denied.

~,

That theory cannot be reconciled with

at

Indianapolis $chool · Comm'rs v; Japobs, 420

u.s.

128 (1975), in

which an oral certification order was held insufficient to
identify the interests of absent class members for Art. III
purposes. I do not understand how the result can chanqe when the
class has not been identified at all. See also Memphis Liqhtr
Gas &· Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Raxter v.
Palmiqiano, 423
Bradford, 423

u.s.

u.s

v. Spanqler, 427

308, 310 n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v;

147 (1975); Pasadena · City · Board of Education

u.s.

"counterproductive,"

424, 430
~,

(1976).

at

Nor do I . believe it

n. 1, to insist that an action

be maintained by adverse parties until the interests of absent
members of a putative class have been identified by proper
certification.

See infra, pp. 11-14; United States Parole

Commission v ; · Geraqhty, post, at
(POWELL, J., dissentinq).

(slip op. at 6 n. 7)

~

er 3/1/80

No. 78-904

Roper:

INSERT to replace pages 2-11.

This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after
finding that respondents retain a personal stake in sharing the
expense of litigation with members of the putative class.
at 7 n. 6.

Ante,

This speculative interest simply will not sustain

the jurisdiction of an Art. III court under established and
controlling precedents.

Accordingly, I dissent.
I

Although there are differences, this case is similar
to United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at
, in one important respect:

both require us to decide

whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of
class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever
from the relief sought in the action.

Here, as in Geraghty, the

District Court refused to certify a class.

~I
1

this case,

u~, the Court recognizes established Art. III

7

It

Qel"'r:'rt~y

states that the "right to employ Rule

23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of
substantive claims." Ante, at 6.

It also agrees that a federal

court "retains no jurisdiction over the controversy" when the
parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense."
Ibid.

Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle

2.

that a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an
action presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal
court of appeals.

!£.,

dispositive principles.

at 7, 10.

These are indeed the

My disagreement is with the way in

which the Court applies them in this case.

In my view, these

principles unambiguously require a finding of mootness.

A
Since no class has been certified and no one has
sought to intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs
arguably present in court.

Yet respondents have no continuing

interest in the injuries alleged in their complaint.

They

sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in full.!/
Respondents make no claim that success on the certification
motion would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from
the petitioner.l/

Their personal claims to relief have been

abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names.

The notice of appeal filed with the District Court

recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated • • • • "

App. 63.

This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents
have no interest in the "individual and private case or
controversy" relied on by the Court today.

Ante, at 5.

But

even without such evidence, this and other courts routinely have

3.

held that a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's
ealifornia · v.

injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome •
San · Pablo &· Tulare · R; · Co;, 149

u.s.

...;;,...;o~;;.;;..;~~..o;._...;.._

308, 313-314 (1893);

~

Hill &· Thomas Co. v; · United · States, 392 F.2d 204 (CA6 1968)(per
curiam); Lamb v; · Commissioner, 390 F.2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
curiam); A;A; · Allen Revivals; - Inc; - v; - Campb@ll 353 F.2d 89 (CAS
1965) (per curiam).

It is the tender itself that moots the case

whether or not a judgment is entered.

Ibid.

Thus, the law is

clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract
questions remaining in a case when the plaintiff has refused to
accept a proffered settlement that fully satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the
result should differ because the District Court has entered a
judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their
lawsuit as moot.4/

It is certainly true, as the Court observes,

that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case.

Ante at 7, 9.

There never has been any

doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely.

See 15 Wright,

Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3902 (1976);
9 Moore's Federal Practice

,r

203.06 (1975).

But the requirement

of adverse effect is more than a rule "of federal appellate
practice." Ante at 7.

As we have held repeatedly, Art. III
)\

4.

trhe-- etiteome "throughout the entirety of the litigation."

Sosna

v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e.g., Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422

u.s.

395, 401-401

( 1975).

It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule
of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to
require a showinq
to appeal."

o~=~;~ect
'1

in order to confer "standinq

15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra,

v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections,

~

3902.

Barry

U. S. App. D. C.

, 580 F.2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Freeman, 319

u.s.

359

(1943); Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307

u.s.

241

(1939); Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F.2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 748 (1943).~/ As these cases show, the requirements of Art.
III are not affected by the "factual context" in which a
suggestion of mootness arises.

See ante, at 6.

context, Art. III asks but a single question:

Whatever the
Is there a

continuing controversy between adverse parties who retain the
requisite stake in the outcome of the action?
Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is
the case primarily relied upon by the Court.
or no support for today's ruling.

It provides little

In Electrical Fittings, a

limited appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was

5.

~. .-..-~prejudiced

by the inclusion of an unnecessary and

adverse finding in a generally favorable decree. See
10.

~'

at

Here, the existence of the District Court's order denying

certification has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus,
the personal stake that justified the Electrical - Fittings appeal
i s not present in this case.

Absent such a stake, it is simply

irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a
litigation."

Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as

an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."

.!.E.·r

at 9-10.

Collateral rulings - like other rulings - may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.
B

After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject
to the "jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court
agrees that only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal
[can satisfy] tpe requirements of Art. III."
id~,

at 10.

~'

at 7; see

a~~

The Court @81'\ee~~~l'\~ that k espondents have no
1\

remaininq stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy."
id., at 9-10.

~r:he Cour~~ndents
I\

retain a

personal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses

~

94- vf

that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they

6.

Id., at 7 n. 6; see id. at

assert a continuing obligation."
10.6/

This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by

the record.
The Court observes that

respondents "have maintained

throughout this appellate litigation that they retain an
individual interest" in sharing expenses with the putative
class.

Id., at 12.

But neither the Court nor the respondents
;

ar/-~
te-Q~e

have identified any expense incurred

~_I'
1~~.,V~
~t is not oov~red

-\
by-the petitioner's

tend~~.

Nor did respondents identify any

such cost in their brief in the Court of Appeals, on which the
Court relies.

Id., at 7 n. 6.

The only "continuing
~

obliqation," ibid., mentioned in the respondents' brief is not a

~ [presen ~ obligation at all.

~

./ tl (])

Respondents assert that they have

;'I)

} offered l - but not executed - a note and mortgage on realty as

~,_,..,~~

~f-0~

security for a $15,000 loan to defray notice costs that may be

V~Vr~~

incurred if the District Court grants certification on remand.

,, ;

v~

rVYv .

11

~~~

Brie; for Respondents 33; App. 78.

This possible future

~ '1' •
tvvt..bf obligation cannot supply a personal stake in the pending appeal.
~
11 (

(,f'l

.OJ

~

~-,,;._.
~0-- 1 ~
~.,_.{

)

,

~
Petitioner paid into court the full amount of
/

respo~dents'

claims

and ~

court cost:;

~l ~o~qk

nothing was

W ~- ~/ v
J_!.a ~ tt.t4.J. ' < ~ ~~ a.. t
+~-added s~y for lawyers' fee ::X Athere was no reason

~~J.iQ""

t:. r-

~,1

. and

"""t-ainly no reason· : o assume

9 •

ui·J

/~

~~f/'Yvr~~

~... ..J-~-~

~.t.4_)

that any such fees
...

CV' ~fl would be assessed against petitioner.

~

U J

1

N-~Ari">d~'

The complaint suggests

t'lA.c d._

7

0

that respondents' lawyers have agreed to accept as full
compensation a contingent fee equal to 25 per cent of the amount
recovered from the petitioner.

App.

13-14.

The record reveals

no further details, and the respondents have offered no contrary
interpretation.

On this record, therefore, it is fictional to

-U.,.~ ~~o-rsuggest that respondents have any continuing interest in costs
1\

~)~
~

fees. Only counsel is concerned with whether the recovery is

enlarged. (

"

Prior decisions of this Court establish that

unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power."

u.s.

Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426

26, 44 (1976).

I would adhere to that principle

today.]~

2$'7~~~...,d·

/-U--

Even if one assumed that respondents' liab1lity to

~(.~
be reduced by a class recovery, no one has

their ~ ~e~A could

sugqested that the petitioner is or ever will be liable for that
~-(., ·

obligation. The

Cour ~.~e

J t

holds that the

~

possibility

of a future claim for attorney's fees against the members of a
class that possibly may be certified, is sufficient to establish
a case or controversy against a class defendant who has afforded
full relief to the only identified adverse parties. This is an
unprecedented theory that drains all substance from the personal
stake requirement of an Art. III case or controversy.2/ The
jurisdictional limitations of Art. III "requir[e] that a federal
court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to

8.

the challenged action of the defendant • • •

II

Simon v.

Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., supra at 41-42; see Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441

u.s.

91, 99 (1979).

The

"injury" - if any - represented by respondents' attorney's fees
scarcely can be "traced" to the petitioner, who is not obliged
to pay them.

As respondents seek no further relief from the

petitioner; their appeal can have no effect upon any right or
obligation obtaining between the parties.

It is axiomatic that

"federal courts are without power to decide questions that
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them."
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).

In the

circumstances presented, this elementary principle disposes of
the case.

c
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in
the outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot.
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431

u.s.

171, 172-173 (1977)

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1976)

E.g.,
(per curiam);

(per curiam); Preiser

v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis School
Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312, 316-320 (1974)

(per curiam); North Carolina v. Rice,

404 U.S. 244,246 (1971)

(per curia.m); SEC v. Medical Comm. for

9.

Human Rights,404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972).8/
Respondents do not suggest that their claims are
"capable of repetition, yet evading review."

Cf. Gerstein v.

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975) ..~./

Not a single one

of the alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in
the nine years since this action was filed.
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald 432

u.s.

Cf. United

385 (1977).

Nor has anyone

challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint
or protest.

Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.

Even after certification was

denied, the action lay dormant during the seven months in which
respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without
provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought
that the class action would protect his rights.

Apart from the

persistence of the lawyers, this has been a non-case since the
petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents•
individual claims.

To be

/~,~~
t-l:le
_ interest

sure ~
JA_,

la-wye't' ~ bau~

a.A

in

~ 1.-u~

an enlarged recovery that,t aiso woard inereaoe t..b.e contingent fee

~~~Offiplaint.

But I know of no decision by any

~ ~c-'... ~ ~ ~~-

-/-o -d,

court that holds that a lawyer's interest in a larger fee

1\
creates the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III.

Despite tradition and policy considerations to the

1 0.

contrary, the Court allows this federal action to be litigated
on remand by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class
members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.~/
The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for reasons
of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective "response
to the existence of iniuries unremedied by the regulatory action
of government."

Ante, at 12.

I am not aware that such

considerations ever before have influenced this Court in
determining whether the Constitution confers iurisdiction on the
federal courts.

In any event, the consequences of a finding of

mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as the Court seems
to fear.

And the Court fails even to recognize that allowinq

this action to proceed without an interested plaintiff will
itself generate practical difficulties of some magnitude.

3.

relief that interest disappeared.

21

For example, consistent application of this theory

would permit a person who previously had accepted full settlement
of his individual claim to file a class action.

Apparently, the

putative plaintiff need only "asser[t] ," ante, at 7 n. 6, that fees
incurred in anticipation of the litigation ultimately might be
shared with a class.
~/

These cases are discussed more fully in United States

Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post at

(POWELL, J. ,

~

dissenting).

2/
lQI

FORMER N. 4
I do not suggest that counsel acted improperly in

pursuing this case.

Since they have prevailed both in this Court

and in the Court of Appeals, the responsibility for allowing
client-less litigation falls on the federal courts.

er · 3/1/80

INSERT NO. 2, No. 78-904 Roper p. 14
~/

As noted above, p.

appeal in their own names.

, supra, respondents took no

One would think that this candid

disclaimer of personal interest would destroy the foundation upon
which the Court predicates Art. III jurisdiction.
p.

Ante, at

7~

see

, supra.

INSERT NO. 3, p. 17
~/

The Court's resurrection of this dead controversy

may result in irreparable injury to innocent parties, as well as to
the petitioner bank.

When the District Court denied certification

on September 29, 1975, it assigned as one of its reasons the
possible "destruction of the [petitioner] bank" by damages then
alleged to total $ 12,000,000 and now potentially augmented by the
accrual of interest.

App. 47, see ante, at 2 n. 2.

The possible

destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue,
but serious indeed to d e positors, stockholders, and the community
served.

It is said that this is necessary to redress injuries

suffered by members of the putative class.

Yet, no such person has

come forward in the nenrlv n ine years that have passed since this
action was filed. Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by
statute

~<..'("
~six

years ago.

As the District Court may be called

upon to determine whether the equitable doctrine of "relation back"
permits it to toll the statute of limitations on remand, ante, at 3

2.

n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for that court to consider
the equities on both sides. In the circumstances presented, the
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable
discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on
their rights these many years.

FOOTNOTES
~

Although respondents also asked for attorney's fees,

their complaint shows that fees were to be granted only from the
damages ultimately awarded to them or the class.

App. 13-14.

There is no possibility of prospective relief because the
Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974 to authorize, inter
alia, the charges at issue in this case.

~

564, § 7; see Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-1

ll

1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch.
(6).

Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted

that the petitioner's tender fails to include all costs and fees
for which it could be held liable.

!/

See Part II-B, infra.

The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself

----------

cannot supply a personal stake in the outcome, for Congress cannot
abrogate Art. III limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.

Gladstone; · Realtors - v; -village - of -Bellwood, 441

u.s.

91,

100 (1979).
~/

United Airlines; · Inc; · v; · McDonald, 432 U.S. 385

(1977), and Coo3ers & Lybrand · v;
not to the contrary.

· Li~esay

437 U.S. 463 (1978), are

Incidental dictum in both cases stated that

the denial of class certification is subiect to appellate review
after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs.
Neither case discussed mootness, and neither analyzed the
proposition in any way.

Indeed, the only authority cited in

Cogpers &· Lybrand was United - Airlines, see 437 U.S., at 469, and
the only authority cited in United · Airlines was a concession made

2.

by the defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals,
not one of which dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an
analogous situation, see 432

u.s.,

at 393, and n. 14.

Such

statements, casually enunciated without a word of explanation in
opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not
controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further
reflection to have been inconsistent with settled law.

As the

Court agrees today, neither case creates an exception to the
fundamental rule that "federal appellate jurisdiction is limited by
the appellant's personal stake in the appeal."

!/

Ante at 10

The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class

action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer
substantial advantages for named plaintiffs • • • • "
9.

~'

at 11 n.

But any such advantages cannot accrue to these respondents, who

will not be litigating their own claims on remand.

Indeed, the

Court refers to respondents in this context only to point out that
their total damages were so small that they "would be unlikely to
obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not do so
by means of a class action. We may assume that respondents had some
interest in the class action procedure as a means of interesting
their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement.
This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once
respondents obtained both access to court and full individual

LFP/lab

Ellen:

3/3/80

Footnote

p.

Roper

What about adding a footnote along the following

lines:

_! Responoents, in their brief here and in the

Court of AppeaJs, have been conspicuously vague in
identifying the "fees and expenses" relied upon as supplying
the adverse interest essential to a live controversy.
Perhaps their strongest statement is:

"Of course, the interest of the [respondents]
in assertion of the right to proceed on behalf
of the class incluoes such matters as the
prospect for spreading attorneys' fees and
expenses among more claimants and thus reducing
the percentage that would otherwise be payable
by them".
Br. Court of Appeals, p. 4.

The only expense ever mentioned, apart from court costs
already paid by petitioners f ; ndPr, is an alleged offer to

~be:ft~ ~~!iass
""'

·,_

....

...... ·"

ultimately is certified.

2.

See supra at

No

s ~Gif~

reference is mane to any

obligation of respondents to pay attorneys' fee ~eyond that
in the complaint to a 25% contingent fee.

~

Iooeed..,-1'\ it is clear f'f....,'~"'~O""m'""
' "1i~im":1(~1~ bee nthe

11

fees and expenses 11

See supra at

.sa id --0-y-eeu ~

that

~~~~
a.re those

a ~I-H-i~Wfi.J.·..ct~t;.U~~'Ft'. 't"
. ~-€
..

-1

incurred in connection with this appeal, and which may arise
in the future if a class should be certified.

These are

hardly fees and expenses that create any present controversy
between petitioner and respondents •

1•••

..

LFP/lab

Rider A, pg. 7

3/3/80

Roper

The Court's reliance on its attorneys' fees
argument is more than puzzling.

No one has suggested, or

mathematically could suggest, how respondents' obligation to
pay 25% of what they may recover could be reduced if other

- -·

parties also should become obligated to pay 25% of what they
:,).recover.
Even if we were to assume that respondents had
obligated themselves imprudently to pay a fee that possibly
could exceed the amount recovered by them, the applicable
principles of mootness would be no different.

Under the

American Rule, the petitioner could not he held liable under
a fee agreement made between respondents and their counsel.
The iniury claimed to be suffered by respondents is the loss
of opportunity to spread costs and fees if a class is

·,,

..

<'

..

-

2.

eventually certified.

The jurisdictional limitations of

Article III "require [e] that a federal court act only to
redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged
action of the defendant • •

"

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky

We] fare Rights Organization, Orq., supra at 41-42: see
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
(1979).

u.s.

91, 99

No such injury exists in this case as petitioner has

no responsibility
and their counsel.

~
9Y a

fee arrangement between respondents

Indeed, it is wholl.y speculative whether

there ever will be such

~n

injury.

Respondents could share

fees with others only if a class ultimately is certified

)

~~ 

if it prevails in the subsequent litigation, and if a fund is
created from which fees may be paid.

Quite apart from this

"unadorned speculation [that isl not sufficrient] to invoke
the federal judicial power", Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, supra at 44, respondents' "injury" - if any

3.

f

should ever exist - cannot be "traced" to the petitioner /i!sJo

J

is not obligated to pay any part of respondents' attorney's

1

fees; ] "Federal courts are without power to decide questions
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
them."

North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).

This elementary prjnciple disposes of this case, even if one
were to assume some fee obligation other than the 25%
contingent arrangement mentioned in the complaint.

*

*

*

Ellen:
The more I think about the attorney fee question,
the more frivolous it seems.
Perhaps we should omit from the text the
hypothetical assumption as to what would happen if there were

·,

.,_

.

--~

4.

no continqent fee arrangement.

I have not rechecked the

briefs, but I do not recall that either counsel or the Court
disclaims the

_tyy;.~~e.
e~n

of a contingent fee arrangement.

The

1\
Court, in one of its footnotes, vaguely suggests that other
fees may be owed .

..

/

.... .

_
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The only expense mentioned by respondents - apart
from Court costs included in the petitioners'
tender - is not a present obligation at all.

It is

an offer to provide security for costs in the event
a class ultimately is certified.
respondents 33; app. 78.

Brief for

Nor does the fee

arrangement in this case create any obligation,
present or future, that can be affected by
continuing this partyless litiqation.

Petitioners'

complaint identifies the fee arrangement as
"twenty-five percent (25%)" of the amount of the
final judgment.

App. 13, 16.*

No other fee

arrangement is identified in the record or briefs.
Even if it were relevant one has suggested, how
respondents' obligation to pay 25% of what they may
recover could be reduced if a class subsequently is
certified and its members become obligated to pay
25% of what they recover.

Thus, the "spreading

[of] attorneys' fees and expenses" relied upon as
providing the necessary live controversy between
petitioner and respondents,?
present obligation.

relates to no

It is merely an expectation of

respondents and particularly their counsel in the
event a class is certified.

It is irrelevant to

2.

the existence of a present controversy between
petitioner and respondents.
*Ellen: What do you think of actually quoting the
two provisions of the complaint with respect to the
attorneys fees.

9.

or protest.

Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.

Even after certification was

denied, the action lay dormant during the seven months in which
respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without
provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought
that the class action would protect his rights.

Apart from the

persistence of the lawyers, this has been a non-case since the
petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents'
individual claims.

To be sure, respondents' counsel may have

the same interest in an enlarged recovery that is inherent in
any contingent fee arrangement. But I know of no decision by any
court that holds that a lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be
paid by third persons not present in court,

creates the

personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III.
II
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the
Court directs a remand in which this federal action will be
litigated by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class
members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.ll/
The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for reasons
of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective "response
to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action
of government."

Ante, at 1 2.

--~Apart
from the fact that no
I

"unremedied" injuries are known to exist, I am not aware that

)

10 •

such a consideration ever before has influenced this Court in
determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the
federal courts.

In any event, the consequences of a finding of

mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as the Court seems
to fear.

And the Court fails even to recognize that allowing

this action to proceed without an interested plaintiff will
itself generate practical difficulties of some magnitude.

lfp/ss

3/4/80

Rider A, p. 6 (Roper)

The only expense mentioned by respondents - apart
from Court costs included in the petitioners'
tender - is not a present obligation at all.

It is

an offer to provide security for costs in the event
a class ultimately is certified.

Brief for
~~~,

respondents 33; app. 78.

Nor does

th~

arrangement in this case create any obligation,
present or future, that can be affected by
litigation.

Petitioners'

-hJ -t-e., Jd•c. •l 1 4-4c.l~4o·f
the fee arraA~~e~t~ as

tio ~

~~

"twenty-five percent (25%)" of the amount of the
final judgment.

App. 13,

79
. ~1-ttlwo/~~
16. ~ r fee
f-t-c- ~
~~~~

arrangement is identified in the record or briefs.
?£.<9

Even if it were

relevant ~one

has

suggested ~ ow

respondents' obligation to pay 25% of what they may
recover could be reduced if a class subsequently is
certified and its members become obligated to pay
25% of what they recover.

Thus, the "spreading

[of] attorneys' fees and expenses" relied upon as
providing the necessary live controversy between
petitioner and respondents,?
present obligation.

relates to no

It is merely an expectation of

~

..

respondentsJand particularly their counsel in the
event a class is certified.

..,

It

is~vant
'\

to

~.~

2.

the existence of a present controversy between
petitioner and respondents.
*Ellen: What do you think of actually quoting the
two provisions of the complaint with respect to the
attorneys fees.

5.

or no support for today's rulinq.

In Electrical · Fittinqs, a

limited appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was
prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse
findinq in a qenerally favorable decree. See

~'

at 10.

Here,

the existence of the District Court's order denying
certification has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus,
the personal stake that iustified the Electrical - Fittinqs appeal
is not present in this case.

Absent such a stake, it is simply

irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a
litiqation."

Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as

an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."

~.,

at 9-10.

Collateral rulinqs - like other rulinqs - may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.
B
After recoqnizinq that the riqht to appeal is subiect
to the "iurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court
agrees that only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal
[can satisfy]
id;, at 10.

the requirements of Art. III."

Ante, at 7; see

-----------

The Court also aqrees that respondents have no

remaining stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy."
id;, at 9-10.

Nevertheless,

~ holds

th~~Q~~t
~

that respondents

retain a personal stake in this appeal because they "desire to

6.

shift to successful class litigants a portion of those fees and
expenses that have been incurred in this litigation and for
which they assert a continuing obligation."
id; at 10.6/

Id;, at 7 n. 6; see

This conclusion is neither legally sound nor

supported by the record.
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense,
chargeable to the petitioner, that was incurred before the
petitioner's tender.
information.

Nor have respondents supplied this

Both here and in the Court of Appeals, respondents

have been conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and
expenses" relied upon as supplying the adverse interest
essential to a live controversy.!/

----

i The

only expense mentioned

by respondents - apart from court costs included in the
petitioner's tender - is an alleged offer to provide security
for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified.

Brief

for Respondents 33; App. 78. No reference is made to any
obligation to pay attorney's fees beyond the 25 per cent

Jlo .
contingent fee mentioned in the complaint. App.

14)~

Thus, it

appears that the "fees and expenses" relied upon by respondents
counsel are those that may arise in the future if a class should
be certified.

These are hardly "iniuries" of the sort required

to support a finding of present controversy between petitioner

and

respondent~

7•

. ; ' The record does not positively rule out the hypothesis
that respondents have altered their fee arrangements or incurred
some obligation for costs in the period between the filinq of
the complaint and the petitioner's tender.
the slightest factual support for any such

But neither is

. t:lWe

hypothesis. ~

have

held repeatedly that "unadorned speculation will not suffice to
invoke the federal iudicial power."
Welfare · Riqhts · Orq;, 426

u.s.

E;g;,
__...__

26, 44 (1976).

~~~~
ha~

been-no

suqqest~

t

liable for any

rl

~

~imon · v; · Eastern · Kv;

'Jul

~
M.G.repveP-["~ht!!re

"

that the petitioner is or ever will be

fl.,
~~~~-~'
hypq

or expenses.

Indeed, the

American Rule would bar an award of attornev's fees aqainst this
petitioner.

Thus, respondents' "injury" - if any exists - is

not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner.

Id;, at

41-42; see Gladstone; · Realtors · v; · Villaqe · of · Bellwood, 441
91, 99 (1979).~/

asserted desire to

().,

u.s.

Wha tever may be the basis for the respondents'
4~..U

osts~

reco~

fl.;.;..

u

unnamed members of

,.

~

I

p.t:Pt,at]¥-e clas s , th e petitioner is at most a bystander.

ee tltai?

1\
"[F]ederal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the riqhts of litigants in the case
before them."

~---. . -oen

i:f on""S.

North · earolina · v; · Rice, 404

wer~t

the

~ttrt:J.s

u.s.

244, 246

(1971 ).

a s'oumpt i.oA'e":-t"his
\

~

'I
I

elementary principle~ dispos ~ of the case.

,
c
)

8.

Since respondents have no continuinq personal stake in
the outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot.

u.s.

Ashcroft - v; ·· Mattis, 431

u.s.

Weinstein · v; · Bradford, 423

u.s.

v; · Newkirk, 422

404

u.s.

312, 316-320 (1974)

u.s.

244, 246 (1971)

Human - Rights,404

u.s.

147 (1976)

(per · curiam);

(per - curiam); Preiser

395, 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis - School

Comm'rs - v; · Jacobs, 420

u.s.

171,172-173 (1977)

E;q;,

128 (1975); BeFunis · v; · edeqaard, 416

---

(per
· curiam); North · earolina · v; · IHce,
.
(per - curiam);

- ·- --

~F.e · v; · Medical · eomm; · for

403, 407 (1972)._!/

Respondents do not sugqest that their claims are
"capable of repetition, yet evading review."

-Pugh,

420

u.s.

103, 110-111, n. 11

Cf.

(1975).l8/

~erstein · v;

Not a sinqle one

-

of the alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in
the nine years since this action was filed.
Airlines; · Inc; · v; · McDonald 432

u.s.

Cf. enited

385 (1977).

Nor has anyone

challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint
or protest.

Tr. of Oral Arq. 4.

Even after certification was

denied, the action lay dormant durinq the seven months in which
respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without
provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thouqht
that the class action would protect his rights.

Apart from the

persistence of the lawyers, this has been a non-case since the

9.

petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents'
individual claims.

To be sure, respondents' counsel may have

the same interest in an enlarged recovery that is inherent in
any contingent fee arrangement. But I know of no decision by any
court that holds that a lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be
paid by third persons not present in court,

creates the

personal · stake in the outcome required by Art. III.
II
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the
Court directs a remand in which this federal action will be
litigated by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class
members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.!l/
The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for reasons
of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective "response
to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action

~r~;- ~;.-t-~ --·~:~ .

of government."

~
~

Ante, at 12 .I\ I am not aware that such

considerationr,J. ever before have influenced this Court in
determininq whether the eonstitation confers iurisdiction on the
federal courts.

In any event, the consequences of a finding of

mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as the Court seems
to fear.

And the Court fails even to recoqnize that allowing

this action to proceed without an interested plaintiff will
itself generate practical difficulties of some magnitude.

3.

relief that interest disappeared.

ll

Perhaps the stronqest of respondents' statements is:

"Of cou1e, the interest of the [respondents]

in

assertion of the riqht to proceed on behalf of the
class includes such matters as the prospect for
spreading attorneys' fees and expenses amonq more
claimants and thus reducing the percentaqe that would
otherwise be payable by them."

Plaintiffs-Apellants'

Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and
Reply Brief, filed in Roper - v; - Consarve (CAS, No. 763600), Jan. 10, 1977.
~/

Far-reachinq consequences could flow from a rule that

injuries compensable by putative class members could be "traced" to
the class defendant for purposes of the case or controversy
requirement.

At the least, this rule would support a claim that a

person who previously had accepted full settlement of his
individual claim was entitled to file suit on behalf of an
unrecompensed class.

Apparently, the putative plaintiff need ~ly

"asser[t] ," ante, at 7 n. 6, that fees incurred in anticipation of
the litiqation ultimately miqht be shared with a prevailinq class.
9/ These cases are discussed more fully in Hnited - States
Parole · Commission · v; - ~eraqhty,

post, at

(POWELL, J.,

dissenting) •

.!..Q_/
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ll/

I do not suqqest that counsel acted improperly in

4.

pursuing this case.

Since they have prevailed both in this Court

and in the Court of Appeals, the responsibility for allowing
client-less litigation falls on the federal courts.

To: The Chief Justict:
M:r . J ustice Brennan
Mr . Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Just tee M•1 \·shall
Mr. Justic n Bla<Jhmn
Mr. Just i( , i' "''•'J<list
Mr. JusJcico St Jvcns

~ .. (-~o
~

From: Mr. Justice Powell
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Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States ~ourt
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Robert L. Roper et al.
Circuit.
[February - , 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with ·whom MR. JusTICE SnJWAH.'rj
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the.
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this.
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleg<.'u to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amouut due with the clerk of the ·c ourt.

Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ y
5,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state Jaw, and 28 U. S, C.
1

§ 1:355.
.

..
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This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after
finding that respondents retain a personal stake in sharing the
expense of
at 7 1 n. 6.

litigation ~ ith members of the putative class.

Ante,

This speculative interest simply will not sustain

the jurisdiction of an Art. III court under established and
controlling precedents.

Accordingly, I dissent.
I

Although there are differences, this case is similar
to linited · States · Parole .. eommission · v; · @eraqhty, post, at

_,

in one important respect:

both require us to decide

whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of
class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever
from the relief sought in the action.

Here, as in

District Court refused to certify a class.

@eraght~,

the

In this case,

however, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine.

It

states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right
only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims." Ante,
at 6.

It also agrees that a federal court "retains no

iurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties'
"substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense."

Ibid.

Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that a

2.

party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals.

Id., at 7, 10.

principles.

These are indeed the dispositive

My disagreement is with the way in which the Court

applies them in this case.

In my view, these principles

unambiguously require a finding of mootness.
A

Since no class has been certified and no one has
sought to intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs
arguably present in court.

Yet respondents have no continuing

interest in the injuries alleged in their complaint.

They

sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in full.z/
Respondents make no claim that success on the certification
motion would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from
the petitioner.3/

Their personal claims to relief have been

abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names.

The notice of appeal filed with the District Court

recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated • • •

"

App. 63.

This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents
have no interest in the "individual and private case or
controversy" relied on by the Court today.

~'

at 5.

But

even without such evidence, this and other courts routinely have

.J

3.

held that a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's
injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome.
San · Pablo · &· Talare · R; ·· eo;, 149

u.s.

ealifornia ~ v;

308, 313-314 (1893); Drs ·;

Hill · &· Thomas ·· eo; · v; ·· united ·· states, 392 F.2d 204 (CA6 1968)(per
curiam); Lamb · v; · commissioner, 390 F.2d 157 (CA2 1968)
cariam);
1965)

A;A; · Allen - Revivalsi ~ Inc; ~ v;

(per ~ cariam).

(E!!

· eampbell 353 F.2d 89 (CAS

It is the tender itself that moots the case

whether or not a iudqment is entered.

Ibid.

~hus,

the law is

clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract
questions remaining in a case when the plaintiff has refused to
accept a proffered settlement that fully satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the
result should differ because the District Court has entered a
judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their
lawsuit as moot.4/

It is certainly true, as the Court observes,

that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case.

Ante at 7, 9.

There never has been any

doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable iudqment that affect him adversely.

See 15 Wriqht,

Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3902 (1976);
9 Moore's Federal Practice

,I

203.06 (1975).

But the requirement

of adverse effect is more than a rule "of federal appellate
practice." Ante at 7.

As we

ha~e

held repeatedly, and as the

4.

Court concedes,

~'

at 10, Art. III itself requires a live

controversy in which a personal stake is at issue "throughout

____

the entirety of the litigation."
See,~'

402 (1975).

..__
Sosna · v;. ;-. .Iowa,
419

Preiser · v; ·· Newkirk, 422

u.s.

u.s.

393,

395, 401-401

(1975).
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule
of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to
require a showing of continuing adverse effect in order to
confer "standing to appeal."
supra,

§

3902.

Barry · v; · District - of - eolumbia - Bd; - of - Elections,

U.S. App. D.C.
Freeman, 319

u.s.

Betts · Co;, 307

, 580 F.2d 695
359

u.s.

(1943)~

241

(CA9

(1978)~

see Altvater · v;

Electrical · Fittings · v; · Thomas · &

(1939)~

I:Jeagoe, 586 F.2d 644, 650
F.2d 541

15 Wright, Miller and Cooper,

Kapp · v; - National · Football
1978)~

(1942), cert. denied, 319

Cover · v; · Schwartz, 133

u.s.

748 (1943).5/ As these

cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not affected by the
"factual context" in which a suggestion of mootness arises.
~'

at 6.

question:

See

Whatever the context, Art. III asks but a single
Is there a continuing controversy between adverse

parties who retain the requisite stake in the outcome of the
action?
Electrical - Fittings - v: - Thomas · &- Betts - eo:, supra, is
the case primarily relied upon by the Court.

It provides little

s.

or no support for today's ruling.

In Electrical Fittings, a

limited appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was
prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse
finding in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10.

Here,

the existence of the District Court's order denying
certification has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus,
the personal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal
is not present in this case.

Absent such a stake, it is simply

irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a
litigation."

Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as

an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."

Id., at 9-10.

Collateral rulings - like other rulings - may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.
B

After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject
to the "jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court
agrees that only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal
[can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III."
id., at 10.

Ante, at

7~

see

The Court also agrees that respondents have no

remaining stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy."
id., at 9-10.

Nevertheless, it bolds that respondents retain a

personal stake in this appeal becaus2 they "desire to shift to

-

-

..

6.

successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they
assert a continuing obligation."
10.6/

Id., at 7 n. 6; see id. at
1

--J

This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by

the record.
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense,
chargeable to the petitioner, that was incurred before the
petitioner's tender. Similarly, the respondents have been
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses"
relied upon as supplying the adverse interest essential to a
live controversy.z!

The only expense ~entioned by respondents,

apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender, is
not a present obligation at all.

It is an offer to provide

security for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified.
Brief for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee
arrangement in this case create any obligation, present or
future, that can be affected by the certification of a class.
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subiect to
court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25%)" of the amount of
the final judgment.

App. 14, 16.8/

No arrangement other than

this customary contingent fee is identified in the record or the
briefs.

Yet, no one has explained how respondents' obligation

to pay 25% of their recovery to counsel could be reduced if a

7.

class is certified and its members become similarly obligated to
pay 25% of their recovery. Thus, the asserted interest in
"spreading (of] attorney's fees and expenses"2_/ relates to no
present obligation.

It is at most an expectation - of the

respondents' and particularly of their counsel - that certain
fees and expenses may become payable in the event a class is
certified.

That expectation is wholly irrelevant to the

existence of a present controversy between petitioner and
respondents.
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses
cannot be reconciled with the repeated admonition that
"unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power."

E.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights

Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976).

Such speculation is particularly

inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor
respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon.

Indeed, the

American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against this
petitioner.

Thus, respondents' "injury" - if any exists - is

not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner.

Id., at

41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 99 (1979).10/

Whatever may be the basis for the

respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with

8.

unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a
bystander. "[F]ederal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
before them."

North Carolina v. Rice, 404

u.s.

244, 246 (1971).

he case.
This elementary principle should dispose of t

c
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in
the outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot.
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431

u.s.

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
v. Newkirk, 422

~

u.s.

171, 172-173 (1977)

u.s.

147 (1976)

E.g.,
(per curiam):

(per curiam): Preiser

395, 401-404 (1975): Indianapolis School

Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. · 128 (1975): DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312, 316-320 (1974)

(per curiam): North Carolina v. Rice,

404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)

(per curiam): SEC v. Medical Comm. for

Human Rights,404

u.s.

403, 407 (1972).11/

Respondents do not suggest that their claims are
"capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-111, n.

Cf. Gerstein v.

11 (1975).12/

Not a single one

of the alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in
the nine years since this action was filed.
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald 432

u.s.

Cf. United

385 (1977).

Nor has anyone

challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint

9.

or protest.

Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.

Even after certification was

denied, the action lay dormant during the seven months in which
respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without
provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought
that the class action would protect his rights.

Apart from the

persistence of the lawyers, this has been a non-case since the
petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents'
individual claims.

To be sure, respondents' counsel may have

the same interest in an enlarged recovery that is inherent in
any contingent fee arrangement. But I know of no decision by any
court that holds that a lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be
paid by third persons not present in court,

creates the

personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III.
II
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the
Court directs a remand in which this federal action will be
litigated by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class
members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.ll/
The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation

fo~

reasons

of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective "response
to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action
of government."

Ante, at 12.

I am not aware that such a

consideration ever before has influenced this Court in

10 •

determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the
federal courts.

In any event, the consequences of a finding of

mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as the Court seems
to fear.

And the Court fails even to recognize that allowing

this action to proceed without an interested plaintiff will
itself generate practical difficulties of some magnitude.
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The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness b~;J
appealability. But the characterization does not withsta
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was n erless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent,

d

I
Although there are some differences, th case is similar to
United States Parole Commiss·ion v. G aghty, post, at - ,
in one important respect: both requ· us to decide whether
putative class representatives may a eal the denial of class certification whe11 they can derive no enefit from the relief sought
in the action. ln this case, as i · Gerayhty, the District Court
refused to certify a class. s· ce no one has sought to intervene, respondents are the ly plaintiffs arguably present in
court. Yet respondents ave no continuing interest in the
injuries allegeu in thei complaint. They sought only damages; those damages ve been tendered in fulP Respondents
have not suggeste that success on the certification motion
would entitle th 1 to additional relief from the petitioner. 3
2 Although l'PS ondPnt:,; also u~kPd for Mtoruey's feet;, their comJJiainL
were to be granted only f:om the damages ultimately
shows that f
awarded to i em or the class. App. 13-14.
8 Hespon entt; do m;sert that certifie;ttion would enable them to reduce the
litigation by a.llocating costs among the members of a prevailing
rirf for Respondents .8a. Except for attorney's fees, however,
res1 dents do not. Jdentify any eosts incurred to date Lhat are not
pov red by the petitioner's tender. Although the record does not reveal
details. of the fee arrangement bet ween responden.ts and their lawyers,
complaint sugge.;ts that the lawyers have agreed io accept as full comlsation 25% of the amount recovered from the petitioner. App. 13-14.
If thiJS .i,; t.hr. agrrement as to fees, re~pondents have no continuing interest.
Only counsel i,.; roneerned whethPr the recovery is enl:trged.
Even if one assumed that rrspondents' liability to their lawyers could be
reduced by a class recovery, no one has suggested that petitioner is or ever
will be liable for feci' that u.Jt.imately ma.y be owed by respondents. Re.__
sp_on.dcn.ts' juri:;dictional tJ1eory appea.rs to be tlmL the mere possibil~of

.-

_,.

__.,
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clai1:~ 7o reli~;;:.:-

Indeed. their personal
been aband"'....{d
so completely that no appeal was take11 in their own :z::~.
'The notice of appeal filed with the District Court re9tes that
respondeuts appeal only "on behalf of all qth's similarly
sitmLted . . . ." App. 63.
Since respondents have no continuing perS<)ll'al stake in the
outcome of this action, I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court require that the 'Case ne dismissed as moot.
See Geraghty, post, at - - - (l6WELL, J... dissenting).
There is no suggestion that responpents' claims are "capable
of repetition. yet evading review' Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975 I And not a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class member 1as sought to intervene in the
nine years since this actio 1 was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. J.1fcDonald, 432 !J. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
ever challenged the llegedly usurious charges by informal
complaint or protes . Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in whi h respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, with ut provoking a response from anyone who previously ma have thought that the class action would protect
his rights We are not told what, if anything, motivates reassert.in • fuf .ul'C• <'laim:-; for attomey's fees against other members of a
putati , class gh·~ rise to a cnse or controver&-y against the class defendauk , uch a u~eory is unprecedented, and its consequences are bizarre.
Fo example, I'f..>spondents' theory would permit, t1 person to file a class
t,ion, even t.hough he had previously a.cceptt>d full :settlement, of his inlividuaJ claim. on the ground Uwt, the fee.· incurred in unticipit.tio~he;.
· ·
, , 'y he ~lmrec(witl · ~; ~
4 If a class-act ion defendant wt>re shown to have embarked on a course
of conduct designed ttl immlatP the class certification i&.1te from appellate
review iu ordf'r Lo avoid cla."<lwide liability, a court in proper circum~tances
migh~ find tJw Gerstein test f:'.atisfied and the cH~e not. moot. See Susm..an v.
Lincoln American Co1·p., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978) ; 13 Wright , Miller &
Cooper, .Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (SttJ1p. 1979) ;
Comment , Continuation and Representation of Class Action;; Following
Dismissal of the Class Repre;;entativc, 1974 Duke L . J~ 57:3, 599- 600,
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spondents tO continue t'his crusii'Cie' Ol1 "behatl o"£ persons who
for e s have evinced uo interest whatever in obtaining
covery f themselves.5 On its face, this appears simp
be a "lawy r's case."
Despite tr clition and policy considerations to th contrary,
the Court see 1s undisturbed that this federal action will be
litigated on re and by a lawyer whose on "clients" are
unidentified clas members who have show no desire to be
represented by an one. 0 The Court also eglects established
principles of Art. I I jurisprudence, an remands to the District Court a headl s class actior/ hat does uot meet the

II/ .

The Court identifies e qu95tion for decision in this case
as "whether respondents' 'ndnridual and private case or controversy became moot by ason of the entry of judgment in
their favor." ld., at §I Wholly ignoring the fact that
respondents themselve~Felect d to appeal only on behalf of
third parties, the Cour conclu s that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigat on- as dis 'nguished from whatever may
be their represen i¢live responsilf ities to the putative classis sufficient to ..Permit their app 1. . . ." 1d., at 12. One
might expect that the Court woul reason to this conclusion
by pinpoint' g the individual intere ton which it purports to
rely. Bu no such reasoning appear in the Court's opinion.
antages that generally
Althou there is some discussion of
may/ ccrue to named plaintiffs from the se of the class-action

~'hE> Mis,;issippi usury statute was amendE·d in 974, and it appa.rently
now a uthorizes the fees charged by pet.itioner. 197 Miss. Gen . Laws, ch.
564, § 7 ; see Miss . Code Ann . § 75- 17- 1 (6 ) . Thus, t ere iH no queHtJOn of
prospective relief.
6 I do uot, !:iuggt•:;t that rt>,;ponde u t~ ' lawyer artc·d· Jlllpt
erly in pursuing
this cru;e. Since he has prevailed both in this Court a d in the Court
of Appcal,, the re:;puu!:iibility for a llowing client~ le:; s liti · tion faUs Oil

the fedeml courts

..

...
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device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether t4 se
particular respondents can derive any such benefit from"this

action.'

A

/

The Court does not explain how it is ap.le to find an.
uindividual interest" in the litigation wi lout identifying
the iuj ury in fact required by Art. III. I simply ignores this
essential inquiry and relies on the "f tual context" of the
case: Wh('n respondents refused the · offered settlement, the
trial court e11t~red judgment in th r favor over their objectiou. I d., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in. pires the Court to draw a "•ritical distinction" between
mootness deriving from a ju gment and mootness resulting
from events extrinsic to the itigation. ld., at 9. The Court
appears to hold that a li · ·ant who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment h an "individual interest" in exercisj11g his "statutory righ to appeal." Id., at 7. If the statutes
a11d rules governing 'federal appellate practice" confer such
a right, the Court oncludes that Art. LII requires no more.
Ibid.; see id., at
Haviug shift the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the
7

Any advan l!;hl that. onlinarily may flow from "the u:;e of the class
adion proce re for litigation of individual claims," ante, at 10, cannot
accrue to
ese respondents who will not b3 litigating their own claims
on reman . Nor do('s the Court identify :my unrecovered cost of litigation tlu these respondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class.
Sre id at 10, n. 8; n. 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents
only o point out that their total damages were ~o small that they "would
be nlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not
so by means of a class action . Ante, at 10, n. 8. We may assume
.hat rP..spondents had some interest in the class-nction procedure as a means
of interesting their lawyer;; in I ho case or obtaining a. ~tisfa.ctory settlement. This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once
respondents obtamed both accesH to eourt and full indiv1dual relief that
inl·e:rest disappeared.

''

1

_···r,

..
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BA~~

v.

~?f~R

. '
;'formtrlattidu] [of] standards ... ~wvern [ing l tlie appealability of procedural rulings," 1:bid., _the Court deter_mines that
respoudents are aggriev~d by the denia.l of certification for twq
reasons. First, t~e certification order is. a "procedural ruling,
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stapds as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." ld., at 9,
Second, the. contrary result would frustrate the goals of
Rule 23. ld., at 10-i2.
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it correctly, is to avoid a direct confro tation with settled principles that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to co,nsider the respondents' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually
and legally unsound. /

B
As a matter of fact, there is subst11ntial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgm~nt in favor of a party at an.
intermediate stage of litigation," l d., at 9. Petitioner has
rwver conteuded hat the controversy became moot merely
"by reason of t e entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor. "
I d. , at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full
relief has rerlwdied the respondents' individual injuries anc;t
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority ftupports petitioner's contention that the tender itself
moots tl)e case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to rev ew the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plai;ftiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that
ful(y satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
_ . Co. _, 149 U. S. 308, 313- 314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas
yo. v. United States, 392 F . 2d 204 (CA6 i968) (per curiam);
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 ]'. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
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curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F 2d
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that e result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dis issing their
lawsuit as moot. 0 It is certainly true, as the ourt observes,
that the entry of judgment in favor of a ~rty does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There · ever has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those a ects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adv sely. See 15 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practic and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practic ~· 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have re9 ired a showing of some
adverse effect in order to confer ''J an ding to appeal. " Ibid.;
see Barry v. District of ColumbiL Bd. of Ele'ctions,- U. S.
App. D. C. - , 580 F. 2d 695 1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a continuing contro rsy between adverse parties at
all stages of the litigation.
. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393,
402 (1975); Steffel v. T mpson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contraventio of Art. III, that rule would yield to
and.
the constitutional co

c
almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp .
8 The Court rna
· uo pffort to di~tingui8h the~e caselS. Yet it concedes
that the "right t employ Rule 2:3" is a "procedural right only, ancillary
to the litigatio of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court
retains no juri iction over the controversy" when the "substantive claims
become moot m the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If the tender itself
mooted the sponJents' claims without regard to the entry of judgment,
then the onrt's own analysis requires it to conclude that the case is

moot.
The '~tatutory right '' to appeal it~elf cannot supply a personal stake
the outcome, for Congress cannot, abrogate Art.. III limitations on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtol'l$ v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979),
9

111

..
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. ----~----~~--~------. . v. l'homas & Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241

(1939).w · But the dec;sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed.
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to
appeal the finding that the patent was valid~ This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue of patent validity after t trial court found
no infringement, because " [a] party n y not appeal from a
judgment . . . in his favor, for the urpose of obtaining a
review of findings ... which are no necessary to support the
decree." I d., at 242. But the tri court had erred by inclqding in the decree itself a ruling · at "purport[ed] to adjudge
the validity of [the patent]." bid. Since that ruling "was
immaterial to the dispositio of the cause," the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction for e limited purpose of eliminating
the extraneous ruling fro
he decree. Ibid.
The Court reads Elect cal Fitt·ings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III se e "because policy considerations permitted an appeal." A te, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was
a "live" controversy nly because-and to the limited extent
that-the petitione here asserted a continuing personal stake
in the outcome.
s Judge Learned Hand later explained, the

111 The only uthP authorities cited by the Comt are Un:ited A1:1·Unes, Inc.
v. McDonald, 43 U. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463 ( 78). Dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class
certification i subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of t
named vlaintiffs. Neither ease rliscusl:led mootness, and
neither ana1yzed the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority
cited in oopers (~ Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469', and
the onl authority cited in United Ai1'lines was a concession made by the
defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which
de t with a suggestion of moot.ness in an analogous situation, see 432
. S., at 393, and n. 14. Such statements, cal:lually enunciated without a.
word of explanation in opinions dealing with umelated legal questions, are
not controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further reflec- ·
tion to have been inconsistent with established la,w.

•
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petitione ·n Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161
(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F . 2d 103, lll (CA3
1973) . Ll 'l'his genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtainin reformation
of the decree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical F'ittin is plainly inconsistent with the holding of that case. T Court of Appeals
was told to reform the decree, but e ressly forbidden to
consider the merits of the patent va.li · y question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdict' n was only as broad as
the petitioller's personal stake in t appeal. Just four years
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 . S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constit wnally based. Reversing a
decision that had relied on El ctrical Fittings in refusing to
consider the merits of an
peal, the Court distinguished
Electrical Fittings as a case n which the parties soug4t decision of "a hypothetical c ." The appeal in Altvater, by
contrast, satisfied "the r quirements of case or controversy"
because the parties co inued to contest a counterclaim that
had not been conclu d by the dismissal of the orginal complaint. 319 U. S., 't 363-366.
Altvater and
ectrical Fittings entirely foreclose the
Court's argumen that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of is appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
fcdera.l court erely because policy-based "rules of practice'~
11 Alt.lwttglyfhe Court of Appeals in Electrical Fittings held that collateral er:.to!f;~ would be no bar to relitigatiou of tpe validity question, 100
F. 2d 403f 404 (CA2 1988), other courts had taken a different. view on
similar i¥'ues of collateral estopp~:>l. If the validity finding were permitted
to o:tanff, the petitioner could have been forced to litigate the question of its
preclu 1ve effect m future cases. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra
11 . 4, ·§ 3902, 1tt· 40a (1976); lB Moore's F~:>deml Practice
0.443 [5] , at
3,925 (1974) ; 9 id., 1208.06, at 716 (1975}.

,I
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permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvatej's
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), a case in whiph the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at ength the
constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cov sought to appeal
from a judgment that had eliminated IS stake in the outcome.12 The Court of Appeals emp tically declined to assume jurisdiction over an appeal hich sought "no relief
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an
advisory opinion that [a] paten [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
554.1 3 Since there was no ca or controversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it w "without discretion" to hear the
appeal. Id. , at 545.
These cases demo11str e that the requirements of Art. III
do not change with the factual context" in which a suggestion
ee ante, at 5. Whatever the context,
of mootness arises.
Art. III asks but a ugle question: Is there a continuing controversy between verse parties? Tn Electrical Fittings, the·
1 2 Thr appellan1 . 1 rove?' V. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942) ' cert.
denied, 31!) U.S. 48 (194:3), was the losing plaintiff in a patrnt infringement arl'ion.
er the trlal court found the patent invalid and not
lnfringed, the aintilf took an appeal on the validity question without
contesting the nding of noninfringement. By accept.ing the judgment to
that extent, e lost his right to recover· from the defendant-and thus his
interest in 1e litigation.
1 3 Judg
rank wrote for the court:
"[Wl he there iR no 'justiciable' dispute, t.here are no 'merits.' There is
merel~r an unreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis
Carol immortalized. :\.fany Supreme Court derisions teach us that appellate urisdietion , when no justiciable dispute exists on appral, cannot be
res d upon the rrcollection that such a dispute previously existed when
t
ease was in the trial court." 1:33 F. 2d, ai. 551 (footnotes omitted).
See also Kapp v. National Pootball League. 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
978); Hall v. U. S. F'iber & Plastics C'orp., 476 F . 2d 418, 420 (CA3,
7-3); cf. Lewis . ·united States, 216 U. S 6l1 (J9W) (p~r curiam}.
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re~pec~

to the,

U

Wugle.-nar;ow

issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent v lfdity
properly was included in the decree. But nothi
in that
case suggests that a "procedut•al ruling, collat€ra.l the merits
of a litigation," may be appealed after final j gment because
"policy considerations permi[t] the appe ' or because the
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one the issues litigated."
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings ike other rulings--may
be appealed only when the litiga
as a personal stake in the
resolution of his appeal.H !1 :.~lectricaJ Fittings, there was
a stake; here there is uou . Since nothing remains of the
case or controversy, the ourt of Appeals should have dismissed this case.

III
It is clear fro the Court's extended discussion of policy
and practical c siderations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
heavily in i decision. I am not aware that such considerations eve)! before have influenced this Court in determining
wheth the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal
cou1>ts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of mootI1esa would~ {!,S

;vere. a~utt pJ..@Jcts ..

A finding of mootness woufd have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in~tuation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
· , appE>ars .o rE>cognize thif; in passing, ante, ~ 9 1~
fails to apply the rule to this case. Since the Court. suggests that respondents' interest in the certifici~tion rulin~ ,.deri ,s from the mere fact that it
<;stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated," id., at 9, Electrical Fittings itself would tfmit us to the issuance of an order directing that
the offen~ive rulin'fbe expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242.

<=
-----------·------=-·~=--------------
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granted, the absent members of the putative class would hay~
obta.int'd by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
th(: benefits of actual class membership. If, OJi the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class membe~ to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk o£ being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" tha~ ~ '
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate. ~
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic i:Q.
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of ce•·ta.in legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, a~~ The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade,
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim,
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of

l!L

~-~

See Comnwnt, Immedi;Lle Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought undev
Rnle 23 (b) (:3), a class member must decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rtlle 23 (c) (2). This provision
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were permittrd to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to secure t.he benefits of that, decision. Notes of the Advisory
Cpmmittce on Proposed An1endments to Rule 23, 39 F . R D. 69, 10~106
'(1.9~6).

,,)-
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usury
Court's concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and a t v
worst l.~JCpnsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act..--J.ly
The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative cl~ss. I
o not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin"'itrfttion wo11ld_ re 1 But these problems can and should
e addressed by measures short of rewriti~i the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have one today. The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.-tt
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain conI
questions of law. In many cases, a class-action

1J/

P

;

v. Litton Systems, Tnc., 800 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowers' class action); F1·y v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941) .
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mississippi '3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
§ 85. But I do uot understand that the National Bank Act displaces state
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of
that AcL iti to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or
unr/ue penalties that may be imposed by st;:~.te law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
,-Lb~The Act provides that rules of procedure promulgated by this C o u v
"shall not . . . enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U. S. C.
§ 2072. See Amm·ican Pipe &: Consti"Uction Co. v. Utah, 414 U . S. 58 ,
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See genera-lly Landers, Of Legalized Black.. and Legalizf'd The.ft: Consumer Class Actions and the Subetancecedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974).
In Coo1>ers c~ Lybrand v. Livesay, 487 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court
d t,ha.t the denial of class certification is no1, a "final decision" appealable as of right tmder 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the
dangers of "indi:,;criminate" interlocutory review. Id., at 474. Although
Coopers & Lyb11and now prevents review in cases in which it would be
desirable, Congress may remedy the prob1em by appropriate legislation •.

/
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defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certification question· on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
d settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at
some circumstances, it may require th~t putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
~
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, DistricV
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
[:
lacking, it ~s Jor Congress-not this Court-to correct the
deficiency.VJ..tg
- - - -- - - - - - - - - Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it~
judicially fashioned "solutions" ·to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" ·solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the c·
r -- - - L can be intended only to benefit
ss.
- .......-~·.
serve on t mr own motio~. Since no cour

J5

~:ss currently has before it a Lill that attempts to remedy the

difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supm, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace cla~s cer~.
' tifi('ation under the proposed procedures,

~~ I
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has certified the class, there has been no considered determina.;
tion that respondents will fairly and adeq1ately re.present itv s
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent.
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of t.he claims ... of the class'' within the meaning of Rule
23 (a)(3)'? 2 ')

The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced settlemen " ~ud ll*& even foreclose ·lrll settle.men of class
action litigation. See tmte, n. 5. r Thus, the difficulties faced
by the District Court on rem~tnd in this case may not arise
again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's result
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who
\ - - --1---.:h-:::a-v--..e prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation,
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing
relationship to the putative class than respondents have
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way
2
" The District Court properly may conclude on remand thnt respondents,
for the::;e or other r<'asons, cannot adequately. represent the class. ~
'Eerventi~ P"~' t
·
crcourton equitable grotm might. well
tt8e t6 toH the- sfil'!'l'if.e 'Onim
.
m order fo J'X'nnit it. ~ N t•a rl~· nin
) ea.rs have pa;;sed sincf' this ction wail filed <Uld six since he goV.ernin
s tbsttmt·ive i:ltatute was am 1ded to authorize the challeng conduct. I .
i s order denying certific· ion on September 29, 1975, t District. Cou
· ·igned as one of it~; r ~ons the possible '·destruction of .he [petitioner's
b k" by damages t n alleged to total §12,000,000 a. d now potept.iall
a gmented by the · crual of intere.;t.. App. 47, see a· te, at 2, n. 2. Th
p ssible destructi of pet.itiont:>r's bank is irrelevant
the cent.ral ii:ll:iue o ·
m tness, but. SP ous indeed to depo;:;itors, stockhold K, and the communit~
se ved. As th' · Court rdiel:l so heavily on its pra 1cal and equitable con
c ns for pu tive Plas~ nwrnbPrs, it will hardly e inappropriate for th
IJ. istrict Co rt on remand to consider pru.ctical' ics and equities on botl
sfdP~. In
e circumstances presented, the Dist ICt Court may well !lee n
r 'a son t exPrcifie its equitabiP discretion in fav · of putative cla~;s InPUlbe s·
. lio- h e slept on their right" thel:le many yea s,

___ _ / '

--a--
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As noted above, p.

appeal in their own names.

supra, respondents took no

One would think that this candid

disclaimer of personal interest would destroy the foundation upon
which the Court predicates Art. III iurisdiction.
p.

supra.

,.

Ante, at 7: see
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intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep, t1-fJ~ and
n. 15, supta. These tensions, arising from the express terms
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached' today.
In sum, the Court's attem~ted solution tothe problem of
forced settlements in consumer class acti1ns :;arts from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It ~ unnecessarily cflates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal
as moot.~
·
/

~S'I'ICE STEYENR statE's, in hb concurring opinion, lhat all persons

:tlll'gf'd to be mc·mbNs of a. put~t.tive ela.-;s " automaticall~· become parties
i.o tlw ra,.;f' or routroversy for purpo,;es" of Art. Ill, and that they
"remain partiE'>~ nnt.il a final determination hHs hc-'E'n made that the action
may not. be mainta.i11(;'(l as a. clasll action." Ante, at. - . This novel
viPw, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indianapolis School r'omm'1Js v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral
certification ortler wa:-; ht>ld insufficient to identify the interests of absent
clasR memberl'l for Art. lii purposes. The result hardly could be different
when the ela.s,: has 110t been ident.ifird a.t. all . See also M ern phis Light;
Gas & Water Div . v. Craft. 436 U.S. 1, 8 (Hl78) ; Baxter v. Pabnigiano,
423 U. S. 308, 310, n . 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford. 42a U. S. 147
(19i5); Pasadena City Board of Ed'Ucation v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430
(1976).
The proposed rule of automatiC' party statu:>-in this cas<:> fot· 90,000
unidentified person::r-has troublt>some and frtr-reaching implications that
could prejudice the bringing of class actions. PrPsumably a purpose of
such a rule would be to Hi-isure that satisfaction of the claims of named
parties would not. terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of
unnamed parties be rxt.inguiHhed by the fa.ilurr of t.hc named pu.rties to
appeal. Thus, if thr rule proposed by Mrt. Ju:;TrcE 8'!'~~\'ENl'l is to accomplish it:; purpo..w, I ..:upposr that <L fiduciary duty must be imposed upon
nam<·d partie>~ to eontinm~ the litigation where--as herl'--th<:> tmnamed
parti(•s rrmain tutident.ifif'([ and fail to intc•rvene. AH fiduciaries, would the
nauwd parti<'K not onl.v be required to continue ·to litigate, but to assume
personal rf'l;ponsibility for costs aml attorncy'1; fee1; if the ca;;e ultinmtely is
lost? Woulrl rp.-.;pon::<ible litigants be willing to file rlass actions if they
thereb r "~:-:umed su!'h long-trrm fiducia.ry obligation"'? The;;e aud like

~""
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ql!(•::;tions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe/
they merit carPfnl study py Congres<; before tJ1is Court-perhaps unwittingly-creates a major category of clientless litiga.t.jon unique in our
~;yst.em.

•

FOOTNOTES

!/

Although respondents also asked for attorney's fees,

their complaint shows that fees were to be granted only from the
damages ultimately awarded to them or the class.

App. 13-14.

There is no possibility of prospective relief because the
Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974 to authorize, inter
~'

the charges at issue in this case.

564, § 7; see Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1

ll

1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch.
(6).

Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted

that the petitioner's tender fails to include all costs and fees
for which it could be held liable.

.!/

See Part II-B, infra •

The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself

cannot supply a personal stake in the outcome, for Conoress cannot
abrogate Art. III limitations on the iurisdiction of the federal
courts.

Gladstone; - Realtors - v; · village - of - Bellwood, 441

u.s.

91,

100 (1979).
~/

(1977), and

United - Airlines; - Inc; - v; - McDonald, 432
Coopers - & · ~ybrand - v; - Livesay

not to the contrary.

u.s.

385

437 U.S. 463 (1978), are

Incidental dictum in both cases stated that

the denial of class certification is subiect to appellate review

(

after final iudgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs.
Neither case discussed mootness, and neither analyzed the
proposition in any way.
Coopers - & - ~ybrand

Indeed, the only authority cited in

was United - Airlines, see 437

u.s.,

at 469, and

the only authority cited in United - Airlines was a concession made

2.

by the defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals,
not one of which dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an
analogous situation, see 432 U.S., at 393, and n.

14.

Such

statements, casually enunciated without a word of explanation in
opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not
c ontrolling or even persuasive when they are shown on further
reflection to have been inconsistent with settled law.

As the

Court agrees today, neither case creates an exception to the
fundamental rule that "federal appellate jurisdiction is limited by
the appellant's personal stake in the appeal."
~/

Ante at 10,
---1

The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class

action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer
substantial advantages for named plaintiffs.
9.

II

Ante, at 11 n.

But any such advantages cannot accrue to these respondents, who

will not be litigating their own claims on remand.

Indeed, the

Court refers to respondents in this context only to point out that
their total damages were so small that they "would be unlikely to
obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not do so
by means of a class action. We may assume that respondents had some
interest in the class action procedure as a means of interesting
their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement.
This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once
respondents obtained both access to court and full individual

3.

relief that interest disappeared.

21

Perhaps the strongest of respondents' statements is:

;f.•of course, the interest of the [respondents] in
assertion of the right to proceed on behalf of the
class includes such matters as the prospect for
spreading attorneys' fees and expenses among more
claimants and thus reducing the percentage that would
otherwise be payable by them."

Plaintiffs-Apellants'

Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Consurve (CA5, No. 763600), Jan. 10, 1977.
~/

Respondents'

"Demand for Judgment" asked the court to

award the "[c]ost of this action as well as attorney fees in the; '
amount of 25% as hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may
.....

~

be deemed ift and proper by the Court."

App. 16.

--~

--

The request for

fees was clarified in Paragraph VI of the amended complaint, which
reads as follows:
"Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court be
designated custodian of the funds and judgment to be
paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly situated,
by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a
suitable depository and, upon proper order of this
Court, disburse said funds after deduction of
necessary expenses and attorney fees to Plaintiff's
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the
amount so paid, the same being reasonable by all
standards, including that alleged and utilized by
Defendants in suing certain members in of [sic] the
class in State Courts for unpaid accounts."

App. 13-

4.

1 4.
~/Seen~

0

~/

7, supra.

Far-reaching consequences could flow from a rule

that fees r coverable from putative class members could be "traced"
to the class defendant for purposes of the case or controversy
requirement.

At the least, this rule would support a claim that a

person who previously had accepted full settlement of his
individual claim was entitled to file suit on behalf of an
unrecompensed class.

Apparently, the putative plaintiff need noly

"asser[t] ," ante, at 7 n. 6, that fees incurred in anticipation of
1
the litigation ultimately might be shared with a prevailing class.
~/

These cases are discussed more fully in United States

Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at

(POWELL, J.,

dissenting).
~/

F ORMER N. 4

lll

I do not suggest that counsel acted improperly in

pursuing this case.

Since they have prevailed both in this Court

and in the Court of Appeals, the responsibility for allowing
client-less litigation falls on the fP.deral courts.

INSERT NO. 3, p. 17
~

~/

The Court's resurrection of . this dead controversy

may result in irreparable iniury to innocent parties, as well as to
the petitioner bank.

When the District Court denied certification

on September 29, 1975, it assigned as one of its reasons the
possible "destruction of the [petitionerl bank" by damaqes then
alleged to totalS 12,000,000 and now potentially auqmented by the
accrual of interest.

App. 47, see ante, at 2 n. 2.

1

The possible

destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the iurisdictional issue,
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community

served.

It is said that this is necessary to redress

suffered by members of the putative class.

injurie~

Yet, no such person has

come forward in the nearly nine years that have passed since this
action was filed. Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by
statute almost six years ago.

As the District Court may be called

upon to determine whether the equitable doctrine of "relation back"
permits it to toll the statute of limitations on remand, ante, at 3
1

2.

n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for that court to consider
the equities on both sides. In the circumstances/ presented, the
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable
discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on
their riqhts these many years.

LFI

y
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This novel view apparently derives from early cases in which
this Court referred to class members who would be bound by a
judgment as "absent parties," Hansberry v. Lee, 311

u.s.

32, 42

(1940), or "parties in interest," Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How.
288, 303 (1853).

Ante, at

, n. 3.

But these cases were

decided before certification was established as the method by
which a class achieved judicial recognition.

Under Rule 23, no

member of a putative class will be bound by a judgment unless a
proper certification order is entered.

That they may be

"intP.rested parties," ibid., before that time does not make them
parties to the litigation in any sense, as this Court has
recognized.

In Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs 420

u.s.

128 (1975), the Court held that an oral certification order was
insufficient to identify the interests of absent class members
for Art. III purposes.

The result hardly could be different

when the class has not been identified at all.

u.s.

Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
v. Palmigiano 423
Bradford, 423

u.s.

u.s.

308, 310, n.1

See also Memphis

1, 8 (1978); Baxter

(1976); Weinstein v.

147 (1975); Pasadena City Board of Education

v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976).
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS indicates that unnamed members of
an uncertified class may be "present" as parties for some

2.

purposes and not for others.

No authori: : : : : . . : : :, ~~

selective "presence" in an action.

~;.., -wby ~~c:rt

Nor d.oei oop

A/

J~ ~'I'~

is to determine when these

unidentified "parties" are present.

If their presence is to be

limited to the satisfaction of the Art. III case or controversy
requirement, then the rule of party status would have no content
apart from Art. III and could only be described as a legal
fiction.

If, on the other hand, the proposed rule is to apply

outside the Art. III context, it may have troublesome and farreaching implications that could prejudice the bringing of class
actions.

Presumably, a purpose of the rule of party status

would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named
parties would not terminate the litigation.

..
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affi~ms

Court

the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after

1\
finding that respondents retain a personal stake in "shift[ing]
to successful class litigants a portion of those fees and
expenses that have been incurred in this litigation • • • • "
Ante, at 7 n. 6.

~---~~

.L eal"l'ftM- ~r-ee ~fia~ t~»-t:~.ove~ aAGl- wholJ y

~ ~ ~ ~ .2llw#!!(:
Aspeculative interest is sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction
of an Art. III ;lourt.

n_t_·----------~

Accordingly, I dis_s_e__
I

Although there

are~

d'fferences, this case is

similar to United States Parole Co

v. Geraghty, post, at

, in one important respect:
whether putative class repre
class certification when
relief sought in
Court refused to cer

Geraghty, the Court

require us to decide
ntatives may appeal the denial of

~

ey can derive no benefit from the

1

Here, as in Geraghty, the District
fy a class.

But in this case, unlike

~14.t~-~.\that
"';;"e "right

to employ Rule 23"

is a "procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of
substantive claims." Ante, at 6.

'l\ho

C8~!

also

J\.

~hat

a

federal court "retains no iurisdiction over the controversy"

',

when the parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art.
III sense."

Ibid.

Moreover, the

~
~
~~cknowledq~h~
LV"-" S +e.-t-

familiar principle that

personal stake in the

outcome of an action presents

controversy cognizable

in a federal court of appeals.

Id.,

:E believe that

~ ~.,h~·· ~~-c..
the~Q

p'!':i:Aeifr:res iire .Q:i:erpo·s~±~, tooe~.Dd :tRB!t LlH!!)'Junambiguously

~finding
i\

of

mootness.i~

tRio eaSQ.

A

Since no class has been certified and no one has
sought to intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs
arguably present in court.

Yet respondents have no continuing

interest in the injuries alleged in th~r complaint.

They

sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in full.~/
Respondents

~M.-ct:> ~
h~ze

"

not

~et~d

that success on the certification

motion would entitle them to additional
petitioner.l/

relief~from

the

Their personal claims to relief have been

abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names.

..,.

The notice of appeal filed with the District Court

recites that respodnents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated . • . • "

App. 63.

. ..,;,. . ~~ ~

This
~

~~J:e~ompelling

•

~

"'-

evidence that respondents

'

have !b-e-&tl\interest in the "individual and private case or
controversy" relied on by the Court today.

Ante, at 5.

But

even without such evidence, this and other courts routinely have
held that a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's

3.

injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome.
San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149

u.s.

California v.

308, 313-314 (1893): Drs.

Hill & Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F.2d 204 (CA6 1968)(per
curiam): Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 157 (CA2 1968)

(per

curiam): A.A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell 353 F.2d 89 (CAS
1965)

(per curiam).

It is the tender itself that moots the case

whether or not a judgment is entered.

Ibid.

Thus, the law is

clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract
questions remaining in a case when the plaintiff has refused to
accept a proffered settlement that fully satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the
result should differ because the District Court has entered a
judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their
lawsuit as moot.4/

It is certainly true, as the Court observes,

that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case.

Ante at 7, 9.

There never has been any

doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely.
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and
9 Moore's Federal Practice

,I

See 15 Wright,

Procedure~

203.06 (1975).

3902 (1976):

But the requirement

of adverse effect is more than a rule "of federal appellate
practice." Ante at 7.

As we have held repeatedly, Art. III

itself requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties

I

~- !.)...<... ~ ~ .............. ,~
A-~---- /AA., q_~~ . 9 ~~~4 {{

·,~~~

$~~~~~

~.)()~-~
at all stages of litigation.

-1

E.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,

402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n. 10 (1974).
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule
of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to
require a showing of adverse effect in order to confer "standing
to appeal."

15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902.

Barry

U.S. App. D.C.

v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections,

, 580 F.2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359
(1943); Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307

u.s.

241

(1939); Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F.2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319

u.s.

748 (1943).2/ As these cases show, the requirements of Art.

III are not affected by the "factual context" in which a
suggestion of mootness arises.

See ante, at 6.

context, Art. III asks but a single question:

Whatever the
Is there a

~s~~·-.t.~
L., ;u._ ~.?f

continuing controversy between adverse ::_~ ~
.in Electrical Fittings v. Thorn

-1 t~~.lile......c;c:,;;Q~eirlr~te-f!Jf!J-ee"t:t1tM"lT1"1t:"'il~e~etii

etts Co., supra,

a 1 i mite d a pp e a~ because the inc 1 us ion

~

~rl·~

~

~~~

unnecessary and adverse finding in a generally favorable decree
had a genuinely prejudicial effect on the petitioner himself.

~
See ante, at 10.

ButAthe mere existence of the District Court's

~
order denying certification has no
~his

casa.

c

effect~on

the

respondents & ~

Thus, the personal stake that justified the

~.

...

5.

~Vlc-....~ ..
h~.

Electrical Fittings appeal is not present

Absent such a

stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy considerations"
sometimes may favor an appeal from "a procedural ruling,
collateral to the merits of a litigation."

Nor is it

significant that the ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of
the issues litigated."

Id., at 9-10.

Collateral rulings - like

other rulings - may be appealed only when the requirements of
Art. III are satisfied.

B

~-

The Court confines its

~

~!2

of the constitutional

to a single footnote. Ante, at 7 n. 6.

Respondents are

retain a personal stake in the outcome of the class

shift to the members of the putative class.
see id., at 10.6/

Ante,

Since the Court believes that

may benefit in a concrete way if they obtain class
on remand, it holds that they have a personal
the "procedural ruling," although they have no such
"the merits fo the substantive controversy."

Id., at

is both factually and legally unsound
( 1)

The Court observes that

respondents "have maintained

throughout this appellate litigation that they retain an

S ,eL.

~~

~

6.

individual interest" in sharing expenses with the putative

~ NK..tJ.u.J-~

class.

(~

But-t respondents have identified r~

Id., at 12.

incurred to date that is not covered by the petitioner's tender.
Nor did

~
t~

identify any such cost in their brief in the Court

""'
of Appeals, on which the Court relies.

Id., at 7 n. 6.

The

only "continuing obligation," ibid., mentioned in the
respondents' briej is not a present obligation at all .

.,;J~~4~,'1~J! ~ c.k, ~ (~,;.., ~ ~)

I

on realty as security for a $15,000 loan to defray

)·

-

notice costs that may be incurred if the District Court grants

•

~·I

certification on remand. Brief for Respondents 33: App. 78.

This~future

obligation cannot supply a personal stake

·~
~
f
, t)

,........ 1he Court identifies no currently4;

in the pending appeal.

) ~ ~1-·'*··~.,e,.~~

e_.-H+£.. r~~e.,;(

,.,_#/A.;~

--==-===-==

=~

=::: ~.

~he~ear~. f..tn .

#t¢1' . . .

· ·

' '

"':t ~ ~#if rft..A._
~.

ade

-r

.ca:::u ; ; s 4 11 J
no """:t-'~UL..I...w...I..UJu.-..~~...a.i~>LL-~'-+-..--...,..J.J"""'"!,_,....- l: he comp 1 a in t suggests that

-

~1::'::::- :a

a..~~~~
~25 per cent of the amount

.

<f/-~~ ~

outstanding obligation"'

respondent • s lawyers

·.~

~

accept as full

a!:::;.,.

vf ~-- ~

~-;;::;:

compensation~~

recovered from the petitioner.

App.

~~'
~

13-14.

The record reveals no further details, and the

respondents have offered no contrary int'erpretation.
{),.._

tbira

/\
have

~

H

~ ~J ~.I ~~-- ~. ~~-It>
iii l:-RdQE!e! ts.fie--

.e~:tS:~e~u;u-~t

~~continuing

interestA Only counsel is concerned

~

~whether

as t.o

f8~~~ndents

u..--~~~"""~·

~·

the recovery is enlarged.

Thus, the Court's

1

7.

assertion that respondents have incurred fees and expenses that
they "desire to shift to successful class litigants," ante, at 7
su : WUfA.IIII/I
-~
J-.

n. 6, is( .nsupport..r.

"&AooV
b~"L

"Prior decisions of this

the record.

Court establish that unadorned speculation will not suffice to
invoke the federal iudicial power."

Simon v. Eastern Ky.

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976).

I would adhere to

that principle today.

H-.~~ ~ J,c.u,;.-......-'
~~,J,. ... ~~
/1c.A... f"'W ·~.,• ...., 1&-f a,. ../~

( 2)

~.n,...

Even if one assumed that re pondents' liability to
their lawyers could be reduced by a cl ss recovery, no one has
suggested that the petitioner is or eve
that ultimately may be owed by responde

~

1 holds today

~

the~possibility

ts~

'Pfl:tts..., the Court

of asserting future claims

a .. ,t. ~ ...

1: haa

Art.

''

tli~ught

III •

fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not injury that results from the independent action of some
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976); see Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441

u.s.

91, 99 (1979).

rJ!
~

1t.·~~

requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that

third party not before the court."

~

will be liable for fees

~

~

'

JJr

/~ ~ ..~

~~~

8.

Although respondents' liability - if any - for
attorney's fees may be viewed as one consequence of the
petitioner's putatively illegal conduct, the petitioner is not
legally responsible for that "injury."

I do not understand that

an injury "fairly can be traced" to a defendant who will not be
required to compensate for it.

In holding that such an iniury

may satisfy Art. III, the Court enunciates a principle of
unknown dimensions.

For example, today's holding could, if

consistently applied, permit a person who previously had

AA--A-

accepted full settlement of his individual claim to file a class

~41...·--f

~

(

k~

action.

a~

Apparently, the putative plaintiff need only

"asser[t] ," ante, at 7 n. 6, that fees incurred in anticipation
of the litigation ultimately might be shared with a class.

~
?~

.ld ~
~ ...,.
~./-~
4..- ~ .,

... '""
-.tur

c

tA- 12 ~" ~~,..u.P
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in
lt:J ~.
the outcome of this action, of
~~cedents

~

eei~~"""+::fi&t

A.rt. III and the

of this Court require that the case be dismissed as
~~

moot.

See United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post at

~

(POWELL, J., dissenting).

~~
~

Respondents do not suggest

~~

k•~.4~A~
that their claims are "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."
(1975).7/

Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11
And not a single one of the alleged 90,000 class

~

~~~

~~

~H.~--~

.::J!ZI ~
~

members has sought to intervene in the nine years since this

~
~4ft.<.,.,

~,&.ect4-

M

4-c r.:~ ......... J

,Tt> k

~-'.I

.. ,

...t;:

~ .&....,~~ ~-<.. ....... ~ ..
--1-- -g-:
~ ~ ~., ..z:,....,, ~.e.&-_, r=< -~
~ 2f>~D ~ ~ Jdk..ua~~.Z: ~. /i.-1-' ? ~

(

PI/~

action was filed.

~44 ~

Cf. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald 432

~AictU(

~&.I"

~

Nor has anyone ever challenged the allegedly

A4L-

t-c-~

usurious charge~, informal complaint or protest.

Tr. of Oral ~~
~

Arg. 4.

,__

Even after certification was denied, the action lay
~~~~- ~
---:;."\ ~.L..i.....~

cu. ~FI~fd)~

dormant during the seven months in which respondents sought to

& .,4-C;A~ •

~ ~--~~-1

take an interlocutory appeal, without provoking a response from

illusory, we cannot divine with any certainty what ~ . anything-

if

responde/a--con inue
,,/~~

..............-·

behalf
w

f persons

-f"or years have evinced no interest

in obtaining recovery for themselves.a/

----- -----

appears, this is simply a "lawyer's case."

In permitting

~

~

t

continue, the Court remands to the District Court a headless

~~
class action

thatA~t

satisfy the most elementary

III
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the
contrary, the Court seems

v!ftA

~Rdi~~reed

~
this federal action

tk~

be litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are

unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be

7f~

represented by anyone.~/ I~deee, the Court appears to endorse

1 0.

this form of

~~.......(~~~,~~- 1-1-~
litigation iJ1/!J' an effective "response to the
~ .Jo

"'

Lvt.

existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of
government."

Ante, at 12.

I am not aware that such

~:~?acti~l

~

,

CQflSIO~~~~~ftS

ever before have influenced this Court in

determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the
federal courts.

In any event, the consequences of a finding of

~wa..l<l ne~ <>~~~~~~ nretl;irts.

~~~"' k.-.-.......~~~~~
~ 4
;e.~~.~~~ ~~6-(~
Yt LTo pa ~ tl J
~
~ ~ ;.-..~..,_.,-/l. ~ ~-~A P~..._.

~

~~.C.<fAo'1 ~~ ~~~

rev._

c,.w....r- ~

~ ~

L

FOOTNOTES
~/

Although respondents also asked for attorney's fees,

their complaint shows that fees were to be granted only from the
damages ultimately awarded to them or the class.
3/

App. 13-14.

Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted

that the petitioner's tender fails to

~.~

eAaem~a~s

for which it could ultimately be held liable.

all costs and fees

See Part II-B,

infra.

!/

The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself

cannot supply a personal stake in the outcome, for Congress cannot
abrogate Art. III limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.

Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441

u.s.

91,

100 (1979).

21

United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432

(1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay 437

u.s.

u.s.

385

463 (1978), are

~
not to the contrary.

A-

;ictum in both cases stated that the denial

of class certification is subject to appellate review after final
judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs.

Neither case

discussed mootness, and neither analyzed the proposition in any
way.

Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers & Lybrand was

United Airlines, see 437 U.S., at 469, and the only authority cited
in United Airlines was a concession made by the defendant and a

~~

,

list of cases from the Courts of Appeals,~ ~hich dealt with
a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432
~ ~t

393, and n. 14.

u.s.,

Such statements, casually enunciated without a

2.

word of explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal
questions, are not controlling or even persuasive when they are
shown on further reflection to have been inconsistent with settled

S~

~ •• I

zs ,(b

IIVU~

p;r: :e~~,..

law;\ As the Court agrees today, neither case creates an exception
to the fundamental rule that "federal appellate jurisdiction is
limited by the appellant's personal stake in the appeal."

Ante at

10

---.§_/

The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class

action procedure for litigation fo individual claims may offer
substantial advantages for named plaintiffs . • •
9.

II

Ante, at 11 n.

But any such advantages cannot accrue to these respondents, who

will not be litigating their own claims on remand.

Indeed, the

Court refers to respondents in this context only to point out that
their total damages were so small that they "would be unlikely to
obtain le~ redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not do so
by means of a class action. We may assume that respondents had some
interest in the class aciton procedure as a means of interesting
their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement.
This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once
respondents obtained both access to court and full individual
relief that interest disappeared.

2/

FORMER NOTE 4, VERBATIM.

~I

FORMER NOTE 5, VERBATIM.

~/

FROMER NOTE 6, VERBATIM.
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This novel view apparently derives from early cases in which the
Court referred to class members who would be bound by a judgment
as "absent parties," Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.

32, 42 (1940),

or "parties in interest," Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303
(1853).

Ante,

at

n.

3.

But

these

cases

were

decided

before certification was established as the method J y which a
class

achieve~judicial

recognition.

Under Rule 23, no member

of a putative class will be bound by a judgment unless a proper
certification order
parties,"

is entered.

That they may be "interested

ibid., before that time does not make them parties to

the litigation in any sense, as this Court has recognized.
Indianapolis School Comm'rs v.

Jacobs 420

u.s.

In

128 (1975), the

Court held that an oral certification order was insufficient to
identify

the

interests

of

absent

has not been identified at all.
Water Div. v. Craft, 436

147

u.s.

members

for

Art.

III

The result hardly could be different when the class

purposes.

423 U.S.

class

308, 310, n.1

(1975);

u.s.

See also Memphis Light, Gas &

1, 8 (1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano

(1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423

Pasadena City Board of Education v.

424, 430 (1976).

Spangler,

u.s.
427

2.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS indicates that unnamed members of
an

uncertified

purposes and
selective
offered

class

not

to

be

"present"

for others.

"presence"
as

may

how

as

No authority

in

an

action.

a

court

is

unidentified "parties" are present.

Nor
to

parties

for

some

is cited for such
is

any

determine

explanation
when

these

If their presence is to be

limited to the satisfaction of the Art. III case or controversy
requirement, then the rule of party status would have no content
apart

from

fiction.

Art.

III

and

could

only be described

as

a

legal

If, on the other hand, the proposed rule is to apply

outside the Art.

III context, it may have troublesome and far-

reaching implications that could prejudice the bringing of class
actions.
would

be

Presumably,
to

assure

a

that

purpose

of

the

rule

of party status

the

claims of named

satisfaction of

parties would not terminate the litigation.

78-904-DISSENT
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

15

'

sarily creates significant problems in the administration of /
..
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case.~

arties w
in ate
Nor could the rights
unnamed parties be extinguished by the failure of the named parties to
appeal. Thus, if the rule proposed by MR. JusTICE STEVENS is to accomplish its purpose, I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon
named parties to continue the litigation where-as here-the unnamed
parties remain unidentified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the
named parties not only be required to continue to litigate, but to assume
--....~~·sonal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is
lost? Would responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwittingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our
system.
__.,-22 The Court's resurrection of this dead controversy may result i~
irreparab!e injury to innocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank.
When the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, it
assigned as one of its reasons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner]
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially
augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The
possible destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue,
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community served.
It is -said that this is necessary to redress injuries possibly suffered by
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward
in the nearly nine years that have passed since this action was filed.
Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by statute almost six years
ago. As the District Court may be called upon to determine whether the
equitable doctrine of "relation back" permits it to toll the statute of
limitations on remand, ante, at 3, n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for

78-904-DISSENT
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.

that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances
presented, the District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their
rights these many years.
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Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
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of Appeals for the Fifth
Robert L. Roper et al.
Circuit.
[February -, 1980]

\

MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor.
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received
everything they could have recovered from petitioner in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the de11ial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties.
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C.

§ 1355.
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appealability. But the characterization does not withstand
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - ,
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class
certification after receiving everything they sought on their
own behalves. Since the District Court refused to certify the
class and no one has sought to intervene, respondents are
the only plaintiffs arguably present in court. Yet respondents
have no continuing interest in the injuries alleged in their
complaint. They sought only damages; they have received
those damages in fulP Respondents have not suggested that
success on the certification motion would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner. 3 Indeed, their personal
2 Although respondents also asiced for attorney's fees, their complaint
shows that fees were to be granted only from the damages ultimately
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14.
3 Respondents do a8sert that certification would enable them to reduce
litigation ro~t~ by allocating them among the members of a prevailing
class. Brief for ReRpondentR 33. With the exception of attorney;s fees,
however, they do not identify any costs incurred to date that are not
covrrcd by the petitioner's trndcr. Although the record dors not reveal
the details of the fee arrangemrnt between respondrnts and their lawyers,
the complaint snggr~ts that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full compensation 25% of the amount recovered from the petitioner. App. 13-14.
If this is t,at~ft.t'!M-1~ifu''ic<~r.gaJ:d.l~~...tl.J~H:t
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claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no
appeal was taken in their own names. The notice of appeal
filed with the District Court recites that respondents appeal
only "on behalf of all others similarly situated .... " App. 63.
I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court
require the dismissal of this case. See Geraghty, post, at
- - - (PowELL, J., dissenting). There is no suggestion
that respondents' claims are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110-111,
n. 11 (1975). 4 And not a single one of the alleged 90,000
class members has sought. to intervene in the eight years since
this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone ever challenged the
allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the
action lay dormant during the seven months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought
that the class action would protect his rights. We are not
told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this
crusade on behalf of persons who for years have evinced no
attorney's fees against other members of a putative class gives rise to a
case or controversy against the class defendant. Such a. theory is unpre~
cedented, :md its consequences are bizarre. For example, respondents'
theory would permit a person to file a class action, even though he had
previously accepted full settlement of his individual claim, on the ground
that the fees incurred in anticipation of the litigation might ultimately be
shared with the class.
4 If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification from appellate review
in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances might
find the Gm·stein test satisfi0d and the case not moot. See Susmo:n v.
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright , Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
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interest whatever in obtaining recovery for themselves. 5 On
its face, this appears simply to be a "lawyer's case."
Despite long traditions to the contrary, the Court seems
undisturbed that this federal action will be litigated on remand
by a lawyer whose only "clients" are unidentified members
of a class who have shown no desire to be represented by
anyone. 6 The Court also neglects established principles of
Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the District Court a
headless class action that does not meet the requirements of
Rule 23.
II
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or controversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in
their favor.;' !d., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of
third parties, tl_J.e Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representative responsibiiities to the putative classis sufficient to permit their appeal. ...)' 1d., at 12. One
might expect that the Cour~ would reason to this conclusion
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these
5 The Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974, and apparently
, authorizes the fees charged by petitioner. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 564,
§ 7; see Miss. Code Ann. §.75-i7-t (6). There is thus no question of
prospective relief.
6 I do not suggest that respondent's lawyer acted improperly in pursuing
•
this case. Since he has prevailed both in this Court and in the Court
of Appeals, the responsibility of allowing client-less litigation is that of the
federal courts.
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requirGd by rules of practice, for two reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits
of [the] litigation," that "stands as an adjudication of one of
the issues litigated." Id., at 9. Second, the contrary result
would frustrate the goals of Rule 23. Id., at 10-12.
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it correctly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled principles that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by
which it attemps to justify its failure to do so is both factually
and legally unsound.
B
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has
never contended that the controversy became moot merely
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor."
I d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of fuJi
relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itseif
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case once the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8
8 The Court makes no effort to distinguish these cases.
Yet it concedes
that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their
lawsuit as moot. 9 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that adversely affect him. See 15 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice ~ 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some
adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.;
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C.-, 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at
ali stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393,
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10
(1974). If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to
the constitutionar command.

c
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp.
v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).~ 0 But that deci-

~

to the litigation of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court
retains no jurisdiction over the controversy" when the "substantive claims
become moot in the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If the tender itself
mooted the respondents' claims without regard to the entry of judgment,
then the Court's own analysis requires it to conclude that the case is

~ moot.

The "statutory right" of appeal cannot itself supply a personal stake
m the outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
10 The only other authorities cited by the Court are United Airlines, Inc.
v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463 ( 1978). Dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class
9
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments
by which no person is individually aggrieved. The trial court
there had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not
infringed. Although the alleged infringer won the case, it
sought to appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This
Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to
consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the
decree." !d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by including in the decree itself a ruling that "purport [ed] to adjudge
the validity of [the paten] t." Ibid. Since that ruling "was
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid.
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations permitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fit.tings was
a ' 1live" controversy only because-and to the iimited extent
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuing personal stake
·in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand explained, the petitioner in Electrical Fittings was in}ured in fact because the
unnecessary ruling tha.t the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive pre}udice" against him in a future
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161
certification is subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs. Neither case discusRcd mootness, and
neither analyzed the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority
cited in Coopers & Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469·, and
the only authority cited in United Airlines was a conceRsion made by the
defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which
dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432
U. S., at 393, and n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a
word of explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are
not controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further reflection to have been inconsistent with established law.

78-904-DISSENT
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

9

(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3
1973) .11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation
of the decree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly inconsistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a,
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought decision of "a hypothetical case.' 1 The appeal in Altvater, by
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy"
because the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal complaint. 319 U. S., at 363-366.
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice'~
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the
Although the Court of Appeals in Electrical Fittings held that collateral estoppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity question, 100
F. 2d 403, 404, other courts had taken a different view on similar issues of
collateral estoppel. If the validity finding were permitt!i'd to stand, the
petitioner could have been forced to litigate the question of its preclusive
effect in future cases. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra n. 4, § 3902,
at 403 (1976); 1B Moore's Federal Practice ,, 0.443 [5], at 3925 (1974);
9 id., ,. 203.06, at 716 (1975).
11
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the outcome.12 But the Court of Appeals emphatically declined to
assume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
544.13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the
appeal. I d., at 545.
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III
do not change with the "factual context" in which a suggestion
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing controversy between adverse parties? Nothing in Electrical Fitt'ings suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits
of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because
·. "policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the
ruling a stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated.';
12 The appellant in Cover v. Schwm·tz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), cert.
denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaintiff in a patent infringement action. After the trial court found the patent invalid and not
infringed, the plaintiff took an appeal on the validity queRtion without
contesting the finding of noninfringement. ·By accepting the judgment to
that extent, he lost his right to recover from the defendant-and thus his
interest in the litigation.
ts Judge Frank wrote for the court:
"[Wlhere there is no 'justiciable' dispute, there are no 'merits.' There is
merely an unreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis
Caroll immortalized. Many Supreme Court decisions teach us that appellate jui·isdiction, when no justiciable dispute exists on appeal, cannot be
rested upon the recollection that such a dispute previously existed when
the case was 1n the trial court." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted).
See also Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978); Hall v. U. S. Fibe1· & Plastics Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3
1973); cf. Lewis v. United States, 216 U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam).
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I

Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the
resolution of his appeal. 14 In Electrical Fittings, there was
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the
case or controversy in this case, pedeffil-.e<TNrt= c~ h-;;;- BO
_a.!temtttnoe Jom.t ~s!t' the-ease.

III
It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy
if,
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
---heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considerations ever before have influenced this Court in determining
nk. ~h L ~
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal I:::- <../' -----ycourts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of lnoot•
ness would not be as severe as the Court predicts.
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, liti ted 'ud ment. I be 'eve ha any subsequent attempt to appeal t e ema of certi catlo would be
barred by Art. III. But the consequences of applymg settled
rules of mootness in this situation would not be unjust. If
injunctive or declaratory relier'were granted, the absent members of the putative class would have obtained by force of
stare decisis or the decree itself most of the benefits of actual
class membership. If, on the other hand, damages were
awarded and an appeal is permitted, reversal of the certification ruling would enable putative class members to take
advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
14 The Court appears to recognize this in passing, ante, at 9, n. 7, but
fails to apply the rule to this case. Since the Court uggests that respondents' interest in the certification ruling derives from the mere fact that it
"stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated," id., at 9, Electrical Fittings it elf would limit us to the issuance of an order directing that
the offensive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U.S., at 242.
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one. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in this situa~
tion will reinstate the "one~way intervention" that the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.1 5
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment as petitioner did in this case. A defendant cer~
tainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certa.in legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade~
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usury claims/ 6 the Court's concern for compensation of putaSee Comment , Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification , 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470--471 (1979) . In actions brought under
llule 23 (b) (3), a class member must decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rul e 23 (c) (2). This provision
was de igned to brin g an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members had been permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to secure the benefits of the decision . Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D . 69, 105-106
(1966).
1 6 Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941) .
P etitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply wi th Mississippi':o interest limits would violat e the National Bank Act. 12 U . S. C.
§ 85. But the National Bank Act cannot be read to displacr state policy
disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims, since the federal Rtatutc seeks
chiefly t o protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or undue
p enalties t hat may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. C. § 86.
15
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tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act. 17
The Court's concern for putative class members could be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administr~tion would be real.
But these problems can and should be addressed by measur~s short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems
to have done today. The first step should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the denial of class certification. District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C.
§ 1292 (b) to certify such appeals in appropriate circumstances. In many cases, a class-action defendant undoubtedly
would forgo the opportunity to settle with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate and final determination
of the class certification question on appeal. Where a defendant attempts to moot a class action by forced settlement, the
District Court is not now powerless. In at least some circumstances it may require that putative class members receive
some sort of notice and an opportunity to intervene within
the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The availability of such
measures could be a significant deterrent to the deliberate
mooting of class actions. Indeed, District Court management
of the problem by measures tailored to the case at hand may
well be preferable to the Court's open-ended approval of
appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory

~

~

~

- -t

The Act provides that rules of procedure promulg d by this Court
"shall not . . . enlarge or modify any substantive rig ." 28 U. S. C.
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974) ; Developments. in the Law-Cia s Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358- 1359 (1976). Sec generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the SubstanceProcedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) ,
17
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appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are lacking, it
is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the deficiency.18
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. There is no warrant
in Rule 23 for the appointment of a "quasi-class representative" solely for the purpose of obtaining class certification.
Since the representative can gain nothing from a certification
order, his participation in the case can be intended only to
benefit. the class. Yet he-or most often his counsel-serves
on his own motion. No court has examined the adequacy
of his representation as required by Rule 23, and no personal
stake in the outcome assures that vigorous advocacy will continue. The requirements for certification under Rule 23 are
not easily applied to a class action lacking a named plaintiff. 10
Congress currently has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The bill, supportrd by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypa~s the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provid es for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United State . The bill also authorizrs interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certification under the proposed procedures.
In view of the pendency of this legislation, it seems particularly unfortunate that the Court today has chosen to unsettle fundamental principles
of Art. III Rtanding and mootness.
10 Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See
East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, -!31 U. S. 395, 403-404 (1977).
Arc their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the
class" within the meaning of Rule 23 (a) (3)? The District Court properly
may conclude on remand that respondents, for these or other reasons,
cannot adcquat~ly represent the class. Should intervention be proposed,
the District Court on equitable grounds might well refuse to toll the
statute of limitations in order to permit it.
Nine years have passed since this action was filed and six since the
18
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,And the Court's new rule will contradict Rule 23 directly in
some cases by inviting a form of intervention that the Rule
meant to eliminate. Seep.-, supra.
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. Tt also creates
unnecessarily significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remal'lld' with instructions to dismiss the appeal
as moot.

governi'ng substantive statute was amended to authorize the challenged
conduct. In its order denying certification on September 29, 1975, the
District Court assigned as one of its reasons lhe possible "destruction of the
[petitioner's] bank" by damages then alleged to total $12,000,000 and now
potentially augmented by interest accruals. App. 47, sec ante, at 2, n. 2.
The po~sible destruction of petitioner's bank is irrelevant to the central
issue of mootness. But as this Court relies so heavily on practical and
equ itable concerns for the interests of putative class members, it will hardly
be inappropriate for the District Court on remand also to consider practicalities and equitirs on both sides. In thtl circumstances presentrcl, the
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion
in favor of putative class members who have slept on their rights these
'
many years.
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Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Robert L. Roper et al.
Circuit.
[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the.
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this .
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor.
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received
everything they could have recovered from petitioner in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties.
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C.
§ 1355.
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appealability. But the characterization does ·not withstand
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation , the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.
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the only plaintiffs arguably present in court. Yet respondents
have no continuing interest in the injuries alleged in their
complaint. They sought only damages; they have received
those damages in fulP Respondents have not suggested that
success on the certification motion would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner. 3 Indeed, their personal
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~~e,.e.,r~ wi~
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2 Although respondrnts also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint
shows that fees werr to be granted only flam the damages ultimately
awardrd to them or the class. App. 13-14.
3
Respondents do a~srrt that certification would enable them to redu.ce
-\ ~~~J
tigation costs by allocating ~~illOng the mrmbrrs of a prevailing
ith the sxccp+ion ~1 at f orney's fee~
lass . Brief for R espondrnts 33.
owevrr, ti;Yjl do not identify any costR incurred to
e that are n~~
t')(<..e ~
covered by the petitioner's trnder . Although the rrcord dof'R not reveal
the detailR of the fee nrrangrmrnt brtwcen rrspondrnts and their Ja,wyers,
· the complaint snggrstR that the lawyrrs have agreed to accept as full comensation 25%
the aJUonnt recovered from the petitioner. A Jp. 13-14.
If this is the xt r n1 of the fee rrgaraleRS of"the number o r mms recovere ,
· ·pondrnts havr no int erest in "spreading" attorney's fees. R eliance
a cost· ·
·
·~js sheer p_e ulation.
Even if one assumed that respondents' liability to their lawyers could be
reducrcl by a class recovery, no on e has sugg e~t ed that petitioner is or ever
will be liable for &ttot"lk~ feesrites hondents' jurisdictional theory
appears to be that the mere possibility of asserting future claims for
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4 S; Au re~ro~clt~ appeal was taken in their own names.
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claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no
The notice of appeal ·
filed with the District Court recites that respondents appeal
only "on behalf of all others similarly situated .... " App. 63.
I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court
See Geraghty, post, at
- - - (POWELL, J., dissenting . There is no suggestion
that respondents' claims are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110-111,
n. 11 (1975). 4 And not a single one of the alleged 90,000
class members has sought to intervene in the eight years since
this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U. S. 385 ( 1977). Nor has anyone ever challenged the
allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the
action lay dormant during the seven months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought
that the class action would protect his rights. We are not
told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this
crusade on behalf of persons who for years have evinced no
attorney's fees against other members of a putative class gives rise to a
case or controversy against the class defendant. Such a theory is unprecedented, and its consequences are bizarre. For example, respondents'
theory would .Pe.'rmit a person to file a class action, even though he had
previously accepted full settlement of his individual claim, on the ground
tha.t the fees incurred in anticipation of the litigation might ultimately be
shared with the class.
4
If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a. course
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification[from appellate review
in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumRiances might
find ' the Getstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v.
Lincoln American Cotp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright , Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
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interest whatever in obtaining recovery for themselves. 5 On
its face, this appears simply to be a "lawyer's case."
Despite long traditions to the contrary, the Court seems
undisturbed that this federal action will be litigated on remand
by a lawyer whose only "clients" are unidentified(illembers
.of lil class- who have shown no desire to be represented by
anyone. 6 The Court also neglects established principles of
Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the District Court a
headless class action that does not meet the requirements of
Rule 23.
II
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or controversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in
their favor." Id., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representative responsibilities to the putative classis sufficient to permit their appeal. ... " I d., at 12. One
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these

D+-"

---

5 The Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974, and apparently,r-(r'\oW
authorizes the fees charged by petitioner. 1974 Miss. Gen. La s, ch. 564,
§7; see ·Miss. Code~§"7~17-1 (6). \ 1here is ~es 1011 of
-r:;prospective relief.
6 I do not suggest that respondenl\hawyer acted improperly in pursuing
this case. Since he has prevailed Woth in this Court and in the Court
of Appeals, the responsibility fallowing client-less litigation is that of the
federal courts.
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particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this
action. 7
A
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying
0
the injury in fact ~inaril:{fequired by Art. III. It simply
ignores this essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the case: When respondents refused the proffered
settlement, the trial court entered judgment in their favor
over their objection. I d., at 6. The single fact of respond. · ·
· "
ents' refusa.1 inspires the Court to draw a "cr~

bet~ H!@8t

utt888 nwiil ee

1 ·

!!.h!!..' l~!:t~2temJj}oV

€?Peal from a fayorablc.Wlldgmen
., at 9. The Court
as an "individual interest" in
appears to hold that
exercising his "statutory right o appeal." /d., at 7. If the
statutes and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer
such a right, the Court concludes that Art. III requires no
more. Ibid.; see id., at 12.
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the
"formulat[ion] [of] standards ... govern [ing]the appealabil:
bid ,
ity of procedural rulings," iii., a:t l~e Court determines thah!..,__ :>
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certificatio~L

f;

Any advantages that ordinarily may flow from "the use of the class
action procedure for litigation of individual claims," ante, at 10, cannot
accrue to these respondents who will not b2 litigating their own claims
on remand. Nor does the Court identify nny unrecovered cost of litigation that these respondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class.
See id., at 10, n. 8; n. 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents
only to point out that their total damages were so small that they "would
be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not
do so by means of a class action. Ante, at 10, n·. 8. We may assume
that respondents had some interest in the class-action procedure as a means
of interesting their lawyers in the case or d'<ibtaining a sat isfactory settlement. This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once
respondents obtained both access to court and full individual relief that
interest disappeared.
7
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1 eqttiLd: by rulQii gf }3Paetieej for two reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits
of [the] litigation," that "stands as an adjudication of one of
the issues litigated." I d., at 9. Second, the contrary, result
would frustrate the goals of Rule 23. !d., at 10-12.
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it correctly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled principles that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by
which it attemps to justify its failure to do so is both factually
and legally unsound.

B
As a ma.t ter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has
never contended that the controversy became moot merely
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor."
!d., at 5. Instead , petitioner argues that its tender of full
-relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless CJ""-~
to review the abstra.ct questions remaining in a case eRee~ l
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). 8
The Court makes no effort to distinguish these cases. Yet it concedes
that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary
8
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their
lawsuit as moot. 9 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that adversely affect him. See 15 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice ,-r 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some
adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.;
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C.-, 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10
(1974). If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to
the constitutional command.

c
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp.
v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).10 But that deci-

\~
"'{"0

l

J-

to the litigation of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court
retains no jurisdiction over the controversy" when the "substantive claims
become moot in the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If tho 1ender itself
mooted the respondents' claims without regard to the entry of judgment,
then the Court's own analysis requires it to conclude that the case is
moot.
9 The "statutory-;.ight" ~appeal{a:nno itsel supply a personal stake
m the outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
10 The only other authorities cited by the Court are United Airlines, Inc.
v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 3 5 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class

·
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments
by which~ is iR-8iviElwal~aggrieved. The trial court
there had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not
infringed. Although the alleged infringer won the case, it
sought to appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This
Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to
consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a
judgment . . . in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the
decree." !d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by including in the decree itself a wvng that "purport[ed] to adjudge
the validity of [the patm1J'a" Ibid. Since that ruling "wa~
immaterial to the dispositiOn of the cause," the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid.
.
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations permitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuing personal stake
in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand explained, the petitioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the
unnecessary ruling tha.t the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161
_certification is subject to appellate review after final judgment at the
behest of the named plaintiffs. Neither case discu~sed mootness, and
neither analyzed the proposition in any wrty. Indeed, the only authority
cited in Coopers & Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469, and
the only authority cited in United Airlines was a concession made by the
defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which
dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous sit tmtion, see 432
U. S., at 393, and n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a
word of explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are
not controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further reflection to have been inconsistent with established law.

tf.
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(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co,, 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3
1973) .11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation
of the decree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly inconsistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other
words, the court's appellate ,jurisdiction was only as broad as
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing 8J
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought decision of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy"
because the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal complaint. 319 U. S., at 363-366.
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice''·
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the
11 Although the Court of Appeals in Electrical Fittings held that collateral estop el would be no bar to relitigation of the validity question, 100
F. 2d 403, 404 other courts had taken a different view on similar issues of
collateral estoppel. If the validity finding were permitted to stand, the
petitioner rould have been forced to litigate the question of its preclusive
effect in future cases. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra n. 4, § 3902,
at 403 (1976); 1B Moore's Federal Practice~ 0.443 [5], at 3925 (1974);
9 id., ~ 203.06, at 716 (1975) .
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the outcome.12 ~1he Court of Appeals emphatically declined to
assume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
544. 13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the
appeal. I d., at 545.
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III
do not change with the "factual context" in which a suggestion
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing ontrovers~ beiweeh ael (6FBe }9ar~ies-? Nothing in Electrical 'Fittings suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits
of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."
12 The appellant ]n Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), cert.

04R:§aaNJ )~l lo
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denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaintiff in a patent infringement action. After the trial court found the patent invalid and not
infringed, the plaintiff took an appeal on the validity question without
contesting the finding of noninfringement. By accepting the judgment to
that extent, he lost his right to recover from the defendant-and thus his
interest in the litigation.
13 Judge Frank wrote for the court:
"[W]here there is no 'justiciable' dispute, there are no 'merits.' There is
merely an unreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis
Caroll immortalized. Many Supreme Court decisions teach us that appellate jurisdiction, when no justiciable dispute exists on appeal, cannot be
rested upon the recollection that such a dispute previously existed when
the case was in the trial court." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted).
See also Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978); Hall v. U. S. Fiber & Plastics Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3
1973); cf. Lewis v. United States, 216 U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam).

24o-241 (1~3i) ~
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Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the
eN\
resolution of his appeal. 14 In Electrical Fittings, there wasA SIJ
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the
case or controverf:Jjin this Q8:Se, a f~€1~rlil comt can hav~ .n.oalhu·natjve bu.t to c]ismiss tbe Clliii

.r

·

III

---;;>------

It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considerations ever before have influenced this Court in determining
whethe1 the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal t~'d Ucourts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of mootness would not be as severe as the Co~rt predicts.
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to -~
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that~ subse·
roJf
quent attem5Uto appeal the denial of certificationJWOuld oe - - ~ ~
barred by Art. III. But the consequences of applymg settled
rules of mootness in this situation would not be unjust. If
i.njunctive or declaratory relief wNe granted, the absent members of the putative class would have obtained by force of
stare decisis or the dt-cree itself most of the benefits of actualclass membership. If, on the other hand, damages were
awarded and an appea
permitted, reversal of the certification ruling would enable putative class members to take
advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
The Court appears to recognize this in passing, ante, at 9, n. 7, but
fails to apply the rule to this case. Since the Court suggests that respondents' interest in the certification ruling derives from the mere fact that it
"stands as an adjuclication of one of the issues litigated," id., at 9, Electrical Fittings itself would limit us to the issuance of an order directing that
the offensive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U.S., at 242.
14
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Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate? 5
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
lYh n the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judg~as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney [s]
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particula.r substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, .the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns. the aggregation of
usury claims,1.6 the Court's concern for compensation of putaSee Comm~nt, Immediate Appea,lability. of Orders Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under
Rule 23 (b) (3), a class member must decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). Thi provision
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
member~~8: l~H!t:n permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to secure the benefits of ~decision. Notes of the Aavisory
'Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966).
10 Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mississippi'3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
§ 85. But the National Bank Act cannot be read to displace state policy
disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims, since the federal statute seeks
chiefly to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or undue
penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. C. § 86.
15
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tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act.l7
(vl
The Court's concern for putative class members ruld be ----,_;
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern o forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial admin~
istration would be real.
~But these problems can and should be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems '\o cw.fl...ol i "ZSl...
to have done today. The first step should be
'ga_
I~
...tien of interlocutory appeals from the denial o class certifica..:_v ...____,t,_I-OI-1:).... District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C.
§ 1292 (b) to certify such appeals in appropriate circumstances. In many cases, a class-a.ction defendant undoubtedly
would forgo the opportunity to settle with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate and final determination _
of the class certification question on appeal. J Where a defend]----a--n..,.,
tl attempt,i to moot a class action by forced settlement, the
District, Court is not
powerless. In at least some circumstance~it may require that putative class members receive
some sort of notice and an opportunity to intervene within
the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The availability of such
measures could be a significant deterrent to the deliberate
mooting of class actions. Indeed, District Court management
of the problem by measures tailored to the case at hand may
well be preferable to the Court's open-ended approval of
appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory

J]

'i}

d()tS

17

The' Act provides that rules of procedure promulgfea y this Court
"shall not .. . enlarge or modify any substantive rigrtt ." 28 U. S. C.
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976) . Sec generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the SubstanceProcedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) .
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appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are lacking, it
is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the deficiency ....
M--Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. There is no warrant
in Rule 23 for the appointment of a "quasi-class representative" solely for the purpose of obtaining class certification.
Since the representative can gain nothing from a certification
order, his participation in the case can be intended only to
benefit the class. Yet he-or most often his counsel-serves
on his own motion. No court has examined the adequacy
of his representation as required by Rule 23, and no personal
stake in the outcome assures that vigorous advocacy will continue. The requirements for certification under Rule 23 are
not easily applied to a class action lacking a named plaintiff.~

Ji/

UJj

118 Congress currently has before it a bill 1hat attempts to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provid es for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes Interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certification under the proposed procedures.
In view of the pendency of this legislation, it seems particularly unfortunate that the Court today has chosen to unsettle fundamental principles
of Art. III standing and mootncss.
2.0 _.Are reSJlODdcnts members of the class they seek to represent? 8ee
East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 403-404 (1977).
Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the
class" within the meaning of Rule 23 (a) (3)? The District Court properly
may conclude on remand that respondents, for these or other reasons,
cannot adequately represent the class. Should intervention be proposed,
the District Court on equitable grounds might well refuse to toll the
statute of limitations in order to permit it.
Nine years have passed since this action was filed and six since the

'
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And the Court's new rule will contradict Rule 23 directly in
some cases by inviting a form of intervention that the Rule
meant to eliminate. See p.
supra. In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also creates
~MIHUl('~ililul'i1,- significant problems in the administration of
U
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal
as moot.

f=,

governing substantive statute was amended to authorize the challenged
conduct. In its order denying certification on September 29, 1975, the
District Court assigned as one of its reasons the possible "destruction of the
-\L__~~ [peti..!i£.ner's bank" by damages then alleged to total $12,000,000 and now
:._('
potentially augme
interest,llo881 ttetle. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2.
or
The possible destruction of petitioner's bank is irrelevant to the central
iss~e of ~ootncss. But a.s this Court reli.es so heavily onApractical and
o--:eqwf1tble concern) for tlH1 lilt8r~"ts et putat1ve class members, 1t wlll hardly
be inappropriate for the District Court on remand also to consider practicalities and equities on both sides. In the circumstances presented, the
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion
in favor of putative class members who have slept on their rights these
many years.

,. I

..
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Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
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v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Robert L . ·Roper et al.
' Circuit.
[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTlChl PowELL, dissenting.
Respon dents ar.e two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi 1aw.1 ·They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of .$683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After fonr years of litigation , the District
Court denied · respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus 1egal interest and
court costs. Over respondeuts' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor.
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received
everything they could have recovered from petitioner in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion 6f mootness and reversed
the de11ial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Co urt of Appeals without identifying the case or
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties.
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adoptt' the interest, limits set by state law, :md 28 U. S. C.
§ 1355.
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appealability. But the characterization does not withstand
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing iuterest in the
outcorne of the litigation. the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are some differences. this case is similar to
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - .
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether
putative class representatives may appeal the de11ial of class
certification aftet· receiving everything they sought on their
own behalves. In this case. as a Geraghty, the District Court
refused to certify a class. Since no one has sought to intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present in
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; they have received those damages in fulP Respondents
have not suggested that success 011 the certification motion
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner. 3
Although l'l'i'liJOmlPnts also a~ked for n1iorney's frP:::, their complaint
1hut fep~ wrrr to br granted only hom the damage::; ultinudely
awardrd to llwm or thP elnss. App. 13-14.
8 Re~pondrnt" do assert that c(•rtification would rnable them to reduce
litigal ion cosb by allocatiug cost:; among tlu• members of a pr<'vailing
class. Brief for RPspondentH 33. ExcPpt for attorney's ft-el-i, however,
respouc!Pn(,; do uot identif~· any costs incurred to date thai, are not
covered b~' tlw JH'tii imwr's trnder. Although tlw rrcord doe:; not rPveal
the dPtails of lilt' fE><' arrangemPn1 between rrspondents and tlwir lawyers,
tlw complainl ~ugge~t~ that the lawyer:> havE> agrr!'d to arcept a~ full compensation 25% of til(' amonnt rel'ovrrPd from thr prtitimwr. App. 18-14.
If this is lhr ngrr<'mcnt. as to fres, respondents have no continuing int('rcst.
Only roun::;pJ j,.; conrrrned whet h<'r tlw recovery is t>nlargrd .
Even 1!' Oll(' n;;::;umed that rt>spondent~:>' liability to their lawyer~ rould be
reduC('(} by a ria~::, rrcover~·, no onP has ~:>ugget;trd that pditioner i::; or evrr
will be liabl<' for fpes that ult.imalely mar be owPd by rr:;pondc·nt~:>. Respondent-s' juri~dictional theory appear,; to bP tha.t the mere po~ibility of
assert.i11g futurp claim::l for altoruey's fees against olhrr membrr::; of :1
putative da><,.; give•;> ri:;c to a cas<' or controversy again~t the class defend-.
2

show~
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Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abaucloned
so completely that no appeal was taken in their O'v\'11 names.
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that
respoudents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly
situated . . . ." App. 63.
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action , I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot.
See Geraghty, post, at - - - (PowELL, J., dissenting).
There is no suggestion that respondents' claims arc "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S. 103, 110- 111. n. 11 (1975). 1 And not a single one of the
alleged 90.000 class members has sought to intervene in the
f\.ii\L -::eigltifJyears since this actiou was filed. Cf. Un ·ited Airlines,
Inc. v. McDo11ald, 432 U. 8. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which respondents sought to take a11 interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response from anyon~ who previously may have thought that the class action would protect
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining re-

l

ant.. Snch n 1hrory ill unprrcedentrd, and its conSE"quencr,; are bizarre.
For examplr, rr,;pondrnts' theory would prrmit, a person to file a cla,;s
action, <•vrn though he had previously acce11ted full :settlemrnt of hi,; individual clahn , on t.he ground that; the f.re.-; incnrrrd in anticipation of the
litigation mi11:ht ultimat<>ly be :sharrd with tlw cla"l:i.
4 If a cla :;.~-action drfendant were shown to have embarketl on a cour;;c
of conduct de>,;igned (() immla1e> thr clas.s certification is.-;ue from appellate
review in ordPr to a.void claR..-;widP liability, n court in propf'r ('ireum~tant·rs
might. find tlw Ge1'stein te:st "atisfird ~u1d the case not. moot. SeP Susrnan v.
Lincoln Ammcan Co1'p. , 5157 F . 2d 1166 (CA7 197R); 1:3 Wright, l\liller &
Cooper, FeclPral Practice and Procedure § 3533, al. 171 (Supp. 1U79);
Comment, Continua!iou and Hf:'pre:::cntation of Cla~:>s ArtionH Following
Dis.missal of the Clas:s Repre,.;cntative, 1974 Duke L. J . 573, 59~-600,
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covery for themselves. 5 On its face, this appears simply to
be a "lawyer's case."
Despite long traditions to the contrary, the Court seems
undisturbed that this federal action will be litigated on remand
by a lawyer whose only "clients" are unidentified class
members who have shown no desire to be represented by
anyone. 6 The Court also neglects established principles of
Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the District Court a.
headless class action that does not meet the requirements of
Rule 23.
II
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or controversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in
their favor." !d., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representative responsibilities to the putative classis sufficient to permit their appeal. ..." I d., at 12. One
might expect tha.t the Court would reason to this conclusion
by pinpoiuting the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action
device, the Court never attempts to ascertaiu whether these
5 The Mis...;i::;sippi usury statut.e was amrnded in 1974, and it apparrntly
now authorizes thr fpes charged by petitioner. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch.
564, § 7; sro Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there i::; no question of
prospective relief.
6 I do not ::;uggest. that respondents' lawyer acted improperly in pur::;uing
this ca::;e. Since he has prevailed both in this Court and in the Court
of Appeab, the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation is that of the
federal court ~.
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pal'ticular respondents can derive any such benefit from this
action. 7
A
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objection. ld., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in~
spires the Court to draw a "critica1 distinction" between
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting
from events extrinsic to the litigation. I d., at 9. The Court
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercising his "statu tory right to appeal." I d., at ·7. If the statutes
and rules governing "federa1 appellate practice" confer such
a right, the Court concludes that Art. III requires no more.
Ibid.; see id., at 12.
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootuess to the
"formulat lionl [of] standards ... govern [ing] the appealability of procedural rulings," toid., the Court determilleS that
respondeuts are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two
7 Any auv:mtag<.'o; that ordinarily may flow from "the u~e of the class
action procedn rc for litigation of individual clai111:s," ante, at 10, cannot
accrue to the,;e re::;poncleuts who will not be litigating their own claim8
on remand . Nor does tl1e Court identify :my unrecovered co::;t of litigation that ·the,;c l't>>:ipondents can reduce if f11ey obtain relief for a cluss.
See id., at 10, n. 8; n. 3, supra. Inueea, tl1e Court refer:; to re,;pondents
only to point ont tllat their total damages were ;,;o small that they "would
be unlikely to obtain legal redre~::; at an acceptable co,;t" if they could not
do so by mrans of a cla~;,; action. Ante, at 10, n. 8. We may as,;ume
that re,;pondents had some intere~t in the clas~-action procedure a~ a means
of intere:;ting their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement. Thi~ may be an intere~t properly furtht•red by Rnle 2J, but onccrel:ipoudents obtained both accc:;:; to court and full individual relief that
inter~t di:sappeared.
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reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling,
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stands ag
an adjudication of one of the i~sues litigated." I d., at 9.
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of
Rule 23. /d., at 10-12. .
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it correctly, is to avoid a direct confrqutation with settled principles that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this
case. But the Court canuot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the respondeuts' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical'distinction" by
which it attemps to justify its failure to do so is both factually
and legally unsound.
B
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgment iu favor of a party at an
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has
never contended that the controversy became moot merely
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor."
/d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full
relief has remedied the ·responuents' individual injuries and
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself
moots the case whether or not a judgmeut ·is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlemeut that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & 'l'ulare
R. Co., 149 U. S. 308. 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 'l'homas
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Larnb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
cur·i am); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8
8 The Court muke:s no effort to di:stiJ1gui~h the:se ca~e::;. Yet it eoucedes
that the ''nght to employ Rule 23" i:s u, "procedural right only, ancillary
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I know of no authority remotely suggestiug that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dis1uissing their
lawsuit as moot. 0 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
that the entry of judgmeut in favor of a party does llOt in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that adverseiy affect him. See 15 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federai Practice a.nd Procedure ~ 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1(263.06. (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some
adverse effect in ord.er to confer "stand.ing to appeal." Ibid.,·
see Barry v. .District oj' Columbia Bd. ol Ez'ections, U. S.
App. D. C.-, 580 F. 2d 69-5 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a coHtiiJUiug controversy between adverse parties at
ali stages of'the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 (1975); Steffel v. 'l'hornpson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10'
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contravention o{ Art·. III, that rule would yield to·
the constitutional co1mnand:

c
The Court relies almost eutirely on Electrical Fittings Corp.
v. 'l'hmnas & Betts Co., 307 U.s·. 241 (1939). 10 But that decito the litigation of' sul:i:stantive · daim:s," cu1d · il: admit:s that '·the court
retain~ no jmi:;didion over the rontroven;y" wlien tlie ":sub:stantive claims
become moot in tlic Art. III ~ensc."' At1te, at 6.· If the tt>nder itself
mooted the respondents' claims without regard· to th.e entry of judgment,
then the Court'::; own analy;;i::; requires it to conclude that the case is
moot.
0 The " statutory right" to appeal itself cannot supply a. personal stake ·'
m the outcom<', for Congre~s cannot abrogate Art. III limitation:; on the
juri~dir·tiou of the fpderal court::;. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 100 (1979) .
10 The onl~· oOwr authoritie~ rited by the Court. are United Airlilles, Inc.
v. McDonald , 432 U. S. 385 (1977), und Coopers <~ Lybrand v. Livesay,
43.7.,;U .. S. 403 (197.8) .. Dictum in both case~ stated. that the denial of chtsff·
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sion simply reaffirms our obligatiou not to review judgments
by whi~h no individual aggrieved. The trial court there
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed.
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because "r a] party may not appeal from a
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by including in the decree itself a ruling that "purport[ ed] to adjudge
the validity of [the patent]." Ibid. Since that ruling "was
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of elimi11ating
the extraneous ruling from the decree. 1bid.
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations permitted a11 appeal." Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fitt·inys was
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuing persona] stake
in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand explained. the petitioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the
unnecessary ruliug that the patent was valid could have~
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future
case. Harries -v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161
certificat ion il,, ;mhject to appellate review after final jndgmrnt at the
behest of the nnmcd plaintiff:>. Neither case di~eussed mootnes~ , nnd
neitlwr analyzed tl1e proposition iu tHI~' way. Indercl, t1w oul~· authority
cited in Coopers (~ Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., a.t 409, and
the only autlwrity cited in Unite(l Airlines was a. conce~:<iou madl' b~· the
defendant and ri Jist of cn~es from tlw Courts of Appral:<, none of which
dealt with a ~uggt·~tion of mootness in an amdogou:> situation, see 432
U. S., at :393, and n. 14. Sucl1 statements, casua.lly cmmcia tPd without a
word uf explanation in opinions dealing with umelatrd legal que"tions, anJnot controllmg or even per~ua,;ivc when they arc ;;hown 011 further reflec1ion to have been incon~i:stent with e::;tabli~heu law.
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(CA2 1950); see In 1·e Trim,ble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3
1973) .l l This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation
of the decree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly inconsistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidde11 to
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other
words, tlw court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as
the petitioner's personal stake iu the appeal. Just four years
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the lilllitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court disti11guished
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought decision of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or coutroversy"
because the pa.rties continued to contest a counterclaim that
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal complaint. 319 U. S.. at 363-366.
Altvater and Electrical Fittinys entirely foreclose the
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the ou tcomc of his appeal may iu voke the jurisdiction of a
federa,l court merely because policy-based "rules of practice"
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the
Although the Court of Appeal:; in Electrical Fittings held that collateral e"toppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity que:;tion, 100
F. 2d 403, 404 (CA2 1938), othrr courts had taken a different view on
similar is:;ur:; of collateral estoppel. If the validity finding were permitted
to :;tand, tilP prtitioner could have been forced to litigate the que:;tion of its
preclu~in t>ffeet in future ca;;l>s. 15 Wright, MiliPr, aud Cooper, supra
n. 4, § :390~, at 40::! (1976); 1B Moor!''~ Fedpral Practice ,I 0.443 [5], at
3925 (1974) ; \J id., 203.06, at 716 (1975).
11

,r
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 TT. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
from a judgment that had · eliminated his stake in the outcome.12 The Court of Appeals emphatically declined to assume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief
against anybody before the court ... ·but ... want[ed] an
advisory opini011 that [al patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
544.13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the
appeal. Jd., at 545.
These cases demo11strate that the requirements of Art. III
do not ehange with the "factual context" in which a suggestion
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context,
Art. Ill asks but a single question: Is there a continuing controversy between adverse parties? Nothing in Electrical Fittings suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits
of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because
"policy considerations penni [(I the appeal" or because the
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."
The appellant in Cove1· v. Schwattz, 133 F . 2d 5-ll (CA2 19-l2), cert.
denied, 3HJ U. S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaintiff in a patent infringement uctiou. After the trinl court found the patent invnlid and not
infringed, the plaintiff took nn appeal on the validity qm-,;tion without
contesting the finding of noninfringrmcnt. By accepting tlw judgment to
that extent., he lo~t his right to recover from the defendant-and thu~ his
interc~t in t he litigation.
1 3 .fudge Frank wrote for thr court:
"[Wjhere there is no '.in~tiriable' di:;pute, there arc no 'merits.' There is
mere!~· fill nnrt>al entit~· re~embling that di;;embodied ~mile which Lewis
Caroll immortalized. Man~· Snpreme Court, deci;;ions teach us that appellate jnri~dietion, when no jn,.,tiriablc disputr existH on appeal, cannot bo
re:;tcd upon the rrcollect ion that :;nch a dispute previously t>xi~trd when
the ca;;r waH in the trial eourt." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnot<>~ omitted).
See al:;o Kapp v. National Football League, 58() F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978) ; Ilall v. U. S. Fibe1· & Pladi1·s Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3
1973) ; cf Lewi~ v. Uuited State~, 216 U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam).
12
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Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the
resolution of his appeal. 14 In Electrical Fittings, there was
a stake; here there is uone. Since nothing remains of the
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this case.

III
It is clear from the Court's rxtended discussion of policy
and practical considerations. ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
heavily in its decisiou. I am not aware that such coHsideratiolls P\'er before have influenced this Court in determining
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction 011 the federal
courts. In any event, the co11seque11ces of a finding of mootness would not be as severe as the Court predicts.
A finding of mootuess would have repercussions primarily
in two situatio11s. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settlrd rules of mootness in this situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, thr absPnt members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If. on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification mling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assumiug the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
14 The Conrt apprarR to recognize this in passing, ante, at. 9, 11. 7, but
fails to apply the rule to thi;:; case. Sinee the Court :snggrHtii that m-;poudentK' intere"t in I he 1wtifieation ruling derive;; from the mere fael that it
''stand~ a~ nn adjudiention of one of the i~surs litigated," id .. at 9, Elect?·ical F'ittiugs it ·elf would limit llii to the i;;~uanrP of an order directing that
the offcn~in ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242.
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judgme11t. ":rhus, the Court's decision to al1ow appeals in
this situation will reinstate t~e "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate. 1 r.
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant 'Certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certa.in 'legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. 'But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to .i udicia1 policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and en'forcement available for particular substantive Claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Cougress. At the very 'least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive ·law giving rise to the claim.
·Today, however. the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usury claims,t 0 the Court's concern for compensatiou of putaSer Cumm(•ul, Immediate Appralability of Order~ Drnying Cla<s~ Certification, 40 Ohio St. L : J. 441, 47(}-471 (1979). In action<s brought under
Rule 2:3 (b)(:3), a clns::~ member mw;t decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Hule 23 (c) (2). This provi<sion
was dPsigm·d tu bring an end to the ";;purious" cla~s action in which class
member;; wt·n' permitted to intervene aftrr a decision on the merit3
in ordPr to st'cure th{' benefits of tluLt decision. · Notes of thH Advi;;ory
Committee un l'ropo:;ed Amendmeut;; to Rule 23, 39 It'. R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966).
16 Liddell v. Ditton Systems. Inc .. 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejeeting Lorl'Ower"' ria~~ action); Ji'ry v. Laytun, 191 Mi;;<s: 17, 2 So. 2tl 561 (1941).
}letitioner is a national ha'uk, and it~ alleged failurr to comply with Missis:;ippi';; int1•re,.;t limits would viohtte tl1e National Hank Act. 12 F. S. C.
§ 85. But the National Bnnk Act cannot be read to tli;;pluce ;;tate poliey'
disfavoring the aggregation of u~ury claims, sincr the federal :;tatute ~Seek::;
chiefly to protect JJntional bnnk;; from di~criminatory treatment or undue"·
tJelmltles that Ulay be imposed by ;;tate law, See 12 U. S. C. § 86.
15
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tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act. 1 7
The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telliug in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement coul<.l indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of succ<'ssive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step
should Le the authorization of iuterlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification. 18 District Courts already are
empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) to certify such appeals
in appropriatt> circumstances. In many cases, a class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the Oj)portunity to settle
with an i11dividual plaiutiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certificatioll question on
appeal.
Where a clPfP11dant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlemE:>nt, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of uoti,ce and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The
1.7

The Act proviu<':> thai rulr, of procedure promulgn.ted hr this Court

"shall not . . . t·ulnrgP or modif~r any :mb,tanlive right." :!~ t ;. S. C.
§ 2072 . Se<· Aml'l'ican Pipe (~ Co1t8tmction Co. v. Utah . 414 P. S. 538,
557-55!-i ( 1!:174) ; Devrlopnwnt~ in !Iw Law-Cia~,; Action~> , SO Han:. L.
Rev. 101S, Ia58- 105~ (1976) . See generally La.nder,, Of LegalizNI Blackltlail and Legaliz<,d Theft: Con~llllH'r Cia~~ Act ion" und the Sub,tanccProePclure DilenHna, 47 S. Cal. L. Hev. s-!2 (1!)74).
1 8Jn Coopas & Lybrand v. Livl'sa.y. 4a7 U . S. 46!3 (1978), !hi,; Court
hf•ld that. tho d<·niaJ of cia:;~ cNtification i~ noL :L "final deei~ion " appealable a~ of right ttndPr 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied i11 ihat <':t:>C' on tho
danger,; of "indiHrrirnina.te" interloeutory rt'\'iPw. !d., nt -ti4. Although
Coope1'.~ & Lybrand now prC'venb review in rn,;p,; in which it, would b~
desirable, C'ongrr""' may rf'rnedy the proMem by appropriate lf'gislntion,
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availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to tl.1~ Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in .all circ4mstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lackiug, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
deficiency.19
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. There is llO warrant
in Rule 23 for the appointment of a "quasi-class representative" solely for the purpose of obtaining class certification.
Since the representative can gain 1wthing from a certification
order, his participation in the case can be inteuded only to
benefit the class. Yet he-or most often his counsel-serves
on his own motion. No court has examined the adequacy
of his representation as required by Rule 23, and no personal
stake in the outcome assures that vigorous advocacy will continue. The requirements for certification under Rule 23 are
not easily applied to a class action lacking a named plaintitf. 20
Congrf':-:s c\.uTeutly has before it a bill that ai.ternpt.-; to remf'dy the
H. lt. 5103, 96th Cong., bt S('S::;.
(1979). The bill, supported Ly the bepattment of Ju::;tice, propo~es to
bypass the llule" Enabling Act problem, fil'e n. 17, supr·a, and to Pliminate
JSome of the problemJS of ch\im::; too ~inall to ju:;tify Individual law::;uit~, by
creati11g a new fed('ral right of action for damages. The bill provide::; for
the enforcement of thi:s right in ~ome instances through <Lction:s brought in
the name of thP United State:;. The bill also authorizt•:s 'interlocutory
appeals from tlw grant or denial of the ruling that will replace clas:> certification under the proposed procctlures.
In view of tlw twndency of thi:s legislation, it ~eems particularly unfor. tuna.te that tlw Court toda~· hnli cho::>en to unsettle fundamental principles
of Art . III Htauding and mootm•::;,;.
2o Are respoudPnt::; membf'rs of the cht.~::l thr~· seek to represent? See
Easi 'Pev:as Motor f?reight v. Rodriguez, ·!31 U. S. 395, 403-404 (Hl77).
19

difficultie~ infecting this troubled area.

r
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A.nd the Court's new rule will contradict Rule 23 directly in
some cases by inviting a form of intervention that the Rule
meant to eliminate. See p. 11-12, supra.
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unnecessarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals ai1d remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal
as moot.

Are their currently nonexi:st ent. claims "typical of the claimR ... of the
clas:s" within the meaning of Rnlf:' 23 (a} (3)? The District Court properly
may conclude on rf:'mand that re;;ponclents, for these or other reasons,
cannot. adequate!~· repre::;ent the class. Should intervention be proposed,
the District Court. on equitable grounds !night well refuse to toll the
statute of limitationl:i in order to jJermit it.
Nine year::; have passed since this action was filed and six since the
governing ~uh:;tantiw sta tute was amended to authorize the challenged
condurt. In itH onif:'r denying certification on September 29, HJ75, the
District Court a::;:signed m; one of it:; reasom; the possible "destruction of the
[petitioner'::;] bank" b~· damagf:'::> then alleged to total $12,000,000 and now
potentially augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, a.t 2,
n. 2. The po:ssible destruction of petitioner'::; bank is irrelevant to the central is:sue of mootne:ss. But w; t.his Court relies so heavily on its practical
and equitable concern for puta-tive class mmebers, it will hardly be
inappropriate for the Dir;trict. Court on remand also to consider practicalities and equitie:s on both i:iide:s. In the circuml:itance:; pre;;ented, the
District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable di:;cretion
in favor of putative clal:ii:l nwmbers who have slept on their rights the;;e
many years.

1.:

;
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MR.

PowELL, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 ·They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of .$683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief ou behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full a:mount of their imlividual claims plus "legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the· District Court
entered ·final judgment in their favor.
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received
everythiug they could have recovered from petitioner in this
action. Neverthe1ess, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion Of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties.
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootuess but
JusTICJ<.J

Jurisdiction wa::; premist•d on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85,
86, which <Hiopt:; the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C.
§ 1355.
1

/
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appealability. But the characterization does not withstand
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation. the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - ,
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of c ass
In this case, as Geraghty, the District Cou
refused to certify a class. ~ince no one has sought to intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present in
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; tlLiy li,~J;QgaiuQQ those damaget fulP IteSporidents
have not su ested that success on t e certification motion
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitiouer. 3

..

2 Although r<'KJ)Ondeuts also a~:>ked for attorney's feE's, their complaint
shows that fePI' Wf'l'f' to be granted only f10m the damage:; ultimately
aw rded to tht>m or th<• clnss. Aw. 13-14.
( ~ t¥OCl-V-\.Jl
8 He:;pond<>nt:; do assert. that certification would enable them to reduce,r-L"
r
litiO', ion ~ by allocatiug costs among the members of a prevailing
cJass. Brief for 'RP;;pondents 33. Except for attorney's fees, however,
rrspond<·n!::; tlo not identif~· any costs incurred to date that. are not
covered b~· thE' prtitionPr':; tE>nder. Although the record doe;; not reveal
the detail~ of the fpp arrangement betwepn respondents and their awyers,
tlw complaint ~ugge:;t;:; that tllP lawyers have agrPed to accept a:; full compensation 25% of thr amount rrcoverrd from the:' Jletitioner. App. 13-14.
If this i,; the agrc:'ement. as to fees, respondpnts htwe no continuing interest.
Only eo1m~el i:; concPmed whether the recovery is c:'nlarged .
Even if one a:::~mnC'd that rPo:poudent~:>' liability to their lnwyPr~ could be
reduced by a cia;;:> recovery, llo o11e has suggested that petitio11er i~ or evc:'r
will be li;1h1P for fel'S that uJt.imately may hP owPd by re:::pond<·nts. Respondent:;' ,imi~dictional theory appear::: to be tha.t. the mere:' po!S~ibility of
asserting future ela.im~S for attorney's fees against othc:'r membNs of a
plltativc daH;.; givP::; ri,;c to a case or cont.rover~y against the· cla&> defend-. ~

f
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Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned
so completely that no appeal was taken in their own names.
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that
respoudents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly
situa.tecl . . . ." App. 63.
SincP respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action , I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court require that the ·case be dismissed as moot.
See Geraghty, post, at - - - (PowELL, J .. dissenting).
There is no suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable
of repetition , yet evadillg review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S. 103. 110- 111. n. 11 (1975). 1 And not a single Olle of the
alleged !)0,000 class members has sought to intervene in the
eight years since this actiou was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. Y. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even aftE-r Cf'rtification was tlcniecl, the action lay dormant duriug the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal , without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought that the class action would protect
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining re~
ant. Such a ilwory is unprrcedented, and its consequrncrs arc bizarre.
For examplP, rP;;pondents' throry would prrmit <t person to file a class
action, <·vrn though he had previously accepted full :;ettlemPnt. of hi;; individual claim , on the ground that. the f.pe.-; incurrPd in anticipation of the
litigation might ultima1ely bP ~lwred with the ria~.
4
If a cla.,~-action defendan1 wen' shown to have embn rkeJ on a cour~c
of conduct d<·signed i.o in>'ula1e thr cla::;::; crrtlfica.tion issue from appellate
review in order to avoid cla,.;,.~wiclf' liability, n court. in proppr eircum~1am·('S
might find tlw Gerstein te:;t Ratisfipd and tho case not. moot. Set' Susman v.
Lincoln American Corp., 5157 F. :2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, l\IiliPr &
Cooper, Fed<·ral Practice and Procedure § 3533, n.L 171 (Rupp. Hl79);
Commeut, Coutinun1ion and Repre::;enfntion of Class Actions .Following
Dis.mi,;sa) of the Cia:;.,; Repre:-ientative, 1974 D11ke L . J . 57a, 59\)-600. /
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covery for themselves. 5 On its face, this appears simply to
be a "lawyer's case."
Despite
tradition~to the contrary, the Court seems
undisturbed that this federal action will be litigated on remand
by a lawyer whose only "clients" are unidentified class
members who have shown no desire to be represented by
anyone. 6 The Court also neglects established principles of
Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the District Court a
headless class action that does not meet the requirements of
Rule 23.
II
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or controversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in
their favor." ld., at 5. Whol1y ignoring the fact that
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of
third parties. the Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representative responsibilities to the putative classis sufficient to permit their appeal. .. ·." Id., at 12. One
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these ~
5 The Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974, and it apparently
now authorizes the fees charged by petitioner. 1974 Mis:>. Gen . Laws, ch .
564, § 7 ; see Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no que;;tion of
prospective relief.
6 I do not sugge;;t that re,;pondents' lawyer acted improperly in pur,;uing
thi.:; ca;;e. Since he has prevailed both in thi;; Court and in the Court
of Appeal;;, the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation
the

f"

fede<el '""'"·
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particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this
action. 7
A
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objection. I d., at 6. 'The single fact of respondents' refusal in~
spires the Court to draw a "critica1 distinction" between
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness rpsulting
from events extrinsic to the litigation. I d., at 9. The Court
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercising his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at7. If the statutes
and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such
a right, the Court 'Concludes that Art. III requires no more.
Ibid.; see id., at 12.
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the
"formulatlion l [of] standards ... govern[ing] the appealability of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court aetermines that
/
responde11ts are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two/
7 Any auvunlagt>::; that ordinarily may flow from "the Utie of the class
action procedure for litigation of individual claim,£," ante, at 10, cannot
accrue to the:>t> respondents who will not be litigating their own claim:s
on remand. Nor dot>~ tlw Court identify nny unrecovered cotit of litigation that ·these re:;pondentti can reduce if t11ey obtain relief for :L class.
See id., at 10, 11. 8; n. 3, supra. Inoeed, t11e Court refers to re:spondents
only to point ou1 that 'their total damages were so small that they " would
be unlikely to obtain legal redre:so; at an acceptable cost" if they could not
do so by mram; of iL cla:;t; action. Ante, at 10, n. 8. We may ao;l:iumc
that retipondents had some intPre~t in the clasl:l-action procedure a:s a means
of inlere,1ing thrir lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement. This may be tlll intPre:-~t properly furthered by Rule 2:3, but onccre::;poudenls obtained both accetis to court and full individuul relief that
intere;;t di::;appeared.
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reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling,
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." !d., at 9.
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of
Rule 23. ld., at 10-12.
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it correctly, is to avoid a direct confrqutation with settled priHciples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the responcleuts' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by
w w 1t a m1 to justify its failure to do so is both factually
and legally uusound.
B
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgment iu favor of a party at an
intermediate stage of litigation." !d., at 9. Petitioner has
never contended that the controversy became moot merely
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor."
!d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full
relief has remedied the responuents' individual injuries and
thus elimwated their sta"ke in the outcome. Considerable
authority supports petitioner's contention that the teucler itself
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settleineut that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
R. Co .. 14!) U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & 'l'horna8
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2cl 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2cl 157 (CA2 1968) (per
~
curiam); A. A . .Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d
8
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).
~
The Court lllake:; no effort to <.lbtingui:;h lhe:;c ca~es . Yet it concede$
that. tllc "nght tu employ Rule 23" i~ a, " procedural right only, aucilhtry
8
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their
lawsuit as moot. 0 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There 11ever has been any
doubt that a party may a J eal those as )ects of a generally
favorable judgment that adverse y affect bin See 15 Wright,
Miller, and. Cooper", Fe era ractice and rocedure § 3902
(1976); 9 M(iore's Federal Practice rr2o3.06 (1975). But
federal comt uniformly have required a showing of some
adverse effect in ord.er to confer "standh1g to appeal." Ibid.;
see Barry v: District oj' Columbia Bd. a{ E(ectio?IS, - U. S.
App. D. C. - , 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties a.t
ali stages of'the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 4'!5 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10'
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contravention o( Art. III, that rule would yield to·
the constitutional command:

c
TJie Court relies ahno~~- E'Htir~ly on Electrical Fittings Corp.
~
v. 'l'hmnas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939). 10 But that deci-/
to the litigation of ' sub~htntivc · claim~," ant!' it: admits that "the court

retain:; no juri~diction over tlw coutrover~y" wlien the ":;ubstautivc claims
become moot iu tlie Art. III :;en:;c.'' A·ltte, at 6.' If the trnder it::;elf
mooted the re:;poudeuts' claim:s without regard · to Hie entry of judgment,
then the Court 'l:l own analy::;i:; requires it to conclude that the case is
moot.
9 The " statutory right" to appeal itself cannot. supply a. J>ersonal stake ·'
m the outcome, for Congre~:; cannot abrogate Art. III limitationt; on the
juri:sdirtiou of the federal courtt;. Gladstone, Realto1·s v. Village of Bell1Vood, 441 l l. S. 91, 100 (1!)79).
10 The only other authoritie::; rited by the Court are United Airlines, Inc.
v. McDmwld , 432 U. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
43.7.,:U. S. 4ti3 (197~) ... Dictum in both cases stated . that the denial of. claslf·
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sion simply reaffit·ms our obligation not to review judgmeuts
IS
by whi()h no individual aggneve .
1e tna court t ero
had entered a decree hol ing a patent valid but not infringed.
Although the alleged infringer won the case. it sought to
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because "r a] party may not appeal from a
judgment ... in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the
decree." !d. , at 242. But the trial court had ened by including in !the decree itself a ruling that "purport[ed] to adjudge
the validity of [the patentl." Ibid. Since that ruling "was
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating
the extraneous ruling from the decree. lbi"d.
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations per.mitted a11 appeal." Ante, at 8- 9. But Electrical Fittings was
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent
that-the petitioner there asserted a co11tinuing personal stake
\M
in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand exp allled. the petitioner in Electrical Fittings was injured 111 fact because the
unnecessar·y ruling tha.t the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a futu:~ ~
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 1 y
certification i;.. ::;ubject to appellate review aftrr final judgmrnt nL the
behe:>t of 1he named plaint iff':;. Neii her cnl:ic di~ru~:>t•d mootm·H~ . and
neith{'l' nnal.\'zcd the propol"ition in :w~r way. Indcrd, t11C only authority
cited in Coopers & Lybrawl was Uuited Airlines, see 4:37 U. S., at 4G9, nml
the only unfhorit~· cited In Unite(? Airlines wal'i :1 concP>i:<ion made b~· the
deft>ndant and a li:>t of cn~es from tl}(' Conrts of Apprul~ , nonr of whieh
deali wJth a ~ ugge:stion of mootnes;; in an 1malogou,; situation, st>e 432
U. S., nL :39:~, nnd n. 14. Sucl1 ·tatemrnls, casually Pnunriatrd without a
word of Pxplauatiou in opinion:; c!Paling with umelat<·d le!);al qut•"tionR, are~ ,
nol eontrollmg or even perHua,ive whrn they are shown on further refle~
tion to h ttvP bt·cn incon;:;istent with e:>tubliHhctl bw.
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(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, Ill (CA3
1973) .11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation
of the decree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plaiuly inconsistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as
the petitioner's persoual stake iu the appeal. Just four years
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought decision of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy"
because the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal complaint. 319 U. S .. at 363-366.
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice"
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliance ou Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942),
cert. denied. 319 U. S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the/
Althouglt thr Court of Appeal:> in Electrical Fittings held that collateral e:,toppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity que~;tion, 100
F . 2d 403, 404 (CA2 1938), other courts had taken a different view on
similar i ::;su e~:; of collateral e~;toppel. If the validity finding were pennitted
to stand, the petitioner could have been forced to litigate the qut>:;tion of its
preclusin• pffert in future ca,;es. 15 Wright, Miller. and Cooper, b¥Upr-a
n. 4, § 3902, at 4Da (1976); lB Moore':; Federal Practice ~r 0.443[5], at
/
~
8925 (1974); 9 id., ~[ 203.06, aL 716 (1975).
11
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at
363, 11. 2. Like the respOI!dents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
from a judgment that had · eliminated his stake in the outcome.12 The Court of Appeals emphatically declined to assume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an
advisory opinion that [a] patellt [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
544.13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the
appeal. Jd., at 545.
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III
do not ehange with the "factual context" in which a suggestion
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context,
Art. IJ 1 asks but a single question: Is there a con tin uin cm rsy between adverse parties?
· ·
·
·
suggests that a "procedura1r·u ing, collateral to the merit
a 'tigation ," may be appealed after fi.Hal judgment because
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the
ruli11g "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."
The appellant in Cove1· v. Schwartz. 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), <:ert.
denied , :319 U. S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaint.iff iu n patrnt infringement. act ion . After the trial conrt found thr patent. invalid and not
infringed, the plnintiff iook an appeal on ihe validity qur~tion without
contr::;ting the finding of noninfringrment. By accepting the judgment to
that extent , he lo~L his right to recover from the defendant-and tim~ his
inten·~t in the litigation.
1a .Judge Frank wrote for the court:
"[W]here there is 110 'ju~tiriablf'' di~pute, there are no 'mrritR.' There is
men·!:'<· an unre<tl entit~' re~embling that di~embodied ~mile which Lewis
Caron immortalized. Mall~' Supreme Court, decision::; teach us that appellate jurbdirtion, wlien no jw;tiriable dispute exist~ on appeal, cannot be
rel'itcd upon the recollection that ::;uch a dispute previously Pxistrd when
the ca.~e waH in the trial rourt." 13a F. 2d, at 551 (footnotr;~ omitted).
See abo Kapp v. National Pootball League, 586 F. 2d G44, 650 (CA9
1978) ; Ilall v. U. S. Fiber & Plastirs Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3
HJ73) ; cf. Lewis v. United States, 21G U. S. 611 (1910) (per curiam).
12

~1\0 ·~
\~~
CAA.J..
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Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
· be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake iu the
resolution of his appeaJ.1 4 In Electrical Fittings, there was
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this case.

III
It is clear from the Court's extended discussio11 of policy
and practical considerations. ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considerations eyer before have influenced this Court in <letermining
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal
courts. ln a11y event, the consequences of a finding of mootness would not b<' as severe as the Court predicts.
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in this situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare dt-cisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,/
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assumiug the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
H The Conr( HJlJWar;; io re>cognize thi:; in pa:ssing, ante, at 9, .n . 7, but
fail::> to apply the rule to thi1:> CHI:>C. Since the Court ;;ugge:-;tH that n•;;pondentH' int(•J'P"t lll (he rPrtifiration ruling derive:; from the mere fact tha.t it
''stand;; H" an ad]11dieation of onP of the i~sues litigated," id .. at 9, Electrical Fittings it::;p]f would limit u~ to the i:;~:>uanre of an ordPr directing that
the offcn~ive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U.S., ut 242.
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judgmeHt. ~"rhus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate t~e "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate? 5
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deuy
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain 'legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. 'But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade~
quacy of compensation and en'forcement available for particu~
la.r substantive Claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Cougress. At the very ·least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive ·taw giving rise to the claim.
·Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of ~
usury claims/ 6 the Court's concern for compensation of puta~
15 Sp(' Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Clni:i:.< Certification, 40 Ohio St. L.-J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under
Rule 23 (b) (a), a c1n:;s uwmber must decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision
was de~>igu<'d to bring an end to thP "spurious" cla:;s action in which class
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the merite;
in ordt>r to secure the benefits of that decision. · Notes of the Advisory
Commitlee on Proposed Amendment~; to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966).
16 Liddell v. Litton Systems. Inc .. 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor. rower:;' clm:is action) ; Pry v. Layton, 191 Miss: 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (194 .
Petitioner i~ fl nationfll ba'nk, and its n11eged failure to comply wi 1 Iississippi'.; intl're:;t limit:; would violate the National Bank Act. 1 f. S. C.
85. But t lC I ationul Btmk Act
.
H:ip nee tate po icy
I disfavoring !he aggregation of usur~· claim:; siaiu th9 fedarul78htut~t iitQ]cs=
~ to protect nntional bnnk:; from d~
's iminatory tre!tfillent or undue·
peualtk'ti that may be impo~ed by ~;tate Ia . See 12 U. S. C. § 86.

---- n

- ---~a_
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tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst mconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act. 17
The Court's concern for putative class membC'rs would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A patteru of forced
settlement could indeed ·waste judicial resources on the litigation of succpssive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the COllsequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems cau and should
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step
he authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certificatio1 .18 District Courts already are
empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 12H2 (b) to certify such appeals
ln many cases. a class-action
·
·
tovt-\wl\t~ (l
defendant undoubtegly would forgo the OJ)portunity to settle
with an i11dividual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
qlA.U.tiO~ l>\
and final rlctermination of the class certification question on
llt.W.
appeal.
~
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The
Tlw Ac·t providP:; that rulr~ of proct•dnrc pt·omulg;ttrd
"shall JJOt • • . enlargr or modif~' auy ;;nb~tanlive right."
'1 7

§ 207:2 . Sec· Anwrican Pipe &
557-55~

\

Cun~tmctiun

b~·

~8

this Court
1". S. C.

Co. v. Utah, 414 P. S. 538,

(HJ74) ; Developnwnt~ iu thP Law-Cia~:; Adion~. 8!) HarY. L.
Uev. 131K, 1:~5H-135~ (19713). See gerwrally LaJH1er~, Of Legalized Hlackmail and LPgalrzc•d Theft: C'on8um<•r Cia~~ Act ions and the Sub~tance-
l)ron>dure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Re\'. 842 ( HJ7 4).
18 In CoopN8 ce· Lybrand v. Live~ay. -!;37 U. S. 46!3 (1978), thi..: Court
hC'ld thllt. tlw clPnia.l of cla~l:i cNtificatiou i;; nol a, '·final deri8ion" a.ppea.lable a~ of right undPr 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We reli(•d in that <'aHr on tho
danger;; of "mrlil'r riminat.e" intNlocutory n·,·iew. ld .. at 47·+. Although
Coopers & Lybrnnd uow prrvellli< rrview in <'<1~(\~ in which it. would be
dcsirabl<·, CongrP~:> may rf'rnedy the problem by nppropriate IPgi~lation,
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availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to t~~ Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in ,all cirm.pnstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress--not this Court-to correct t_h_e_ _ , '0,• ~r
1
deficienc .19
K' OJL..
ince a court is limited to the decision o t e case efore it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
wn. Today's holding is no exception. There is no warrant
'n Rule 23 for the appointment of a "quasi-class representaive" solely for the purpose of obtaining class certification.
ince the representative can gain 110thing from a certification
order, his participation in the case can be intended only to
enefit the class. Yet he-or most ofteu his counsel-serves
on his own motion. No court has examined the adequacy
of his represeutatio11 as required by Rule 23, and no personal
stake in the outcome assures that vigorous advocacy will continue. The requirements for certification under Rule 23 are
not easily applied to a dass action lacking a named plaintiff. 20

A
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Since a court is limited to the decision of the case
before it, iudicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems
often are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own.

Today's holding is no exception.

On remand, respondents will

serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the purpose of
obtaining class certification.

Since they can gain nothing more

from the action, their participation in the case can be intended
only to benefit the putative class.
serve on their own motion.

Yet they - or their lawyers -

Since no court has certified the class,

there has been no considered determination that respondents will
fairly and adequately represent its members.

Nothing in Rule 23

authorizes this novel procedure, and the requirements of the Rule
are not easily adapted to it.
they seek to represent?

Are respondents members of the class

See East Texas Motor Freight v; · Rodriquez,

431 U.S. 395, 403-404 (1977).

Are their currently nonexistent

claims "typical of the claims • • • of the class" within the

~11

meaning of Rule

23(a)(3)?~/

The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced
settlements," and may even foreclose all settlements, of class
action litigation.

See ante, n. 6.

Thus, the difficulties faced

by the District Court on remand in this case may not arise again in
r···.

2.

precisely analogous circumstances.

But today's result also

authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who have
prevailed on the merits of their individual claims.

If the order

denying class certification is reversed in that situation, the
named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing
relationship to the putative class than respondents have here.

A

remand for certification could also lead to "one-wav intervention"
in direct violation of Rule 23.

la:Q 15,

Seef p· 11-12 1

supra.

These tensions, arising from the express terms of the Rule,
undermine the Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule
23 dictate the result reached today.
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A.nd the Court's new rule will contradict Rule 23 directly in ~---
some cases by inviting a form of intervention that the Rule
nt to eliminate. See J. 11-12
'
~
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of~
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unnecessarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
,
Appeals ai1d remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal
as moot.

r,::
'a!J

"typ~ic~'LL..IU..:W£;.J:.LOIJJl~--""~~"

e t eir currently nonexistent. claims
s::;" within the mPan·
~The District Court properly
may conclndP on rpmand that respondents, for these or other reasons,
cannot adequate]~· rrpre::;ent the clal:is. Should intervention be proposed,
the District Court, on eqt!itable grounds tJl!Fht well refuse to toll the
statute of limitation;; in order to j1erinit it. !Q.
,._ \
me year::; uwe pa:ssed- since t11is action was filed and six :;ince the
goveming f' nb.tantiw statute was amended to authorize the challenged
conduet,. In itH order denying certification on September 2!:l, Hl75, the
District Court a~::;igned a:; one of it:; rea::;ons the pos::;ible "df:'::;truction of the
[petitioner'::;.! bank" b~· damages then alleged to total $12,000,000 and now
potentially augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, E·ee ante, at 2,
n. 2. The pos::;ible destruction of 1etitioner's b· nk is irrelevant to the central issue of mootne;:;s
a::; t 1i::; Court relies so heavily on its pract1ca
an eqmta. e co .
for ~mta. tive class rdi\Jbers, it will hardly be
istric.t Court on rem~1M ~ to consider pracina.ppropria.te for t.he
ticalities and equitie::; on both side::;. In tho circum~nce:; pre:,;ented, the
Di;;trict Court may well ~l'e no reason to exerci8e its equit11ble discretion
in favor of putative cla;;s members who have slept on their rights the::;e
many years.

~
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

I

No. 78-904

Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Robert L. Roper et al.
Circuit.
[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTICB HowELL, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi 1aw. 1 They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those •charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents a:lso sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 mi1lion. After four years of 'litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months "later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual Claims plus 'legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor.
No one disputes that respondents themselves have received
everything they could have recovered from petitioner in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification; This Court affirms the j udgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or
controversy that remains to be 'litigated between the parties.
The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but
t Jurisdiction was premi~ed on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85,
86, whicl! adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C.
§ 1355,
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appealability. But the characterization does not withstand
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - ,
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class certification when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought
in the action. ln this case, as in Geraghty, the District Court
refused to certify a class. Since no one has sought to intervene, respoudents are the only plain tiffs arguably present in
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damag<'s; those damages have been tendered iu fulP Respondents
have not suggested that success on the certification motion
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner. 8
Although r<'~:>pondents also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint
that fees were to be granted only f10m the damag~ ultimately
awurded to them or the class. App. 13-14.
n Respondrnts do assert that certification would enable them to reduce the
CXJJensc of litigation by allocating costs among the members of a prevailing
clar;s. Brief for Respondents 33. Except for a.ttorney's fees, however,
respondents do not identify any costs incurred t.o date that. are not
covf'red by the petitioner's tender. Although the record does not reveal
the details of thr fee arrangement between respondents and their lawyers,
thr romplaint :o:ugge:;ts tha.t the lawyer:; have agreed to accept as full compcm;ation 25% of the amount recovered from the petitioner. App. 13-14.
Tf this is the agreement as to fees, respondents have no continuing interest.
On!~· counsf'l is concerned whether the recovery is enla.rged.
Even if one assumed that respondents' liability to their lawyer:; could be
reduced by a cluHs recovery, no one has suggested that petitioner i;, or ever
will be liable for fees that ult.imately may be owed by respondents. Respondents' jurisdictional theory appears to be thu.t. the mere possibility of
asserting future claims for attorney's fees against other members of a
putative class gives rise to a case or controver:::;y against the class defend2

:,~hows
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Indeed. their personal claims to relief have been abandoned
so completely that 119 appeal was taken in their own names.
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that
respondents appeal only "on behalf of all ·others similarly
situated . . . ." App. 63.
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot.
Sec Geraghty, post, at - - - (PowELL, J., dissenting).
There is no suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).4 And not a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the
f\il\t..- ~ years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought that the class action would protect
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining reant.. Sut•h a theory i~ unprect>dented, and its conSPquences are bizarre.
For cxrunple, respondents' theory would permit a person to file a. clas~
act.ion, even though he had previousl~r accepted full settlemt>nt. of his in~
dividual cln.i.m, on the ground that. the f·Pcs incurred in aJlticipation of the
litigation might ultimately b€' shared with the class.
1
If n. class-action defendant were o;hown to have embarked on a course
of ronduct d!'signed tQ insulate the class certification is.-<ue from appellate
review in ord!'r to avoid ch1sswide liability, a court in proper circu.m.:;tances
might find tlw Gerstein tl':'lt <><ttisfied a.nd the case not moot. See Susman v,
Liw·oln American Corp., 587 F. 2d Rfi6 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright , Miller &
Coop€'r, Fedmtl Pmctire ;md Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment., Continuation and Repre::;rnfation of Cln~s Actions Following
Djf'JUis:;;al of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke ·L, J. 573, 599-000,
·
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covery for themselves. 5 On its face, this appears simply to
be a "lawyer's case."
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the contrary,
the Court seems undisturbed that this federal action will be
litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are
unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be
represented by anyone. 6 The Court also neglects established
principles of Art. III jurisprudence and remands to the Dis~
trict Court a headless class action that does uot meet the
requirements of Rule 23.
II
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case
as "whether respoudents' individual and private case or controversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in
their favor." Td., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that
respondents themselves elected to appeal only ou behalf of
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representative responsibilities to the putative class-is sufficient to permit their appeal. ..." I d., at 12. One
might expect tha.t the Court would reason to this conclusion
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these
Tho Missi8sippi usury statut.e was amended in 1974, and it apparently
uow autl10rizes the fees charged by petitioner. 1974 Mi~s. Gen . Laws, ch.
564, § 7; :,<'e l\lir;s. Code Ann. § 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no question of
prospective relief.
6 I do not ::;ugge:st that respondents' lawyer acted improperly in pursuingthi:; ~c. SincP he has prevailed both in this Court and m the Court
{)f Apveab, the re::;ponsibility for allowing client-lr:;s litigation falls Oil
the federal courtll.
5
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•particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this
·action.7
A
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an
"intlividual interest" in the litigation without identifying
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this
rss{:'ntial inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objection. I d., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal inspires the Court to draw a "critical distinction" between
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting
from events extrinsic to the litigation. ld., at 9. The Court
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercising his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at 7. If the statutes
and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such
a right, the Court ·concludes that Art. Ill requires no more.
lb·id.; see id., at 12.
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the
11
formulat[ion] [of] standards ... govern[ing] the appealability of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two
7 Any advantage::J thaL ordinarily may flow from "the u~e of the class
action proeedure for litigation of individual claims," ante, at 10, cannot
n.ccrue to tlH'HC re~pondent::J who will not b3 litigaLing their own claims
ou remand. Nor does the Court identify ~tny unrecovered cost of litigation that the:se re~:~pondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a cla::;s.
See id., ut 10, n . 8; n. 3, sup·ra. Indeed, the Court refer:; to re::;pondentl::~
only to point out that their totill damages were ~o ~mall that they "would
be uulikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable co~;t" if they could not
do so by meanFO of a clas::; action. Ante, at 10, n . 8. We may a~~ume
that rt>spondrn1s had some interest in the class-action procPdure as a mean::;
of interesting their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement. This may be an intere::;t properly furthered by Rule 23, but onco
respondent,.: obtained both accc::;s to court and full individual relief that
interest disappeared.
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reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling,
collat<>ral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." !d., at 9.
Second, the con~rary result would frustrate the goals of
Rule 23. !d., at 10-12.
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it correctly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled principles that unambiguously dictate a nnding of mootness in this
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities ~:~imply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident
Jack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually
and legally unsound.
B
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an
intet·mediate stage of litigation." ld., at 9. Petitioner has
never contended that the controversy became moot merely
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor."
I d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full
t·elief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
R. Co. , 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiarn) .8
8 The Court makc:s no effort to distingui~h these ca:ses. Yet it concedes
that the "right to employ Rule 23" i~ a "procedural right ouly, ancillary-
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg..
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their
lawsuit as moot. 0 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itsplf moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller. and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some
aclvPrse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.;
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Election s, U. S.
App. D. C.-, 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. lli itself
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at
all stages of the litigation. b'. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 0975); Steffel v. 'l'hornpson, 415 U. S. 452, 459 , n. 10
(1974) . If allY statute or rule purported to authori:-;e an
appeal ill coutravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to
the coustitutional command.

c
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp.
v. 'l'homas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939). 10 But that decito the litigation of suu:stantive claims," and it admit:; that <;the court
uo jnri::;diction over t1H~ controversy" wlwn the ":sub:stautive claims
h<•<•onw moot in the Art. III ~enHe." Ante, at 6. If the tender itl:le!f
nwol!·d the respomlents' claim~ without regard to the entry of judgment,
theu th(• Court's own analy:;i:s requires it to conclude that the case is
moot.
u The "statutory right" to appeal itself cannot SUJJply a. per8onal :sta.ke
l1l llw oulcomt:', for Congre:s:s cannot abrogate Art. III limitutwn:s on the
juri~tlietion of the federal court:;. Gladstone, Realtors v. Villaye of Belltoood. 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) .
1
" The ouly other anthoritie;; cited by the Court are United Airl!'lte~, Inc.
v. McDonald , 4:32 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybraud v. Live~ay,
43( U.. S. 4(i3 (19(8). Dlct~~m in both rases stated that the denial of class·
l'C'Iain~
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed.
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appea1 from a
judgment . . . in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
review of findings .. __which are not necessary to support the
rlecree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by including in the decree itself a ruling that "purport[edj to adjudge
the validity of [the patent]." Ibid. Since that ruling "was
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of
Apjwa]s had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating
the extra11eous ruling from. the decree. Ibid.
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. Til sense "because policy considerations permitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. 'But Electrical Fittings was
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuiug personal stake
il1 the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand later explamed, the
p<'titioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the
unnecessary ruling ·that the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice" agaiust him m a future
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161
eertific-ation i~; ~ubject to appellate review after final judgment at the
hclwst of the named plaintiffs. Neit11er· cal:le di:,;cu~~<'d mootne~s, and
ncitl1er analyzed the propol:lition in any -way. Indeed, the only authority
<-it<'d in Coopers t~ Lybrand was United· Airlines, ~ee 437 U. S., at 469, and
I h<' only authority eited in United Airlines wa~ a conc~~;ion made by the
defPndanl !mel a 1i8t of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which
UPall with a Huggestion of mootne,;s in an analogous c;ituHtion, :see 432
F. S., at 393, nml n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a
word of PXplanation in opinion!:! dealing with unrelated legal quec;tioni:i, are
110L eontrolling o1· even per~uasive when they are Hhown on further reflection to l1ave been .inconsistent with C::itnhliiihed law.
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{CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3
1973) . l 1 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself
'Supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation
of the decree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plaiuly incon~
·sistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to
consider the merits of the patent va.tidity question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a
decision that had t'elied on Electrical Fittings in refusiug to
consider thf' merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought deci.
sion of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by
eontrast, satisfied "the t'equiremeuts of case or controversy"
because the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal com·
plaint. 319 U. S .. at 363-366.
Altvater aud Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice'·'
permit him to do so. Auy doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliauce on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the
11 Although the Court of Appeals in Electrical F'ittings lwld that col~
lateral e::,toppel would be no bar to relitiga.tion of the validity 4ue~;tion, 100
F . 2d 403 , 404 (CA2 19S8), other courts had taken a different view on
similar issues of collateral estoppel. If the validity finding wen' permitted
to stand, the petitioner could have been forced to litigate the 4Uei:ition of its
preclu ~;ive effpet. in future case::;. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra
n. 4, §3902, at 403 (1976); 1B Moore'~; Federal PractJ ce ,[0.443 [5] , at
3925 (1974) ; 9 id., , 203.06, a.t 716. (1975}.
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 3Hl U. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the outcome.12 The Court of Appeals emphatically declined to assume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
544.13 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the
appC'al. I d., at 545.
ThesP cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III
do not ehangl· with the "factual context" in which a suggestion
of mootness al'is<'s. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing controversy between adverse parties'? In Electrical Fittings, the
controversy continued with respect to the single narrow
issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent validity
properly was included in the decree. But nothing in that
casf' suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits
The appt%m1 in Covel' v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 Hl42), cert.
deuied, 319 tl. S. 748 (1943), was the losing plaintiff in a patent mfringemcnt aetion . Aft<'r the trial court found the patent invalid and not
infringed, the plaintifi took an appeal on the validity question without
ronte:;t ing the fin<l'ing of noninfringement. By accepting the judgment to
that extent, he lo~t his right to recover from the defendant-and tlm~ his
intere:;t in 1he litigation.
1 a Judge Frank wrote for the court:
"[W]here there iH no 'ju~ticiable' di~pnte, there arc no 'merits.' There is
merPI~· an nnreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis
Caroll immortalized. Man~· Supreme Court deci:;ions teach us that appellate jurbdi<"tiou, when no ju:;tiriable dispute exist:; on appeal , cannot be
t•esl<'d upon the r<'collection that :;uch a dispute previou::;ly existed when
the ea.~e wtt;:; in th<' trial court.." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnote:; omitted) .
See al:;o Ka11JJ v. National Fi10tball League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978); Hall ' . U. S. Piba & PlMtics Corp., 476 F. 2d 41H, 420 (CA3:
19i3); cf. Lewi8 v. United States, ~Hi U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam).
12
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of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the
r•uling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
be appealed only wheu the litigant has a personal stake in the
resolution of his appeal. 14 In Electrical Fittings, there was
a stake; here there is none. Since nothing remains of the
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dish1issed this case.

III
It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy
and practical cousiderations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
]wavily in its decision. ':r am not aware that such considerations ever before have infiue11ced this Court iu determining
whether the Constitution couiers jurisdiction on the federal
courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of mootness wouid uot be as severe as the Court predicts.
A finding of mootness wouid have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The flt'st involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. 'III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in this situation would
not be unjust. If iuj unctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actuai class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the CE'rtification ruling would enable putative class members t(').
H The Court appea rs to recogni:te thi~ in IJas~ing, ante, at. 9, n . 7, but
faib to apply the rule to this ca~e. Since the Court, s ugg e~t~ that re.~pond
eut:;' in((•re~t in the C'ertifi('ation ruling derive:; from thr mere fact that it
'';;Land;; HH an udjudic·ation of one of the issues litigated," id ., at 9, Elec•
tl'ical Ji'ittiugs it;;elf would limit u~; to the i s>~ uance of an order directing that
the offen ~ ive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242.
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take advantage of a favorable judgment on tJ1e issue of liabillty
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstat·e the "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.15
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant a.ttempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant ·certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members a.nd jeopardize the
enforcement of certa.in legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particulat' substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
1'oday, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usury claims, 16 the Courfs concern for compensation of puta"
15 Set> Commcnf, Immediate Appealability of Order~:~ Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In action:; brought under
Rule 23 (b) (3), a dm:i:> member must decide at the time of certification
whelher to "opt out" of tl10 action undcr Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision
wu.., de,;ig:ned to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were permitted lo intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Note>: of the Advisory
Committee on Propo~ed Amendment:; to Rule 23, 39 F. R D . 69, 105-106
( 1906).
16 Liddell v. Litton Systems. Inc .. 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowl:'rs' elas::; netion) ; 'P1'y v. Layton, 191 Mi::;s. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and i1H alleged failure to com]Jly with Mi~::~
si::;~ippi'., interc~t limit::; would violale t1te National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C .
§ 5. But I do not undrrstand that the National Bank Act displaces st4te
jlOli!·y dit:~favoring the aggn•gation of usury claim~::~ . A primary purpose of
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tive class members in thi case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act. 17
The Court's concern for putative class members would be
mor·e telliug in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step
shoul(l be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
dt>nial of class certification in appropriate circumstances. 15
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. ~ 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases. a class-action
drfendaut undoubtedly would forgo the OJ)portunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the Distl'ict Court is not powerless. In at
that· Act i:-, to proteet nRtionnl banks from discriminatory treatment or
unduP penalties that mny be imposed by ;;tate Jaw. See 12 U. S. § 86.
17 The Act proY:iues tha:t rules of procedure promulgated by this Court
"shall not . . . <'nlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U. S. C.
§ 2072. Sec Ame1'ican Pi7Je (~ Construction Co. v. Utah~ 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974): Development::; in t1w Law-Cia~::; Actions, Sn Harv. L.
Rev. 1:318, 1:358-1:359 (19i(i). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail nnd Legalized Theft: Con;~umer Clas,; Actions and the Sub:stanceProcedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. llev. 842 (11:174).
18 In Coope1's & 'Ly'braru1 v. Livesay, 4:37 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court
h~ld th<~t the denial of cia~ certification is not a "final deci8ion" appeal~
nhle as of right undc·r 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in tha.L case on the
dangers of "indi~crimina.te" interlocutory review. !d., a.t 474 Although
Coopers (~ Lyln1and now prevents review in cases in which it. would be
.d~irabie, Congre,;:l lJlay remedy the problem by appropriate legi~a.twn,
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least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and .-an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). 'The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the dE-liberate mooting ·of .class actions. Indeed, District
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances~ · To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or mauagerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
deficiency .w
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
can be intended only to benefit the putative class. 'Yet theyor their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court
has certified the class, there has been no considered determination that respondents will fairly and adeqhately represent its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
1

°Congress

currently has before it u bill t1mt attempts to remedy the
infrcting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The bill, supporte·d by the Department of Justice, propo::;es to
bypass the Hule.,; l!..'nabling Act problem, ::;ee n. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of tl1e problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal rigbt of action for damage;,; . The bill provide,; for
the enforcement of this right in ::;ome instance~ through actions brought in
the name of the Unitt:>d States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
uppeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace clai:>s certifiration under t he propo::ied proceduret:~.
diflicultie~
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403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a) (3) '? 20
Tht> Court's holding well may prevent future "forced settlements," and may even foreclose all settlements of class
action litigation. See ante, n.
Thus, the difficulties faced
by the District Court 011 remand in this case may not arise
again i11 precisely a11alogous circumstances. But today's result
· also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation,
the umned plai11tiffs 011 remand will have no more continuing
relationship to the put~;ttive class than respondents have
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way
intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and
n. 15, supra. These tensions, arising from the express terms
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the
policies uuderlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
20 The Di:strict Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents,
for these or othrr real"ons, cannot adequately represent the cla~s. Should
intervention be propo~ed, the District Court on equitable grounds mi ht
well refu:;e to toll the statute of limitations in order to permit it. Pflne years
have passed since thi:; action was filed and six since the governmg :;ubotantive ~o;tatutP was atm•nded to authorize the challenged conduct. In it:; order
denying certification on September 29, 1975, the District Court assigned as
one of its rea;.;ons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner's] bank" by
dam11ge~ then 11lleg('d to total $12,000,000 and now potentially augmented
by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see 'lnte, at 2, n . 2. The possible
destruction of petitioner's bank is irrelevant to the central is:;ue of mootness, but ~o;enou~ indPed to depositor::;, :;tockholders, and the community
;orrved. A,; thi:s Court relie::; so hPavily on ib practical and equitable concerns for putative elass membPrs, it will hardly be inappropriate for the
Di,trict Court on remand to eonoider practicalities and equitie:; on both
sidP~. In the circum:;tances presented, the District Court may well oee no
reason to exerci:se it~ equitable dil;cretion in favor of putative cla8s memben~
who have sleiJl on their right;; these many years.

S
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forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unnecessarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the ·judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss :the appeal

as moot.
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Deposit Guaranty National Bank,lOn Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
Robert L. Roper et al.
[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Barik Act and Mississippi law. 1 'They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for iudividua1 totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
CO\}rt costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from 'it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir- ·
cuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
tqe denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties.
1
Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopt the interest limits o;et by state law, and 28 ·u . S. C.
§ 1355.
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The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but
appealability. But the characterization does not withstand
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation. the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to
Un·ited States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - ,
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class-certification when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought
in the actiou. In this case, as in Gerayhty, the District Court
refused to certify a class. Since no Olle ·has sought to intervene, respondeuts are the only plaintiffs arguably present in
court. Yet respoudents have uo continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam~
ages; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respondents
have not suggested that success on the certification motion
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner. 3
2

Although respondrnt:; also a::;ked for attorney's fees, their complaint
shows that feet' were to be grantrd only from the damages ultimately
awarded to them or the elm;:;, App. 13-14.
3 Rt·~ponJrm::; do a~:;ert that <:t•rtification would enable them to reduce the
expenHe of litigation by allocating co;;t:; among the members of a prevailing
clasH. Brief for Rf'SponJents ;);3. ExPrpt for !~Horney's fees, however,
respond€'11t~ tlo not ident if~, any co:>ts incurred· to date tlmt, are not
covered by the petitroner's tender Although tlw record does not reveal
the detuilt~ of the fee arrnngem('ut between respo)ulents and their l!twyers,
the complaint :;ugg(':>ts that the lawyer:; have ugr~ed to accept as full compen~ation 25 % of the amount recovered from the petitioner. Apf>. 13-14.
If this j, th<:> agreement a:; to · fees, I'('S])Olldents have no continuing interest.
Only cotm,;d is concrrned whether the recovery is enlarged: ·
Even if one assumed that respondents' liability to their lawyers could be
reduced by a dass recovery, no one has &·ugge:oted that petitioner is or ever
will he liable for fre,; tha.L ult.imatrly ma~· be owed by re.;pondents: Respondent,' juri::rlictioual t.heory appear::; to be tha.l the mere pos:;ibility of
assort.ing ftttu re ela.im:-; for aJtonH• ':-; fet..>:> against ot-her membere. of .a.
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IndE>Pd, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned
so completely that uo appeal was taken in their own names.
The 11otice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that
rcsp011dents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly
situa.ted . . . ." App. 63.
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
ou teome of this action, I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot.
R<>c Geraghty, post, at - - - (PowELL, J., dissenting).
Tlwre is no suggestio11 that respondents' claims are "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." C'f. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975):4 And not a single one of t~e
all<•ged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in tpe
11ine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
he. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by infornial
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral A1·g. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought that the class :wtion would protect
his rights. We are not told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who
putnli\'(' C"la,;;; givE':' rise to a case or controversy against the class defendant. Such a. theory i~ nnprecf'u~>ntcd, and its consequences are biza.rre.
l!~or t'xampl<-\ rt>spondf'nts' theory would pcnni1, a person to file. iL class
:wtion, C'Vf'll though he had pmvi011~ly act•rptPd full settlC'ment of his individual rl:Lim, on thf' ground that. the fees incurrf'd in anticiptLtion of the
litiga1ion might ult.i matt'ly bt• ~hart"d with the ela>:.-;,
4
If a class-aetion defendant W<'l'f' ,.;hown to have ~>mbarkcd on a. course
of ('Ondurt. desiguPd Lo in~uhte 1he da&;;; Ct'Jtifiea.tion is.'>ue from appellate
l'C\'iew 111 ordC'r to a.void cla&;wid~> liability, n court. in proper circmnstances
llligbt find the Gerstein tr:-;t. ~Htisfit•d tU1d th0 ea,.;e no1. moot. See Su.sman v.
Li11coln Ametican Corp ., 587 F . 2cl R6() (CA7 1978); 1:3 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice nnd Procedure § 35:~3, a.t 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment. Co1i1 inuation and Hf'pr!',;eHfation of Class Action:; Following
Dismis;;al of the Class EeJlresentat.ive, 1974 .Du~e L . J. 573, 59~600, .
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for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining ra..
covery for themselves! On its face, this appears simply to
be a "lawyer's case."
Despite traditio11 and policy considerations to the contrary,
the C'ourt seems undisturbed that this federal action will be
litigated on remand by a lawyer ·whose only "clients" are
uuidentifieq class members who have shown no desire to be
represented by anyone. 6 ·'rhe Court also neglects established
priHciples of Art. III 'jurisprudence, and remands to the District Court a headless c1ass action that does not meet the
requirements of Rule 23.
II
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or con ..
troversy became moot· by reason of the entry of judgment in
their favor." Id., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representative respo11sibilities to the putative classis sufficient to permit their appeal. ... " !d., at 12. One
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action.
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these
'•

5 Tl1e Mi:s.-;issippi usury statute was amended in 1974, and it apparently
now authorizes the fee:-; charged by pPtitioner. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch.
5u4J §
see Yliss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no question of
prospective relief.
0 I do not sugge-:t that. respondPnts' lawyer acted improperly in pursuing
lhb clllie. Since he has prevailed both in thii:i Cou·rt and in the Court
of Appeals, the rP:sponsibility for allowing client-less litigation .fa-lls ton
'the fetle'hll cotltttl,

1:
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particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this
action.'
A
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the
case: When respoudents refused the proffered settlement, the
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objec.
tion. I d., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal in·
spires the Court to draw a "critical distinction'~ between
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting
from events extriusic to the litigation. ld., at 9. The Court
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercis·
ing his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at 7. If the statutes
and rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such
a right, the Court concludes that Art. III requires no more.
Ibid.; see id., at 12.
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the
"formulat[ion] [of] standards ... govern[ing] the appealabil·
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certification for two
1 Any advantage;; that ordinarily may flow from " the use of the class
action procedure for litigation of individual cl{lims," ante, at 10, cannot
accrue to these respondents who will not be litigating their own claims
on remand. Nor does the Court iqentify any unrecovered cost of litigation that these m;vondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class.
See id., at 10, n . 8: n . 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refer:;) to respondents
only to point, out that their total damages wpre so small that they ''would
be unlikely to obtain legal redre~s at an acceptable cost" if they could not
do so by means of a clai3s action. Ante, !\t 10, n. 8. We may assume
that rf0Spondents had ~orne intere:>t iu the class-action procedure as a me!}ns
of interesting their lawyers in the c~e or obtaining a sat.isfactory settlement. This may be a:n intere~t properly furthered by Hule .23, but once
respondept ~ obtained both acee;:;s to court and full individual relief that
interest disappeared.
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l'Ol:tsous. }1 irst, the certification order is a "procedural ruling1
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation ," th.at "stands as
an adjudicatioll of one of the issues litigated." !d., at 9.
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of
Rule 28. ld., at 10-12.
· The effect of the ,Court's analysis, if I understand it cor.
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled priuci..
ples that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by
which lt atten1pts to justify its failure to do so is both factually
t:\llU legally UHSOund.

B
A:s a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a JUdgment in favor of a party at an
intermediate stage of litigation.'; l d., at 9. Petitioner has
nevet• contended that the controversy became moot merely
1
'by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor.' 1
i d., at 5. Instead, petitionei· argues that its tender of fuli
relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries and
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority supports petitioner;s contention that the tender itself
moots thP case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff' has refused to accept a proffered settlement that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
R. Co .. 149 U! S. 3o8, 313- 314 (1898); Drs. Hill"& Thomas
Co. . United States, 392 F. 2d 204; (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Lamb v. Commis_sioner, 390 F . 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
curiam); A.. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam).8
!i The Court make:, no effort Lo di~tiuguh;h these ca~eo:..
Yet it cm1cedes
'that tfte "tight to employ Rule 23" ib a. "procedural· right only, ancillary
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I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a j udgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their
lawsuit as moot. 9 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
tha.t the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some
adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.;
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C.-. 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at
aU stages of the htigation . E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to
the constitutional command.

c
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp.
v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939). 10 But that decito tlw litigation of sub~tantivc claim:s," ami it admits that "the court
retains no jurisdiction over the controY<'r,.;y" when the "substantive claims
bceon1e moot iu the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If tho tender itself
mooted the respondent~' claim:; without regard to the entry of judgment,
thl'll the Court':; owu analy:si:s requires it to conclude that the case is
moot.
u Tho ":stu.tutor) right" to a.ppeal it<>elf cannot supply a. personal stake
Jn tlu~ outcome, for Cougre:s~ cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the
juri:;dietion of the federal court::> Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)
10 The only other authoritie:; cJted by the Court are United Airlines, Inc.
v. McDvuald, 4a2 U. S 385 '(1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both case~ stated that the denial of class
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there
·had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed.
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a
judgment . . . in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
review of findings ... whicb are not necessary to support the
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by including in the decree itse1f a .ruling that "purport[ed] to adjudge
tho validity of [the patent]." lbid. Bince that ruling "was
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid.
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations permitted an appeal." Ante, at 8...:9. But Electrica1 Fittings was
a "Jive" controversy only beeause-aud to the limited extent
that-the petitioner there asserted a continuing personal sta.ke
in the outcome. As Judge Learued. Hand later explained, the
petitioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a futu.te
c·asc. Harries v. Ait King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161
certification is subjeet lo appellate review after final judgment at the
of the named plaintiffs. Neither rn~e di~cn~:;ed mootne~~, and
neither analyzed th(· propo~ition m any way. Incl('ed, the only authority
<'itecl in Coopers & Ly'bmrul wa~:> lhiited Airli:tli'N, ~(·p 437 U. S., at 4()9, and
thr only authority rited in United Airlines wa:; a emweH~iou madr by the
defenclaut aud a li:,t of raReH from the Courts of Ap]wals, none of which
dealt. with a sugge;;tion of mootne~s in an analogou:< ::<it uai ion, .,;re 432
U. S., at ~9:3, and n. 14. Surh ;:;tatem(•nts, ca~ually enUIH·tatNI wilhuut a
word of exp!ana.tion in opinion~ dealing with unrelated legal CJlll'~t iono, aro
not eonlrolhng or even per::nta:;Jve when they are shown on further rc!le(,"'
tion to have been incou~i;;;tellt with C~StahliHhed law.
belw~t
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(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3
U>73) .11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation
of the dPcree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly inconsistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
was told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as
the petitioner's personal stake iu the appeal. Just four years
la!Rr. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a
deci!>ion that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to
consider the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished
Electrical Fittings as a case in which the parties sought decision of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by
eontrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy"
heqause the parties continued to contest a counterclaim that
hacl not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal complaiut. 319 U. S .. at '363-366.
Altvater and Electrical Fittinys entirely foreclose the
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice"
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942),
cert. denied, 319 U. S. 74S (1943), a case in which the Court
of Appeals' for the Second Circ4it discussed at length the
Although the Court of Appeals in Electrical 1-'ittings held that collateral e~:>toppel would be no bar to relit igntion of the validity que~;tion, 100
F. 2cl 403, 404 (CA2 1938), other court.-; had taken a d1fferent view o11
, imilar i:osues of collateral estoppel. If the validity finding wert> permitted
to stm1d, the petitioner could havr been forced to litigate the 4uestion of its
preclusive rffect. in futurf' ca:,;e::; 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra
n. 4, § 3902, at 403 (1976), lB :\Ioore '~:~ Federal Practice 0.443 [5], at
3925 (1974) ; 9 id., ,120a.06, at 7L6 (1975),
11

,f
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constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the outconw.12 ThP C'ourt of Appeals emphatically declined to assumP jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
544. 1 8 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the
appPal. 1d., at 545.
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III
do not change with the "factual context'' in which a suggestion
of mootness arises. See ante, at 5. Whatever the context,
Art. liT asks but a single question: Is there a continuing controwrsy between adverse parties'? In Electrica7 Fittings, the
controversy conti11Ued with respect to the single narrow
issue whethet the District Court's ruling on patent validity
properly was included in the decree. But nothing in that
case suggests that a "procedural ruling, collatera.l to the merits
1 ~ The appellant in Cover v. Schwa1·tz. 133 F . 2d 541 (CA2 1942), <:ert.
de11ied, 319 lJ. S. -.,48 (1943), wa:> tht' lo~ing plaintiff in a patent infringe·
ttwnt action. After tho trial c·()t1rt found the patent invalid and not
infriug(•d, the plmt1tiff took an appeal on tho validity qu~tion without
cout(•;:tmg the finding of nouinfringemcut. By accepting the judgment to
lhut extent, he lost hi:; tight to recover from the defendant-and thus his
in lerc~t in the htigatio11.
1 3 Judge Frank wrote tor ihe court:
"[W Jhere tlwre i~:: no 'ju~tieiable' di~>]Hite, there are no 'merits.' There is
mC:'rely au \lmeal entity re~embling that di~embodied ~mile which Lewis
Catoll immortalized. Many SnprC:'me Court deci~ion8 teach u~ that appellate jurh.dictwn, when no ju~ticiable dispute exi~t8 on appeal, cannot be
te~<ied upon tllf' recollection tlmt ::;ueh a d1~pute previou~ly exit;ted when
the ea~e wu~ in th(· trial court." 13:3 F . 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted).
See abo Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978) , Hall v. C S. fiber & Plastic.~ Corp., 476 .F. 2cl 418, 420 (CA3
1973); d . Lewis v. United States, 21U U. S. IHl (1\HO) (per curiam).
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()f a litigation ," may be appealed after final judgment because
"policy considerations permi [ t] the appeal" or because the
ruhug "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated.')
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the
resolution of his appeal. 14 In Electrical Fittings, there was
a stake; hete there is none. Since nothing remains of the
ea8e or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dismi8sed this case.

III
It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy
and practical consitlerations. ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
heavily in its decision. I am uot aware that such considera-·
Lions evet' betore have infiueuced this Court in determining
whether the ('onstitut'ion confers jutisdiction on the federal
comts. In any event, the consequences of a findiug of mootness Wt1uld not be lls severe as the Court predicts.
A finding of' mootness would have repet·cussions primarily
in two situations. the fi"rst involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification aud then pursues his case to
a successful, iitigated j udgmeut. t believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to apj'>eal the denial of certification
generally would. be barred by Art. IlL But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in this situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the beuefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would euable putative class members to
11 The C'ourt appean, to recognize thj,., in Jll:l::>sing, ante, at 9, n. 7, but
faib to apply the rule to tlu~ ca::;e. Since the Court 1:1Ugg~t1:1 that re::;pondeul:s' intert'l'it in the C(•rtifi<'ation ruling derive:> from the mere fact that it
";,;land:; aH an adjudication uf one of the iHstH•::. litigated," id., at 9, Electl'ical Fittinyii It :;elf would limit u::> to the io::smuwe of an order directing that
the olf~n::iivc ruuull: he expuuged fro111 the recorq! 307 U.S., at, 242.
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take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by ' an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to ~llow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.13
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this <lase. A defendant certainly will have a sqbstanti'al incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative · class members and jeopardize the
t>nforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade~
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu~
la1· substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, howev~r, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since'l Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usury claims,ill the Court's concern for compensation of puta1

1 ~ See Comment, Immediate At>peulability of Orderti Denying Class Cer~
tification , 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 0979) . In actions brought un.der
Rule 23 (b) (3), ~ class member mu. t derid<> at the time of certification
whether to ·'opt put" of the action under Rule 2J (c)(2). This provision
wns dPl::iigncd to !;>ring an end to the "l::ipurious" class action in which class
members W((re permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to secure the bPnefit:; of that decision . Notes of the Advisory
Committee on PiiOposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F . R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966) .
16 Liddell v. Litton Systems, luc., 300 So. 2cl 455 (1974) (rejecting bor~
rower::;' cla:;s action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Mi::;::;, 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and it~ alleged failure to comply with Missis::;ippi';o interest limitl::i would violate the Nationa l Bank Act. 12 U . S.C.
§ 85. But I do not under~<tand that tlw National Bank Act displaces state
}JOJlcy dh;f!worin~ the aggrega.tion of UHUI')' el<~ims. A primary J)Urpose ()f
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tivc class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act. 1 7
The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these -problems can and should
be addressed by measl.tres short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances. 18
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(h) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
uefendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the District. Court is not powerless. In at
thtLt Acl is to protect national bank~ from di~crimina.tory treatment or
undue penaltir;:, that may fJp impo:sro b~· state law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
17 The Act provide~ tha.t· rul~ of procedure promulga.ted by this Court
":;hall not . . . enlarge or modify any sub:stantive right." 28 U. S. C.
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U . S. 538,
557-558 (1974); Developmentk in the Law-Cia:ss Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-la59 (1976). See generally Lander:;, Of Legalized Blackmail and LegalizPd Theft: Com;umer Clas~:; Actions and the Sub:stanceProcedure Dilemma,, 47 S. Cui. L. Rev . ~42 (l!J74) .
1 In Coupers (~ Lybt·and v. Livesay. 4:37 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court
lwlcl that, the denial of cla:ss certification i:s not !L " final decision" appealable as of right undrr 2~ U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that ca:;e on the
rlanger,; of " indi~crimumle " mtrrlocutory review /d ., at 474. Although
Cuo]Jers & Lyb,.and 110\\ prPveut" revit>w in cast>$ in which it would be
.d~infble, Congrc::;~:> may remedy thf• problem by appropriate legislation,
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least, some circumstances, · it may require .that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and\ an opportun.ity to
intervene .within the appeal r)eriod. Rule 23 (d)(2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting
of class actions. Indeed,
District
I
.
Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers -are
lacking, it is for · Congress-not this Court-to correct the
dPficien cy.19
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions'' to legislative· problems often
are attended by unfortuuate practical consequences of their
owu. 'l'oday's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives'' solely for- the
purpose of obtaining c1ass cert!fication. · Since they cal'l. gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
cau be intended ouly to oenefit the putative class. Yet theyor their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court
has certified the class. there has been no cousidered determination that respondents will fairly ana adequately represent its
members. Nothing iii Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
aud the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
Are respondents men:ibers of the class they seek to represeut'?
See East Texas Motor Freight v Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
111 Congress currently has before iL a bill that attempts to remedy .t11e
difilcultie::; infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Departmrnt of .fu::;tice, proposes to
bypa::;:; 1he Rules Enabling Act problem, ::;ee n. 17, supra. and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify mdividuallawsuits, by
ereatiug a ne~ federal right of action for damages. The bill provides .for
the enforcement of thi:s right in some instances through actions brought in
the namC> of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
nppcals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cer-.
tifkation undPr the proposed procedures.
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408-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typi..
cal of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a) (3) '? 20
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced settlements," and may even foreclose all settlements, of class
action litigation. See ante, u. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced
by thE' District Court on remand iu this case may not arise
agaill in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's result
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation,
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing
relationship to the putative class than respondents have
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "oue-way
intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and
n. 15, supra. These tensions. arising· from the express terms
of th<:' Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the
policic·s underlying Rulr 23 dictate the result reached today.
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
~ 0 The District Court proprrly may conclude on remand that respondents,
f'or llw~r or otht>r rPa~olh>, cannot adrquatrly repre~ent the clat::s. Should
intervrntion b(• propo~rd. tflr Di~trict Court on rquitable grounds might well
rcfll:<(• to toll tlw Htatute or limitations in ordPr to permit. it. Nearly nine
~·t·Hr;o; have pa:;:>Pd :;ince thi::; action was filE-d and six since the govrrning. ·ub~tuntive ~tal utn wa"" amPndPd to authorize thr challrngrd conduct. In
it:; ordPr denying certineation on Srptembrr 29, 1975, the District, Court
a~,.;ignpJ as one of it~ rrasonH I hr poHsiblr ''de~truction of the [petitioner's]
bank" by damage~ then allrgPd to tot<d §12,000,000 and now poteut,ially
au~mented by the accrual of intrrt>HI. App. 47, SPP ante. at 2, n. 2. The
po~:<~ible drstruction of prt.itioner',._ bank is irrelevant to the cent.ral i~~ue of
mootne,.;~ , but s~rious indred to t!rpositor,.;, stockholder~, a,nd the community
served . A~ thi:; Court rPlirs so heavily on it~ practical and equitable conePrm: for putative cia:;~ mrmbrrs, it will hardly be inappropriate for the
pi:;trict Court 011 remand to con~1drr practicalities and equities on both
side~ . In the circum~tances pre:seutrd, tlw District Court may well see no
rra~on to exercisr its rquitablr discrrtion in favor of putative class mem&eT:;;;
~',llo have ..,[el_Jt on their right:; the::;c 1111111Y ycarr:, ..
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forced settlements in consumer cla~s actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. . It also mmecessarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
,AP,peals and remand with instru'ct,ions to dismiss the appea.l
'as 'moot.
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Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
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Robert L, Roper et al.
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MH. JosTIC.l!: PoWJ,;LL, with whom MR. Jus'l'ICE STEWART
joins, dissPntiug.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this
action lat-e in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59 Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class allPgcd to include 90.000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full an10U1J t of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respo11dents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount du<-• with t.he clerk of the ·court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties.
Jurisdietwn was premisl'd on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S.C. §§ 85,
86, which adopb; the mtere~t. limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C.
§ 1355.
1
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''!'he Court decides that the central issue is not mootuess but
appealability. But the characterization does not withstand
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I clissent.

I
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to
U'nited States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - ,
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether
putative class re1Jresentatives may appeal the denial of class certificatiou when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought
in the actwu. In this case, as in Geraghty, the District Court
refused to certify a class. Since no one has sought to intervene, respoudents are the only plaintiffs arguably present in
court.~ Yrt rPspondents have no continuing interest in the
l! 1\fH JusTICb Sn,:\~CN:-; ,;titles, in hi,; c•ommring opinion, that all1~rrsons
ulleg<'d to be• mPml)('r;< of a putativP elm;:; ''automnt.trally b<>rome part.i(•.,; to
the c·a~e or c·ontrovpr,;~· for lhe purpost>R" of Art. Ill, and that they
"rrmain partiC'i'i until a final delt•rmiwtltOJl ha,.; been madP tha.t thr action
mn~ · not. ])(' mamtainPd a~ a l'la"" artiou " Ante, at . Thj;; uovc•l
viPw , for which no authorit~ J:,< c1ted, rannot be reconeiled with hulianapolis Schoof ( ' umm ' r~> v. Jacobs, 420 ( l. S. 128 (1975), 1vherr an oral
eerti.fil'ation order wa, hl'ld m;;ttfh('ic•nt to identify the interests of absc>nt
cla;;s nwmb<·r·s for Art III [ltlrpo;;r,;. Thf' r<·~t!lt harJl~· eould be different
wllf'n t hr C"la~" ha~ not bern tdent.ifi.Pd at. all. See also M ern phis Light,
Oas & Water Dw v. Cmjl. ~;{() 0 . S. I, 8 (Hl78): Baxte1' v. Palrm'giano,
42:3 U . 8. ;{(JK, 310, 11 . 1 (HJ7fi), Weiu.~tein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147
(1975) ; PaMrii'IIO City Huard of FJducation v Spunyle1', 427 U. 8. 424,430
{lH71l ).
Tlw propo,.,pJ rule· of nutomatte party ~tatu,;-in ihi:; cas<' for !:lO,OOO.
nnidPnttfied pNson,.._ha" frouble:,;ome and far-reaching implications t.h at
could preJudice· the lmnging of cla~s action". Pm:;umabl~· a ]Htrpose of
sul'h a rul<• II'OUld he to a>'~'Un· that 1:\atisfactwn of the chim::; of named
partiP" would nol 1Prmin;ttt· tlw httgation . :"\or· rould thr rights of
unnauwd p<trtil'" hr l'Xtingui,..hrd by thr failure of the named partjes to
npp('al. Tbtt,.., 1! the rul<' l)l'O[lOS<'d by :\Ju.•Jt:I:\'J' J('g STEVf~Nt:i is to bo
tne:-tumg;t'nl, f 't tppo"<' that a fidtt<·wry duty must b(' imposed upon namtltl
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injuries alleged in their complaiut. They sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in full.U Respondents
have not suggested that success on the eertification motion
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner.4
Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned
so completely that no appeal was taken in their own names.
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that
parties fo <'on1inne 1lw litigation wlwre-as here-the wmamed parties
remain ttmdrntifiNI and fail to intervene. As fiduciarif';;, would the respondent"' not only h<· rPquirect to continue t.o litigate, but to assume perRonal rrsponstbdity for eost;; and attorn<"y's ff't's if thr case ultimately is
lost? Wonlcl re:spoll>Hble litigants be willing to .filf' class actions if they
"thrreb)' u~nmed stH'h long-term fiduciary obligations? Thf'se qn~tions are
substantial They an· no1 resolved by Rule 23, and I believe they merit
careful ,;tudy by CongrP:;..,; before this Court~perhaps unwittingly-creates
a major catPgory of l'liPntless littgatJOn unique in our system .
3 Although r!'lipondt>nt."' also n~<ked for attorney's fees, their complaint
shows that fees were lo be granted only from the damages ultimately
awarded fo them or the class. App. 1:1-H.
"'Hesponch·nts do a:s~ert that c<•rtification would t>nable them to reduce the
expense of httgat1on by allocatmg costs among the members of a prevailing
class. BriC'f for Re,.:pondt·ut:,; aa Except for attorney's fees, however,
respondent::! do not tdC'ntJfy any cost::! incurred to date t.lmt are not
covered by the pet 1t ioner';s tender Although the record does not reveal
the detail:s of the fep arrangemt>nt between respondents and their lawyers,
the com]llaint :sugge:st~ that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full compensation 25% of the amonnt recovert>d from the petitioner. App. 13-14.
If this it, tht> agret-menL a~-; to f0eb, respomients have no continuing interest.
Only connsel is COIH:emcd whether the recovery is enlurged
Even if on~ as:smm.J that respondents' liability to their lawyers could be
reduced by a clas:s re('OVNy, 110 one has suggestPd that. petitioner is or ever
will be liable for fP<':< that uJt.im;l rely may be owt>d by respondents. Respondents' Jtlflsdtct wmtl theory appeu.rs to be that the mere possibihty of
asserting future chumb for at.tomey':; ft>e~:~ against, other members of a
pnt!Ltive cia.~~:> givt'ti ri"'<' to a case or cont.roversy against the class defendant. Such a. thro1~ i, tmprert>dented, and its conSt>quenres are bizarre.
For ex1unplP, n~ponc!Pnts' theory would penni1, a person to file a class
action, ~wf'n though h<· had previously accrpted full se1tlement of his individual rla.im on the !!;!'OUnd thnt. the fe<\" incurr(:'(] in antiript~tion of the'
}ltig-Jtiou tni11;ht ult.mw t~ly he shart><l wirh thr ria&.
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respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly
situated ... .'' App. 63.
Since respondents have uo continuing personal stake in the
ou teo me of this action, 1 believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot.
See Oeraghty, posi , at - - - (PowELL, J., dissenting).
Therf' is no suggestion that respondents' claims are "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 110- 111, 11. 11 (1975)." And not a single one of the
alleged HO.OOO class members has sought to intervene in the
nine years swee this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 F . 8. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
ever challenged the a1legedly usurious charges by informal
complawt or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certificatiou '"'as demed, thP action lay dormaut during the seven
months tn which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response fr01n anyone who previously may have thought that the class action would protect
his rights. We arc not told what, if anything, motivates respondents to continue this crusadE' on behalf of persons who
for years have evinceJ no interest whatever in obtaining recovery for- themselves.'' On its face . this appears simply to
be a "lawyer's cas<> "
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the contrary,
the Court st>ems undisturbed that this federal action will be
0 If a da~-aetion defmdant were ,;howu t.o have embarked on a course

of conduct. d<'stgned t.o in~ula,te thr rlal:>S ccrtifica.tion is,;uc from t~ppellate
review 111 order io avOid r[a,.,~widt> lmbility, a <'Ourt. in proper circumstances
might. find the Orr~trin test :>attsfied and tho case not. moot.. See Susrnan v.
Lincoln American Corp .. 587 F. 2d 81)6 (CA7 1978) ; 13 Wright, Miller &
Coopt>r, Federal Practiee and Procedure § 35:33, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
CommPni., ContinuatiOn and HepreRentation of Class Actions Following
Dismi~~al of the Class Repre:;eutatiVe, 1!:174 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
"Tlw \li;;:-;J~~ippl u;;ur~· ~tattttP wa:; amended in 1974, and it apparently
11ow aurhonz<':l the f('~ rhargt>d by ]JPiltJoner. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch.
5!:>4, ~ 7· H't' .\li"~ · ( 'odP Ann.§ 7.'1-17-1 (6). Thus, there is no question of
prospcet1vr rrl!ef.
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litigated on r('mand by a lawyer whose only uclients" are
unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be
represented by anyone. 7 The Court ·also neglects established
principles of Art. III jurisprudence, and remancjs to the District C'ourt a headless class action that does not meet the
requirements of Rule 23.

II
The Court identifies the question for decision in this case
as "whether· respoudents' individual and private case or controversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in
their favor.'
I d., at 5. \Vholly ignoring the fact that
responcle11ts themselves elPcted to appeal only on behalf of
third parties. the Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in tlw litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representative responsibilities to the putative classis sufficient to permit their appeal. . . ." I d., at 12. One
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although the!'(' is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action
device, th<' Court never attempts to ascertain whether these
particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this
action.
7 I do not sngJ!:t'Nf t.hnt. re,;pondenb,' lawyer ad(•u improperly in pursuing
this c<tSt> SincP he has prevailed both in thiR Court and in the Court
of App('al;;, the re:;pousihiJity for allowing client-less litigation fall:; ou
the f<>rlPral eourt8.
~All~' advanhtJ!:€'" that ordinarily may flow from ''the use of the class
action !Hor·<-'<iure for litigation of individual claims,'' ante, at 10, cannot
!~crru<' to tlw~e m.;pondent~; who will not br litigating their own claims
on remand ~or doe~ the Comt identify ttny unreroverf'd cost of litigation thnt the~c n•spondents eau reduce if they obtain relief for a class.
Sec ul., at LO, n. ~, n. 3, ljupm Indeed, the Court r€'fers to rf'spondents
only to pomi out that their total damages were so Nmall that thry ·'would
be unlikely to obtaul legal redn·~~ ttt. un acr·cphlble ro.~t" if they eould not
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The Court does not explain how it is able to find all
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying
the iuj ury in fact required by Art. III. lt simply ignores this
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the
case: Wheu respondents refused the proffered settlement, the
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objection. ld., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal inspires the Court to draw a "critical distinction" between
mootness deriving from a judgment and mootness resulting
from events extrinsic to the litigation. I d., at 9. The Court
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment has an "mdividual interest" in exercising his "statutory right to appeal." ld., at 7. If the statutes
and rule~ gowming "federal appellate practice" confer such
a right, the <'ourt concludes that Art. III requires no more.
Ibid. ; see id., at 12.
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the
"formulatlionj [of] standards ... govern[iug] the appealability of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that
respondents an' aggrieved by the denial of certification for two
reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling,
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation,'' that "stands as
an adj udicatim1 of one of the issues litigated." 1 d., at 9.
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of
Rule 23. Td., at 10-12.
The effect of the Court's analysis. if 1 understand it correctly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled principles that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this
do ~ by mpau:; of a elass action . AntP. at 10, n. . We may assume
that rPspondrnts had ~;ome interest in the class-action procedure as a means
of intPn·~<tiug tlwir law~·er~ m the case or obtaining a sat.isf<tetory settlement.. This ma~ be au intrre:<t propPrly furthered by Rule 23, but once
respondent~:~ ubtamccl bot.h acres~:> to court, aiJd full individual relief that
intf're:;i rh:>appeared
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case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by
which 1t attempts to justify its failure to do so is botfl factually
and legally unsound.

B
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has
never contended that the controversy became moot merely
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor."
1d., at .5 Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full
relief has reineched the respondents' individual injuries and
thus elimmated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority supports petltionefs contention that the tender itself
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review the abstract questions remaiuing in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
R. Co .. 149 U. S. 308, 313- 314 ( 1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Lamb v Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
cu1'iam), A.. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v Campbell, 353 F. 2d
89 (CA519o5) (per curiam). 11
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents iustead of dismissing their
9 Tlw Court makp,; no effort to di~tinguish tht~P ca:;<.-.;.
Yet it concedes
that the "righL to employ Rule 23" IH a "procedural right only, ancillary
to the litJgatwn of sub.;tantivt• claims,'' and it admits that "the court
retain::, no JUI'illdietwn over tlw controverHy" wh<'n the ":;ubstantive claims
beconw moot m the Art. lli ~cnl'le." Ante, at 6 If the tender it elf
nwotrd the re:;pomlents' clann::o without rrgard to the entry of judgment,
then the Court\ own aualy~1" req!Iirl':; tt to conclu.de that the case i$
moot
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lawsuit as moot. 10 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
that the entry of judgment iu favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice n- 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have requir(;ld a showing of some
adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.;
see Barry v. D·istrict of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C. --, SRO F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a eontinuing controversy between adverse parties at
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
40~ (1975); Steffel \'. ThornpsOit, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in eontrave11tiou of Art. lTI, that rule would yield to
the constit,utional comtnand.

c
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp.
v. 'l'homas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939) .' 1 But the deci10

Tlw

"~tat11tor~·

right!' to aJlpeal ikielf cannot supply n personnl stnke

m the outeome, for Congre~~ cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the
juri~diction of the· fl'drral eourt:>. Uladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. R. 91, 100 (1979) .
11
Thr ouly othrr anthoritiP~ eiiNI by t.lw Court arp United Airlines, lnc .
v. M cDunald, 4:~2 l l. S. 3~5 (1977). and Coopers & Lybmnd v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both ca:;es stated that the denial of class
certification is ~nbjert to appPllate review after final judgment at the
behr:;t, of the namPd plaintiffs, Neither case di:;cussed mootness, and
nPithPr analyzed thP propoHition in auy way. lndred, the on!~· authority
ritrd in CoupP1'8 & Lybrand waF> United Airlines, see 437 U. S., n.t 469, and
the only anthorit~ · cited in Cmted Airlines was (~ concPssion made by the
defendant and a l1~t ol' cases from the Comts of Appeals, none of which
dealt w1th a ~nggr:;twn of mootne~>s in an analogous situation, see 432
U. l::l., nt :19:3, and n . 14, Such ~tatement:s, rmmally ennneiatPd without a,
word of <··xplanation lll opi.mons dealing witb unrelated legal quest10ns, are
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed.
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to
appeal the finding that th~ patent was valid. This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because a l party may not appeal from a
judgment .. . in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
review of findings . .. which are not necessary to support the
decree." l d, at 24:2. But the trial court had erred by including in the decree itself a ruliug that "purport[ed] to adjudge
tho vali<.!Jty of l the pat~nt] " lbid. Since that ruling "was
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of
Appeals had j urisdiCtwn for the limited purpose of eliminating
the extraneous ruling from the decree. Ibid.
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations permitted an appeaL ~' Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent
that--the petitioner there asserted a continuing personal stake
in the outcome A8 Judge Learned Hand later explained, the
petitioner in Electrical Fittings was injured iu fact because the
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161
(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3
1973). 1 ~ This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself

"r

not controlling or even pC:'r:masivt- wlwn th<'y are shown on further reflection to have been incon::nstent With e:ltabli:shed law
12 Althou~~:h the Court of Appl'ab iu Elect11cal FLttings lwld 1hat collateral e!>topp<'l wonlcl bC:' no bar to relitiga.t10n of the validity ques1ion, 100
.F. 2d 40;3 , 404 ( CA2 1938), othrr c:ourt,~o; had t.aken a diffen•nt view on
similar ~~,;uet-~ of collatt•ral rstoppel. If thf' v<~lldity finding W<'re permitted
to sttUld, the pf'tJtwnrr could have bt>eu forced to litigate the question of Its
prerluHive effPI't, Ill future ras<--'l>. l 11 WriF;ht., Miller, and Cooper, 8Upra

TS-904--DISSENT
10

DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

suppli<>d the requisite personal stake h1 obtaining r·eformation
of the decree.
Thus, the C'oUl't's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly inconsisteut with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
was told to rcfonn the decree, but expressly forbidden to
considm· the merits of the patent validity question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as
the petitioller's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years
later. Altvater v. F1·eernan, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to
consider tlw merits of au appeal. the Court distinguished
Electrical Fittin(Js as a case in which the parties sought decision of "a hypothetical case:" The appeal in Altvater, by
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy"
because the parties contilmed to contest a cou11terclaim that
had not been coucluded by the dismissal of the orginal complaiut. 3H) r. S., at 363-366.
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federa.I court merely because policy-based "rules of practice't
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliance ou Cover ,.. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942),
cert. denied, 319 F. S. 748 (1943), a case in which the Court
of Appeals for· the Second Circuit discussed at length the
constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fitt·inys, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the outconw.1 3 ThE> Court of Appeals emphatically declined to asn. 4, § :mo:l, a.L 40;3 (1\rifi): lB :\Ioorr\ Federal Practice ~0.443 [5], a.t
3925 0974) ; 9 id., ,120B.()(i, ai, 7ll) (1975).
1 ~ Tlw apprllaul, Ill ('uue1· \'. Sthwartz, 1:~3 F. 2<1 541 (CA2 1942), ccrt.
denied, 31!.! ( . S. 7-!.S (Hl-!3), was the loHing plaintiff in a patent mfriuge-.
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sume jurisdiction over an appeal which soug-ht 11no relief
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] va.Jid." 133 F. 2d, at
544.11 Since there was no case or controversy, the Court. of
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the
appeal. l d., at 545.
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III
do not ehange with the "factual conte~t" in which a suggestion
of mootness arises. See a:nte, at 5. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: ls there a continuing controversy between adverse parties? In Electrical Fittings, the
controversy continued with respect to the single narrow
issue whethf.:'r the District Court's ruling on patent validity
properly was included in the decree. But nothing in that
case suggests that a "procedura1 ruling, collateral to the merits
of a litigatiou,'' may be appealed after fina.l judpment because
"policy considerations permi [t] the appeal'' or because the
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the
resolution of his appeal,I" In Electrical Fittings, there was
menL a.ciion. After the trial c·ourt found the pa.tent invalid and not
infringed, the plaintiff' took an appeal on the validity question without
cont.esting the finding of noninfringement. By a.ccepting the judgment to
that extent , he lo;:;t his right to recover from the defendant-~;md thus his
interest in the litigation.
J< Judge• Frank wrote for the court.:
"fW.Ihere there i::; no 'justiciable' diRpute, there arc no 'merits.' There is
merely Hil 1mreal entity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis
Caroll immortalized. Many Supreme CourL decisions teach us that appellate juri;,diction, when no justiciable dispute exists on appeal, cat~not be
rested upon the recollection that such a dispute previously existed when
the rasr was in t.lw trial court.." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (foot.notes omitted).
See also Kapp v. National J?ootball League. 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978); Hall v. lJ . S. Piber & Plastics Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3
1973) ; cf. Lewis v. United States, 216 U.S. 611 (1910) (per curiam).
1 5 The Court. appear>' to re<·ognize this in pct~sing, ante, at 9, n . 7, but
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a stake; here there is none. Since nothi11g remains of the
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have tlisrnis..c;;ec l til1is case.
·. .

III
It is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considerations ever before have influenced this Court in determining
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal
courts. I11 auy event, the consequences of a finding of mootness would not be as sevel'e as the Court predicts.
A fiuding of mootuess would have repel'cussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. 1 believe that a subsequent
attetnpt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applyiug settled rules of mootness in this situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
grautcd. the absent members of thC' putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decis-is or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded awl an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advautage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus. the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to elimiuate.10
fail,; to appl) tlw rule to thi~ ca.~e . Since the Court sugge:;ts that respondents' intere:;t. in the certification ruling dt>rive~ from the mere fact that it
";-;tand,; a;, an adjudication of onP of the io;sue:; litigated,'' id., at 9, Elect1'ical l~'iltings ittwlf would lin11t u~ to the i~~uance of an order directing that
the offensive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242.
J.l> ...t'<' ('ommf'lll, lnunPruate AppealalHhly of OrdPr~ Denying Clas:; C<·r~
tifir.atwn , 40 Ohio St. L. J . 4-!1 , 470-471 (1979) . In actionH brought under·
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
.Judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant ·certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cast>s. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general.'' Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of comp<'nsation and enforcement available for particular substautive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court uever pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usury claims, 1' the Court's concer·n for compensation of putative class membt>rs in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst mconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act.1 s
Rnle 23 (b) (3), a clas~ member must decide at the time of certification
wlwt.Jwr tn ''opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision
was designed to bring an end to the "s puriou~ " cla!:>S action in which class
mmnb<'r,.; wen• JWI111lt!ed. to int<'rvene n.fter tt derision on the merits
in ordt>r Co ,penn' thP beJJdit:-: of th~Lt· dPrision. Notes of the Advisory
Committe<' on Propo~ed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D . 69, 105-106
(1966) .
17 Liddell 1. Litlun Systnns, lnc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rrjeeting horrowerH' cla~~ action); F'ry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner iH n national bank, and it:; alleged failure to comply with Missi~sippi'3 mterest limits would v10late t.he National Bank Art. 12 U. S.C.
§ 85. But I do not undPr:;tand that the National Bank Act displaces stale
polic) dikhvoring the aggregn,t 1011 of usury rlaim~. A primary purpose of
lha t Act. i:- to prott•C't n;t tiona] bank;; from di:-;rriminatory treatment, or
uudut· pennltJet> that nw~ · bP impo~ed by ~ta.te law. See 12 lJ. S. § 8fi.
lo Tlw Aet provide" that ruk•::- of proc'PClurc promulgated by this Court
"E<ht~H .nol ••. enlarge IH' mod1fy any subtltantive right " 28 U. S. C.
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The Court's concern for puta.tivc class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litiga~
tion of successiw suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of moottless, as the Court seems to have done t.oday. · 'The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
dPnial of class certification in appropriate cireumstance_s.w
District Courts already arc empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questio11s of law. ln many cases, a class-action
defenda11t undoubte>dly would forgo the opportuuity to settle
with an individual plaintiff iu order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certification question on
appeal.
When' a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settleme11t, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene withi11 the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). 'The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
Court mauagemeut of the problem by measures tailored to the
C'on~truction C'o. v. Utah, 414 U . 8. 538,.
557-558 (1974): Devf'lopments in the Law-Class Actions, 8!-l Harv. L.
H,ev . J318, 1358-1;{50 (1976) , See generally Lander:;, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized The-ft: Comnnner Cia"" Actions and the Sub:stnnccPn>cf'dure Dilemma, -!7 S. CaL L. H.eY. 842 ( Hl7 4) .
10
ln C'oovms & Lybrand '. Live8ay, 4:37 U, S. 463 (1978), this Court
held that thfl denial of cla88 eeri ification is not. a "final derision" appealable 3S of right under 2R U. 8 C. § 1291. We relied iu that ca8e on the
danger::; of " wdi~rrimiua.te " iuterlocutory review. ld., at 474. Although
Coopel's & Lyb11and now prevent;; review in cases in which it would be
n{-sirahle, Congre:;~-> mar remedy the problem by appropriate le~islation ..

§ 2072. See Amuimn Pipe &

78-904-DISSEN"!
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

15

case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
defici«:>ncy. 20
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems ofteu
are atteuded by unfortuuate practical consequences of their
OWll. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respond(•nts will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
}mrpose of obtaining class certification. t)ince they can gain
nothing more from the action. their participation in the case
can be intended only to benefit the putative class. Yet theyor their lawyers-serve 011 their ow11 motion. Siuce no court
has certified the class. there has been no cousidered determina'tion that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its
members. ~othing in Rule 23 a.u thorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East 'l'exas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 (1977). Are their currently nouexisten t claims "typical of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a)(3)? 21

°

Congm-s currently ha-" before it a bill that. attempts to rem<'dy the
difficultie:; infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of .Justice, proposes to
bypass thr Rnles Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problem:s of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
lhe enforeement of this right in ~ome instances through actions brought in
the n11111e of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cerfifiration under thE> proposed procedures.
21 ThA Distriet Court properly may conclude on rcmanu that re~pondents,
for theo;e or ot lwr rPa,:on~>, cannot adequately rrpresenl the clast;. Should
intervention lw propo~<·d . the Di:;tncl Court on equitable grounds might well
rduse to toll the Hlatnle of limitations in order to pennit it. ~early nine
2
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The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced settlements." and may even foreclose all settlements, of class
action litigation. See ante, n. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced
by the District Court on remand in this case may uot arise
again in precis<>ly analogous circumstances. But today's result
also authoriz:es appeals by putative class representatives who
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation,
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing
relationship to the putative class than respondents have
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way
intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and
n. 15, supra. These tensions, arisiug from the express terms
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unnecessarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand with instructions to dism:iss the appeal
as moot.
years have pas~:<ed ::;ince this artion was filed and six Rinre the governing
,:uhs!imtivf> "tatuto wa.- anwnded to authorize the challengrd conduct. In
it.~ order dt>n~·iug rertificat ion on September 29, 1975, the Di:strict. Court
:t><:<igur<l as one of it~ ren,:on::; tlu• pm-;,:ible "de:stntction of thC' [petitioner';;]
bank" hy dmHagC's th('Jl allegt>d to total §12,000,000 nnd now potent,ially
augrtwntf'd by thC' aC'crual of interest. App. 47, sN• anti'. at 2, u. 2. The
]>O~siblC' de:struction of J>E't.itioner's bank is irrl:'levaut to thC' cent.ral i:s..~uc of
nwotnl':-<:', bnt, :serious indPecl to dt>po..-.;itor;:;, l::ltockholder:s, and t.be eommunit.y
~;erwd . A;; thi<' Court reliP:s :,;o heavily on its practical and equitable concern,.; for putativr ria~<,.; mrmbt>r,.;, it will hardly be inappropriate for the
])i,.:triet Court ou rl'mand to eon:.;idl•r pmcticalitie:-; and C'quitie:s on both
side,.:. ln the eircumiitan<:Ps pi'C'iiC'Utl'd, thC' District Court may well see no
rrm-on to exC'rri:,:l• it~ Pquitahlr di~C'retiou in favor of putHiivc cla;;s members
who ha\'(' sh·pt on their r·ight,; thc•se mn,ny year:;.
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Robert L, Roper et al.
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MH. Ju::sTIC.I!l PoWELL, with whom MR. Jus'l.'ICE STEWAR'l'
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 'They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class aJleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 milliou. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner theu deposited tlw full amount due with the clerk of the ,court.
No one disputPs that the petitioner has tendered everything that rPspouclcllts could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitiOner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the dcuial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals without identifying the case or
controversy that remains to be litigated between the parties.
1 Juri~di ction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the iutere:;t limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C.

§ 1355.
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'l'he Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but
appealability. But the characterization does not withstand
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to
U·nited States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - ,
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether
putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class certificatiou wheu they can derive no benefit from the relief sought
in the actio11. In this case, as in Geraghty, the District Court
refw:;<:>d to certify a class. Since no one has sought to inter_yene,.;espondents are the ouly plaintiffs arguably present in
~ court.' Yet rt>spondents have no continuing interest in the
2 MR. Ju~TICE S•rEVI,NH :4ale;;:, in hi~ eonrurring opinion, that all pE>rsons
aiiE>gNl to he mPmbrr~ of a putative cia~,; ''automat.Jcally becomE> part.iPs to
tlw ca::;e or eontrovensy for .uw- lJUrJlOt>es" of Art.. Ill, and that they
"n•main partir~ nnt1! a final dE>termination haH been madl' that thE> actiou
may not, he maintainPd a:,; a ela::;::; action" Ante, at --. Thj" uovel
vi('W. for whieh n;, authority iH riled, c·annot bE> recon('ilecl with hulianapoli.~ School Comm'1 '~ v. Jacvb8, 420 U. S. l28 (1975), where an oral
certifi<'atwn onl<•r wa" lwld in~ufticient to idE>Jltify thP intere::;b of abo;eut.
claRH meml)('r,; for Arf IH pmpo:<<':< . Thf' n·::;nlt hardly ('OU!d bE> different,
when thr cia"" lw" not I)P!'ll Iclent.ified nt all. See abo Memphis Light,
Ga.~ & Water Dw v. Cm/l. ~;{(i 0. S. 1, 8 (Hl78): Ba:cte1' v. Palndgiano,
42:{ 1'. S. ;~o~, 310, n. 1 (197H) : Weinstein v. Bmdford. 423 U. S. 147
( 1975) ; J>aswleno City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 (J. S. 424, 430

(lH7(i) .

\\o

ThP propo::,ell rule of :1utornatw pnrty status-in thi::; cnsP for 90,000
unidentified J>er:::ons--ha"' frouble"'ome and far-reaching impliratiom; that
could prP.]nclir(:' the lmnging of elasH a chon::;. Prr:;tmlabl)' a purpo:;E> of
Bneh a rul<' \\'OI!Id h1· to a~"un· that suti~faction of the claim;:; of muned
partiPH \\'Ould not tPrmin:ll!' the ht1gation. Nor eonld 1he right;.; of
nnnnnwd parti<•,.. hr !'Xtingtn"'hrcl b.1· thE> failure of thE> named partie::; t~
o
~
appeal. Till!,;, 11' tlw rulP propoH<·d by MH . .Tu~·rrcg STJWEN~ is to ~
~
··
~ · , I ~nppo:<e that n fidtH'IH ry duty InU>it be impo::;efl upon nam~:,'\.1
~,)

;;z.,.
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InJuries alleged in their complaint. They sou
on dru}k - ]:_}
ages; those damages have been tendered in full Respondents
I
have not suggested that success Oll the certi cation motion
would entitle them to addition11l relief from the petitioner:::---=
Indeed, their personal claims to relief have been abandoned
so complet.ely that no appeal was taken in their own names.
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that

:1J

~~-rontitme

Ut~named

parties
ihe lit.igation where-as here-thfl
parties
retmtin llllidentifiN.! nnd fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the ~/
~~~~mo.;· not. only h<· required to continue t,o litigate, but to assum£> personal m>]Jon.;tbility l'or eost« and attorney's fees if t.he case ultima,tely is
lc~t? Would t·e~pon,;ible litigants be willir1g to file class actions if they
thereb~· n::-::nnnrd such long-term .fiduciary obligations? These f!!t¥letiMts~
suhshmtinL They are not. resolved by Rule 23., ~ I believe they merit
careful ::;tully by Congrr"S before this Court~perhaps unwittingly-creates
It major category of <"lientle~s litigation uniqur in our system.
"tAlth<Htgh rc•::;p<mdPnt.~ also asked for attomey's fees, their complaint
s o s that fees were to be granted only f<om the damages ultimately
awarded to them or the cla;;s. App. 18-H.
He;,pondvnt,; do assert that cHrtification wo~rld <>nable them to reduce the
expen~P of litig;ttron by allocating costs among the members of a prevailing
clas,;. Brief for Hc:>pondt>uts 8:3 . Except for attorney's fees, however,
responclen.ts do not ident.rfy any eosts incurred to date t.hat. are not
covered by the petitioner's tender. Although the record does not reveal
the details of t·he fee nrrangcment between rt>spondents and their lawyers,
the complaint sugge;;tR that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full compensation 25% of the amount recovered from thr petitioner. App. 13-14.
If t.his il:l the agrcrment as to fees, responqen(s have no continuing interest.
Only counsel is concerned whether the recovery is enlarged.
Even if one as::mmcd thai respondenLs' liability to their lawyers could be
reduced by a cla::~s recovery, no one has suggel:lted that petitioner is or ever
will be liable for fer:; tha.t uJt.irrwtely may be owed by respondents. Respondents' JUrifldwtional Utcory appears to be tha.t. the mere possibility of
assertin)r future claims .for a.t.tomey'~:> fres against ot.her members of
putative cla.':i~:> gives rii'P to a ease or controversy aga.inst the class defendant. Snell a th<eory i::~ unprecedented, and its conser)uences are bizarre.
}'or ex~J.mple , rto:spondent~' theory would IWrmit, a prrson to file a class
action, twen though he had previou~:>ly ;tccept.ed full settlement of his individnaJ ela.im on the ground tha.i, the fees incurred in a.nticipa.tion of the•
lit.iga.tion might, 1dtm1a t~ly b~} shal'eti with the cla88.

3

a--

~

·r~-~~
~

_
~ ~

~

'18-904-DISSENT
4

~-

DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK

1J.

ROPER

respotHlents appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly
situated . . . .'' App. 63.
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, 1 believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court require that the ·case be dismissed as moot.
Sec Gerayhty, post, at - - - (PowELL, J., dissenting).
There is no suggestio11 that respondents' claims are "capable H I
of repetition, yet evading review.'' C
· .
, 0 .!:}_j
U. S. 103, 110-111, 11. 11 (1975). And not a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the
nine years smcc this a:ction was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 F. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
ever challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was demed, the action lay clorma11t during the seven
months m which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response fron~ anyone who previously may have thought that the class action would protect
his rights. v\7'e are 110t told what. if anythiug, motivates respondents to contiu ue this crusade on behalf of persons who
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining reC0"9F)' fm themselv~ On its face. this appears simply ~
be a ''lawyer's cas<>.''
DespitP tradition and policy considerations to the contrary,
the Court seems undisturbed that this federal action will be

---

tf; If a cla:;,;-ne1 ion dt>fPIHhmt were ,;howu t.o have embarked on a course
of conclurt. clr,;igned to inHul<tte tlw cla,;s ccrtlfi<'ation issue from appellate
review 111 order to <~VOJd elm.:,.:widc ha.bility, a, court in proper eircumstances
might. find the Oer:;tein tr,;t ~atisfird and thfl case not moot . See Susman v.
Lincoln America11 Co?'p .. 587 F . :2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procrdure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Coutinuatwn and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismi:;sal of the Cia:;::; HepreHentative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
_5'Tlw :\li~~~~~ippi u~ur~· statute wa::; amended in 1974, and it apparently
uow authonzr,; the fl'PS charged by petitioner. 1974 Mis::;. Gen. Laws, ch.
564, § 7: ,.,<'<' }.li H~ . Code Ann. § 7 .~17-1 (6). Thus, tht>re is no question of
prospcet1ve Jehel.
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A
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an
"individual interest" in the litigation without identifying
the iuj ury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this
<•ssentlal inquir-y and relies on the "factual context" of the
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the
trial court entered judgment in their favor over their objection. ld., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal inspires the Court to draw a "critical distinction" between
mootness dPriving from a judgment and mootness resulting
from events extrinsic to the litigation. ld., at 9. The Court
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment has an '!mdividual interest" in exercising his "statutory right to appeal." !d., at 7. If the statutes
and rules goveming "federal appellate practice" confer such
a right, the ( 'ourt 'Coucludes that Art. III requires no more.
Ibid. ; St' f' id., at 12.
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to t~
"formulat[wn l [of] standards ... govern[ing] the appealability of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court determines that
respondeuts are aggrieve<.! by the uenial of certification for two
reasons. First. the certification order is a "procedural ruling,
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation·,'' that "stands as
an aujudicatio11 of one of the issues litigated.'' !d., at 9.
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of
Rule 23. ld., at 10-12.
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it correctly, IS to avoid a direct confrontation with settled principles that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this
do so by lllt'an::; oi a rlas;;, action . Ante. at 10, n. 8. We may assume
that rl.'.:;pondl'nts bad ~oml.' intnrl.'8t. in th<' class-action procedure as a means
uf intPre:-tmg tht>Ir law~·er:-; m the case or obtaining a. satisfactory settlement . Tlu ~ ma~· bt• an interl.'::~t propl.'rly furthered by Rule 23, but once
rr~pondent ::; obtamPd both ac<'e~;:; to court and full indiv1dnal relief that
intf'r~1 fh::;appeared.
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case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction' 1 by
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually
and legally unsound.
B
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at an
intermediate stage of litigation." I d., at 9. Petitioner has
never contended that the controversy became moot merely
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor."
ld., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full
relief has relnedied the respondents' individual injuries and
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authorjty supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review the a.bst.ract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Lamb v. Comm·issioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (per
curiam) ; A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2
89 ( CA5 1965) (per curiam) ·t"
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents iustead of dismissing their

fJ

The Court. makf'~ no effort to dio;t.iugui,;h thest• cases. Yet it concedes
that the "righL to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary
to the litigation of sub"tantive claims,'' and it admits that "the court
retain~ no juri~diction over the controwrsy" when the "substantive claims
become moot in the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If the tender itself
mooted the re~ pondent s' claim~ without rPgard to the entry of judgment,
then t.he Cou r t'~ own analysis reqpire:; ii to. concll.l£l.e that the case is ,
moot.

il l
,91
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awsmt as moot. 1 It, is certainly true, as ' the Court observes,
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7. 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some
adverse effect in order to confer "standiug to appeal." Ibid.;
see Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Electio·n s,- U. S.
App . D. C.-- , 580 F. 2d 695 (H)78). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a continuing controversy between adverse parties at
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v.Iowa, 419 U.S. 393.
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 'G. S. 452, 459, n. 10
(1974) . 1f any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contraveutiou of Art. III, that rule would yield to
the constit.utional command.

c
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp.
v. 'L'hornas & Betts Co. , 307 U.S. 241 (19:39).) But the deci-

~The "~tat11for~·

~nppl~·

right.'' fo appeal it<ielf (·Hnnot.
a prrsonal stake
m ihe outcome, for Congre:-;.: cannot. abrogate Art. III limitations on the
juri~diction of thl' frderal court::>. Gladstone, Healtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. Pl, 100 (1979) .
If) Thr only ot lwr authoritiP:< cited hy t.]w Court are United Ai1'line11. Inc.
v . McDouald, 4:rz 11 . S. 31)5 (1977), and Cooper~ &· Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U. S. 463 (1978). D1ctnm in both ca~es :stated that the denial of class
certification i:; ;mbjf•et t.o appellate review after final judgment a.t the
behl'~t. of the named plaintiffs. Neither ca::;P di:seus::>ed mootnPst>, and
neitfwr anal~· zetl the propo~itwn in any wn~· . lnc!Pecl, the on!~· authority
citrd Ill C'ooper8 c(: Dybrand war; United Airlines. Hec 437 U.S., a.t 469, and
the only a11thont~ · cited in C ruiPd Airlines was a conct'RHiou made br the
defendant aud a [J:-;t of ca:-;f•,-< from tlw Courts of Appeals, none of which
dealt wi1 h <t ~nggetition of mootnl':s~ m an analogous :situation, see 432
U. S., at :{g ;~ . and n . 14-. Rnch :sf a tcment~:>, C'a:sually enunl'iated without a
word of explanation in opmion::; rlralmg with 1mrelatPd legal qne:stions, are

.JJ
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litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are
unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be
represente(l by anyone.r The Court ·also neglects establist1ea
principles of Art. III ,itrisprudence, and remands to the District Court a headless class action that does not meet the
requirements of Rule 23.
II

The Court identifies the question for decision in this case
as "whether respoudents' individual and private case or controversy became moot by reason of the entry of .i udgment in
their favor." ld., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of
third parties, the Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their !'<'presentative responsibilities to the putative classis sufficient to permit their appeal. . . ." I d., at 12. One
might expect tha.t the Court would reason to this conclusion
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action
device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this
action:r-lJ
I do no! ~<ng;gr~t t.hat. rrspondcnt~;' lawyer actof'd improperly in pursuing
thi. casf' Since he has prevailed both in this Court and in the Court
of Appeals, the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation fall8 ou
tl.u:i federal eourtti .
'"fAn~· advantages that ordinarily may flow from "the use of the class
actim1 JHO<'Pdnre for litip;ation of individual elaims," ante, at 10, cannot
acrrur lo tlw~P rrHpondrnt:, who will not be litigating their own clnims
on remand Nor doe~ the Court identify any unrecovered cost of litigation that these re~pondent:s can reduce if they obtain r('lief for a class.
See id., at 10. n. 8 ; n. :{, ~;upra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents
only to pomt out that their total damages were so ~mall that they "would
be unltkcly to obtain legal redrP::l:; a1 an aeceptable ro.~t" if they could not

•

I
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sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not i1~fringed.
Although the alleged infringer wo11 the case, it sought to
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a
judgment . . . in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
review of findings . .. which are not necessary to support the
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by including in the decree itself a ruliug that "purport[ed] to adjudge
the validity of l the patent] .'' Ibid. Since that ruling "was
immaterial to the disposition of the cause," the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited purpose of eliminating
the extran0ous ruling from the decree. Ibid.
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations permitted an appeal. '' Ante, at 8- 9. But Electrical Fittings was
a "live" controversy only because-aud to the limited extent
that-the petitwne1· there asserted a continuing personal stake
ill the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand later explained, the
petitioner in Elect1'1,cal Fittings was iHjurecl in fact because tM-unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161
lf
(CA2 1950); sec In re Tn:rnble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3
__,__ _"""'1"9""7"'3rt)-,.:J This g('uuine prejudice to the petitioner himself

I

not controlling or even prrt'ua:sive when thry nrc shown on further reflection to have been incons1"trnt w1th e:stabhshfd law
Although thP Court of Aptwal~ in Electl'i,caL F1ttings held that collateral e:,topprl would be no bar 10 rrlitigatlon of the validity question, 100
F. 2d 40:~, 404 ( CA2 1938), other l'CHlli.~ had takrn a diff<'rent. view on
~;imilar ii:iiSUP::; of collatPral r;;t-oppeL If the validity finding werr permitted
to :;;tand, t h<> twhtwnPJ' could have bt>eu forced to litigate the question of 1ts
predusivn effpc•J iu future' ras%. Jfl Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra

IJ

•
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supplied Lhe requisite persottal stake in obtaining reformation
of the decree.
Thus, the Comt's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly inconsistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
wn.s told to reform the decree, but expressly forbidden to
consider the merits of the patent validity question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as
the petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years
latet·, Altvater v. F1·eeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a
clecisioJt that had relird on Electrical Fittings in refusing to
consider the merits of an app~al. the Court distinguished
Electrical Fitti.nys as a case iu which the parties sought decision of ''a hypothetical case:'' The appE>al in Altvater, by
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case Ot' controversy"
becautse the parties contiuued to contest a couuterclaim that
had not beett collcluded by the dismissal of the orginal complaint. 319 ("'". S., at 363- a66.
Altvater and l!}lectrical Fittings entirely foreclose the
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practic~
permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliance on Cover Y. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942),
cert. denied , 319 U. S. 74~ ( 1943) , a case in which the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the
constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the out~ The ( 'o urt. of Appeals emphatically declined to asn. 4, §:{902, a.t 4(H (Hii6); lB -:\loon•'::. FPdernl Pmct.ice ~0.443 [5], a.t
~ id., ~~ 203.0(-i, at ilo (1975) .
fJ..Tlw <IJI]Jf'lliiul, Ill CoUI:'l \ . Srhwartz, J:~;l F . 2<1 541 (CA2 1942), ccrt.
denied, 3Hl (' . S. 7-!S (1943) , wu;, the lo~mg l>laintiff in a patent mfriuge3925 tl974J;

/
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sunte jurisdiction over an appeal which sought 11no relief
f against anybody before the court ... but .•. want[ed] an
'1. \ advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
~ ~ Since there was no case or controversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was "without discretion" to hear the
appeal. 1d., at 545.
These cases demonstrate that the requirements of Art. III
do not ehange with the "factual conte~t" in which a suggestion
of mootness arises. See .ante, at 5. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a si11gle question: ls there a continuing controversy between adverse parties? In Electrical Fittings, thj:},__..
coutroversy continued with respect to the single narrow
issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent validity
properiy was included in the decree. But nothing in that
case suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits
of a litigatiou," may be appealed after finaJ judgment because
"policy considerations permi [t_l the appeal" or because the
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."
Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
I~
be app(~aled only when the litigant has a personal stake in the
.,__ _ _r-:-:e-solution of Tiis appea:t.::t In Electrical Fittings, there was
meut a.ction . After the trial eour! fonnd the patent invalid and not
infringed, the plaintifi" took an appeal on the validity question without
contesting the finding of noninfringemenL. By accepting the ,judgment to
that extent,, he lo~t his right to recover from the defendant-and thus his
interest in the litigation.
lJ.rudgP Fnmk wrote for the court.:
"[WI here there i:-l no 'justiciable' dispute, there are no 1merits.' There is
merely an unreal entity resembling that di~embodied smile which Lewis
Caroll immortalized. Many Supreme Court decision~; teach us that appellate jurisdiction , when no justiciable dispute exists on appeal, cannot be
rested upon the recollection that such a dispute previously existed when
the rase was in the trial court.'' 1Ba F . 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted).
See also Kapp v. National F'ootball League, 585 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978); Hall v. U. S. Fiber & Plastics Corp., 476 F. 2d 418, 420 (CA3
1973) ; cf. T.;~• wis v. United States, 216 U. S. 611 (1910) (per oul'iam) .
~The Conl't appearti to rec·ognize thi:; in passing, ante, at 9, n. 7, bnt
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a stake; here there is Jlolle. Since nothing remains of the
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this case.

III
H is clear from the Court's extended discussion of policy
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considerations ever before have influenced this Court in determining
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal
courts. Iu any event, the consequences of a finding of mootness woulrl uot be as severe as the Court predicts.
A findmg of mootiJess would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. 1 bf'lieve that a subsequent
attempL by thaL plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of moot11ess in this situation would
not be uuj ust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted. the absent members of tho putative class would have
obtaiued by force of stare deciS'is or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on tho other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal pennittf'd, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstat·e the "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminatey--:

-

!S}

fail:< to appl) tlw rule to thi:; case. Since the Court suggest:; that respondents' int<'re:;t in the certification ruling d<'rivc~ from the mere fact that it
",.;tandl' a" an ;~djudicntion of one of the issm•s litigated, '' id., at 9, Elecfl·ical Fittings 1t::wlf would limit u~ to the i:;:;uance of an order directing that
thlffens.ive ruling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242.
'
l'l' <'omuwnt . lnunrdwte AppealabJhty of Order:> D0nying Clas.; Crrti <ttJOn , 40 Ohio St L. J. 441 , 4/(J.-.!71 ( 1979) . In actionH brought under·

i8-90~DdSSEN'f

DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

18

Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
j-udgment, as petitioner uid in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general.'' Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of comprnsation and enforcement available for particular substalltivc elaims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, howcvrr. the Court llever pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of__
, 1ry c auns. · the Court's concern for compensation of putative class membt>rs in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst mconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
"----=---"
Act.
/

Rule 23 (b) (3), n rlas~ member must deride at the time of certification
whether to "opt ont" of the aetion under Rule 23 (c) (2) . This provision
ww; df'si!!ned to bring an end to thn "spuriou::;" elm;::; action in which class
mPmber,.; werE" wnmtlrd to lllt<'rvenr after a dceision on the merits
in ordf'r w ,;pcun• t.hr be!J(•fit.~ of t.h:Lt· deciswn. Notes of the Advisory
Committer on Propo::;ed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R.. D. 69, 105-106
(1996).
1 t>Liddell 1 . Utlu11 Systems, hu·., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (n'jr<'ling borrower;-;' ela:;;, action); Pry v. Layton. 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2cl 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bauk, and its alleged failure to comply with Mississippi'::; mten':->t limits would vwlate the Kationall3ank Art. 12 U.S. C.
§ 85. Hut I uo not under~taud that the Narional Bank Act di;;place::; sta-te
policy diHfavoring the ap;grPgnt ion of usury rlaim:s. A primary purpose of
that Act. j,. to prott'c1 national banks from di~rriminatory treatment or
unclut' penaltll'~> that 1w1~· O<' impo~ed by ~ta.tr law. See 12 ll. S. § 86.
llf'J'he Act provtd!'>-~ tba1 rule~ of proredure p1·omulgated hy this Court
"~b~.Jl .nol . •. cula.rge ot· ntOlhfy any sub~tant.iw right." 28 U. S. C.
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Tlw. Court's concern for putat.ivc class members would be
more telling in a. more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administratioll would be real. But these problems can and should
be addresseu by measures short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. · The first ste~)
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
1~
d<•nial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to setne--with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
aml fiual determination of the class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attPmpt to 1noot a class action by
forced settleme11t, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least, some circumstances, it rnay require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
tD the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
Court managemeut of the problem by measures tailored to the
§ 2072. S<'l' Ameril:an Pipe &:

Cou~truction

C'o.

Y.

Utah, 414 U. S. 538,.

557-551\ (1974); DrvrloprrwntH in the L<~w-Cla,.;s Actions, 89 Harv. L.
ltev. I iHH, 1358-135(! ( J97U). See gmerally Lewder;;, Of LegaJizrd Blackmail and LegalizPd Theft: ConHHmer ClHHH Actions and the SubstanceProt(>dure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. HeY. 842 (Hl74) .
"ln C'oopen; & Lybrund \'. Live8ay, 4:37 lT. S. 463 (197c ), thi::; Court
hPid that the deuml of clasH certification is not a ''final decision" appealable
of right under 2H P. S.C. § 12!H. We relied in thaL case on the
daugers of " mdiscrimi11ate'' intf'rlocutory rev1ew. hl., a.t 474. Although
C'oopen; & Lybmnd now prevents l'f'Vll'W in cases in which it would be
Ut"Sirahlr, Congre~~ mar remPdy the prohll'm by appropriate ](>~islation ..

u"
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case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals arc unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-uot this Court-to correct the
y.

Since a court is limited to the decision. of the case before it,
.iudicially fashioned "solutions'' to legislative problems ofteu
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
owtl. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondPnts will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they cau gain
nothing more from the action. their participation iu the case
can be intended only to benefit the putative class. Yet theyor· their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court
...
has certified the class. there has been no considered determination that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its
members. Xothillg in Rule 23 a.uthori~es this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas Motor Freiyht v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical .of the clait~ ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 ( a)(3) ?3?/

fi ~Congrr~s rurrmt ly ha,; bt'forc it a bill that. attempts to remrdy the

'lAJ

difficulties infecting this troubled area.. H . R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of .Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the namr of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certifirntion under thr proposed procedures.
,.trThr Dist'rit·t Court propPrly may conclude on remauclthat re~pondents,
f'or tlw~e or othPr rea~on:; , cannot adequately represent the cia~~:>. Should
intervention br Jlropmwd, the D1stnct Court, on equitable grounds might well
rd\115(' to toll the Ht<~tntt> of limitatwns in order to pt'rmit it. Nearly nine
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rrhe Comt's holding well may prevent futurf' "forced set·
tlemen ts," ami may Pven foreclose all settlemeuts, of class
action litigation. See ante, n. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced •
by the District Court on remand in this case may 110t arise
again in precisPly analogous circumstances. But today's result
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the
order cleuying class certification is reversed in that situation,
tlw named plain tiffs on remand will have no more continuing
relationship to the putative class than respondents have
here. A remand for C£'rtification could also lead tO "one-wal--interveution" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and
n. 15, supra. These tensions, arising from the express terms
of the Rule, undermiue the Court's conclusion that the
policies uuderlyiug Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.
In sum. the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unnecessarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals ~~1<j remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal
as moot.~
yem~

havl' JXIS<:Pd ,.ince this nrtion was filrd ru1cl six f'inre the governing
statute wa;; anwnded to authorizr thr challengrd conduct. In
it..; ordt•r denying rrrtification on September 29, 1975, the Di~trict. Court
a;;~;ignrd ns one of it~ reason:; ill(• poH><ible ''dt>titruction of the Lpetitioner'~]
bank" by damagrK thrn allegPd io iota! §12,000,000 and now potent.ially
uug;mentt'u by tlw aeC'rual of int<•rp~t. App. 47, fW<' antP. at 2, u. Z. The
po;;:;ihl<• t!e~lructiun of pet.itioner':; bank io; irrelevant to the eent.ral i;;..-mc of
moot 11<'1'><, but. :>Priou" ind!;'Pcllo dPpo.~itors , ;,;lockholclers, and thr community
served . A;; thiF< Court n•lic·~ o<o hPavily on its practiral and equitable conrer·n" for putatin• ria;;~ nwmlwr~, it will hnrdly be inappropriate for the
Dif'trid Court ou I'Pll1H1Hl to eonsid<·r practicalitie>< and rquitie~ ou both
sidP~. Jn tht' eirf'um~tan<:P>' pn•srntl:'d, tlw Distrirt C'ourt may well :see uo
l'Pa~on ro exPrri"t' it:; <•quitablP di~cretion in favor of putative cia~~ members
who ha,·c .sl<·pt ou their righl.s the"e many yean;.
~uh><tant.ivf•
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The Court decides that the central issue is not mootness but
appealability. But the characterization does not withstand
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing interest in the
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appeals was powerless
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are some differences, this case is similar to
United States Parole Cornrniss·ion v. Geraghty, post, at - ,
in one important respect: both require us to decide whether
putative class representatives may appeal the de11ial of class certification when they can derive no benefit from the relief sought
in the action. In this case. as in Geraghty, the District Court
refused to certify a class. Since no one has sought to intervene, respoude11ts ar·e the only plaintiffs arguably present in
court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; those damages have been tendered iu fulP Respondents
have not suggested that success on the certification motion
would entitle them to additional relief from the petitioner. 3
Althou!!:h l'<'~pomh•nt;.; also n~ked for attorney',; feeti, their compla.ini
shows that fees were to be granted only fwm the damages ultimately
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14.
3 Hri:'pontlt•nts do fi8~Prt that crrtifirntion would enable them to reduce the
expen::;e of litigation by a.Jioca.t i.ng costs among the members of a prevailing
class. Bri<>f For Het<pondent~ 8:·!. Except for attorney's fet•s, however,
rrspondents do not 1dcnt if~ · mw t·osts incurred t.o daJf~ tha.t are not
covPred by thP petitioner's tender. Although the record docs not reveal
the details of the fee arrangement between respondents and their lawyers,
the complaint sugge~ts that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full compen~ation 25% of the amount l'PCovered from thE' petitiom'r. App. 13-14.
If thi;; is t.br agrrement as to fee:::, respondents have no continuing interest.
On!,,· counsel i;; coneprned whPthrr the recovery is enla.rgrd.
Even if one as~umed that rrspondmts' liability to their law~·ers could be
reduced by t~ elass recovt>ry, no one has suggcstrd tha.t. petitioner is or ever
will be liable for fee" that ult.imatt'l~r may bE' owE'd by respondents. Respondents' jurii:\dietional t.heory appetLrs t.o be tha.L the mere po~ibility of
·2

-
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Indeed. their personal claims to relief have been abandoned
so completely that no appeal was take11 in their own names.
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that
respotH.ieHts appeal only "on behalf of all others similarly
sitm~ted . . . . " App. 63.
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, I believe that Art. III and the precedents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot.
See Geraghty, post, at - - - (POWI<:LL, J., dissenting).
There is no suggC'stion that respo11dents' claims are "capable
of repf'ti tiotl. yet evading review." ('f. Gerstein v. Puyh, 420
U.S. 103, 110-111, 11. 11 (1975).' And not a single one of the
alleged HO,OOO class nwmbers has sought to iut<orvene in the
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. Cnited A1:rtines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 r:. S. 385 (1977). ~or has anyone
ever challengt•d the allegedly usurious charges by informal
complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may havp thought that the class action would protect
his rights. vVe arl-' not told what, if anything, motivates reassert.ing fufltrP !'!aim:-; fot nttornry'::; feeH agnin:'lt otlwr members of a
puta,til'0 C'la.~t- gin~ rt::<e to a ca~e or controven;y aga.inst the cln&'l defendaut. SlH·h a thror~· i,;; unpreet'dc·ulcd, u.nd it~ cou::;equrncc·~ are biza.rre.
For cxmnpll'. rr::;pond('nts' theory would permit, a person to file ;t class
aetion, l'l'eH though he had previOusly accpptrd full ,.;f'ttlement of hiK individual claim, ou tlw ground that. thE:> f<'es incurred m anticipation of the
litigatJOll might ult.imntPly lie t:<hared wit.h the ela,;.~
1 If a C'la~~-al't iou ddPndant werr F<hown to hav<' cmbnrkrd on a cour~
of conduct de::>igurd. to in;-;ula.t r the class crrtificatiou is.~ue from <tpprllate
l'Pview in or<kr to avoid !'laR~wide linbility, a court in proper eircun~tances
might find the Oerstrin tr,;t. ,;;ttisfied and the rH>'l' not moot . Se--e Su..smJJn v.
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CAl 1978) : 13 Wright, .\Jiller &
Coop<'r, Federal Prartice and Procrdure § 35:3:3, ;tt. 171 (Supp. 1979) ;
Comment, f'ont inun t ion and Hepre»entation of Class Aetions ~~ollowing
Dismissal of the Cia~::; ReprP,;entativc, 1074 Duke L. J . .57:3, 599-600.
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spoudents to continuo this crusade on behalf of persons who
for yeat·s have evinced uo interest whatever in obtaining recovery for themsclves.G On its face, this appears simply to
be a "la\\'Yer's case."
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the contrary,
the Court seems undisturbed that this federal action will be
litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are
unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be
represented by anyone.n The Court also neglects established
principles of Art. III jurisprudence, and remands to the District Court a headless class action that does 11ot meet the
requirements of Rule 23.
II
The Court identifies the question fot· decision in this case
as "whether respondents' individual and private case or controversy became moot by reason of the entry of judgment in
their favor. " I d., at 5. Wholly ignoring the fact that
respondents themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of
third parties. the Court concludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representative responsibilities to the putative classis sufficient to permit their appeal. . . ." I d., at 12. One
might expect that the Court would reason to this conclusion
by pinpointing the individual interest on which it purports to
rely. But no such reasoning appears in the Court's opinion.
Although there is some discussion of advantages that generally
may accrue to named plaintiffs from the use of the class-action
"The :\Iio,;i.-sippi u~my statute wa>: umenclrd l1l 1974, and it apparently
now auth01izr::; the fee:-; charged by prtitioner. 1974 Mi~s . Gen . Laws, ch.
564, § 7 ; ::;reMiss. Co<le Ann . § 75- 17-1 (G) . Thus, there i~ no que::;twn of
prosprctive relief.
6 I do not r-;ugg<>:.;L that n'sponclPnt::; ' lawyrr ac1<•d Jill]HOperly in punming
this rase. Sinee be has prevuilf'd Loth in this Court and m the Court
of AJlpeal~, t hl' re:;puusibility for a Ilowing rlieut -le:;:; litigation fall::> on
the federal court~:~.
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device, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these
particular respondents can derive any such benefit from this
action. 7
A
The Court does not explain how it is able to find all
"individual iuterest" in the litigation without identifying
the iuj ury in fact required by Art. III. It simply ignores this
essential inquiry and relies on the "factual context" of the
case: When respondents refused the proffered settlement, the
trial court e11tered judgment in their favor over their objectiOJI. I d., at 6. The single fact of respondents' refusal inspires the Court to draw a "critical distinctiou" between
mootness deriving froin a judgment aud mootuess resulting
from events extrinsic to the litigation. ld., at 9. 'l'he Court
appears to hold that a litigant who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment has an "individual interest" in exercisillg his "statutory right to appeal." I d., at 7. If the statutes
aud rules governing "federal appellate practice" confer such
a right, the Court concludes that Art. lii requires no more.
Ibid.; see 'id., at 12.
Having shifted the inquiry from Art. III mootness to the
7 Auy advnntagt•o: tha1 ordinarily may flow from "the u,.;t> of the class
artion proct>dure for litiga.t ion of individual claimH," ante, at 10, cannot
accrue to lhes<' re::>pondcnts who will not b~ litigating their own claims
on remancl. Nor does the Court identify any unrecovered cost of litigation that these respondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class.
S1'e id., at 10, n . 8; n. 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refer:; to re:>pondents
only to point out that their total damage;.; were ~;o small that they "would
be unlikely to obtain l!>gal redress at an aceeptable cost" if they could not
do so by nwans ol' a class action . Ante, at 10, n. 8. We may a::;sume
that respondents had some interest in the class-action procedure as a means
of interrc;ting their lawyerl'! in the ca.~e or obtaining a. &~tisfactory settlement, This may bn an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once
respondents obtained both access to eourt aud full individual relief that
interest disappeared.
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"'formu]at[ion] [of] standards ... gqvern[ing] tlie appealability of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court deter~nines that
respondents arc aggrieved by the denial of certification for twq
reasons. First, the certification order is a "procedural ruling,
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." ld., at 9.
Second, the contrary result would frustrate the goals of
Rule 23. ld., at 10-i2.
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I understand it correctly, is to avoid a direct confrontation with settled principles that unambiguously dictate a finding of mootness in this
case. But the Court cannot escape the impact of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the respondents' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The "critical distinction" by
which it attempts to justify its failure to do so is both factually
and legally unsound.
B
As a matter of fact, there is substantial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judgment in favor of a party at a11:
intermediate stage of litigation," I d., at 9. Petitioner has
i10ver contended that the controversy became moot merely
"by reason of the entry of judgment in [respondents'] favor. "
l d., at 5. Instead, petitioner argues that its tender of full
relief has remedied the respondents' individual injuries anq
thus eliminated their stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority supports petitioner's contention that the tender itself
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, among others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. Scm Pablo & Tulare
_R. Co., 149 'C. S. 308, 313-314 ( 1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas
Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam);
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (pef
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curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d
89 (CA5 1965) (per c·uriam).8
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their
lawsuit as moot. 9 lt is certainly true, as the Court observes,
that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have required a showing of some
adverse effect iu order to confer "standing to appeal." Ibid.;
see Barry . District of Colurnbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C. - , 580 F. 2d 695 ( 1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a coutin uing controversy between adverse parties at
all stages of the litigation. E. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contravention of Art. III, that rule would yield to
the constitutional command.

c
The Court relies almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp.
8 The Court makPH no pffort to distingui::;h the::;r eases.
Yet it concedes
that the '·right to employ Rule 2:3" is a "procedural right only, ancillary
to the litigation of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court
retains no jurisdictwn over the controversy" when the "substantive claims
become moot in the Art.. III sense." Ante. at 6. If the tender itself
mooted the respondents' claimR without regard to the entry of judgment,
then the Conrt's own analysis require:! it to conclude that the case is
moot.
o The "~tatutory right'' to appeal it::<df cannot supply a pen;onal ;;take
m tht> out l'Ome, for Congre:;;s cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the
jnri::;dietion of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-

wood, 441 U.S. !H, 100 (1979),
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v. Thonw,s & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939). 10 But the decision simply reaffirms our obligation not to review judgments
by which no individual is aggrieved. The trial court there
had entPred a decree holding a pateut valid but not infringed.
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought to
appral the finding that the patent was valid. This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue of patent validity after the trial court found
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appeal from a
judgment . . . in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a
review of findings ... which are not necessary to support the
decree." !d., at 242. But the trial court had erred by including in the decree itself a ruling that "purport[ed] to adjudge
the validity of [the patent]." Ibid. Since that ruling "was
immaterial to th<' disposition of the cause," the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limitf'd purpose of eliminating
the extraneous ruling from thf' decree. Ibid.
The Court reads Electrical Fittings as a case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because policy considerations permitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. But Electrical Fittings was
a "live" controversy only because-and to the limited extent
that-the pE>titioner there asserted a continuing personal sta.ke
in the outcome. As Judge Learned Hand later explained, the
10 The on!~· otht•r· authorilirs ritetl hy the Courf 11re United Airliue11, Inc.
v. McDonald. 4a:Z F. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,

437 U.S. 463 (1978). Dictum in both ca~€'R stated that the denial oJ class
C€'rtificaf ion 1:,; fntbjrrt. to appellate review aff er final judgment :Lt the
behe~t. of ihe named plaintiffs. Neither ease disc·us~ed mootnesR, and
neithrr a nalyzed thr proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority
cited in Coopers & Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469, a.nd
i he on!~· authority rited in United Airlines was a concession made b~' the
defendant and a list of case;; from thr Courts of Appeal~, none of which
dealt with a. :suggestion of mootness in an analogou~ Rituat10n, see 432
U. S., at 393, ami n. 14. Such statemrnti", casually enunciated without a.
word of rxplanation m opi11ions deahng with um·€'laird le!!;al questions, are
not controllin!!: or even persnasJve when they are shown on further reftec- ·
tion to have bern inconsisLent with el'tnblished law.
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petitioner in Electrical Fittings was injured in fact because the
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F. 2d 158, 161
(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 103, 111 (CA3
Hl73). 11 This genuine prejudice to the petitioner himself
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtaining reformation
of the drcree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittings is plainly inconsistent with the holding of that case. The Court of Appeals
was told to reform the decree. but expressly forbidden to
considet' the merits of the patent validity question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdiction was only as broad as
t,l1c petitioner's personal stake in the appeal. Just four years
later, Altvater v. Free'man, 319 U. S. 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constitutionally based. Reversing a
decision that had relied on Electrical Fittings in refusing to
considE'r the merits of an appeal, the Court distinguished
Electrical Ji'itt'i?tgs as a case in which the parties sougqt decision of "a hypothetical case." The appeal in Altvater, by
contrast, satisfied "the requirements of case or controversy"
because the parties coutinued to contest a counterclaim that
had not been concluded by the dismissal of the orginal complaint. 319 U. S.. at 363-366.
Altvater and Electrical Fittings entirely foreclose the
Court's argument that a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of his appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court merely because policy-based "rules of practice"
11 Altho11gh the Cour1. of AppealH in Electr-ical F!ttings hrld ihat collateral estoppel would be no bar to relitigation of the validity question, 100
F. 2d ·!03, 404 (CA2 19:38), other courts had taken a different view on
similar issue;; of collateral estoppel. If the validity fiuding were permitted
to stand, the petitioner could have beeu forced to litigate the 4uestion of its
preclusive effecL ii1 future cases. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra
n. 4, § 3902, llt· 40:l (19i6); lB Moore'::; FE>deral Practice ,ro.4.43 L5], at
3925 (19i4); 9 id., ft 203.06, at 716 (1975),
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permit him to do so. Any doubt is dispelled by Altvater's
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 ( 1942),
cert. denied. 319 U. S. 748 ( 1943), a case in whiph the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at length the
constitutional limits on appe1late jurisdiction. 319 U. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the petitioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sought to appeal
from a judgment that had eliminated his stake in the outcomc.12 TIH' Court of Appeals emphatically declined to assume jurisdiction over an appeal which sought "no relief
against anybody before the court ... but ... want[ed] an
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] valid." 133 F. 2d, at
554. 13 Sine<' there was no case or controversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was 11 without discretion" to hear the
appeal. /d., at 545.
These cases clemonstrate that the requirements of Art. III
do not change with the "fn.c(,ual cont-ext" in which a suggestion
of mootness arises. See a.n te, at 5. v\lhatever the context,
Art. TIT asks but a single question: Is thet·c a continuing controversy betwcPn adverse parties? In Electrical Fittings, the
1 ~ Tlw apJwllant in rover \'. 8d11cartz, 133 F. 2d .54J (CA2 1942), <'!'rt.
denied, 3Hl 1'. S. 'i4.R (l94:l), wa:; the loHing plaintiff in a pateni infringement arfion. Aflpr the trial conrt found the patent. ir1valid and not
infringed, the plaintJir took an appeal on the validity que:;tion without
contesting the fiudinp: of nouinfrinp:ement. B)· accepting the judgment to
thaL extent, ht> lo>;t hi" right to recover from the defendant-and thus his
intere;t in the litigation.
l3 Judg!' Frnnk wrotr for the court:
"[vYlhere there iH no '.iu~tiriable' dispute, t.here are no 'merits.' There is
mere!~· raJ unrral entity re~embling thai di~ernbodied smile which Lewis
Ca.roll immnrtaliz!'d. :\(nn~· SuprPme Comt derisions teach us that appellate juri~diction, whrn no jtllstiriable di;;putl' exi~ts on appeal, cannot be
rested 11pon the rrrollection that such a dispute previously existed when
the C!\.'5<.' was in the tnal r·ourt." 133 F. 2d, nt 551 (footnotPS mmttecl).
See also Kapp v. National Football League. 586 F. 2cl 644, 650 (CA9
1978); Hall v. U. 8. Piber & Plastics ro1·p., 476 F . 2d 418, 420 (CA3.
197-3); cf. Lewis v. Cnited States, 216 U. S 6ll (19W) (per cunam} .
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controvrrsy coJJtinued with respect to the single narrow
issue whether the District Court's ruling on patent validity
properly was included iu the decree. But nothing in that
case suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral to the merits
of a litigation," may be appealed after final judgment because
"policy considerations permi [t] the appeal" or because the
ruling "stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated."
.Ante, at 8-9. Such collateral rulings-like other rulings-may
be appealed only when the litigant has a personal stake in the
resolution of his appeal.U Iu Electrical Fittings, there was
a stake; here there is 11011e. Since nothing remains of the
case or controversy, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this case.

III
It is cleal' from the Court's extended discussion of policy
and practical considerations, ante, at 10-12, that these weighed
heavily in its decision. I am not aware that such considerations evet· before have influenced this Court in determining
whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal
courts. [n any event. the consequences of a finding of mootness would not be as severe as the Court predicts.
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness i11 this situatiou would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
11 TIH' Comt appraro< to rrrogniz<' thi~ in pa,.'Sing, ante. at 9, n. 7, but
fails to apply the rule to thi,; casr. Sinre the Court :mggl:'::lts that respondents' intere::~t in the rertification ruling dt>rives from thr mPre fact that 1t
":-;tands as an adjudieation of one of the i::;sues litigt~ted," id., at 9, Electrical Fittings it~elf would limit us to the isi:iuancc of an order directing that
lhe offensive ntling be expunged from the record. 307 U. S., at 242.
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granteu, the absent members of the putative class woukl hay~
obtainl."d by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
tht: benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class member§l to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the ''one-way intervention" that
the 1966 anwndments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate. 15
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judg111ent, as petitioner did in this ·case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic il).
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 10-11. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade=
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim,
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
1 " See Commvut, Immediate Ap,walability of Order~ Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under
Rnle 23 (b) (:3) , a class member must decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2) . This provision
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were permitted to inU>rvene after a decision on the inerits
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Kotes of the Advisory
C,ommittee on Proposed Anlendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 1os-:1m"i

('19~6).
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usury claims/ 0 the Court's concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act. 17
The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should
be addressed by measures short of rewriting the law of mootness, as the Court seellls to have done today. The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
dPnial of class certification in appropriate circumstances. 18
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. ~ 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they iuvolve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
IG Liddell v. Litton Systems, Tnc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrower;;' class adion); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mississippi'3 interest limit d would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S.C.
§ 85. But I do uot uttdenstand that the National Bank Act di,;places state
polil'y rlisfavoring the nggrrgrltion of u~ury claim::;. A primary purpose of
that Act i>~ lo protrct 11ational banks from di,;criminatory trt•atment or
undue pcmdtic~ that may be imposl'<i by ;;tate law . See 12 U. S. § 86.
17 Thr Acl provide,; that rules of procedure promulgated by 1his Court
"shall not .. . enlarge or modify any substantive right ." 28 U. S. C.
§ 2072 . See American Pipe & Coustruction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974): Developmrnts in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landeril, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalizrd Theft: Consumer Clas~ Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemmrt, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974).
1 8Jn Coo pets & Lybrand ' . Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), t hi,; Court
held th<tt tho dPnial of clnss certification is noL a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 F . S. C. § 1291. We relied in that CilSe on the
dangers of "indi~crimimtte" interlocutory review. !d., at 474. Although
Coopers & Lyb1Jand now prevents review in cases in which it would be
desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation ..
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defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaiutiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certification questiori' on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least, some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
Court managemellt of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress--not this Court--to correct the
deficiellCy.1 n
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" "to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
can be intended only to benefit the putative class. Yet theyor their lawyers-serve on their own motion. Since no court

°Congress rnrrently has before it a bill tha1·. attempts to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra. and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace claes . cer~
· tification under the proposed :procedures,
1
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has certified the class, there has been no considered determination that respoudents will fairly and adeq~ately represent its
members. N' othing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Te·:ras Motor Freight Y. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 (1977). Arc their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the class'' within the meaning of Rule
23 (a) (3) '? 20
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced settlements." ano may even foreclose all settlements, of class
action litigatio11. See ante, n. 5. Thus, the difficulties faced
by the District Court on remand in this case may not arise
again in precisely analogous circumstaiJees. But today's result
also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who
have prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the
order denying class certificatiou is reversecl in that situation,
the named plaiHtiffs on remand will have no more conti1ming
relationship to the putative class than responclents have
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way
20 The District Court proper!~· ma~· concludr ou remand that rc::;pondents,
for theo:f' or otht•J' rea~ons, cannot adf'quately represent the elasH . Should
intervention be propo~ed . the District Court on equitable ground::; might. well
rpfu:se to toll tlH• Hhllutc of limitations in order to pE'rmit it . Nearl~· nine
yenrs have p:.t~:;sed since> t.hi1> action was filed and :,;ix since the governing
substantive Htatute was amended to authorize the challenged conduct. In
it<> order denying Cl•rtifira.tion on Sc•ptember 29, 1975, the Di::;trict. Court
a.~:signed as one of it>< rea><on,.; tl1e possible '·destruction of the Lpetitioner':;,]
bank" by damages then alleged to tot<d §12,000,000 unu llOW potentially
augmented by the uecrual of inten'St. App . 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2 .' The
pos,.ible dE-struction of petitioner's bank is irreleva,nt to the CE'nt.ral i,;.sue of
mootness, but. seriou:s ind('eu to depositors, ::;tocklwlder:s, and t.he community
served. As thi:s Court reli<':s ::;o heavily on its practical and equitable concern,; for putative cia~~ member~<, it will hardly be inappropriate for the
District Court on rPmand to eon:sidcr pmcticalitie::; and equitieH on both
sidr~ . In the rircmnstancr,- prP:<Pnted, the District Court lll<~Y well ~ee no
reason to exercise it~ equitable di,.;cretion iu favor of putative da;,;:s members·
wlio· have slept ou their right::; th(':sc many years.
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intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11-12, and
n. 15, supra. These tensions, arising from the express terms
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. It also unnecessarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal
as moot. 21
~ 1 "\frt . .Tlffi'l'lCE Sn:n:NR

Rtatrs, in his eonrurring opinion, tha.t all pf'rsons
to lH' nwmiJ<·r~ of a putative <·la~~ " antomatie;tll~· be<·unt<' parties
to thl' ea:'<' or c·ontron•r:-;~· for pnrpo~e"" of Art. 111 , and that llwy
"rrmniu partir:< until a final dPtrrmination ha" bE•Pn made that the action
may not. bP mnintaim·cl as a clus" adion." Ante, at - . Thi~ novel
viPw, for which no authority i::; cited, cannot be rf'ronciled with Indianapolis School C'omm'1 1s v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 12R (1975), where an oral
certifieation oniPr wa" hrld insufficiPnt to idrntify the intere::;t,; of absent
clasK nwmbf'r,; for Art. III purpo:-;e". Thr result. hardly could be difff'rent
when th<• cia"" lw;; not. bern idPnt.ifi<>d at. all. Ser al><o Memp!ti~ Light,
Gas & WatPr Dill . \'. Craft. 426 U. S. I, 8 (1078) ; Baxter v. Pahnigia:no,
4~2 F. S. :30R, ;no, n. 1 (19i6): Weinstein v. Bradford. 42:{ U. S. 147
(19i5); Pa~>adeno, City Board of Bducation v. Spangler, 4::!7 U.S. 424, 430
(19i6).
The propn~<<>d rulr of automatic pa.rty Rtatu"-in this case for 90,000
unidPntifiNl per~on,;--ha~ troubl<:>::;ouw and far-reaching implications tl1at
could prejuclire t hr bringing of clas::; action:;. Pre,;umably H purpo~e of
such a rulfl wonlcl be to a:<surc that satisfaction of the claim::; of named
partie;; would noL t.Prrninntr the litigation . Nor could the rights of
unn:.uned parties br Pxtingui~hed by the failun' of the named parties to
ilpJwal. Thu:s, if tlw rnlr proposed by :VIJt. ,lliH'l'lCI" Sn~mN<~ i:s to aeeompli~h its pnq>o"<··, 1 "uppo:-;P that a fiduciary duty mu::;t be impo;;ed upon
namrd p:trtie,.; 10 <·ontinm' the litigation wlwre--a~ lwrr--th<· tuuwmed
pnrti<•,- l'<'lllHin unidPntifir<l nnd fail to int<•rvrue. As fidu<'iari<•o;, would the
nanwd JlHrtiP>< not onl~· br required to contillU<' to litigate, but to a;;sumc
]>N:sonal n'i<JHmsibility for eo,:ts an<l attorney';; fee:-; if the ca~<e ultimnlt'ly is
lost? Would rri<pon:,;iblP litigants be willing to file rla::;.~ action,; if they
ther!'l>y a~~umcd :-;uch lollg-tC'rm fiduciary obligation~? Tht\,;c aud like
nliP~tNI
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quc•:stion:;: are flubstantial. They arc not resolved by Rule 23. I bdieve
thPy m!:'rit, c-arrfnl stndy by Congres-; before this Court-jwrhaps unwittingl~·-l'reatc. · a major category of clientless litigation unique in our

sytlt.cm.
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Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Hobert L . Roper et al.
Circuit.
[February 7 , 1980]
Mn. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART l
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the,
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this.
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the clerk of the ·court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respomlents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification._ jMi1s CZU · a rmS1'!lej
:merit of thyCourt of Appea1s without · entifying the e or
controve~ that remains to be liti
eel between th parties.
Jurisdictiou was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state lawl and 28 U. S. C.
§ 1355.
1
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The Court decldes tfia:t the central issue 1s
appealability. But the characterization does
analysis. Since respondents lack a continuing
outcome of the litigation, the Court of Appea
to hear their appeal. Accordingly, I dissen

moutness but
ot withstand
nterest in the
was powerless

I.
is case is -similar to
,
in one important respect: both reqr.;i us to decide whether
putative class representatives may ap al the denial of class certification when they can derive no be efit fror_n the relief sought
in the action. In this case, as in G rayhty, the District Court
refused to certify a class. Since 10 one has sought to intervene, respondents are the only aintiffs arguably present in
court. Yet respondents have o continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their comp int. They sought only damages; those damages have bee1 tendered in fuiP Respondents
have not suggested that su cess on the certification motion
would entitle them to add'f'tional relief from ihe petitioner. 3
Although there are some differences,

United States Parole Cornrnission v.

eraghty, post, at -

2 Although rPSpondPnl.~ al8oh ;;kf.d for ''t1oruey's fee~. their comJJbint
shows that fees were to be ,franted only fwm the damages ultimately
awarded to them or tlw clas
App. 13-14.
8 HE',;pondPnt:; do assert tl at certification would enable them lo reduce the
expem;e of litigation by aJ eating co:>ts among the members of a prevailing
class. Brif'f for Re.,.pon ent;; 33. Except for attorney's fePs, however,
resf>ondents do not. id tify any costs incurred to date that, are not
f!Overed by the petiti er's tender. Although the record does not reveal
the details of the fee rrangernent bet ween respondents and their lawyers,
the complaim sugg ts that the lawyers have agreed to accept as full compensation 25% of e amount, recovered from the petitioner. App. 13-14.
If thit> is thr agr emE>nt as to fees, respondents have no continuing interest.
Onl~' coun;;el i.· coneemed whrthf'r thE> recovery is enlarged .
Even if or as;;umed that rrspondents' liability to their lawyers could be
reduced by class recovf'ry, no one has suggested that petitioner is or ever
will be · lr for fees that ult.imatdy may be owed by respondent<;. Respond ts' juri..,dictiomtl theory itfJpea,rs to be thnL the mere po!:>Sibility of

,-

==~~
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In'tleeci. their personal claims to relief have been ~bcloned
so complet-ely that no appeal was takeil in their ow ames.
The notice of appeal filed with the District Court cites that
respondents appeal ouly "on behalf of all others similarly
situated ... ." App. 63.
Since respondents have no continuing pe onal stake in the
outcome of this action , I believe that Ar . III ancj. the precee dismissed as moot.
dents of this Court require that the 'C
See Geraghty, post, at - - OWELL, J ... disseuting).
There is no suggestion that respo Bents' claims are "capable
of repetition. yet evading revie . ' Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 110- 111, n. 11 (197
And not a single one of the
alleged 90.000 class memb s has sought to intervene in the
nine years since this a;c · n was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. .ilfcDonald, 43 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
ever challenged the llegedly usurious charges by infonnal
complaiut or prote . Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifieation was deni~ , the action lay dormant during the seven
months in whtef1 respondents sought to take au interlocutory
appeal, with ut provoking a response from anyone who previously ma,y have thought that the class action would protect
his right . We are not told what, if anything, motivates reassert.iu future <'laims for attorney's fees against other members of a
pu!;atf e cia.~::; gives rise to a case or cont,roversy (lgainst the class defendaut. Such a theory is tt1111reredented, and it~ consequences a,re bizarre.
Ff. example, respondents' theory would pennit. a person to file a class
·tion, oven t.hough he had previously accepted full settlement of hiH ini:lividuaJ claim. on the ground Jll.<tt..tbe. fet~S in&wred in n:nttr-ipa:tion of the
· ·
·
·
~tld'ed ~i"" the-e
4 If a class-ac·tion defendant were shown to have embarked on a course j
of conduct designrd to int>ulato the class certification is.··me from appellate /
review iu order ({> 'woid ela,<.;::;wide liability, a court in proper cirClmllitances
might..find the Gerstein test ~;~at isfied and the ca::;e not. moot. See S'U...sman v.
Lincoln American Corp., 581 F . 2d 866 (CA7 1978) ; 13 Wright, Miller & ~
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3.533, at 171 (Supp. 1979) ;
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions .Following
Dismissal of the C las~; Repmsentativc, 1974 Duke L. J . .57:3, 599-600.

M.w
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spoodentS' to continue this crusade on behalf of persons who
for years have evinced no interest whatever in obtaining recovery for themselves.ij On its face, this appears simply )
be a "lawyer's case."
Despite tradition and policy considerations to the coutrary,
the Court seems u11disturbed that this federal actio will be
litigated on remand by a lawyer whose only "clients" are
unidentified class members who have shown. n · esire to be
represented by anyone. 0 The Court also negl ts established
principles of Art. III jurisprudence, and rer nds to the District Court a headless class action that oes not meet the
requirements of Rule 23.
II
The Court identifies the questio for decision in this case
as "whether respondents' indivi<j,wal and pri~ate case or controversy became moot by reason' of the entry of judgment in
their favor." ld., at 5. .:Wholly ignoring the fact that
res1londeuts themselves elected to appeal only on behalf of
thircl parties. the Court c6ucludes that "respondents' individual
interest in the litigation-as distinguished from whatever may
be their representj.a{ive responsibilities to the putative classis sufficient to (errnit their appeal. . . .'' ld., at 12. One
might expec~ hat the Court would reason to this conclusion
by pinpoi mg the individual interest on which 1t purports to
rely. .:Silt no such reasouing appears in the Court's opinion.
Altb<iugh there is some discussion of advantages that generally
accrue toJla.roed plaintiff&. from the use df t'h~ class-action

y

't; 1 hf:' SII~:iiO:><ljl]li mmry statl'i't'e wa" anwnClecf IU 191{, an<Tit !LJ1pare~
now authorize::; the f~ charged by pPtitioner. 1974 Mist>. Ge11. Laws, ch.
564, § 7 ; ~ 1\Ji::;s. Code Ann § 75-17-1 (6 . 'fh 1s, there IS no question of
prospective rehef.
6 I clo not ~:mgg(•,;t rha.i ~-cWnts~..htw~ actl.'t!Jmproperly in pursuing
t.his cru;e. S.in<'t" l1 t ha~· prevailed both in this Court and m the Court
of Appca1~, tlw re:;pousibility for allowing client-le::;R litigation falll:l ou
the federal collrto.

--------~------~
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de~ice, the Court never attempts to ascertain whether these
particular respondents can derive any such benefit f. o7 this
M~~

.

.

A
The Court does not explain how it is able to find an.
"individual interest" in the litigatiori with ~t identifying
the injury in fact required by Art. III. It imply ignores this
essential inquiry and relies on the "fac al context" of the
case: When respondents refused the pf(>ft'ered settlement, the
tr-ial court e11tered judgment in thei favor over their objectiou. ld., at 6. The single fact . f respondents' refusal inspires the Court to draw a " itical distinction" between
m.ootness deriving from a ju nent and mootness resulting
from events extrinsic to the . igation. ld., at 9. rrhe Court
appears to hold that a liti nt who attempts to appeal from
a favorable judgment h an "individual interest" in exercisillg his "statutory right
appeal." ld., at 7. If the statutes
and rules governing "f tleral appellate practice" confer such
a right, the Court co ludes that Art. III requires no more.
Ibid.; see id., at 12.
Having shifted tl6'e inquiry from Art. III mootness to the
7 Auy advantage'S hat. ordinarily may flow from " the uo>e of the class
artion procedure flj litigation of individual claims," ante, at 10, cannot
accrue to these r ::;pondents who will not b3 litigating their own claims
on remand . Nq~ does the Court identify any unrecovered cost of ljtigal;ion that thes respondents can reduce if they obtain relief for a class.
Sre id., at IQj n . 8; n . 3, supra. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents
only to poipl; out that their total damages were so small that they "would
be unlikeJ.t to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not
flo so b ' means of a class action . Ante, at 10, n . 8. We may assume
that re$}>ondents had some interest. in the class-action procedure as a means
of int rc::;ting their lawyers in the case or obtaining a t'a.t.isfactory settlement,. This may br. an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once
·e.iief thilt..
respon
'" obtained both accesr; to eom:t a~1d full 'n ·
interest disappea·
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;'formu]atlion J [of] standards . . ~oyeru [ing1toa.a.ppealabil...
ity of procedural rulings," ibid., the Court deteqnines that
respondents are aggrieved by the denial of certification for twq
reasons. First, t~e certification order is a "procedural rul'
collateral to the merits of [the] litigation," that "stal)ili! as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." I ., at 9.
Second, the contrary result would frustrate th goals of
Rule 23. Id., at 10-i2.
The effect of the Court's analysis, if I und
rectly, is to avoid a direct confrontation wit settled principles that unambiguously dictate a finding o mootness in this
case. But the Court cannot escape the imr, ct of these authorities simply by refusing to consider the espondents' evident
lack of interest in the outcome. The " ritical distinction" by
which it attempts to justify its failure o do so is both factually
and legally unsound.

7

As a matter of fact, there is s st~ntial doubt that this case
involves the effect of "a judg1 ent in favor of a party at a~
intermediate stage of litigat' n," I d., at 9. Petitioner has
i10ver conteuded that the ontroversy became moot merely
"by reason of the entry o judgment in [respondents'] favor. "
l d. , at 5. Instead, p tioner argues that its tender of full
relief has remedied 1e respondents' individual injuries anq
thus eliminated t ir stake in the outcome. Considerable
authority suppor petitioner's contention that the tender itself
moots the case hether or not a judgment is entered. This
Court, amon others, has held that a federal court is powerless
to review · e abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff as refused to accept a proffered settlement that
fully satisfies his claims. California v. San Pablo & Tulare
U . S. 308, 313- 314 ( 1893) ; Drs. Hill & 'IiLD· ~!I--R. C .
Co. v. United States, 392 F . 2d 204 ( A~ 968) ( per curiam) ;
Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F . 2d 157 (CA2 1968) (p er
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trt; ""''"~ ~ f4.<.
• lflten Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 . 2d
89 (CA5 1965) (per curiarn).8
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has ellltered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of ~ismissing their
lawsuit as moot. 0 It is certainly true, as tJ._e Court observes,
that the entry of judgment in favor of party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. Ther never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those spects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him ad rsely. See 15 Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practi and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Pract" e ~· 203.06 (1975). But
federal courts uniformly have r uired a showing of some
adverse effect in order to confer' standing to appeal. '' Ibid.;
see Barry v. District of Colurn a Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C.-·-, 580 F. 2d 695 (1978). Indeed, Art. III itself
requires a continuing contra ersy between adverse parties at
all stages of the litigation.
. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 (1975); Steffel v. T rnpson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10
(1974) . If any statute or rule purported to authorize an
appeal in contraventio of Art. III, that rule would yield to
the constitutional co
and.

c
almost entirely on Electrical Fittings Corp.
8 The Court ma

no pffort to dii:itinguish the::;e easelS. Yet it concedes
that the "right t employ Rule 23" is a "procedural right only, ancillary
to the litigatio of substantive claims," and it admits that "the court
retains no juri iction over the controversy" when the "substantive claims
become moo in the Art. III sense." Ante, at 6. If the tender itself
mooted the espondents' claims without regard to the entry of judgment,
then the ourt's own analysis requires it to conclude that the case is
"::;tatutory right '' to appeal itself cannot supply a personal stake
m t
outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III limitations on the
jn sdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realt01'1$ v. Village o B(Lffe,
ood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)
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&Betts Co., 307 U. 8:..241 (1939). 10 · But· the deci}
sion simply reaffirms our obligation not to review JU gments
by which no individual is aggrieved. The triaJ court there /
had entered a decree holding a patent valid but not infringed.
Although the alleged infringer won the case, it sought
appeal the finding that the patent was valid. This Court
held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to,lconsider the issue of patent validity after the t.rial court found
no infringement, because "[a] party may not appea) from a
judgment . . . in his favor, for the purpose of oblaining a
review of findings . . . which are not necessary ~o pport the
decree." I d., at 242. But the trial court had err by inch.Jding in the decree itself a ruling that "purport[ e to adjudge
the validity of [the patent]." Ibid. Since t t ruling "was
immaterial to the disposition of the cause the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction for the limited pur se of eliminating
the extraneous ruling from the decree. I fl.
The Court reads Electrical Fitt·ings as case that was "still
live" in the Art. III sense "because po · y considerations permitted an appeal." Ante, at 8-9. B Electrical Fittings was
a "live" controversy only because
d to the limited extent
that-the petitioner there asserte
continuing personal stake
in the outcome. As Judge Lear d Hand later explained, the
Hl The only othrr authorities cite
y the Court are United Ai1·lines, Inc.
v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (19zf), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463 (1978). Dictum both cases stated that the denial of class
certification . is subject to. a~llate ~eview after . final judgment at the
behest of t.he named plar ·tiffs. Neither case cbscussed mootness, and
neither nnalyzed the prol ·ition in any way. Indeed, the only authority
cited in Coopers & Ly~ljind was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469, and
the only authority cit ([ in United Airlines was tt concession made by the
defendant and a lis 1of cases from the Courts of Appeals, none of which
dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an ana.logous situation, see 432
U. S., at 393, alfd n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without, a
word of expla,llation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are
not controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further .x.efiec·
tion to have been ineMsist,eilt w'ith estltblished. law.
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petlttmm1"1Trlmfctrz.caT F£'ttings was mjured in fact because he
unnecessary ruling that the patent was valid could have
created "some presumptive prejudice" against him in a future
case. Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F . 2cl 158, 161
(CA2 1950); see In re Trimble Co., 479 F. 2d 10 , 111 (CA3
1973) .11 This genuine prejudice to the peti · ner himself
supplied the requisite personal stake in obtain" g reformation
of the decree.
Thus, the Court's view of Electrical Fittin sis plainly inconsistent with the holding of that case. T Court of Appeals
was told to reform the decree. but ex ressly forbidden to
considN the merits of the patent validi question. In other
words, the court's appellate jurisdictio was only as broad as
the petitioner's personal stake in the ppeal. Just four years
later, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. . 359 (1943), explained
that the limitation was constituti ally based. Reversing a
decision that had relied on Elec ·cal Fittings in refusing to
consider the merits of an ap . al, the Court distinguished
Electrical Fittings as a case in hich the parties sougqt deciThe appeal in Altvater, by
sion of "a hypothetical cas
contrast, satisfied "the req ements of case or controversy"
because the parties contin ed to contest a counterclaim that
had not been concluded y the dismissal of the orginal complaint. 319 U. S., at 3-366.
Altvater and Ele rical Fittings entirely foreclose the
Court's argument t t a party who has no personal stake in
the outcome of hi appeal may invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court mer y because policy-based "rules of practice' ~
11 Alt.hough the
ourt of Appeal~ in Electrical Fittings held that collatC'ral estoppel w Id bt> no bar to relitigation of tpe validity question, 100
F . 2d 403, 404 CA2 1938), other courts had taken a different view on
similar issues
collateral estoppt>l. If the validity finding were permitted
to stand, the petitioner could have beeu forced to litigate the question of its
preclusive Hect lll future cases. 15 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, supra
n. 4, § 3 2, at. 40a (1976); 1B Moore's Federal Practice 0.443 [5], at
3,925 (1~4) ; 9 id., , 203.06 at 716 (197,5}.

,f
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perm1 m
"lfo -so. 1hry dtmbt is' dmt'retlect by Alt-Nter.'
express reliance on Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942 ,
cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943), a case in whi~h the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed at lengtn the
constitutional limits on appellate jurisdiction. 319 11. S., at
363, n. 2. Like the respondents here and the p tioner in
Electrical Fittings, the appellant in Cover sou
to appeal
from a judgment that had eliminated his st e in the outcome.12 The Court of Appeals emphaticall declined to asught "no relief
sume jurisdiction ovet· an appeal which
against anybody before the court ... b ... want[ed] an
advisory opinion that [a] patent [was] alid." 133 F. 2d, at
554. 1 3 Sincf' there was no case or co1 roversy, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was "witho discretion" to hear the
appeal. Id., at 545.
These cases demonstrate that t requirements of Art. III
do not change with the "factual c text" in which a suggestion
5. Whatever the context,
of mootness arises. See ante,
Art. III asks but a siugle ques n: Is there a continuing controversy between adverse par es? Iu Electrical Fittings, the
1 2 Thr appellant in C'over v. S <wartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1942), cert.
denied, 319 U. S. 748 (194:3),
r; the losing plaintiff in a patent infringe~
ment action. After the l ria eourt found the patent invalid and not
infringed, the plaintiff took n appeal on the validity question without
contesting the finding of n infringement. By accepting the judgment to
that extent, he lost. his ri t to recover from the defendant-and thus his
interest in t.he litigation.
1 ~ Judge Frank wrot() or the court:
"[W]here there is no ju:sticiable' dispute, there are no 'merits.' There is
merely an unreal e ity resembling that disembodied smile which Lewis
Caroll immortalize . Many Supreme Court, decisions teach us that appellate jurisdirtion , hen no justieiable dispute exists on app<'al, cannot be
rested upon th rrrollertion that such a dispute previously existed when
the case was iu the irial court." 133 F. 2d, at 551 (footnotes omitted) .
See also Kapp v. National J?ootball League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9
1978) ; Hq/1 v. U. 8. Piber & Plastics Corp., 476 F . 2d 418, 420 (CA3,
197..3) ; <;f. Lewis v. United States, 216 U. S 611 (19W) (tpl!l' curiam}.
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c
versy continued with respect to the single nar
'ssue whether the District Court's ruling on patent v dit
1roperly was included in the decree. But nothin n tha
ase suggests that a "procedural ruling, collateral t
e merits
fa litigation," may be appealed after .final jud · ent because
' olicy considerations penni [ t] the appeal" or because the
rIling "stands as an adjudication of one of e issues litigated."
nte, at 8--9. Such collateral rulings- · e other rulings-may
e appealed only when the litigant . s a personal stake in the
ctrica.l Fittings, there was
esolution of his appeal.H In
stake ; here there is uoue. .. ince nothing remains of the
case or controversy, the
urt of Appeals should have dismissed t,his case.

III

f1

Court's extended discussion of policy
and practical onsiderations, ante, at 10- 12, that these weighed
heavily i1 · s decision. I am not aware that such considerations e r before have influenced this Court in determining
whe · er the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal
c rts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of moot':"
' ' d not be as severe
- - p
~,X finding oL ';t'lnoea wo I have repercussions primarily
in two situation . The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in th,ig~situatio"n would
not be unjust. lf injunctive or declaratory relief were

-

·

_

~

-'f'he Cout t, appf'ars t6 r: t'Ognh tlris in-pruosin.,, ante;l!l:'fli.~ !; bn~
fa s to apply the rule to thi~ case. Since the Court suggests that respond- )
e ts' interest in the certification ruling derjves from the mere fact tha.t it
' ·tands as an adjudication of one of the i~sues litigated," id., at 9, Elect ·ical fi'ittinys itself 1\'0\tld limit us to the issuance of an order directing that
t ~e offensive rulin ~ ~;:~v.l.mged.ftou:ulle. ~ 3QIJL . at 242.

'•.
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granteu, ~he absent members of the putative class would ha:v~
obtained by force of stare decis·is or tho decree itself most of
the.: benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages 'were awarded and an appe11l permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class membe~ to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that _1
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.~~
Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement befot:e
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic iQ.
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
pompensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal ri ts by "private attorney [s]
1
general." Ante, at -+e-1C he practical argument is not
without force. But predi ating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade,
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the v~ry least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim,
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of

.iJ.JI!' Sec CommC'nt, lmmedia.te Appealability of Order::; De1iying Class Certifiration, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under
Rule 23 (b) (:3), a class member must decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rl!le 23 (c) (2). This provision
was de.signed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the inerits
in order to &'cure the benefits of that decision. Kotes of the Advisory
qonunittee or1 Proposed An1endments to Rule 23, 39 F . R. D. 69, 105-106
,('19~6).

78-904-DISSENT
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPE}t

13

"

usury claims,ttt the Court's concern for compensation of puta.
tive class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act.l'f ''-;
--------------------·
The Court's concern for pJtative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should
be addressed by measures short of Pe?;·Pitifl~the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.u;
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action

lTw Liddell

v. Litton Systems, Inc ., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowers' class action) ; Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss . 17, 2 So. ~d 561 (1941) .
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mississippi'3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
§ 85. But I do not understand that the National Bank Act displaces state
policy disfavoring the aggregntion of usury claims. A primary purpose of
that Act is to protect 11ational banks from discriminatory treatment or
undue penalties that may be imposed by st~tte law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
1
~ The Act provides that rules of procedure promulgated by this Court
"shall not .. . enlarge or modify any substantive right ." 28 U. S. C.
§ 2072. See Ametican Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the SubetanceProcedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) .
18 In Coo1>ers c~ Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appealable as of right tmder 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the
dangers of "indi;;criminate" interlocutory review. Jd., at 474. Although
Coopers & Lyb11and now prevents review in case..'! in which it would be
desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation•.

;B
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defendant undoubte
would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual pl 'ntiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final detennination of the class certification question· on
appeal.
Where a defendant does ttempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the Distri t Court is not powerless. In at
~some circumstances, it 1 ay require thl:tt putative class
members receive some sort of oHce and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal pe 'od. Rule 23 (d) (2). The
availability of such measures coul be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class ctions. Indeed, District
Court management of the problem b measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable t the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstanc . To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or anagerial powers are
lacking,_ it i.~ /or Congress-not this ourt-to correct the
deficiency.~ !}j
Since a court is limited to the decision f the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legisla iv~ problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical cm sequences of their'
own. Today's holding is no exception. Or remand, respond"
ents will serve as "quasi-class representativ s" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Sin e they can gain

a---

~

\tl l

· I

~:!h~:lfn'::;e!'~~Y~ b':~~~'i ~:e~ui'.be:'~ =:.u 111e~e~se ~
Q;{

):r-t>r

·theil'-la.wy:e~serve on th:ir own motim

Since no

cou~ ~

) e

5
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~M>Congress currently has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of ·Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supm, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the gmnt or denial of the ruling that will replace cla~s . cer· tification under the proposed procedures,
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has certified the class, there has been no considered determina..;
tion that respondents will fairly and adeqtiately represent its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of t.he clair.~~ ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a)(3)? ~.!!!J
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced seterne~' ~veJF f'oreclose--a-l~el~ of class
action litigation. &e ante, 11. 6.( Thus, the difficulties faced
by the District Court on remand in this case may not arise
again in precisely analogous circumsta.nces. But today's result
- - - - - - also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who
ave revailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the
order denying class certification is reversed in that situation,
the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing
relationship to the putative class than respondents have
here. A remand for certification could also lead to "one-way
I

-

!J)The District Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents,
ou
for these or other reasons, cannot. adequately repre
intervention be proposed, the District Cou
quitable grounds might well
refuse to toll the statute of limit.a ·
in order to }:>t'rmit it.pearly mne
years have passed since th' · ction was filed and six since the governing
substant,ive statute w , mended to authorize the cha.Uenged conduct. In
its order denyin
•rtifica.tion on September 29, 1975, the District Court
assigned as o of its reasons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner's]
bank" by amages then alleged to total §12,000,000 and now potept.ially
a.ugmet d by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The
possi e destruction of petitioner's bank·is irrelevant to the ~Ji~ue Of
m tness, but sE>riou:; indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community
rved. As this Court relie::; so heavily on its practical and equitable concerns for putative elass members, it will hardly be inappropriate for the
District Court on remand to con!:!ider pmcticalitie:; and e4uities ori both
side~<. In the circumstance-S prPSented, the District Court may well see no
reason to exercise its equitable dbcretion in favor of putative rlass me~pbers·
who· have slcvt on their rights the!:!e many years,

1

,.
'•'
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intervention" in direct violation of Rule 23. Seep. 11- 12, and
n. 15, supra. These tensions. arising from the express terms
of the Rule, undermine the Court's conclusion that the
policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached' today.
~In sum, the Court's attempted
sofution to the problem of
f ed settlements in consumer class actions departs from
principles of Art. III jurisprudence:flt afso unnece5:.
---~~~~tes significant problems in the administration of
I would vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals *emand with instructions to dismiss the appeal
as moot.'
-

11. -':iJ ~f1~ . .TusncE ST~WENR :statt>s, in hi:; concnrring opinion, lha.t all persons

allc•gpd to be· mPmbPrs of a put~ttive elal'i:s " automatically be<;ome parties
to the ca:sP or <'ontmvcrsy for purposes" of Art. lll, and that they
"remain parties unW a final determination has been made that. the action
ma.y not. be maintained as n. class action." Ante, at - . This novel
view, for which no authority is cited, ca.n not. be reconciled with lrulianapolis School r'omm'1 1s v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral
certification order waH ht>ld insufficient to identify the interest.; of absent
clasH members for Art. III purpose:;. The re:;ult. hardly could be different
when the chts,: has 11ot been ideut.ified at. all. See also Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. Cmft. 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxte1· v. Palmigiano,
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976) ; Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 H. S. 147
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430

1976).

-

The proposed rule of u.utomalie party st<1tus-in this case for 90,000
unidentified person::;--has troublesome and far-reaching implications that
could prejudiee the bringing of class actions. Preswnably a purpose of
such a rule wonld be to a:;sure that satisfaction of the claim:; of named
partie,; wouhl not terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of
unnamed parties be Pxtiuguished by the failure of t.he named parties to
appeal. Thus, if thP rule proposed by MR. Jusnc:E S'l'EVENS is to accomplish it,; pnrpo:;e, I suppose that a. fidueia.ry duty must be impoticd upon
named partie:; io continue the litigation where--as hen'-the tmnamcd
partie" r<'main 11nident.ified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, wou.ld t.he
uanwd partie;; not only be requirf'd to continuf' ·to litigate, but to a;:;sume
pertlonal re:;ponsibility for cost.~ ;lnd att.orney's fees if the ca..,;e ultirmttely is
lost? Would t•espon:<ible litigants be willing to file clal:'.'i a.ctions if they
thereby tt..~~ttmed iStH'h long-term fiduciary obligation::;? These aud like

18.)

78-904-DISSENT
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

17

quP.;tions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe
thry merit cardnl study by Congress before tJ1is Court-perhaps unwittingly-ereatcs a major category of clientles:; litigation unique in our
syst.cm.

to: The Chief Jus~~
Kr Justice Brennap
r;
Mr. Juatioe Stewa~ ~
wr. Justice 1b1te "! ~
lt•. Justice ~a.rehall
Mr. Juatioe Blaokaun
Vr. Justice B~bnquiet
llr. Justioe SteYens

1
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF!

I

No. 78-904

Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, ~fississippi, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Robert L . Roper et al.
'Circuit.
[February -, 1980]
MR. Jvs'ricE PowELL, with whom MR. JuSTICE Sn.:WART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 ·They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 a.nd
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
· court rosts. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos. ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reiected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. 'This Court affirms the judg- \
ment of the Court of Appeals. after finding that respondents
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. ;C.
§ 1355.
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7. n. 6. This
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction
of an Art. III court under established and controlling precedents. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at --, in one
important respect: both require us to decide whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class certification whC'n they can derive no benefit whatever from
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, however, the Court n'cognizes established Art. III doctrine. It
states that the " right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims."
Ante, at 6. Tt also agrees that a federal court "retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the partie.s' "substantive claims bC'come moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid.
Moreover, the Court ackuowledges the familiar principle that
a party who has no pC'rsonal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals. !d., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles
unambiguously require a finding of mootness.

A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in full.~ Respond2 Although rr::>pondenls nl::;o a::;ked for attorney's fees, their complaint
iihows that fee;; were lo be grnnted only from the damage;; ultimately

l
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion~
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the
petitioner.M Their persoual claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names. Tho notice of appeal filed with the District Court
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated . . . ." App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have
no interest in the "individual and private case or controversy"
relied on hy the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even withou
such evidene<'. this and other courts routinely have held that
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and eliminates his stak<' in the outcome. California v. San Pablo &
'Pula1·e R. eo., 1M) U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill &
'l'homas Co . v. l'nded States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968)
(per cun:am) ; A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.
2d 89 ( CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the te11der itself that
moots tlw case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid.
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to review the ab~tract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully
satisfies his claims.
I know of 110 authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has. entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
awardNl tu them or the clm.;s. App. 13-14. There is no pos:<ibility of
pro:spcctivr n•liPf b('(·au,.:r the :\1i,.:::;iH,.:ippi m;ury sta.tute was amrnded in
1974 to authumr, inter alia, tlw charge< at. i:<.~ue in this ca:;e. 197-1 1\Iiss.
Gen. Law:-:, ch. ,1)04, § 7; :;ee 1\Ii~"- Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6).
8 NPithPt' thr Cou rt nor the rc~:~ponclrnt ~:~ have aHSertcd that the prtitioner'~ tcndr·r fail~ to include all co~:~t,~ and fcc~:~ for which it could be held
liable. SrP Pari ri-B, infra.
4
he "statutory rig;ht.'' to appral, ante. :tt 7, it:sclf can not supply a
per~:~onnl ~:~take in the outcome, for CongreSi:i cannot abrognle Art. III
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in<
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright.
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1f 203.06 (1975). But
the requiremf'nt of adverse effect is more than a rule "of
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 10, Art. III
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is
at issuf' "throughout the entirety of the litigation." Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 ( T. S. 393. 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v.
Newk·irk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-401 (1975).
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule of practice, that ha:s impelled feclf'ral courts uniformly to require a
showing of continuing adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, ~ 3902.
Barry v. District of Colurnbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C'. - . 580 F. 2d 6D5 (1978); see Altvater v. Freeman, 3HJ U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas &
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football
League, 586 F . 2cl 644. 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz,
133 F . 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943). 5
limitationK ou the juri ~>dirtion of the federal rourts. Gladstone, Realto1·s
v. Village of /3 e/lu•ood, 441 F. S. 91 , 100 (1979).
~ 5 United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 4;32 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopm·s
((; Lybmnd v. Li11esay 437 U. S. 4()3 (1978), are not to thr cout.rary.,
Incidt>ntal dictum iu both casr~ stated that. thr denial of cla,:;s certification
is subjPrt to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the
named pbiutiff,;. Nrither cn~e <li~rHRHrd mootneR">, nod neither anal~·zed
the propositio11 in an~· way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers
& Lybrand was United Airlines. see 437 U. S., at 469, and the only
authorit~· cited i11 [; nited Airlines Wil~> a. conce~!:iion made by the defendant
and a. Ji:;t oJ ca<'e~ from the Court::; of Appeal~, not one of which dealt
with a suggestion of mootness iu an analogous situation, see 432 U. 8., at
393, and n. H . ~uch i'tatrmrnts, casually enunciated without a word of
explaJJa Lion in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are n()t
affected by the "factual ·context" in which a suggestion of
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite
stake in the outcome of the action?
Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is the case
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or uo
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prejudiced by the inclusion of an mmecessary and adverse finding
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the
existence of the District Court's order denying certification
has no effPct whatever on the respondents. Thus, the personal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not
prese11t in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of
a litigation." 1 Tor is it significant that the ruling "stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." Id., at 9-10.
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.

B
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III." the Court agrees that
only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal [can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at
10. The' Court also agrees that respondents have remaining
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." ld., at
controlling or even prr;:;ua<iivc whrn they are shown on further reflection
to have bern iiH'OIJHi~tent with Hettlrd law. As the Court agrees today,'
neither CH:,;() rrmtr~ an exception to the fundamental rule thai "federal
appellatt1 jmi~dietion i::; limited by tho appdlant':; personal stake in the
appeal." Ante, a.t 10.
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Nevertheless. it holds that respondents retain a per.
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they
assert a continuing obligation." !d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10. 0
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the
record.
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, chargeable to the petitioner. that was incurred_\before the petitioner's
tender. Similarly, the respondents have been conspicuously
vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" relied upon as
supplying the adverse interest essential to a live controversy. 7
The only expensE' mentioned by respondents, apart from court
costs iucluded iu the pctitiouer's tender, is not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide security for costs in
the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee arrangement
in this case create any obligation, present or future, that can

(\,

p~'k....

[d' teJ: \

I

@'he Court also mrntions that "rtJhe use of the class action procedure
for litigation of indi\'idual claim:; may off!'r sub:;tantial advantages for
named plaintiff~ . . . ." Ante, at 11, n. 9. But any such advantages
cannot aer·n1r to thesr rr,;pondc·nt:;, who will not. be litigating their own
claims on n•m.md. Indeed, thr Court. rE-fer::; to respondE-nts in this context 1
only to point out that tlwir total damage::! were ~o small that they "would
be unlikrly to ohtam legal rE>drE''~ at an a.ccrptable em;t" if they could not
do so b~· mran" of a cal"" action. We may a:;:;ume that. re::<pondrnts had
some interest. in t lw cla:<::;-act.ion procedure as a means of interesting their
lawyer~ in tho ca,.;c• or obt.a.ining a sati:;factory ;.;ettlement. Thi,.; may be
an intere;;t. proprrly fmthrred by Rule 23, but once rPspondents obtained
both acrPHK to comt and full individual relief that interr~;t disappeared.
7 Per hap" the stronge::;t of rt'::<pondent.~' statements is:
"Of com::'r, till' interrst of the [rE-spondents] in asRertion of the right to
proceed on behalf of the clas.~ includes such matters as thr pro,;prct for
spreading attoi'IH>y':,; Ire:; and PxpenPes among more claimants and thus
reducing the p<·rcpntage that. would otherwi:;e bP payable by them."
Plaintiffs-Appellant.~' Brirf in Oppo:;ition to Motion to Di,mi"'·" Appral and
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Cansurve (CA5, No. 76-3600), Jan. 10,
1977.
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be affected by the certification of a class. Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject to court approval,
as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the amount of the final
judgment. App. 14, 16. 8 No arrangement other than this
customaryA contingent fee is identified in the record or the
briefs. Yet, no one has explained how respondents' obligation to pay 25/'r of their 1·ecovery to counsel ·could be reduced
if a class is certified and its members become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery. Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees and expenses" 0 relates to no presf'nt obligation. It is at most an expectationof the respondents' and particularly of their counsel-that certain fees and expenses may become payable in the event a
class is certified. That expectation is wholly irrelevant to
the existence of a present co11troversy between petitioner and
respondents.
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses cannot be recoJJciled with the repeated admonition that "unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power.'' E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particularly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor
~

Rrspondrnt,;' " Drmand for Judgmrnt!' Hf'k~ the court to award t.he
"rcJo:;t. of ihis action a,; wrll a::; attornry fres in thr amount of 25% as
hereinabovE~ alh·grd, or Huch othrr amount as may br deemed
and
propE'r by tlw Court." App. 16. The reque:;t, for feE':< wa;,: ela;i~cd in
Paragraph VI ol' t.llf' ameudrd eomplaint, which rrad:; as follows:
"Plaintiff ullrgrs that, the Clrrk of this Court. br dr:siguated cuotodian
of the funds and judgmpnt. to be paid Pla.intiff and other prr:<ons similarly
situated, b~· Drfendants and the Clerk deposit said fund:; in a. suitable
depository and, upon proprr ordrr of this Court, di:sbur,;p said funds
aftrr dPductio11 of nere.,:;ary rxpenses and attorney fee:,; to Plaintiff's
at.tornry~ hNein of twPnt~·-fivr per cent, (25 % ) of t hr amount so paid,
the same being r<'HI"Onnhlr by all st~mda.rds, including that alleged and
utilized h)· D<>f.rndants in Ruing rrrtain mrmbrrs in of [sic] the class in
St.ate Court:; for unpaid accounts." App. 13-14.
8

M

o See n. 7, supra,
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury"-if any existsis not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. Id.,
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Vinaye of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91, 99 (1979. 10 Whatever may be the basis for the
respoudents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a by~
stauder. "LF] ederal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot afi'ect the rights of litigants in the case
before them." lVorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the case,

c
Since respondellts have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g.,
Ashcroftv. Matt?:s, 431 U.S.171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam);
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam);
Preiser v. 1\'ewkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis School Comrn'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per
curiam); North Carol-ina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Cornm. for Human Rights,
404 u. s. 403, 407 (1972).11
1

°

Far-reaching consequrnces could flow from a rule that fees recoverable
from putative cla:ss mrmbers.(Cillim)be '' traced" to the class delendm\t
for purpo:;e;; of the ca,.;e or controver~y requirement. At the least, this
rule would :support a claim that a per~on who )r im.JSJ.~..l..·~·~M...~:.;.w.oiOlJ--f--1
full settlrrrH•n1. of his individual claim entitled to file suit on behalf of
an unrecom1wnsed rla~s. Apparently, the put.ntivc plaintiff need only
"a.sser[t]," ante, at 7, n. 6, tha.t f<'e:s incurred in anticipation of the litigation ultima1el)' might br ~hared with a prevailing class.
11
These c·ase;,; arc di~:;cus:sed more fully in United States Pamle CIYm~
mission v. Geraghty, post, a t - - - (PowELL, J., clis:;euting),

['4
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are 11 Capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975). ~ Not a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was deJlied, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response from anyQ11e who previously may have thought that the class action would protect
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this
has been a noi')fase since the petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the n~pondents' individual claims. To be sure, respondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arrangement.
But I know of no decision by any court that holds that a
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persons
not present in court. creates the personal stake in the outcome
required by Art. III.
II
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone. 13
1

@u a cla:s:;-action defendant. were shown to have embarked on a course
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v.
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
3 I do not KHgge:;t that. coun;,;el acted improperly in pur:;uing this case,
Since thry have prevailed both in this Court and in the Court of Appeals,
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The Court appears to endorse this fonn of litigation for rea·
11ons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective
uresponse to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails ~to recognize that allowing this action to proceed without an interested
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some
magnitud .
A
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art: III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate. 14
the responsibility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the federal
eo)ll;ts.
~ee CommC'nL, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under
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Pet'ha.ps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 11-12. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive 'law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usuary claims. 1 ;; the Court's concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act.16
Rule 23 (b) (3), a class member must, decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106
(J-9~6).

\.:2Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17,2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mississippi'3' interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
§ 85. But I do not understand that. the National Bank Act disphwes state
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or
u¢~e penalties that may be imposed by state Jaw. See 12 U. S. § 86.
~rho Act providt>s tha.t rules of procedure promulgated by this Court
· "llhall not • • • enlarge or modify at'Y substantive right." 28 U. s, ·C.

1
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should be
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot- l
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. ·The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification · in appropriate circumstances.17
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an · immediate
and final determination of the class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
11:17-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substancep ~edure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) .
17 tn C'oopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on· the
dangers of "indiscriminate" interlocutory review. ld., at -474. Although
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in which it would, be
-desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation~
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
deficiency .18

B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
can be intended only to benefit ~f'JMdentsVcounsel and thel
members of a _putative class who have indicated no interest
their own mo-l
in the claims asserted ill)~ case~erve
tion-if indf'<>d they serve at all. 10 Since no court has certified the class. there has been no considered detennination
that rcspondf'nts will fairly and adequately represent its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.

on

ongrr;;:'i rurrrntly has before it 11 bill that attempt" to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damagee. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class cerion under the proposed procedures.
s noted abovr, p . .3._, supra, respondents took no appeal in their
o
name"'. One would 1hink that this candid
of r)(-'n;onall
intE>rr:;j, would di><troy jhe foundation upon which the Court predicates
Art. III jurisdi<>1ion. Ante, at 7; seep. - , supra,

di~clnirner
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a)(3)? 20
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set- (
tlements" of class action litigation. Thus. the difficulties
faced by the District Court 0.11 remand in this case may not
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the order denying class certification is
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand
will have 110 more co11tinuiug relationship to the putative
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation
of Rule 23. See p. 12.., and n. !~sUpra. These tensions,
arising from the express terms of the Rule, undermine the
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.

IV
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. 21 It unneces2"

The District Court. properly may conclude on remand that rr:;pontlents,

Io r these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the claEs.

<,.

Mn . .JusTICE STEVtmH state::;, in hi::; concurring opinion, that a.li]H'ri:\On.·
alleged to be membPrs of a putative clw;i:l "automatically becomr parties
tq the case or controversy for pnrposes" of Art. III , and that they
"remain parties until a final determination has been made that the action
may not be maintained as a. class action." Ante, at - . This novel
view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indianapolis School C'omm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral
certification order wa,. held insufficient to identify the interests of absent
class members for Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different
when the cia ·s has not been identified at all. See also Memphis Light,
21
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case. 22
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Ba:xte1· v. Palmigiano,
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976).
The proposed rule of automatic party status-in this case for 90,000
unidentified persons-has troublesome and far-reaching implications that
could prejudice the bringing of class actions. Presumably a purpose of
such a rule would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named
parties would not trrminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of
unnamed parties he extinguished by the failure of the named partjes to
appeal. Thu~, if the rnlr proposed by MR. JusTICE Sn~VENS is to accomplish it::; pmpo,.;P, I :;;uppoSf' that a fiduciary duty mu:;t be imposed upon
named partie:,; to continue the litigation where-as here-the unnamed
partie:; remain unidrnt ifiPd and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the
named partir:-: not only br requirrd to continue to litigate, but to a:;sume
personal responsibility for costR and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is
lost? Would re.sponsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they
thereby assmnrd :;uch long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like
questions arc substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe
they merit rarpful :;tud,v by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwittingly-creatP:; a major category of clientles:; litigation unique in our
sy~m.

\e}rhe Court's rP~urreetiou of this dead cont.rover::;y may result ill
irreparable injury to innocent Jl<lrtie:;, a.':l wt'll as to the petitioner bank.
When the Di~trict . Court. denird cetiifieation on September 29, 1975, it
as:;igned as one of its reasons the 1w::;:;ible "destruction of the Lpetitioner]
bank" by clamagr,.; then alleg<'d to total 12,000,000 and now JWtentially
augmented by thr accrual of intE'rest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The
pos:;ible destruct ion of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional i:;:;ue,
but. seriotl::i inderd to depo::;itor::;, stockholder::;, and the community served.
It is said that thi:s is nec('>;.,;ary to redre:;::; injurirt> pm;sibl~· suffered
members of th<' putative class. Yet, no such per:;on ha,.; come forward
in the nearly ninr yrars that, have pa:;sed since this action was filed.
Indeed, the challenged conduct wa:; authorized by sta.tute ulmo:;t. :six year::;
ago. As the District Court may be called upon to determine whether the
equitable doctrint' of "rrlation back" permit.':l it to toll the statute of
limitation:; on rrmancl, ante, at 3, n. 3, it will h~trdly be inappropriate for
that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances

I

by\
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and:
remand with instructions to dismiss ~he ap}Jeal as JJlOO/t.,

presented, the District Court ma.y well see no reason to exercise its equitable di:;c•rption in favor of putative clu&; members who have slept on their
rights these many years.

..

'.l'o:

The Chief Justice
Juatice Brennan
lr. Juet1oe Stewart
llr. Just joe lbite
Juet1oe Marsha.ll
Mr. Juat1oe Blaoblun
llr. Justice Behnquist
Nr. Justice Stevens

Mr.

1-1 s

*·

From: Mr. Justice Powell
Circulated~~
-- ---------

3-5-80
3rd DRAFT

MAR 1 0 1980
Reciroulated : __________
_

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAn!
No. 78-904
Deposit Guaranty National Bank,, On Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
1
Circuit.
Robert L. Roper et al.
[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 ·They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
· court costs. Over respondents' objection, the 'District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos. ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judg- '
ment of the Court of Appeals. after finding that respondents
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. :C.
§ 1355.
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7. n. 6. This \
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction
of an Art. UI court under established and controlling precedents. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are differences. this case is similar to United
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at --, in one
important respect: both require us to decide whether putative class represc•ntatives may appeal the denial of class certification whrn they can cl~:>rive no benefit whatever from
the relief sought iu the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case. however, the Court rrcognizPs established Art. III doctrine. It
states that tlw " right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural
right only, ancillary to thP litigation of substantive claims."
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the pa.rties' "substantive claims bPeome moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid.
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that
a party \\"ho has uo personal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no ease or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals. I d., at 7, 10. ThesP are inch•ecl the dispositive
principlrs. My disagreement is with the way in which the
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles
unambiguously require a finding of mootness.

A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in fulP RespondAlthough re,-pondent.-; al:;o a~ked for attorney's fees, their complaint
ihows LhaL fee:; were to be granted only from the damag~ ultimately
2
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion \
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the
petitioncr.a Their personal claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names. Tho notice of appeal filed with the District Court
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated . . . ." App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have
no interest in the "individual and private case or coutroversy"
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without
such evideiH'<'. this and other courts routinely have held that
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's iujuries a11d eliminates his stak<> in tlw outcome. California v. San Pablo &
'Tulare R. ('o., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill &
Thomas Co. v. [;'nited States, 392 F. 2d 204 (C'A6 1968) (per
curiam ); La111b ,.• Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968)
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.
2d 89 (C'At) 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that
mootR the ease whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid.
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless toreview the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully
satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favol' of respondents instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot. 1 It is certainly true, as the Court. observes,
~twarded

1o th(•m or tlw cla~:,1. App. 13-14. There is no pos.~ibility of
n•lid brenu:-<e t.he ~1i,.:;iRsippi wsury sta.tutc wa.~ am(•nded in
1974 to aut horizr, 111ter alia, Ow eharge;< at. il".~IIC in this ca;;c. 1974 l\Iiss.
Gen. Law~, rh. 5H4, § 7; "rc 1\[i,;,;. Code Ann. § 75-17-1 (6).
3 N<'itiH'l' tlw Comt nor tlw re:::pondent;,; have H~>F<ertcd that the petitioner '.~ t<·ndrr l":tils to include all co~ts and fees for which it could be held
liable. SC'<' Part TI-B, infra.
@The ··,tatutory right.'' to appml, ante, n.t. 7, it~elf cannot. supply a
personal stnkc in the outcome, for Cm1gress cwmot abrogate Art. III
pro~pedi\'c
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not i~
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. Ree 15 Wright,
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But
the requirenwnt of adverse effect is more than a rule "of
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 10, Art. III
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is
at issuf' "throughout the entirety of the litigation." Sosna
v. Iowa , 4H) F . S. 393. 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-401 (1975).
It is this eonstitutionallimitation, and not any rule of practice, that has i111pelled federal courts uniformly to require a
showing of eontinuiug adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal.'' 15 Wright. Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902.
Barry v. D·istrict of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C'. - . 580 F. 2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas &
Betts Co ., 307 r. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football
League, 58() F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz,
133 F . 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943)."
limitntions on I hr juri:<di<'tion of the federal <'Ourts. Gladstone, Realtors

v.,.l(illage of BelltCood. 441 l ' . ' · 91,100 (1979).
f..!)Jnited Airlines, Inc . v. Mr:Donald, 4:32 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coope1·s
L(; Lyb1'and '"· Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), nre not to thr cont.rary.
Incidental didum in both cnse:; stated that. tlw denial of <'la.s certification
is subject. to appellaiE· review aftrr final judgment. at. the behest of the
named plaintiff~ . Neither <'H~<e di~<'llil>'Pd mootnes.-:, nnd ueithrr anal~·zed
the propo:;ition in Hu~· way. lndred, thr only authority cited in Coopers
L~ Lybrand wa~< United Ai1'li111-'S. fief' 437 U. S., at 469, and the only
authorit~' cited in L'nited Airlines wa:; :t conces:;ion made by the defendm1t
and a li~t of ra,.;c•" from the Courts of Appeal:;, not one of whi<'h dealt
with a. ><ugge:stion of mootne~'i'i in an analogous situation, see 432 U. 8., at
393, and n. 1-!. ' uch statrments, casually enuncinted without a word of
explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal quei:itions, are not

I
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are n()t
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite
stake in the outcome of the action'?
Electrical Fittings v. 1'homas & Betts Co., supra, is the case
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or uo
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the
existence of the District Court's order denying certification
has no effect whatever 011 the respondents. Thus, the personal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not
present in this case. Abse11t such a stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, co11ateral to the merits of
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as
an adjudicatio11 of Oil<' of the issues litigated." !d., at 9-10.
Collateral rulings--like other rulings-may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.

B

tJO

After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that
only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal [can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have\remaining
stake in "the merits of the substantive controvers5l." I d., at
controlling or eV('n

prrsua~ivc

when they are shown Qn further reflection
As the Court agreei:i today,
neither c:tHo rrPatr,.; :tn c·xccptiun to the fundamrntal rulr t.hat "fcdrral
appellate· jmi~diction i::; limited by tho appellant's per,;onal stake in the
appeal." Ante, at 10.
to have bPrn inc·on~i~tent with :set t!Pd law.

I
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Nevertheless. it holds that respondents retain a per~
sona] stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigaHts a portion of those fees and expenses
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they
assert a continuing obligation." !d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10. 0
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the
record.
-~fs
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge'Rc~po ~
able to the petitioner. that was incurred\before the petitioner's
/
tender. Similarly, the respondents h~e been conspicuously
vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" relied upon as
supplying th e adverse interest essential to a live controversy. 7
The ollly exp<'tlse mrntioned by respondents, apart from court
costs includrd in the petitioner's tender, is not a present obligation at all. Tt is an offer to provide security for costs in
the event a class ultimatf'ly is certified. Brief for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee arrangement
in this case create any obligation, present or future, that can

Bv

&

"r

l

WI'hf' C'omt nl~o mrnt ion,.; that. t] ht> US(' of the rla~s action procedure
for Jitiga.t i<~n .o.f indi';:dual rlnim,; may offt>r 1;ub~tant ial ndvantages for
named phlll!Jff ><. . . . Ante, at 11, n. 9. But. any such advantages
cannot a<·c·nw to thcsr rr~pondPnt~, who will not be litigating their own
claims on r·emand. Indeed, thr Court refer;; to respondents in thi8 context \
only to point ont that t.hrir total damage:; were ~:;o ;;mall that thf'y "would
be unlikPI~· to obtain l<'gal redre~~ n.t nn a.rceptable ro;,;t" if they could not
do so b~· llll'Hil.-< of a cal"" ac·tion. We may as;;ume that re:;pond<'nt;,; had
some interest. in thn cln~~-nction procedure as a mean~ of intt>rcsting their
la.wyer~ in tho en~r or obt.n.ining a ,.:at.isfactory settlement. This may be
an inteJ'rst. propPrl)· furthrred by RulP 23, but oncf' respoudrnts obt.ained
both acrPss to court nnd full individunl relief that intere:;t disappeared.
7 Perhaps thr strouge:::t of re::-:pondcnhi' sta.tt>rnents is:
"Of course, the intf'rP,:t of th!:l [rrHrwndents] in a~srrtion of the right to
proceed on bc•half of thf• cla:;s includes such matters ns the prO::']JPct. for
spreading attonH'y's fpe;; and f'xpen,.:e.-; among more claimant,-< and thus
reducing tho ]Jercrntago that. would otherwi;:;e be payablf' by them."
Pla.intiff:o-Apprllants' Bri<•f in Oppo:sition to Motion to DiHmi~<:; Appeal and
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. C:ansurve (CA5, No. ·76-3600), Jan. 10,

1977.
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be affected by the certification of a class. Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject to court approval,
as "twenty-five percent (25o/n )" of the amount of the final
judgment. App. 14, 16. 8 No arrangement other than this
customary)contingent fee is identified in the record or the
briefs. Yet, no one has explained how respondents' obligation to pay 25Ya of their recovery to counsel could be reduced
if a class is certified and its members become similarly obligated to pay 25/{- of their recovery. Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees and expenses" 0 relates to no prPSPnt obligation. It is at most an expectationof the respondents' and particularly of their counsel-that certain fees aud expenses may become payable in the event a
class is certified. That expectation is wholly irrelevant to
the existencp of a present controversy between petitioner and
respondents.
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expeuses cannot be reconcilPd with the repeated admonition that "unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power.'' E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particularly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor
8

aRk~

R e,.;pondt•nt,.;' "Dt•mand for Judgment.''
the court to :.twarJ the
or 1hi~ <tr'l 1on a,.: wrll n~ attomr~' fe~ in the amount or 25% as
hereinabov<> aJit•ged, or ~uch other amount a:; rna~· be deemed~· and
proper by tlw C'onrt." App. Hi. The request for fee,; was rlarificd in
Paragraph VI of thr amPudrd eomplaint, whirh readl:i as follow:-;:
"Plaintiff allf'gt>;; thai. the Clerk of thi~ Court. be de~ignated custodian
of the fundK and judgmeut. to be paid Pla,intifl' and other JWr,.,ons similarly
situated, b~· Drfrnchmts and the Clerk depo ·it said fund~ in a l:lUitable
depm•itory nne!, upon proper order of thi:; Court, disbur"'<' said funds
after dPduriioa of nere.s..;ary f•xpenses and attorney fee~; to Plaintiff'~;
at.tomey:; herein of twE'nty-fivt• JlPr crnt, (25 % ) of the amount so paid,
the ,;arne bf'ing rPa:<ona Lie b~· all stmtda.rds, including that alleged nnd
utilized h~· DrfPndantH in :<uing certain members in of [sic] the rlass in
State Court. · for unpaid aecounts." App. 13-14.
9 See n. 7, suwa,

"rcJo~t.
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will
be liable for the fees or expeuses relied upon. Indeed, the
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury"-if any existsis not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. !d.,
at 41-42; sec Gladstone, Realtors v. Vitla(!e of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91 , 99 (1979. 10 Whatever may be the basis for the
respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a by~
stander. "[F]edcral courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
before them." Korth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244. 246·
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the case,

c
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court. require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g.,
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. R. 171, 172-173 ( 1977) (per curiam);
Weinstein v. Bradford, 4:23 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam);
Preiser v. 1Vewkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis School Cmnm'rs v. Ja,cobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per
curiam); j\:orth Carol·ina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights,
404 u. s. 403, 407 (1972),11

°Fn.r-renching con:;rqufnces could flow from a rule that fees mcoverable
from putative cla::;s mrmber:J~ be "traced" to the clas:s dE-fendant
for puq1o::~rs of the case or cont.rover;;y requirement.. At thr lea;;t, this
rule would ~Support n rlaim that a pcr~on who prcviou:sly had a.cecpted
full scttlemrnt. of hi::; individual claim ~Jentitled to file suit on bPhalf of
an ltnrrcompf'll~Nl rla~s. Apparently, the put~1tive plaintiff need only
"a:sser[t]," ante. at 7, n. 6, that. frr~; incurred in anticipation of the litigation ultima! ely might br ;;han•d with a prevailing cln:o, ·.
11
The:se ca~·c,.: nrc di~cu:;.-;ed more fully in United States Parole CcYYY~r
mission v. Geraghty, post, iLt - - - (PowELL, J., dis~enting),
1

I~
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Respondents do not suggest that their 'Claims are "capable
of repetition. yet evading review." C'f. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).r:! Not a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was deni€'d, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in \Yhich respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, " ·ithout provoking a response from anyone who previously may hav<' thought that the class action would protect
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, respondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arrangement.
But I know of no decision by any court that holds that a
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persons
not preseHt in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome
required by Art. III.

II
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone. 13

®If a elas,;-artion defendant. were shown t~ have embarked on a cour~e
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v.
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
D~issal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
~ do uot ~uggr,;t that. coun~el acted improperly in pur::;uing this case,
Since they have prevailed both in thi:; Court and in the Court of Appeals,
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The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for rea,.
sons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective
f'response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails e¥el'r to recognize that allowing this action to proceed without an interested
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some
magnitud .
A
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art: III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate. 14
the responsibility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the federal
80)I...rtS.

(!;JISee Commmt, Immeclia.t e Appea.lability of Orders Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under
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P&ha.ps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 11-12. The pra:ctical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive "law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usuary claims. 1 :; the Court's concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act.16
Rule 23 (b) (3) , a class member must decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c)(2). This provision
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were pennitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966).
Hi Liddell v. Litton Sustems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mississippi'J interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S.C.
§ 85. But I do not understand that. the National Bank Act displaces state
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or
undue penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
10 The AeL provich-'~ th~~t rules of procedure promulgated by thii'( Court
· "shall not . . . enlarge or modify ru'y substantive right." 28 U. 8; ·C.

I
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should be
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot- J
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. ·The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances. 11
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an · immediate
and final determination of the class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least so1ue circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
M'i-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the SubstanceP~edure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974).
~In C"oopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), thio; Court
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on- the
dangers of "indiscriminate" interlocutory review. ld., at "474. Although
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in which it would, be
- da<~irable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislationL
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to oorrect the
deficiency. 18

B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand , respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the ·
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
can be intciHl<>d only to bPnefit r@ili)9Pd9!l~' counsel and the
members of a putative class who have indicated no interest
in the claims asserted in ~ case)serve on their own motion-if indPed they serve at alJ.1 9 Since no court has certified the class. there has been no consiclered determination
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.

I

<Wcon~rrR~ rurrrntlr ha~ bdorr it a bill that nttrmptF< to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damagee. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certi~ation under the proposed procedures.
(!;>As noted ahovr, p . - , s·upra, respondrnts took no nppral in their
own nnmP>'. On<' would think thnt this candid disclaimPr of rwr:oonal
intt're::;t. would di><troy the foundation upon which the Court predic;1.to.r;
Art. III juri~dirtion . Ante, at 7; sec p. - , supm.

I
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a) (3)?

4

20

The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set- '
tlements" of class action litigation. Thus, the difficulties
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But touay's
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in- I
dividual claims. If the order denying class certification is
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand
will have no more continuiug relationship to the putative
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation
of Rule 23. See p. - , and n. 1~ supra. These tensions,
arising from the express terms of the Rule, undermiue the
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today .

.w~

In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled priuciples of Art. III jurispruclence. 21 It unnecesThe District Court propf'rly may conclude on remand that. rf'spondents,
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class.
L'21 MR. Jus·rrcB STBVImH statE's, in his concurring opinion, that all persons
allf'ged to bf' mPmb!.'rs of a putat.ive class "automatically become parties
to the case or contmversy for purposf's" of Art. III, and that they
"remain parties until a final determination has been made that the action
may not be maint<.tined as a class action." Ante, at - . This novel
view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indianapolis School C'omm'1's v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral
certification order was hf'ld insufficient to identify the interests of absent
class members for Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different
when the class has not been identified at. all. See also Memphis Light,
20
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. Aud it may work a serious injustice in this case. 22 1
Ga~ & Wate1· Div . v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxte1· v. Palmigiarw,
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976) .
The proposed rule of automatic party status-in this case for 90,000

unidentified persons--has troublesome and far-reaching implications that
could prejudice t.he bringing of class actions. Presumably a purpose of
such a rule would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named
parties would not. trrminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of
unnamed parties be extinguished by the failure of the named partjes to
appeal. Tim~, if the mle proposed by MJ{. Jm;TICE STBVENS is to accomplish it;; purpo,;P, I ~up pose that :t fiduciary duty must. be imposed upon
named partie.... to continur thP litigation where-as here-thP unnamed
part iPs remain unidt'nt ified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the
named pnrtir.• not only be required to continue to litigate, but to a<>Sume
personal n':'>ponsibility for costR and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is
lost? Would re:sponsiblc litigants be willing to file class actions if they'
thereby assumrd such long-tPrm fiducia.r y obligations? These and like
questions arr ,;ubstantial. ThPy are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe
they merit. car<'ful stud~· by Congreb"l before t.his Court-perhaps unwittingly-cre1Ltc::; :t major category of clientless litigation unique in our
syj.tem.
(;9The Court's rc~uneetiou of this dead controver::;y may rPsult "in
irrep<trable injury to innocent P<lrtics, as well as to the petitioner bank.
WhE'n the Di,.;trict. CourL dPnied certification on SPptember 29, 1975, it
assigned a.s one of its reason;; the possible "destruction of the [petitioner]
bank" by dama~e,; then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially
augmented by thP accrual of intE'rC'8t. App. 47, see ante, at. 2, n. 2. The
po:ssible dt>strurtion of the bank is irrelevant to the juri~dictional is.~ue,
but, serious indcrcl to depo:siton;, stockholders, and the community served.
It is Mid thnt this i:;; . JH~<·e:-;.-;ar~' to redre;;::; injurir;.: pos:-;ibl~· :<utf~red by\
members of tlw putative class. Yet, no such per,.;on ha .~ tomr forward
in the nearly nine .war/'i that. haw pa;;::;ed since this act.ion was filed.
Inde!'d, the challrngPd conduct. was authorized by statute almost six years
~o. As the District Court rna~· be called upon to determine whether the
equitable doetrinr of "rehttion back" permits it to toll the Htatute of
limitations on rrmancl , ante, at 3, n. 3, it. will hardly be inappropriate for
that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances

l
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and:.
remand with instructions to dismiss ~he ap}Jeal as 1~1oot.,

presented, the District Court may well see no reason t<> exercise its equitable di~rretion in favor of putative cla.ss members who have slept on their
rights the:;e many years.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this
·action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on· behalf
of a class ruleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus'legal interest and
· court costs. Over respondents' objection, the 'District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then depos. ited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
· action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. 'This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S.C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state Jaw, and 28 U. S. rC.

§Ias5.
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction
of an Art. III court under established and controlling precedents. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are differences. this case is similar to United
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at --. in one
important respect: both require us to decide whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever from
the relief sought in the aetion. Here, as in Geraghty, the
Distriet Court, refused to certify a class. In this case. however, the ("ourt recognizes established Art. III uoctrine. It
states that the " right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims."
Ante, at 6. Jt also agrees that a federal court "retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "substantive elaims b<>come moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid.
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that
a party who has 110 personal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals. /d. , at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles
unambiguously require a finding of mootness.

A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to
intervene. respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in fulJ.2 Respond2

Although re;;pondent.o;; al:>o a,;ked for nHorney's fees, theit· coll)plaint
that fee:; were io be granted only from the damage:; ultinmtely

~hows

1

78-904-DISSENT
DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

3

ents make 110 claim that success on the certification motion \
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the
petitiouer.a Their persollal claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names. Tho 'notice of appeal filed with the District Court
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated. . . ." App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have
no interest in the "individual and private case or coutroversy"
relied 011 by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without
such evid<'IH'<'. this and other courts routinely have held that
a tender of full relief remedies a pla.in tiff's injuries and eliminates his stak<' in tlw outcome. California v. San Pablo &
Tulare R . C'o., 14D U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill &
'l'homas Co. v. United States, 392 F . 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per
curiam) ; Lamb \', Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968)
(per curiam) ; A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Carnpbell, 353 F.
2d 89 (CAS 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that
mootR the case "vhether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid.
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully
satisfies his ·claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot.1 It is certainly true, as the Court. observes,
awardPd lo 1ht'm or the clal'f!l. App. 13-14. ThPre is no poR.~ibility of
prol'pcrtivo reliPf bPeau"e thr Mi~:;iH:sippi u,.;ury sta.tutc wal" amPnded in
1974 to authorizr, inter alia, the rhargel' n.t. i"'~uc in this ca:;e. Hl74 l\Iiss.
Gen. Law~, rh ..5M, § 7; ::;ec l\li,.;~. Code Ann. § 75-17-1 (6).
3 Nrithpr· the Comt nor the n':::pondrnt:,; have a:;serted that the prtitioncr '~ ((•ndrr· fails to include all co:st::> and fee:; for which it could be held
liable. Set' Part 11- B, infra.
(Yrhe '',.;1atutor.v right.'' 1o nppral, ante. n.l. 7, ibrlf cannot. supply a
l)ersonal ::>take in the outcome, Jor Congre;;s canuot abrogate Art. III
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in.C:::.
itself m.oot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice ~ 203.06 (1975). But
the requir·cnwnt of adverso efl'ect is more than a rule "of
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 10, Art. III
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is
at iss uP "throughout the entirety of the litigation." Sos-na
v. Iowa , 419 r. S. 393. 402 (1975). Sec, e. g., Preiser v.
Newk·irk, 422 r. S. 395, 401- 401 (1975).
It is this constitutional limitation , and not any rule of practice, that has in1pelled federal courts uniformly to require a
showing of continuing adversr effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." 15 Wright, Millrr and Cooper, supra, ~ 3902.
Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C. - . 580 F. 2d 6!)5 (1978); see Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. Thomas &
Betts Co., 307 G. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football
League, 586 F. 2d 644. 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz,
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943).fi
limitation,; on the j11risdietion of tlw federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Be/IIL'ood. 4-1:1 ll. S. 91. 100 (1979).
0;nited Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopenr \
((; Lybrand r . Livesay 437 U. S. 4()3 (1978), are not to the cout.rary.
Incideutal cli!'tum in both cnsr:,; ~:;tu ted that. th<> denial of class certification
is subject to nppdlate review after final judgment at. the behest of the
named ]Jiaint iff,.;. Neither ra;;e di:-;ruH:-;rd mootnes;-<, and neither nnal~·zed
the pro posit ion in an~· way. Indeed, th<> only authority cited in Coopers
& Lybrand wa;.: United Airliues. Ree 4:37 U. S., flt 460, and the only
authority cited in Cnited Airlines wa:; a conc<>:;:;ion made by the defendaJ1t
and a list of ca"('~ from the Court::~ of Appeals, not one of which dealt
with a. suggestion of mootne:<rs in an aualogou:; :;ituation, see 4:32 U. S., at
393, and n. 1-!. Su<"h statements, casually enunciated without a. word of
explunut-ion in opinion~ dealing with unrelated legal que~:>tions, are

1/
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are n()t
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the co11text,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite
stake in the outcome of the action'?
Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas & Betts Co., supra, is the case
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or uo
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the
existence of the District Court's order deuying certification
has no pffect whatever Oll the respondents. Thus, the personal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of
a litigation." Xor is it significant that the ruling "stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." !d., at 9-10.
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. Ill are satisfied.

B
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the
"jurisdictioual limitations of Art. III." the Court agrees that
only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal [can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have~emaining
stake in "the merits of th<' substantive controversy." I d., at/
controlling or cwn Jl<'r,;ua<;ive whPn they are shown on furthPr reflection
to have brrn in('on~i:<tcnt with ~cttled law. As the Court. a~rree~ toda
neither cHI'O crratrs an rxcrption to the fundamental rule Umt ' edrraJ
appcllat<' Jtll'i~<di c t ion i,.; limited by tho appel.lant',; per~onal stake in the

appeal." Ante, at 10.

I~

[f]
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Nevertheless. it holds that respondents retain a per~
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they
assert a continuing obligation." /d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10. 6
This couclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the
record.
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, chargeabe to the petitioner. that was incurredkbefore the petitioner's
tender. Similarly, 4tyrespondents have been conspicuously
vague in identifying the "fees and expenses" relied upon as
supplying the adverse interest essential to a live controversy. 7
The ouly expP llSe mentioned by respondents, apart from court
costs included in the petitioner's tender, is not a present obligation at all. Tt is an offer to provide security for co_sts in
the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief for ftespondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's ~arrangement
in this case create any obligation, present or future, that can

I

€)rhf' Court also mrntion>< that " rtJlw us<> of the cla~f; action procedure
for Jitiga.tion of individual claims may offrr ~ubstantia.J advantages for
named plaintiff>~.
." Ante. nt 11, n. 9. But. any such advantages
cannot :L<'<'I'Il<' to thrRr rr~pondrnt~, who will not. be litigating tlwir own
claims 011 t'l'lll<!tld. Indeed, t hr Court refers to respondents in thi~ context I
only to point out that Owir total damagP;; were so ;,mall that thf'y "would
be unlikPI~· to obtain l<•gal rf'dre~,; at nn a.ccrptable eost" if tht>y eould not
do so b~· mPan>< of u. cal,;,; actiou . We may assumr that rP><pondrnts had
some interest. in the ela.-s-:1ction proeedure as a means of interesting their
lawyer~ in the ea~<' or obtaining a satisfactory Hettlement. This may be
an inte1•est. tJropPrly furthered by HuiP 23, but oncP respondent:< oLtained
both acrrsx to comt and full individual relief that interPst disappeared.
7 Perh:tp,.: the st ronge::<t of re:;pondcnt.~' statements i~:
"Of couw', the intPrr:-:t. of thfl [respondents] in a~~Prtion of thr right to
proceed ou behalf of the cla::>'3 include:; ~uch matter.,; as the pro:>pPct for
spreading attorney's f<'es and <'xpen~es among more claimant>< and thus
reducing the ]Wrcentage that would oth<>rwise be payable by them."
Plaintiff~-AppPilant"' Brid in Oppo,;ition to Motion to DiHmi><s Appeal and
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Cansurve (CA5, No. ·76-3600), Jan. 10,
1977.
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be affected by the certification of a class. Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject to court approval,
as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the amount of the final
judgment. App. 14, 16. 8 No arrangement other than this
customary_.l contingent fee is identified in the record or the
briefs. y'et, no one has explained how responclen ts' obligation to pay 25y-'o of their recovery to counsel could be !'educed
if a class is certified and its members become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery. Thus. the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees and expenses" 0 relates to no prPsPnt obligation. It is at most an expectationof the respondents' and particularly of their counsel-that certain fees and expenses may become payable in the event a
class is certified. That expectation is wholly irrelevant to
the existencp of a present controversy between petitioner and
respondents.
The Court's reliance on u11identified fees and expeuses cannot be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power." E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare.Rights
Org., 426 U. R. 26. 44 (H)76). Such speculation is particularly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor

/

8

./

ai<kt

Responr!Pnts' "DPmand for Judgnwnt.''
tlw court to award the
af't ion a;~ wrll as attorney fe~ m the amount of 25% as
and
hereinabovfl all<'grd, or ,.;uch otlwr amount as ma~· be deemed
proprr by the Court." App. Hi. The reque:;t for fer:< \\·a:; clarified in
Pa.ragraph VI of thr ameudt>d C'Omplaint, whieh read;; as follow~:
"Plaintiff allrgP>< that the Clerk of thi;; Courl be deo~iguatcd custodian
of the fund,.; and judgment to lw paid Pla.intiff and other Jlf'r~on::; similarly
situnted, b~· Ddrndants and the Clerk depo;;it ~;aid fund,; in a suitable
depo;.;itory and, upon proper order of thi::; Court, rusbur,'{' said funds
after d('duction or m'C'el:'>it\1')' expenses and attorney fpe::; to Plaintiff';;
at.tomey,.; hrreiu of twenty-fiw per cent (25%) of the amount f<O paid,
the :;a me bt>iug I'Pal"onable by all Hl<tndards, including 1hat alleged and
utilized hy Df'f<'nrlants in ,.;uing certain memben; in of [sic] the clnss in
State Courts for unpaid account:;." App. 13-14.

"r c]o:;t. of 1hit<

0

See n. 7, supra,

fV£
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury"-if any existsis not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. !d.,
at 41-42; sec Gladstone, Realtors Y. ViUaye of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91, 99 (1979. 10 Whatever may be the basis for the
respoudents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a by..
stander. "[F Jecleral courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
before them." Xorth Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the case,

c
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g.,
Ashcroftv. Mattis, 431 U. R. 171, 172- 173 (1977) (per curiam);
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam);
Preiser Y. Xewkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per
curiam); North Carol-ina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per curiam); SEC v. M edical Comm. for Human Rights,
404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972).11
1 °F~tr-reaehing ron~equrnce. could flow from a rule that fees recoverable
from putative cia:,;,; member1~ be '·traced" to the clas,; dPfendant
for purpo~<'~ of the ca;;e or controver,:y requirement.. At th<> lea::.1, this
rule would support n claim tha.t a pcr,;on who ~t!""l i8~~~~ ha¢Jwct>ptcd
full sett1rmrn1 of his individual claim ~ntitled to fil<> suit on bt>half of
n \UHC'comprn,;pd cla::>s. Apparently, tho put~ttivc plaintiff need only
"m,;ser[t]," ante, at 7, n. 6, that fr<>s incurrt>d in anticipation of thP litigation ultimately might br ~hared with a prcntiling clas:;.
11 The,;r ea:-K':-: arc cli~cw;sro more fully in United States Parole C01rt-mission v. Geraghty, JJOst, at - - - (PowELL, J., dissenting).
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Respondents do not suggest that their ·claims are "capable
of repetition. yet evading review." C'f. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).r.! Not a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification 'vas denied, the action lay dormant duriug the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, " ·ithout provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought that the class action would protect
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, respondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arrangement.
But I know of no decision by any court that holds that a
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persons
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome
required by Art. III.

II
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone. 13

@r a cla,;,;-action defendant were shown to htwe embarked on a cour~e
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circmru;tances
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not, moot. See Susman v.
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
€>1 do not ~uggr~t that counsel acted improperly in pursuing this case,
s;noo thoy hove pn>v,;lod both ;n tb;, Court •nd ;n tbe Cou..t of Appe/
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The Court appears to endorse this fom1 of litigation for rea·
sons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective
Hresponse to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails ~to recognize that allowing this action to proceed without an interested
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some
magnitud .
A
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtaiu class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
~
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate. ~
the responsil>ility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the federal
iOJl(tS.

'WSee Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Cert;fioaHon, 40 Oh;o St. L. J. 441, 47()-471 (1979). In aot;on' brough/
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 11-12. The pra:ctical argument is not J
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usuary claims. 1 " the Court's concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and at/
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act.16
Rule 23 (b )(3) , a class member must decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Ru1e 23 (c) (2). This provision
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were pennitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to !'ecure tl1e benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966)
Cf!)Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc ., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure 'to comply with Mississippi'3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
§ 85. But I do not understand that. the National Bank Act displaces state
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or
un~e penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
(!!:)Tho Ad proviJPs tlmt rules of procedme promulgated by thi,.; Court
· "sl><ll not ••• onla<go oc modify """ substantive •igbt." 28 U.
0

s, /
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should be
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of moot- I
ness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification ·in appropriate circumstances. 17
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District~
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
M7-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the SubstanceP~edure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974).
(!.9In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), thi:; Court
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on· the
dangers of "indiscriminate" interlocutory review. ld., at ·-474. Although
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in which it w<mld. be

' d<oirnblo, Cong''" may '""'ody tho pmblem by appmpriate Iegi.rati/
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
deficiency. 18

l

B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
can be intemled only to benefit PestnmlentJs' counsel and thel
members of a putative class who have indicated no interest
i the claims asserted in ~case) serve on their own motion-if indPPcl they serve at alJ.l 0 Since no court has certified the class. there has been no considered determination
that respondt'nts will fairly and adequately represent its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
~
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to i V

3

€t:onp;rr:::,< rurrrntl? haR beforr it. a bill that nttemptF; to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area.. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certi~tion under the proposed procedures.
\
CllJIA ~> noted abovr, p.
, supra, rrspondrnts took no appeal in 1heir
own nnmrs. Onr
that this candid disclaimrr of J>Prsonal
intNr,;t. would distroy the foundation upon which the CourL predica.tos
A<t. III jmisdiMion. A•te, at 7; ""'p. -;\• •up>"a,
/

would~ink
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a) (3)?

20

The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced set- \
tlements" of class action litigation. Thus, the difficulties
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's
result also authorizes appea.Js by putative class representatives
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their in- f
dividual claims. If the order denying class certification · is
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand
will have no more continuiug relationship to the putative
class thau respondents have here. A remand for certification
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation
of Rule 23. See p. -;t--, and n. 1f..,.. supra. These tensions,
arising from the express terms of the Rule, undermiue the
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.

wrn:.

In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. 21 It unnece~/
20

o..t

l~c::.t

The District Court. propPrly ma.y conclude on remand that respondents,
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class.
L_
21
MR. Ju::;ncB STEvJmti stH.teii, in his concurring opinion, that all persons
S ~t11.t\
.Ueged to bP membf'rs of a putative class "~tsmt1tisr:lly became parties
to the case or controver~yA for; purposE>~" of Art. III , and that they
"remain pa.rties until a. fina.l determination has been made tha.t. the action
may not be mnint~tined as a class action." Ante, at - . This novel
view, for which no authority is cited, cannot be reconciled with Indianapolis School C'omm'1's v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where a.n oral
certifica.tion order was held insufficient to identify the interests of absent
class membf'fs for Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different
when the class has not been identified at .. all. See also Memphis Light,
/

Ifkt /~
\ 1 ·M ;~

.

__
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration
Rule 23. Aud it may work a serious injustice in this case. 2 ~

4\ 1~ J-

,·s avt~~t,.~
W\of'e_ ~
(}_ t; 'c.h (jY\,

JJ.;'~~~
.1-t> s&tpo~ c;'f
~~~ CJJAR ')

/Jbtt

1-

Gas L~ Water Div . v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxte1· v. Palmigiano,
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147
~
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
1976) .
rule of
party status iR t:l1iii 8Mt:ir f_o_r_9_0-,000
---1
u 11dentified persons--has troublesome and far-reaching implications that
could prejudice the ·bringing of class actions. Presumably 1t purpose of
such a rule would be to assure tha.t satisfaction of the claims of named
parties would not. terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of
unnamed par! ie:;; be extinguished by the failure of the named partjes to
appeal. Thu~, if the rule proposed by MH. Jus'l'ICE STEVENS is to accomplish its pmpo,;p, 1 suppose that a fiduciary duty must. be imposed upon
named part iP,; to continue tlw litigation where--a;; here--the unnamed
p~Lrties remain unid(•nt ified and fnil to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the
named partir;; not onl~· be required to continue to litigate, but to a;;:;ume
personal re:;ponsibility for costi-1 and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is
lost? Would re.,;ponsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they
thereby nssum<'d >;uch long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like
questions nre fl.ub~tantial. Tlwy nre not. resolved by Rule 23. I believe
they merit. rardul stud~· by Congrer,." before this Court-perhaps unwittingly-create~ a major category of clientless litigation unique in our
sy:>1:em.
2
~ The Court's rr~urreetion of this dead controversy may r~ult In
irreparable injnr.r to innocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank.
When the Di::-:trict. Court drnird certification on September 29, 1975, it
assigned a.s one of itil reasons the possible " destruction of the [petitioner]
bank" by damng(•,.; then allegrd to total 12,000,000 and now potentially
augmented by the accrual of intrrrst. App. 47, see ante, at. 2, n. 2. The
possible destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional is:;ue,
but. serious indt•rd to depositor:,; , stockholders, and the community served.
It is Raid that this il'i ne(•rs.,;ary t() redres,.: injuriP:,: pos~ibl~· ,:ufferecl by (
member ' of tlw putative class. Yet, no such per~on ha.-; eomr forward
in the nearly nin <> years that. have passed sinc-e this nction was filed.
Indred, the challPng<'d conduct. was authorized by statute almost six years
ago. A,; the District Court rna~· he called upon to determine whether the
equitable cloctrinr of "relation back" permit>~ it to toll the statute of
limitations on rrma nd , ante, at 3, n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for
that court to con~ider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances

~roposed

. a.~:~tem!tti(

WQ..;
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and:
remand with instructions to dismiss the a~peal as moot.. ~

presented, the District Court may wf:'ll see no reason to exercise its equitable di~:;cretion in favor of putative clttl;IS members who have slept on their
rights these many years.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C.
§ 1355.
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction
of an Art. III court under established and controlling precedents. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - , in one
important respect: both require us to decide whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever from
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, however, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims."
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid.
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals. !d., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles
unambiguously require a finding of mootness.

A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in fulP RespondAlthough rc;;pondcnt.~ al:oo aRkcd for attorney's fees, their complaint
shows lhat fee:; were to be granted only from the damages ultimately
2

. I, : ;·

> ' 'I- .
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion
would entitl<' them to additional relief of any kind from the
petitioner.:! Their personal claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names. The 11otice of appeal filed with the District Court
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated . . . ." App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have
no interest in thr "individual and private case or controversy"
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without
such eviclcnc<'. this and other courts routinely have held that
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome. California v. San Pablo &
'Pulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill &
'Phomas Co. v. Um:ted States, 392 F. 2d 204 (C'A6 1968) (per
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968)
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.
2d 89 (CAS 1965) (per curictm). It is the tender itself that
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid.
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully
satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot. 4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
awarc!Pcl to tlwm or the rial's. App. 13-14. There is no possibility of
pro~prrtivc relid lH·c·au,.:e the ~li,;,.:i;o;:::ippi u;o;ury Rta.tutE' was amE'nded in
1!)74 to authorizr, inlC'I' alia. tllC' <'harg;r>< at i:<.~He in this ca::>e. 1974 Miss.
GE'n. Law,;, rh. 5t)-l., § 7; ,.;pr ~Ii""· Cock Ann.§ 75-17-1 (G).
8 Neither the Court nor tlw rc'spomlent,.; havr a:,;.~E'rtecl that the petitioner',; trnder fail,; to ineludo all eo:,;b and fpe,; for which it could be held
liable. See P:ut IT-B, infra.
1 The "~tntutory right" to appc:.d, ante, at 7, ilRelf cannot. supply a.
per:;onal stake in the outcome, Jor Congress cannot abrogate Art. III
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorahle judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902
(Hl7f:i); ~) Moore's Federal Practice ~ 203.06 (1975). But
the requirement of adverse effect is more than a rule "of
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held
repeatc:dly. and as the Court concedes. a11te, at 10, Art. III
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is
at issue "throughout the c:ntirety of the litigation." Sosna
v. loll'a, 419 LT. f-1. 393, 402 (1975). Sec, e. g., Preiser v.
Xewk·irk, 422 lT. A. :395, 401-401 (1975).
[t. is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule of practiee, that has iu1pellcd fPderal courts uniformly to require a
showing of continui11g adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal.'' 15 vVright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902.

Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D . C. -· . 580 F. 2cl 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Freemall, 319 C S. :359 (1943); Electrical Fittinys v. Thomas &
Betts Co., 307 P. S. 241 (1939); Kapp Y. National Football
Leayue, 58G F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 HJ78); Cover v. Schwartz,
1:3;~

F. 2d 541 ( 1042) , ccrt. cl<'niPd. 319 U. S. 748 (1943). 5

linll( <i( IOII;o; Oil thP juri:<lllrtion or tlw frd<•ral C'Oilrt~::~ . Gladstone, Realtors
v. l'tllage of Belltcood. 4·l:l (T. S. 91, 100 (1970).
['ntted Airlines, Inc. Y. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopers
ct: ],ybrand Y. fMesay ,1,;~7 tT. ~. 46;3 (107~), arc• not fo the contrary.
lnri(knt;tl d1c·tum in both t':l~'<'" ;-;tatPd that the Jpnial of dass certification
i:-; "uiJ.iP<'f to appPll;il<' revirw aftl'l' final jud~ment at. the belw~t of the
nanwd pLnnt d'f~ . :\ <'11 hrr ca~c· di:-;<'11:-;;;rd moolltP,.;.~, and neither nnalyzrd
tht• propo~ition m an~· 1\'a~ ·. [ndrrd, thr onl~· authonty cited in Coopers
& Lybmntl wa:-: (' nited Airlines. ~re 4;~7 l' . S., at 4(i9, aml the only
nuthorit.1· r1t<•d Ill Cnited Airlines wa:,; a romp;-;;;iou madr by thP def.rndant
:llld a h;;t of <·n;;p~ from thr Court:-; of Appc•ab, not one or which dealt
w1th a :-;n~gp;-;twn of mootnr:s,; in an analogou;; ,;ituation, ,;pc 4;32 U.S., at
;~g:{, and n 14
Hul'h ;-;tatemrntH, ea:sunlly c·mmriatNl without a word of
<·xplanatiOll m opminu,.; dealing with unrelated lrgul que:>tiom;, are not
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite
stake in the outcome of the action?
Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is the case
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited
appeal was a1lowed because the petitioner himself was prejudict>d by tlw inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse findiug
i11 a generally favorable decree.
See ante, at 10. Here, the
existc~ncc of the District Court's order denying certification
has 110 cffc•ct whatever on the respondents. Thus, the perfolonal stake that justified the Electrical Fitt?:ngs appeal is not
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as
an adjudication of Otlc of the issues litigated." !d., at 9-10.
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.

B
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the
"j urisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that
only a "party I who I retains a stake in the appeal l can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining
stake in "the m0rits of the substantive controversy." !d., at
eoutrollin!! or cn•n pcr,.;ual'IVC' whrn ihey arr Jwwn on further reflection
to han' bc·rn ineon~i~tPJJt with ~<"ttlPd law. A~; the Court agrees today,
Jl(•Jthri r-a~c· c·n•:tic>~ an PWPption to the fundamental ruiC' thai '• [fJrderal
ap])('IIHH' juri~diet 10n i:-; limited l.Jy tho appcllaut '~ per:-;onal stake in the
appPal." Ante, aL 10.

•
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9-10. NevPrthelcss, it holds that respondents retain a personal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses
that havC' beC'n incurred in this litigation and for which they
assert a continuing obligatiou." ld., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10. 0
This conclu::~iOll is neither legally sound nor supported by the
record.
Tlw Court fails to identify a single item of expense, chargeable to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before
tlw petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been
con f' picuou!Sly vaguP in iclen tifying the "fees allCl expenses"
r<'li<·d upon as i'Ul>plying the adverse interest essential to a live
cutttrovPrsy. 7 The only expense mentioned by respondents.
ap:ut fron1 court costs included in the pditioner's tender, is
noL a pn•st'tlt obligation at all. It is an offer to provide security for costs ill the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief
for Respondents :33; App. 78. ~or does the attorney's fee
arratlgt•nJent in this case create any obligation, present or
" Tlw Court nl,;o nwntion" tlwt " lt]h<• u,;p of tlw rhtss aetion prorrdurc
for lttigation or imli1·idual elaim~ ma~· offrr "ubstantial advantagrs for
!lanH•d plamtiiT~ ... ." Ante, at 11, n. 9. But any "uch advantages
cannot a<'<'nte to th<'"<' n•:;polldt•llt:; , who will not be litigating thrir own
elatm,; on rmwlHI. llld<·Pd, tlw Court refrr:s to rP:spondrnts in thi~ context
o nl~ to point out that their total dama!);E'::' wen· ,;o ,;mall that thr~· " would
bt· uuhkd~· to obtain legal rPdrt·~:; at an arrpptable cost" if thp~· eonld not.
do ~o IJ~· mt•aJJ:; of a <·a!"~ action. ·w e may a:;,;tmH' that rP~pondent:< had
~O llH ' illt<•rp:<t in t hp r•la""-aet ion pro<·Pdurc a~ a nwan:s of inter<•:;ting the1r
l11w~·<·r~ in thP r·a,;<' or obtaini1tg: a :satisfactory ,;pttlcmcnt. Thi,; may be
an tnterP:;t. prop<•rl.1· furthPrl'd b~- Hull' :.l:l, but. on<·P rPspondrnt~ obtained
hot h a<· t· <·:;~ to <·omt i!!ld full individual rPiid that inten•,;t di:<appt•i!rcd.
~ l't•rh:t p,. tlw ,;1 rongr~t of rp,;pondent ,-' Ht at <'InPut" i~:
'·OJ t·om"<', th<· ntt<·n·"'· of tltt• I rP"pondPIIt:;J in i!:<:it-"rtion of thP right to
pro<·P<·d on lwhitlf of t hr ela~:; inelndr::; :such mat tl'r:< a,; thr pro:<]Wct. for
:;prpadinp: atto nH·<~ fN·~ and <'XJWII~(':; among mort' daimant,; and thus
rt•du('ill!!, tlw p<'rcentag<' that. would otiH'rwi,;p bt• payabk b~ · th<•m ."
l'l:tiutitl'"-Appell;lltt:;' Brid in Oppo,;ition to :\Iotio11 to Di:<mi":; Appeal and
Hrply 13rid, fikd in Ilop er v. C'Uitliurvc (CA5, Xo . 76-3li00), Jan . 10,
HJ77.

J'·
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future•. that can b0 aff0cted by tho certification of a class.
Respondents' complaint idc•ntifies the fee to be paid, subject
to court approval. as "twenty-five percent (25'/r )" of the
anwunt of t11<' final judgment. App. 14, 16.H No arrangemeiit other than this customary type contingent fee is identifiE'd in tlw record or the briefs. Yet, no on<' has explained how
rcspondrn t;:;' obligation to pay 25'/r of their recovery to counsC'l could be reduced if a class is certified and its members
h<>COJIIC' si1nilarly obligated to pay 25'/r of their recovery.
Thus. Uw assert('d interest i11 "spn'ading I of I attorney's fees
a11d c>xpc•nsC's'' 1' rdates to no present obligation. It is at
most an c•xtwctatioll-of thE' respondPnts' and particularly of
tlwu· eoull~C'l - that certain fc•0s and ('Xpenses lllay become
payahl<' i11 thC' C'vrnt. a class is certified. That expectation is
" ·holly irrp]c'vallt to the existence of a present controversy
hPhH'<' 11 peti tionrr and rrsponde11 ts.
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses cannot be rrCOIIC'i!Pd with tlw repeated admonition that "unadol'llrd spt'culation will not suffice to i11voke the federal
JUdicial powN." E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare R ·i ghts
Org. , 42() li. S. 26. 44 (1D76). Such sp0culation is particularly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor
' H(·~poJHlt·nt~

"DPmand for JudgmPJit " asb t]l(' l'Ourt to award the
;tC'tiOu a>' wPil ;t~ attor·np~· fr('s in thr amount of 25% as
lwrPinahovP ;tih•gPd, or ~\ll'h ot IH•r amottnt a,; rna~· bP d<•rnlrd tit <IJHl
propPr h~· t IH• C'ourt ." App. W. TIH' I'<'(! II<'"'· for fP<·~ wa,; rlaritird in
Pantg;raph \'1 ol th(· auH·ndPd <·omplaint, which rrnd~ a;; follow:;:
" Plaintiff allP!-(<'s that. thP Cl(']'k of thi;; C'ottrt br dP:;ignated cu::;todian
of thl' fund,; and j11dgrnPJJt to hl' paid Plaintiti and otlwr JH:'r::;ons ::;irnilarly
:-;ituatPd, h~ · DdPrtd;tnt:; and thl' Clt•rk dcpo;;i1 ~aid fuJJd;; in a. :<uitable
<kpo;;rtor~· and. 11pon prop<'r' onler of thi:; Court . cli,.;btrr·,;e ;;aiel funds
:tft!'f d(•dll<'tron of rH'<·<•,;,;ar~· <'XP<'Il:i<'>' alld attonH'Y frr:; to Plaintiff's
altorrw~ ·· lwn·nt of twPnt~· -tin· per <'Put. (25 % ) of thr amount :,;o paid,
tlw ~anw IH'irtl! J'(•a ..:ouahlP b~ · all ~tamlarcls, mrl11ding that allegrd and
utiltzPd h~ · DPI'Pndant,; 111 oumg ('Prtain rn<·mbpr:; in of l8ic] the da::;s in
Stat(' Court :; for unpaid aceount,;." App . 1:~-1·1.

"It lo~t . of

'J

B P( '

!hi~

n. 7. sup m.
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "injury"-if any existsis not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. I d.,
at 41- 42; see Gladsto11e, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U. R. fll, D0 (1D79.'" Whatever ma.y be the basis for the
rrspondents' asserted desire to share fees ancl expenses with
unnamed rnemb0rs of a class. the petitioner is merely a bystander. "IF Iederal courts ar<> without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
hefore tlwm. '' lYorth Carolina Y. Rice, 404 U. S. 244. 246
( Hl71). This elementary principle should dispose of the case.

c
, inee respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, Art. liT and the precedents of this
Court requirP that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g.,
.lshcroft v. Afattis, 431 U.S. 171,172-173 (1077) (per curinm.);
We·i11stei11 v. Bradford, 4~3 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam);
Preiser Y. 1\'ewkirk, 422 F. S. 305. 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis Sehoul Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); DeFunis \'. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316- 320 (1974) (per
c·uriam); iYorth Carol·i11a v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights,
404 F. S. 403, 407 (1972). 11

° Far-r('<tthin):( con~l'qm·ner,.: eould flow from a rnlr that fer,:; rrcoverable
from )lllt<t t ivP rl<t,.:~ lll<'ntlwr~ ma~· hr '· t raerd '' to t IH• ('la,;s 1l<'f'Pn1la.nt
for ]llll']>O:i<'" or the (';)/"((' or eont.rovrr,;~' l'l'C(Uin•mpnt, At thr lra..,·t., this
rul<' would Htpport a elaim t h;t! a [l<'r~on who ha:,; iii'CPpted f111l ~Pi tlPment
of hi ~ indinduaJ t·Jaim j~ Pill it.Jrd to fi)<o ~uit Oil brhnJ!' 0!' :1\l llllrt't'011liJL'lL"Pd
(']:'~" · Appan•ntl.\·, tlw putativr plaintiff llt'Pd on]~· "a~:;nj t]," ante, at. 7,
n. ti, th:t! fpp:; iiH'ttrn·d. in anti<"ipation of tlw litil-(atinn ultimatPly 1rtight be
::;h:tr<'d with :t ])('('\·a iling <"i:t."ti.
1t Th<'~t· <·a:;l·~ an· di~cw<,.:rcl more fully in United State~ Parole Cmn?nt~~W/1 v. Oemght!f, pu:;t, ai - - - (.PowELL, J ., dis8cnting).
1
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Respondents do not suggest that their daims are "capably
of reprtition. yet evading rPview." Cf. Gerstein v. P'ugh, 420
t. R. 103. 110-111, n. 11 (1975). 12 ~ot a single one of the
allPged 90.000 class members has sought to intervene in the
ninP yPars since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v . .McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyoqe
chalkuged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certifica:tion was dC'11ied. the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which respondC'ttts sought to take all interlocutory
app<'a1. without provoking a response from attyone who previously may haw thought that thC' class action would protect
his rights. .\part from the persistence of the lawy('[·s. this
has bPen a noncase · since the petitioner tendered full satisfactioll of thP n'spondPnts' individual claims. To be sure, respondents' counsel may have the same intC'rest in an enlarged
rreovNy that is inhNen t iu any con ti ngen t fee arrangement.
Bnt { know of no decision by any court that holds that a
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to bC' paid by third persons
not present itl court. creates the personal stake in the outcome
required by Art. III.

II
DC'spite the absencp of an Art. III controversy. the Court
directs a remand in \vhich this federal action will be litigated
by lawyers whose only "clients" arp unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be rcpresellted by anyone. 1 3
1
~ lf :t ela~,.,-adion defPnclmt!. wc·rr ~how11 In IHtYr embarked on a ('OUr~c
of conduct designed to insulate the class rrrLifiration is:;ue from appellate
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances
m1ght find the Gerstein te~t satisfied and the ca~e not moot. See Susman v.
Linroln Ameriran Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978) ; 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Frderal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
C'ommrnt , Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
1
a I do not ~ng:gP~t that eom1~el aetpd improper!~ · in pm~ning thiH ea e.
,' inee t lwy have pn·vailed both in thi~ Court and 111 tlw Court of Appeals,

·.
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The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for reasons of policy and practice. It is said to be an 0ffective
"response to the exist0nc0 of injuri0s unremedied hy the
r0gulatory action of gov0rnm0nt." Ante, at 12. I am not
a'>\'UI'<' that sueh a consideration ever h0for0 has inflm'necd this
Court in detenni11ing \\'hether the Constitution confers jurisdietion on the fc<kral courts. In any Pvent, tlw consequences
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrietive as
th<' Court sePillS to f<>ar. And the Court fails to recognize
that allowing this action to proCP('d without an int<'rcsted
plaintiff \\'ill itself generate practiea.l difficulti0s of some
magnitude.

A
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a succ0ssful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
g<'n<•rally would be barred by Art. Ill. But the consequences
of applying s<•t tled rules of mootnPss in that situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
grant('cl, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. ,.rhus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
the HH5G allH'nclin<'nts to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.11
tlw

n ·:<pOll:<ihilit~·

tomt ~.
1
J f'1'f\

for allowing i'licnt-b,

litigation~

fall on the federal

Comnwnt, Jmnwdinte App,·nlahility of Order~ Dc·nying- Clas,.; Cerhfieation , 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under

·.
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." i1 ·nte, at 11-12. The pra;ctical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usuary claims, 1 " th0 Coures concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act. 16
Rule 2:3 (b) (3), a class member must decide at the time of certification
whPther to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members werr permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in ordrr to srcure the benefits of that drcision. Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966).
1 ' ' Liddell\'. Litlno Sust!'m,s. lnr .. ~00 So. 2d 455 (197-f) (n•jeeting borrowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Missi -sippi '3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
5. But T do not uutlerlitand that the National Bank Art tliHplaces state
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury elaim>l. A primary purpose of
that Act i~ to protect national banks from di::;criminatory treatment or
undur prnaltir~ that may be imposed by Htate law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
10 The Act JH'o\·id<'s that rul<':-< of procrdurf' promulgatPd !J~, this Court
" hail not . . . enlarge or modify any substantive right ."' 28 U. S. C.

s

..
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should be
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances. 17
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974); Dev<.>lopments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976) . See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legaliz<.>d Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974).
'' 7 In ('oopers <~ Lybmnd v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (Hl78), 1hiR Court
held that 1he denial of class certification is noL a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the
dangers of "indiscrimmatc" interlocutory review. !d., at 474. Although
Coopers (~ Lyb11a11d now prevents review in cases in which it would be
·destrable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation.
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress--not this Court-to correct the
dcficiency.1 e

B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
can lw intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims
asserted in this case. Respondents serve ou their own motion-if indeed they serve at all. 10 Since no court has certified the class. there has been no considered determination
that respondents will fairly and adequately rcpreseut its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
10 C'ongrp,.:s c·mTPntly h;\s hrforc if. a bill !hat. attempt" to rrmedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) . The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certification under the proposed procedures.
11
' A~ notc>cl nbo1·C', Jl. :3. supm. responclc>nt:- look no appeal in ilwir
own nnml's. One would think that !his candid di~claimPr ol' JWrsonal
iiJtc•rt•st. would di:<f.roy the foundation upon wh1ch the Court. prl'dicates
Art. ]]J jurisd}('tion . Antt', al7 ; ,;pep. 6, ~11]1/'u .

'I
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a) (3)? 20
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced settlPmPnts" of class action litigation. Thus. the difficulties
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the order denying class certification is
rE'versed in that situation, the named plain tiffs on remand
\rill have no more continuing relationship to the putative
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification
could also lead to "onr-way intervention'' in direct violation
of R ul<' 2:3. ~ce p. 10. and 11. 14, supra. These tensions,
arisi11g from tlH' express terms of the Rule. undermine the
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result rf'ached today,

III
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. lli jurisprudence.2 ' It unnecesThe Di:strict Court proper!~· may conclude on remand that re:spondents,
for the:;e or othf'r rea:;on:s, canuot adrquately represent the class.
21 Mu .. JUK'I'ICB STBVBNK .~talc>,;, iu hi,; COIH'urriug O]>inion, that a.ll pen;ons
aliPg<>d to lw mc·mllc·r" of a putatiw eta~::; "should be eou t;iderrd partir~
to thP ra~c· or c·ontrov<·r:,:y at l<>a~t for the limited purpo,:e" of Art. III, and
that. thp~· "rpmain partie~ nntil :t final drtPrmination ha,; br<>n made that the
a<·tion m:t~ · not IH· m<tint<tiiH'd :tH :tria~:; action." A11t1'. ;~t - . Thit-< novel
view , for which no authority i::; cited, caunot br reconciled with Judwnapolis School r'omm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), where an oral
certification order wa;; held in~uflicient to identify the interests of absent
class membpr:; for Art. III purpo;;e;;. The result hardly could be different
whe11 the cia::;:; ha" not bren identified at all. See <dso Memphis Light,
20

I

I
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case. 22
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano,
423 U. S. 308, 310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147
(1975); Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430
(1976).
If it is anything more than a fiction designed solely to dispose of this
case, MR. JusTICE STEVENS' pro11osed rule of party status-here for 90,000
unidentified persons-has troublesome and far-reaching implications that
could prejudice the bringing of class actions. Presumably a purpose of
such a rule would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named
parties would not terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of
unnamed parties be extinguished by the failure of the named parties to
appeal. Thus, if the rule proposed by MR. JusTICE S·rEvENS is to accomplish its purpose, I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon
named parties to continue the litigation where-as here-the unnamed
parties remain unidentified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the
named parties not only be required to continue to litigate, but to assume
personal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is
lost? Would responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwittingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our
system.
22 The Court's resurrection of this dead controversy may result in
irreparab!e injury to innocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank.
When the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, it
assigned as one of its reasons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner]
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially
augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The
possible destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue,
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community served.
It is said that this is necessary to redress injuries possibly suffered by
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward
in the nearly nine years that have passed since this action was filed.
Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by statute almost six years
ago. As the District Court may be called upon to determine whether the
equitable doctrine of "relation back" permits it to toll the statute of
limitations on remand, ante, at 3, n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.

that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances
presented, the District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their
rights these many years.
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[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and 28 U. S. C.

§1355.
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction
of an Art. III court under established and controlling precedents. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - , in one
important respect: both require us to decide whether putative class repres<'ntatives may appeal the denial of class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever from
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, however. the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims."
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid.
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals. ld., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles
unambiguously require a finding of mootness.

A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to
intervene, respondents are tho only plaintiffs arguably present
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respond2 Although respondent<:: al~o asked for attorney's fees, their complaint
shows that fcc:, were to be granted only from the damages ultimately

. '·...,,
. '. .
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion
would entitk them to additional relief of any kind from the
petitioner.~ Their personal claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court
recites that r<:>spondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated . . . ." App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have
no interest in thr "individual and private case or controversy''
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without
such eviclrnCf'. this and other courts routinely have held that
a trndrr of full n'Iirf remedies a plaintiff's injuries and eliminates his stakP i11 the outcome. California v. San Pablo &
Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill &
Thomas Co. V. um:ted States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per
curiam); Lamb \'. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968)
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.
2d 89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that
moots the casr whctlwr or not a judgment is entered. Ibid.
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to revirw the abstract question remaining in a case when the·
plaintiff has rpfused to accept a proffered settlement that fully
satisfies his daims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should diffrr brcause the District Court has entered a judgI'nen t in favor of rcsponden ts instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot.' It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
awarclrd to thrm or thr rt1~s. App. 18-14. There is no possibility of
pro~prctivr relief bt·<·ntt.~r tltr \li,;~i~:.;ippi Hi'lll'~' statutP was am('nded in
1974 to aut!toriz<', intrr alia. thP chargp~ at i::;:;ue in this case. 1974 Miss.
G('n. Law,;, elt. 51i-!, § 7: :.;p(• :.ri~~. CoclP Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6).
8 Krithrr tlH· Court nor tlw rP~punci<>nt~ havr a:;...;erted that the petitioner'~ tpnder fnil,; to indudo all <"O~t,; and fees for which it could be held
liable. S('r Par1 ll-H, infra.
1 The "~tatutury right " to appeal, ante. a.t 7, itRr!f cannot. supply a
per~onal f'takc in the ott!(•omc, fur Congrc~;;.~ cannot al.JrogaLc Art. III
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that the en try of j udgmcn t in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. Ree 15 Wright,
Miller and Cooper. Federal Practice and Procedure ~ 3902
(H)76); ~) Moore's Federal Practice 1T 203.06 (1975). But
the req uirrmen t of adverse eft'ect is more than a rule "of
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, a11te, at 10, Art. III
itself r0quirPs a live controversy in which a personal stake is
at issue "throughout the entirety of the litigation ." Sosna
\'. lou•a , 41D P. ~- 393. 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v.
Xf'u•kirk, 4:2:2 lT. R. :395,401-401 (H)75).
[l ts this constitutional limitation, and uot any rule of practiee, that has impelleJ fedPral courts uniformly to require a
showing of cun tin uing adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal.'' 15 \Vright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902.

Barry v. /Jistrict of Columbia Bd. of Blections, -

U. S.

App. D. C'. - . 380 F. 2cl 695 (1978); see Altvater v. FreeIll aII. a19 l'. N. :359 ( 194:3) ; E lettr·ical Fittiny s v. 1'hom as &
BetLs Co., :307 1'. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. Natio11al Football
£eayue. 58() F. 2d 644, 6i)0 (CA9 1078); Cover v. Schwartz,
1;~;~ .F. :2d 541 ( 194:2) , cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943). 5
linlll<iiJOll:< 011 th<' juri:,;Lhction of th<' frderal eourts. Gladstone, Realto1·s
\'. 1' /l/age of BeliiCOOd. 4-U (T, S. m, 100 (1979).
l"111ted Airli11es. lm:. ' . AhDo11ald, -±:32 0. S. :385 (1977), :wei Coopers
ce· L!fbrand "· J,u•e~ay -1-:37 t:. R. -±();3 (Hl7?-l), are not to the co11trary.
liH'IdPIII:d di('tlllll in both c·a~r~ :<t:tt('(] that the t!Pni:tl of !']ass certification
is ~ul>.wet to app<'ll:ill' r(•view after final judgtrH'llt at the belw~t of the
ll:tlll('d pl:un t liT~ . :\('it her <":1~<' di:<<'tJs~<·d moot II('~,.;, ami n<:'it her a.nnlyzrd
Ihe propo:<it ion in an~ · 1\'a~· . Indeed, tlw on!~· authonty cited in Coopers
cC· L!f/muuf wa:-: ( 'niled Airlines. :-:rr 4:37 r. S., :t t 4!19, am! the only
authorit~ <· J((•ci Ill C11ited Airlilll'li wa:; :1 ronr<'"'~ion madr by the drf.rndant
Hnd :> h:-:t of ('a;-;c•;-; from tlw Court:-; of Appt•ab, not one of which dealt
with a ~uggl':<tio n ol' mootne::;s in an analogou:-< situation, ser 4:32 U. S., at
:l9:l, and 11 l.f . :'\ul'h :<tatements, easuall~· PllllllC'iatNl without it word of
t•xplnna(JOII m O]Hniom; dealing with unrdatccl legal que~tion~, are not
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not
affected by the "factual ·context" in which a suggestion of
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite
stake in the outcome of the action?
Electrical Fittings v. 'Phouws & Betts Co., supra, is the case
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited
appeal vms allowed because the petitioner himself was prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding
in a generally favorable decree. See aute, at 10. Here, the
existence of the District Court's order denying certification
has 110 effrct \Yhatever on the respondents. Thus, the personal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as
an ad.iudication of onC' of the issues litigated." !d., at 9-10.
( 'ollateml rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.

B
After recognizing that thC' right to appeal is subject to the
"j urisclictional limitations of Art. III." the Court agrees that
only a "party I who] retains a stake in the appeal [can satisfy] the requin•mcnts of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining
stake in "tlw lllC'rits of the substantive controversy." !d., at
<·out rolling or l'Y<'H pl'r,;uat'ivc whrn 1hey arr f:hown on further reflection
fo ha\'e l><'PII imon"istPnt with ,;ettlrd la.w. A:-:, thr Court agrrps today,
JH'ltlwr <·n~<· <·rc•afe,- nn l'X<'<'ption to thr fnndaml'nfnl rul<' that ''rfJederal
npjl('llnfe juri::;dief IOn i:-; limited by Lhe appellant':; pcr::;oual sta,ke in the
aprwal." Ante, aL 10.
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9-10. Nevertheless. it holds that respondents retain a personal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses
that haw been incurred in this litigatiou and for which they
assert a C'Otttinuing obligation." I d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10. 0
This conclusion is neither legally sou]l(l nor supported by the
record.
ThE' Court fails to identify a single item of expense, chargeabl<' to the petitioner. that was incurred by respondents before
the petitiotwr's tender. Similarly. respondents have been
eottspiruously vague in identifying the "fees all(] expenses"
r<'li<'d upo11 as supplyiug the adverse interest essential to a live
eottLrov<•rsy. 7 The only expense mentioned by respondents.
apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender. is
noL a present obligatio11 at all. It is an offer to provide security for costs in the evc11t a class ultintately is certified. Brief
for Respondents :33; App. 78. ~or does the attorney's fee
arrangentent in this case create any obligation, present or
<> 'l'lw Court al~o nwntinn:-: that "rt]h<' ns(' of tlw claos aetwn procrdure
for htig:tiion ul' in<ii1·idwd elaim" ma~· offl'r substantial a<ivanUtgr;;; for
JlUilll'd plallllifk .. ." Allte, a( Jl, n. n.
But any :;ueh advantages
('annul a<·cnH' to tlw,.;l' n•spotHknt;:;, who wiJJ not lw litigating thPir own
elunn~ on rmumd . lndPl•d, tlw Court rrfrn; to rp::;pondrnt.- in thi,; context
onl~ to point out that thPir total damagt>:-1 \H'r<' ~o ;;mall that thry "would
lw unltkd~· to ohtain legal n·dre"" at an acreptabll· ro::;t" if tlw~· c-ould not
do ~o h~ · m<·:ut:-: of :1 eal~~ :tel ion. \V" m:t.1· a~:<unH' that rr::-:ponclent::; had
~OIIl!' inl!-rp::;( in tlH· r·ln:':<-artion proePdurc· a~ a tnl'an:; of interP,.;Iing the1r
Ll\lyt•r:-~ in tlw r·a,.:P or obtaining :1 sati~<faetory ;;~>tl lrmrnt. Thi,; may be
an ini<'J'<'~<t. propPrl~· furl hnl'd IJy Hulr :2:~, but on<·<· rl'spondent~ obtained
both a<"<'!''' Io <"ourt :md full indiviciual rl·lid t hHI inlt•re::;t di;:;:tppeared.
7 Pt•rlw p~ t lw ,;t ronge:<t of re:-~pondl'nl :-:' :-;tat l·mc•nt~< j,:

" Of <·om"', th<· int<•re~<t . of thr I l'l'spond<>nt:sJ i11 a',.;Ntion of th<' right to
pror·Pl'd on behalf of thr ela,.;.~ include,; ;;urh mHitPr;; :t~< thr pro::;pect for
'preading atlornl·~··,_ fN•,; and <·xprn~<·,.; among mort• daimant,; and thus
rPdueing thr pPn·(•ntag<' that. would otlwrwi~l' lw payahiP b~· thrm."
l'la i nt iff,;-Appellant"· Rril'f in Oppo~<itimt to :\lot ion to Di:-:mi~::< Appeal and
HPply Briel", filed in Roper v. Crm~urve (('A5, No . 76-3{\00), Jan . 10,
HJ/7 .

,.
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future. that can be affected by the certification of a class.
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject
to court approval. as "twenty-five percent (25/{ )" of the
alllount of the final judgment. App. 14. 16.' No arrangement othrr than this customary type contingent fee is identifipd in the n'cord or the brids. Yet, no one has explained how
respondents' obligation to pay 25~ of their recovery to counsd could be reduced if a class is certified and its members
becomf' similarly obligated to pay 25'/r of their recovery.
Thus. tlw atise>rt<'d in trrest i11 "spreading [ ofl attorney's fees
atHl expC'ns<'~; · :J r<'lat<'S to no pres<'nt obligation. lt is at
1nost a11 <'X]Wctation-of thC' respo11dents' ancl particularly of
tlwtr eounf:'Pl- that certain f<'es ami expenses 1nay become
payahl<' in tilC' C'V<'nt. a class is certified. That expectation is
ll'holly irr('l<'vant to the existence of a present controversy
hPt\\'f'<'n pditiotter and rC'spondents.
TIH' Court'ii reliat1ce on unidentified fees and expenses cannot be rC'coneikd with the rep<'ated admonition that "unadomed SJH'culation will 110t suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power.'' E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. lJ'elfare Rights
Ory., 42() l ~ . ~. :2(), 44 (HJ76). Ruch speculation is particularly i11appropriatc in this case, since neither the Court nor
' Ht •,.,polHit·nt~ ·

"DPlllaJHl for .ludg:mr11t " a:-;b tlw ('OJJrt to nward the
wrll ns nttomp~· fpe,; in thr amount, of 25% ns
h(•rpin:dloV(' :dh·g:Pd, or ~nl'h ot il!'r iilllOIIllt :1,.; Ill: I.'' I)(' drPmrd fit and
propPr b.1· ill!' ('ourt." App. Hi. Tlw n·qtw,;t, for frc·,.; wa,.; rlarifird in
Paragraph \'1 of til(' auwHdPd complaint, which rPad~ a:> follow~:
'' Plaintiff :diPg:<·~ that. tlw CIPrk of thi~ Court lw cll'~ignatrd eu:-;todian
of tlw fniHl,; and judgnwnt to he paid Plaintiff' and other pPr:-;on:; ;,;imilarly
Hiluat<·d, b~ · Dd('lHiant" and tlw ClPrk depo"it ~aid fund" in a ,.;uitnblo
depo~1t or,1· :11ul. upon prowr ordn of this Court. di,;bur:-;r ~aid funds
:d'tl'f <h·dul't 1011 of 11('('('"~'1 r~· <'XJH'll~<'~ and a ttornr~· frr" to Plaintiff's
attonl!'~ ·. h<·n•Jn of (\\'('nt~ · -fi\'C' JH'r <·Put, (25%) of thP amount ::;o paid,
thC' ~anw i>Ping n·H~onablc• b~· :dl ~tandnrds, ineluding: Owt allegrd and
llliilzPd b~ · D<'i'PndHnt,.; in ~tnng ('('!'lain mPmbrr~ in of Lsic] thE' class in
81:til• Court~ for llllp:ud :tC'C'Ounh." App. 13-H
" B~'<' n. 7, up ro.

"I (·lo~t. of

thi~ :IC'twn a~
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rrspondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will
he liable for the fees or <:'xpens<'s relied upon. Indeed, the
American Rule "·ould bar an award of attomey's fees against
this petitionrr. Thus. respondents' "injury"-if any existsis not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. I d.,
at 41- 42; scr GladstoNe, Realtors \'. l'iUage of Bellwood, 441
U. S. !H, D9 (1979."' Whatever may be the basis for the
rrspondc11ts' asserted desire to share fres and rxpenses with
unnam.ecl mrmbers of a class. thr 1)('titioner is mrrely a bystalHler. "IF Iederal courts arr without power to decide questions that cannot affrct the rights of litigants in the case
twforP tlwm.'' i\'ortll Ca,rolina "· Rice, 404 LT. S. 244. 246·
( HJ71). This elementary principle should dispose of the case.

c
~ inec r0sponclents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, Art. 111 and the precedents of this
Court rrquirr that tiH' case be dismissed as moot. E. g.,
A8hcroft v. J.lJattis, 431 U. R. 171,172- 173 (1977) (per curiam);
lrm:11slei11 \'. Bradford, 42:3 U. S. 147 (Hl76) (per curiam);
Preiser "· Xetokirk, 422 F. R. 395. 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis Sclwol Comm'rs "· Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); DeFunis \'. (}dfyrwrd, 416 U. R. 312. 316-320 (1974) (per
curiam); .Yorth CaroliNa v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
( ]Jfr curiam) ; SBC \'. 1\ledical Comut. for Human Rights,
404 1 . S. 403, 407 (1972).11

Far·r<':tl'hinl-( c·on~t·qnruc·f'~ <'onl<l flow from it rnlr thnt fers rcco\·rrable
J'rolll putaliv<' !'l;t"'·" nwmlH•r,; tlla~· IJr '·trw·r•d'' to ill(' rla,.;s <lderHlant
for JHll'JlO"'<'" of lhr <'<l"t' or rontro,·r·r~~· r<·qnirenwnt. At the lrab1·, this
ntlr• would >'Upport a ('l<tim th<tl a pr•r,.,on who h<t"' a<'<'P]ll<•d full "'<>ttl<'ment
of In,; iudn·tdual l'l<tilll j,., !'Ill itlrd to file "'uit 011 lwlwlf or <111 \lllfl'('Olllj)C'IL'<E'cl
r·Lt,...~. . \ppan·nr J,,·, iiH' putatin' plaintiff IH'l'd only ";t~,;Nit 1, '' ante, at 7,
11. 1\, that I<•<•,; in<·tttT<'d in anli('ipation of thl' liiig<ttion ultimately might be
sh; t r!'d with ;t pr<•,·;uling <'l<tl'...;.
1
' Tlw~<· <·a,:<·~ arl' di,:cu,.:,.:ecl more fully in Fniled States Parole Com?rl/.~81<111 v. 0<'mghty, pul!l, <LL - - - (PoWELL, J ., dis"cnting).
1"
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are "capable
of repetition. yet evading rf'Vif'w." Cf. GeTstein v. Pugh, 420
TJ. R. 103. 110-111, n. 11 (1975). 12 Xot a single one of the
allegre! !10.000 class members has sought to intervene in the
uine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. R. 385 (1!J77). Nor has anyo1~e
ehalkngrd the allegrclly usurious charges by informal complaint or prot0st. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Eveu after certifica:tion was cknied. the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which responde11ts sought to take an interlocutory
appra1. without provoking a respouse from anyone who previously may hav<' thought that thf' class action would protect
his rights. Apart frolll the p0rsistencc of the lawyers. this
ha been a no11Cas0 · sinc0 the petitioner kndrr0d full satisfaction of tlH' n'spondPnts' individual claims. To be sure, re.poncl0nts' couns0l may havC' the samr interest in an enlarged
rc'C'OVC'ry that is inlH'rent .in any contingPnt fee arrangement.
But [ kno\\' of no dPcision by any court that holds that a
la wycr's in tc'rcst in a larg0r fpe. to be paid by third persons
noL present in court. creates the personal stake in the outcome
required by Art. lli.

II
Despitf' the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court
din'cts a remand in 'vhich this federal actiou will be litigated
by lawyers whose only "clie11ts" arC' unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be represented by a11yone. 13
~ Il' a ('ln,.:,-aetion ddt>uclallt. were Rhown 1o ha\'P embarked on n rour:;e
of conduct dcHigncd to insulate the class crrtifica tion isHue from appellate
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a eourt in proper circumstances
might. find the Ge7'stein test ,;a tisfied and the ca~e not moot. See Susman v.
Lturoln Ame7'ican Co1'p., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Frdcrnl Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment , Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Di~mi~ sal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 57:3, 599-600.
'" T do not ~ug;gc•,..t that eoun,..c·l artPd impropl'rl~- in pm~uing this case.
i41nc·c· ttH'y haYe JH'f'\'ailed both in thi~ Court and 1n ti\C' Court of Appeals,
1
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The Comt appears to endorse this form of litigation for rcasons of policy and prartice. It is said to be an effective
"r<'sponse to the existence of injuries unremcdied hy t.he
regulatory aetio11 of gov0rnnwnt." , 1nl:e, at 12. I am not
aware that sueh a ronsi<kration ever hcfore has inftut•uced this
Court in tkter1ni ni ng whether the Constitut·ion confers .i urisdiction on thP fcd<•ral courts. ln any P\'t'nt. tlw consequences
of a finding of mootncss an• not likt-ly to lw as rf'strictiw as
thP ( 'ourt se<'lllS to fpar. And thf' ( 'ourt fails to recognize
that allowi11g this action to proe0t>d without a11 int<>restcd
plaintiff "'ill itself ge11Prate praetical diffieultiPs of some
maonituclc.
A
.\ finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a succPssful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
gcn<·rally \voul<l be barred by Art. lli. But the consequences
of applying :-;('t tlC'<l rulC's of mootnt•ss in that situation v,:o uld
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained hy force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
JUdgment. 1"hus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
tlw H)()() allH'JH!mrnts to Rule 2:3 wrrc illtt>Jidt>d to (•liminate.a
tltP

n·;-:pon.•ihilit~·

for allowin!!; elil'nt-1<•;-:,

litigation~

fall on the federal

tOll!'!.•.
J 1 FI<'P C'omnH·nt, Jmmrdiate :\ppP;tlahility ol' Ordl·r~ D<'nylllg; C'hts" Certification , 40 Ohio St. L . J. 441, 470-471 (1979) , ln actions brought under
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
generaL" A 'nte, at 11-12. The pra:ctical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usuary claims. 1 " the Coures concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act. 10
Hulr 23 (b) (3), a class member must decide at the time of certification
wlwther to " opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision
waR designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members wrrc permitted to intervene a.fter a decision on the merits
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966) .
1 " Liddell v. Litton Systems. Inc .. :300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rrjrc!ing borrowers' class aetion) ; Fry v. Layton. 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mis~i ~slppi '3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
§ 85. But I do nut underHtand thnt the National Bank Act displaces state
puhey disfavoring the aggregation of usury claim:;. A primary purpose of
that Act is to protect national banks from di:seriminatory treatment or
undur penaltir::; thnt may be imposed by ::;tate law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
JH The Act pro,·iclrs that rulr,; of procrdnre promulgatrd by thif< Court
"shaU not .. . enlarge or modify any substantive right."' 28 U. S. C.
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should be
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have clone today. The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances. 17
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with au individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d) (2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
§ 2072. Sec American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the SubstanceProcedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) .
17 In ('oopns ,(: L!Jbrwul v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), this Court
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appealnNe as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the
dangers of "indiseriminate" interlocutory review. /d., at 474. Although
Coopers & Lyb1)and now prevents review in cases in which it would be
desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation.
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
deficiency. 18

B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
can be intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims
ass<'rted in this case. Respondents serve on their own motion-if indeed they serve at al1. 10 Since no court has certified the class, there has been no considered determination
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
Is Cong rP~ ~ rurrPntly has before it a bill that attempts lo rrmedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H . R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, see n. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
t he enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certification under the proposed procedures.
1.!J Ao; nolrd abon', p. 8. supra. rnspomknt,; took no appral in thrir
own namr:<. One would think that this candid di:-;rlaimrr of prr:-;onal
inlen·,;l. would di,;t.roy the foundation upon which the Court. predicates
Art. III jmi:;di<"tion. A.nte, at 7; see p. 6, supra.

'~
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of t.he claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a) (3)? 20
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced settl<>ments" of class action litigation. Thus. the difficulties
facf'<l by the District Court on remand in this case may not
arisP again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's
result. also authorizes apprals by putative class representatives
\Yho have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If tlw order denying class certification is
n'versed i11 that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand
·will ha vp no more continuing relationship to the putative
class than rrspomkn ts have here. A remaud for certification
eould also }pad to "one-way in tervcntion '' in direct violation
of RulP 2:~. ~<'e p. 10. and 11. 14, supra. These tensions,
arising from tlw express tf'rms of the Rule, undermine the
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result rpached today.

III
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem~f
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. 21 It unuece
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting,
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law/ They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individm~l totals of $683.30 apd
$322.70. App. 59. Respondent~ also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court depied respondents' motion for class ce,rtification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. · Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered :final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents··
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§,$5,
86, which adopts th~ ?l~~r~t l!mh\l S\Jt by (lt~~:te ~ll:W1 and 28 U. S .. C.-
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jlJ.risdiction
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece.
dents. Accordingly, I dissent.
I
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - , in one
important respect: both require us to decide whether puta.
tive class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer·
tHication when they can derive no benefit whatever from
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, how.
ever, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims."
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid.
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals. ld., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles
unambiguously require a finding of mootness.

A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam·
ages; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respond11 Although respondents also a.sked for attorney's fees, their complai,nt·
il1ows tliat. fees· were· to h<e> granted only from the damage::; ultimately·-

,
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the
petitioner. 3 Their personal claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated. . . ." App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have
no interest in the "individual and private case or controversy"
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without
such evidence, this and other courts routinely have held that
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome. California v. San Pablo &
Tulare R . Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill &
Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968)
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.
2d 89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid,
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully
satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg..
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. There is no possibility of
prospective relief because tl1e Mississippi usury statute was amrnded in
1974 to authorize, inter alia, the charges at issue in this ca.-;e. 1974 Mis$.
Gen. Laws, ch. 564, § 7; see Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6).
8 Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted that the petitioner's tender fails to include all costs and fees for which it could be held
liable. See Part II-B, infra.
4
The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself cannot supply a,
personal stake in thfl outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III
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that the entry of judgtnent in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of ~ generally
favora:ble judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practi·ce and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Pra.ctice ~ 203.06 (1975). But
the requirement of adverse effect is more than a rule "of
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held
repeatedly, an·d as the Court concedes, a:nte, at 10, Art. III
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is
at issue "throughout the entirety of the · litigation." Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U."S.-395, 401-401 (1975).
It is th~s constitutional limitation, and not any rule of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to require a
showing of continuing adverse effect in order to COf!fer "standing to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra,-§ 3902.
llarry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
4PP· D. C. - , 580 F. -2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Free"
man, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v.· Thomas &
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football
League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 ·(CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz,
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. ·748 (1943),a
I

limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtortt
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
~United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432' U.S. 385 (1977), and Caopenr
& Lybrand v~ Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), are not to the contrary.
'Incidental dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class cert.ification
is subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the
named· plaintiffs. Neither case di:scussed mootness, and neither analyzed
the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers
& Lybrand was United Airlines, see 1137 U. 8., at 469, and the only
authority cited hi United Ai1·lines was a concession made by the defendant
and a list of case; from the Courts of Appeals, not one of which dealt
with a suggestion of mootness in all analogous situat·ion, see <!32 U. S., at
393, and n. 14. Such statements, ' casually enunciated withont a word of
' e~p[anation in opinions dealing with unrehtted legal questions, are ·not

•'

.,.
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,As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context,
Art. III as);cs but a singl~ qqestion: Is there a continuing
controversy between adverse parties who retain the reqtJ.isite
stake in the outcome of the action?
Electrical Fitt-ings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is the case
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no
support for today's ruling. In ElectricaJ Fittings, a limited
appeal was allowed becau&e the petitioner himself was prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding
in a generally favorable decree, See ante, at 10. Here, the
existence of the District Court's order denying certification
l1as no effect whatever on the responqent~. Thl\s, the personal stake that justified th~ Electrical fittings appeal is not
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy consideJTations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedpral ruling, collateral to the meri_ts of
a )itigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as
an adjuclication of one of the issues litigated." ld., at 9-10.
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be aPJ;ealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are &:~-tisfied.

B
After recognizing that the right to l\.ppeal is subject to the
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," th~ Court ~tgrees that
only a "party 1[ who] retains a stake in the appeal [can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at
10. The Court also agrees tpat respondents have no remaining
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." Id., at
controlling or even persua.-;ive w~en they are shown on further reflection
·to have been inconsistent wit.h settled law. A~-; the Court agrees today,
neither case creates an E-xception to the fundamental rule that '· [ f]E>deri:il
appellate jurisdiction is limited uy the appellant'~-; personal st.ake in the
a:ppeal." Ante, at 10,
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"-10. Nevertheless, it holds that respondents retain a per.
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses
that have been incurred in this litigation ~nd for which they
assert a continuing obligation." I d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.6
This conclusion is neither leg~lly sound nor supported by the
record.
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, charge.
able to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before·
the petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses"
relied upon as supp1ying the adverse interest essential to a live
eontroversy.7 The only expense mentioned by respondents,
apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender, is
not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide security for costs in the event a class ultimf.l,tely is certified. Brief
for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee
arrangement in this case create any obligfttion, present or
• The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class aotion procedure
for litigation of individual claims may offer sl)bstantial advantages for
named plaintiffs. . . ." Ante, at 11, n. 9. But. any such advantages
eannot accnte to these respondents, who will not be litigating their own
elaims on remand. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents in this context
only to point out that their total damages were so small that they "would
be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable co:st" if they could not
do so by means of a calss action. We may as:;-ume that respondents had
some interest in the class-action procedure as a means of interesting the1r
lawyers in the case or obtajning a satisfactory settlement. This may be
an intere;,t properly furthered by Rule 23, but once respondents obtajned
both access to court and full individual relief that intert>st disappeared.
' Perhaps the strongest of respondents' statements is:
"Of cour:se, the interebt of the [respondents] in assPrtion of the right to
proceed on behalf of the class includes such matters as the prospect for
Jpreading attorney's fees and expenses among more claimants and thus
reducing the percentage that wq\lld otherwise be payable by them ...
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Can.surve (CA5, No. 76-3600) , Jan. 10,
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future, that can be affected by the certification of a class.
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject
to court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the
amount of the final judgment. App. 14, 16!1 No arrangemept other than this customary type contingent fee is identified in the record or the briefs. Yet, no one has explained how
respondents' obligation to pay 25% of their recovery to counsel could be reduced if a class is certified and its members
become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery.
Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees
and expenses" 1J relates to no present obligation. It is at
most an expectation-of the respondents' and particularly of
their counsel-that certain fees and expenses may become
payable in the event a class is .certified. That expectation is
wholly irrelevant to the existence of a present controversy
between petitioner and responqents.
'£he Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses cannot be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power." E. (J., Simon v, Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particularly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor
! Respondents' "Demand for Judgment" asks the court to award t.he
"[c]ost of t.his action as well as attorney fees in the amount of 25% as
hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may be deemed fit and
proper by the Court." App. 16. The request for fees was clarified in
Paragraph VI of the amended complaint, which reads as follows:
"Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court. be designate4 custodian
of the funds and judgment t{) be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly
situated, by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a t.uitable
depository and, upon proper order of this Court, disburse said funds
after deduction of necessary expenses and atton1ey fees to Plaintiff's
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the amount so paid,
the same being reasonable by all standards, including th~tt alleged and
utilizf!d by Defendants in suing certain members in of [sic] the class in
State Courts for unpa.id account!§." App. 13-14.
8 See n. 7, supra.
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever ·Will
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon . Indeed, the
American Rule would
bar an award of fl,ttorney's fees against
•, .
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "irijury"-if any existsis Iiot one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. Id.,
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Vtllage of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91, 99 (1979.w Whatever may be the basis for the
respot1dents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a bystander. "[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions that ·c annot affect the rights of litigants iu the case
before them." North Carolin{l v. lUce, 404 (T. Pi. 244. 240.
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the case,

Since respondents have no continuing iJersonal stake in the
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g.,
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam);
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam);
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401--404 (1975); Indianapolis School C!omm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 1T. S. 128 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per
curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human R 'ights,
404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972).11
:t~ Far-reaching consequences could flow from :L rule that fees recoverable
from puta1.jve cla;;s member::; may Le "tra,ced" to the cla&> defenda,nt
for purposes of tlJe ca~e or cont.rover;sy l'equiremf'l'lt.. At th:• least., this
rule would support a claim t11at a per::;on who h<~~ accPpted full ::;el.tlemeuL
of hls individual claim is entitled to file suit on behalf of trn ·nnrecompen.::>ed
clru.':l. Apparently, tbe putative plarntili' need only "a.sser[t]," ante, at 7,
n . 6, that fep:s incurred in anticipation of t.he litigntion ultunntdy m.ighL ba
shared with a prevailing class.
11 These case.~ are discu.s.-;ed more fully in United States Parole Cmnr

mil!sion v. Geraghty, post, a t - - - (Powm.L, .T., dis:;cmt,ing).
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).12 Not a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
chal1enged the allegedly usuri01.1s charges by informal complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought that the claes action would protect
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, re-.
spondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arra11gement.
But I know of no decieion by ltny court that holds that a
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persone
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome
required by Art. III.

II
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be rep~esented by anyone.1 3
If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances
might find the Gerstein test satisfie<f and the case not moot. See Susman v,
Lincoln American Corp., 587 ;F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, J"ederal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 591H)OO.
lH I do not sugg~t that counsel acted improperly in pursuing thil:l case.
Since they ha.ve preva,iled both in th1s Court and in the Court of Appeals,
12
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The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for rea.
10ns of policy and practice. It. is said to be an effective
"response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not
aware that such a consfderation ever before has influenced this
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails to recognize
that allowing this action to proceed without an interested
pl11intiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some
magnitude.
A
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awardeq and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of' a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
the 1966· amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.14
the r&1Jopsibility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the

feden~I

oonrts.
14

S('e Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 (1979) . In actions brought under:
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this caee. A defendant certainly will have a substaJltial incentive to use this tacti~ in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to de~y
compensation to putative elass membe~ and jeoptlfdize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 11-12. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the ade..
quacy of compensation and enforcement available for particu..
lar substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usuary claims/.o the Court's concern for compensation of puta..
tive ·class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling

Act.1G
Rule 23 (b)(3) , a class memb~r must deci4e at the time of ~:ertification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 ( c)(2) . This provision
w~. qesigned ·to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the ~erits
in order to ~ure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory
Committee o~ PropOiled Amend~~ts to Rule 23, 39 F . R . D. ~9, 105-106
(1006) .
16 LiddeU v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor..
rowers' class action) ; Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d ~61 (1941) .
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mil!llissippi'i! interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
§ 85. But l do not understand that the National Bank Act displaces etate
. policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claim13. A primary purpose of
that Act is to protect national banks from di13criminatory treatmeJ}t or
tUtdue penalties that may be imposed by state Jaw. See 12 U. S. § 86.
1 6 '.t'he Act provides t-hat rules of procedure promulgated by this Court
''shti.U not . , • enlarge o,r modify any s.uba,tant~ve right." 28 U. S, C.
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. -- I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real But the~e problems can and should be
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to, have done today. · ·The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification: in appropriate circumstances.17
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C: § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law.. In many cases, a · class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to' obtain an immediate
and final determination of the ' class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a· class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. · In at
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort 'of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within· 'the appeal period. · Rule· 23 (d){2) . · The
availabpity or such· measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co . v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law...;_Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1'976) . See generally Lllhders, Of Legalized l31aclcmail a.nd Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the SubstanceProcedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) .
11ln Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, -437 '1 ], S. 463 (1978), this Court
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 U. S. C." § 1291. We relied in that case on the
dangers of ''indiscrimiriate" interlocutory review: · fd., at -474. Although
Coopers & Lybrhnd now prevents review in cases in ·which it would be
' • desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation.
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
deficiency.18

B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
can be intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims
asserted in this case. Respondents serve on their own motion-if indeed they serve at all. 10 Since no court has certified the class, there has been no considered determination
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
Congress currently has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sese.
(19'1tl). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some Instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certification under the proposed procedures.
111 As noted above, p. 3, supra, respondents took no appeal in theiJt:
own names. One would think t.hat this candid disclaimer of personal
interest would distroy the foundation upon which the Court prediC~tte&:
Art. Ill jurisdiction. Ante, n.t 7; sec p. 6, supra.
18
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas. Motor Freight v. Rodrigue~, ·431 U. S. 395,
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently none}!:istent claims "typical of the claims ... of the cla$s" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a) (3)? 20
The Court's holding well may pr~':ent future "forced settlements" of class action litigation. Thus: the difficulties
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not
arise again in preeisely analogous circumstances. But today's
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the order denying class certification is
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand
will have no more continuing relationship to the putative
class than respondents have here. A remand for certifi.clttion
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation
of Rule 23. See p. 10, and n. 14, supra. ' These tensions,
arising from the express terms of the :ftule, undermine the
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.

III
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. ·rn jurisprudence. 21 It unneces20

The District Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents,
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class.
21 MR. JusTICE S·rEVENS states, in his concurring opinion, that all persons ·
allegro to be memlx>rs of a. putative class "should be considered parties
to the case or controversy at least for the limited purpose" of Art. III, and
that they "remain parties until a finaJ determination has been made tha.t the
action may not be maintaint>d as a class act.ion." Ante, at - . This ·
novel view apparently dt>rives from early cases in which the Court referred
to class members who would be bound by a judgment as "absent. partie::;,"
Han~betry v. Eee, 311 U. S. 32; 42 (1940), or " pa.rties in intere:st,"
Bmith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 (1853). Ante, a.t - , n. 3. But
these cases were decided before certification was established a:s the method
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. And it ma.y work a serious injustice in this ca.se. 22
by which a chiSi:l achieves judicial recognition . Under Rule 23, no mem~
her of a putative class will be bound by a judgment unless a proper cer~
tifiration order is E>ntered. Tha<t tl1ey may be "interested parties," ibid.,
before that time does not, make them parties to the litigation in any
senSE>, as this Court has rE>cognized. In JndiarULpolis School Comm'rs v.
Jawbs, 420 U. S. 128 ( 1975), thE' Court. hE>ld t.ha.t !Ul oral certification
order was insufficient to identify t.he interests of absent rla;;s members for
Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different when the class
has not been idE>ntified at all. Sre ah;o Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft. 436 U.S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 423 U. S. aos,
310, n. 1 (1976) ; Weinstein v. Bmdford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); PasaderUL
City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 (1976) .
Mu. JusTICE STEVENS indicatE's that, unnamed membE>rs of an uncerti~
fied clas.;; may be "present" HS parties for somE' purposes and not for
others. No aut.h ority i,; cited for such selective "presencE>." in an action.
Nor is any explanation offered 11s to how a court is to determine when
these unident.ifjE>d "parties" ltrfl prE>;;ent. If their presE>nce i:s to be
limited to the satisfact,ion of the Art. III case or controver:sy requirement,
then t.he rule of party statu.s would have no content apart from Art. III
and could only be de;;cribed a!' a legal fiction. If, on the other ha.pd, the
proposed rule is 'to appl~· outside the Art.. III context, it may have troubl~
some and fa.r~rE>aching implications t.hat. could prejudice the bringing of
class actions . Presumably, u purposE" of t.he rule of party status would be
to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named parties would not
t.ermina.te the litigation. Nor could thE" rights of unnamed parties be
extinguished by the failure of the named p&.rties to appeal. Thus, if the
rule proposed by Mn. Jus•rwE STEVENs i:s to accompli:sh its purpose,
I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon flilmed part.ies to
continue the litiga.tion where-alii here-the unnamed parties remain
tmidentified and fail t.o intervPne. As fiduciaries, would the named
part.ies not only be r«"quired to continue to litigate, but to assume per~
sonal responsibility for costs ru1d attorney's fees 'if the casE' ultimately is
lost? Would responsible litigant$ be willing to file class actions if they
thereby assumed such long~ term fiduciary obligations? These and like
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwit~
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our
sy&iem.
22
The Court's re~urrection of this dead controversy may result in.

..
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.

irreparable injury to im10cent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank.
When • the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, •it
assigned as one of its reasons the possible {'destruction of the [petitioner]
bank" by damages then alleged to· total 12,000,000 and now potentially
augmented by the accrual of intj:lrest. ·App.' 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. '.J;he
possible destruction of the bank ·is ·irrelevant to 'the: jurisdictiona.l issue,
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and· the community served.
It is said that 'this -is necessary to ·redress iilhtries possibly suffered by
members of the putative class. Yet, no such ·person has come forward
in the· nearly nine · years that · have passed i>ince -' this action was filed.
Indeed, the challenged conduct was atithorized by statute almost six years
ago. As the ''District Comt·may be called :upon to "determine whether the
equitable doctrine of "relation · back" permits it ·to toll the statute of
limitations on remand, ante, at· q, n. 3, ·it will hardly be inappropriate for
that court· to consider the equities on· both sides. · In the circumstances
presented, the ' District Court may well· see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion in 'favor of putative class-members who have slept on their·
rights these many years.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court depied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents ~
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation·
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ ,85,
86, which adopts the ~~~r~st litpits set br flt~tte l!!,w1 an<l 28 U. S. C.-

51355.
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. This
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jtJrisdiction
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece.
dents. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - . in one
important respect: both require us to decide whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever from
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, however, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substa11tive claims."
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid.
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals. !d., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles
unambiguously require a finding of mootness.

A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages ; those damages have been tendered in fulP Respond11 Although respondent.,; also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint
i!l1ows tT1at. fees were· to be· gr1mted only from the dama.ge;,: ult imately ·
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the
petitioner. 8 Their personal claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court
recites that respondents appeal only 11 on behalf of all others
similarly situated..•." App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have
no interest in the 11individual and private case or controversy"
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without
such evidence. this and other courts routinely have held that
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome. Califomia v. San Pablo &
Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313--314 (1893); Drs. Hill &
Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (pet·
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968)
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.
2d 89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid.
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully
satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg~
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
awarded to them or the clal:ir:l. App. 13-14. There is no pos.~ibility of
prospective relief hecause the Mississippi u~ury statute was anwnded in
1974 to anthorizP, i:nter alia, the clmrge::; at is.sue in this case. 1974 l\Iiso;.
Gen. Laws, ch. 564, § 7; sec Mi~s. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6) .
3 Neither the Court nor the re:;pondents have asserted that the peti·
tioner':; tender fails to include all cost::; and fees for which it could be hPld
liable. See Part, II-B, infra.
4 The ":statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, it::;elf cannot. supply a,
personal stake in the outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III

•
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 7, 9. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice ~ 203.06 (1975). But
the requirement of adverse effect is more ·than a rule "of
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 10, Art. III
itself requires a live controversy in whi·ch a personal stake is
at issue "throughout the entirety of the ·litigation." Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,401-401 (1975).
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to require a
showing of continuing adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902.
Marry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, U. S.
App. D. C. - , 580 F. -2d 695 (1978); see Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas &
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football
League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz,
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. ' 748 (1943),n

'

limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtont
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) .
~United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopertt
& Lybrand v. Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), arc not to the contrary.
Incidental dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class certification
is subject to appellate review after final judgment at·. the behest of the
named plaintiffs. Neither case di::;cussed mootness, aJ1d neither analyzed
the proposition in any way . Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers
& Lybrand was United Airlines. see '437 U. S., at 469, and the only
authority cited in United Airlines was a concession made by the defendant
and a list of cao;e:-; from the Courts of Appeals, not one of which dealt
with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432 U. S., at
393, and n. 14. Such ::;tatements, casually enunciated without a word of
e~planation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not
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,As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context,
Art. III as~s but a single question: Is there a continuing
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite
stake in the outcome of the action'!
Electrical Fitt-ings v. Thomas.& Betts Co., supra, is the case
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prej·
udiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the
existence of the District Court's order denying certification
has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus, the per.
sonal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrele.
vant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." /d., at 9-10.
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.

B
After l'ecognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that
only a "party 1[ who] retains a stake in the appeal [can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." ld., at
controlling or even persna<'ive when they are shown on further reflection
to have been incon;;ii:itent with settled law. A~ the Court agrees today,
neither rase rreat<>H a.n excrption to thr fundamrntal rulr that "[f]ederal
appellate jurbdiction is limited by tho appellant's perwnal stake in the
avpet~L" Ante, at 10,
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Nevertheless, it holds that respondents retain a per.
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they
assert a continuing obligation." !d., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10. 6
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the
record.
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, chargeable to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before·
the petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses"
relied upon as supp1ying the adverse interest essential to a live
eontroversy. 7 The only expense mentioned by respondents,
apart from court costs inc1uded in the petitioner's tender, is
not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide security for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief
for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee
arrangement in this case create any obligation, present or
• The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class a.ction procedure
for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for
named plaintiffs . .. ." Ante, at 11, n. 9. But. any such advantages
eannot accrue to these respondents, who will not be litigating their own
elaims on remand. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents in this context
only to point out that their total damages were so l:lmall that they "would
be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not
do so by means of a calss action. We may assume that respondents had
some interest in the class-action procedure as a means of interesting their
lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory settlement. This may be
an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once rei:ipondents obtained
both acce~:~s to court and full individual relief that intere~t disappeared.
'Perhaps the strongest of respondents' statements is :
"Of course, the intere&"t of the [respondents] in assertion of the right to
proceed on behalf of the class includes l:!Uch matters as the prOl:ipect for
~preading attomey's fees and expenses among more chLimants and thus
reducing the percentage that wql)ld otherwise be payable by them ."
Plaintifft~-Appellanti:i' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismi:;s Appeal and
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. CaMurve (CA5, No. 76-3600) , Jan . 10,

t9n:
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future, that can be affected by the certification of a class.
Respondents' complaint identifies the f~e to be paid, subject
to court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the
amount of the final judgment. App. 14, 16.8 No arrangemep.t other than this customary type contingent fee is identified in the record or the briefs. Yet, no one has explained how
respondents' obligation to pay 25o/o of their recovery to coun··
sel could be reduced if a class is certified and its members
become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery.
Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees
and expenses" 9 relates to no present obligation. It is at
most an expectation-of the respondents' and particularly of
their counsel-that certain fees and expenses may become
payable in the event a class is certified. That expectation is
wholly irrelevant to the existence of a present controversy
between petitioner and respondents.
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses cannot be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power." E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Dry., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particularly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor
11

Respondents' "Dema.nd for .Judgment!' asks the court, to award the
"[c]ost of this action as well m; at.t{)ruey fees in the amount of 25% as
hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may be deemed fit and
proper by the Court." App, 16. The request for fees was clarified in
Paragraph VI of the amended complaint, which reads as follows:
"Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court be designated custodian
of the funds and judgment to be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly
situated, by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a :;;uitable
depository a.nd, upon proper order of this Court, disbur;:,lE) said funds
after deduction of necPSSary expenses a.nd attorney fees to Plaintiff's
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the amount so paid,
the same being reasonable by all st<tndards, including that alleged and
utilized by Defendant;;~ in suing certain members in of [sic] the class in
State Courts for unpa.id account8." App. 13-14.
9
Seen. 7, 8Upra.

·'
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "i1ijury"-if anr existsis not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. Id.,
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. ViUage of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91, 99 (1979. 10 Whatever may be the basis for the
respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with
unnamed members of a class, tho petitioner is merely a bystander. "[F]ecleral courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
before thrm." North Carolina v. Ri('c, 404 (T. S. 244. 24G
(1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the c~.

c
Since respondents have no continuing persona] stake in the
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g.,
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171,172-173 (1977) (per curiam);
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam);
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401- 404 (1975); Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 ( 1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per
curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. jo1· Human Rights,
404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972).11
:to Far-reaching consequruce:; could How from a rule th~u fees recoverable
from putative clal:iS member~ may l>e ·' tra.eed" tu the cla& Jcfendun t
for purpo;:;es of tlu~ case or cont.rover;:;y reqnirPment . At t1w len st., t11is
rule would ~upport. a chtim t1mt a per:>on who l1<~~ ael'<·ptccl full ~eWE'mc nL
of his individual cbim is entitlrd to fiiP "uit on behalf of m1 unre<'()lnpensrd
clab."!. Appart>J1t1y, tJ1e putative plaintiff need only ''a.,~rrrtl," ante, aL 7,
n . 6, tlmt fee~ incurr<-'J in ailticipa.t.ion of the litignt.ion nltima.t rly m1ght. be
sha.red with tt prevailing class.
11 The:se cai'Jt\~ :tn• di.-cul:i.~ed more fully in United States 'Pamte CD'Inmission v. Geraghty, post, at - - - (Pow:RJ,L, ,I., ctis~rllting).
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Respondents do not suggest that their 'Claims are "capable
of repetition. yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Puf!h, 420
U. S. 103, 110--111, n. 11 (1975).1:2 Not a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDcmald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has apyone
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dorrnant during the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
at)peal, without provoking a response from auyone who previously may have thought that the claes acticm would protect
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, re-.
spondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged
recovery that is inherent i11 any contingent fee arrangement.
But I know of no clecieion by any court that holds that a
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persone
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome
required by Art. III.

II
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court
directs a, remand in which this federal action will be litigated
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.lll
12

If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susrru:tn v.
Lincoln American Corp., 587 ;F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismjssal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
l H I do not suggest, that counsel acted improperly in pursuing this case.
Since they have prevailed both in this Court and in the Court of Appeals,
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The Court appears to endorse this fonn of litigation for rea.
aons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective
"response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails to recognize
that allowing this action to proceed without an interested
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some
magnitude.
A
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.14
the responsibility for allowing client-less litigations fall on the federal
conrt>;.
11 S~ Comment, Inunedia.te Appealability of Orders Denying Class Cer·
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 (1979) . In actions brought under'
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, 88 petitioner did iJl this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative .class member!!! and jeopa.rdize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 11-12. The practical argument is not
without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usuary claims,lll the Court's concern for compensation of putative ·class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act.16
Rule 23 (b )(3), a class member must deci<le at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c)(2). This provision
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which claes
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to ~ure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966) .
16 LiddeU v. Litton System.s, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor..
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17,2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Misllissippi'i3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
§ 85. But I do not understand that the National Bank Act displaces state
. policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or
undue penalties that may be imposed by :state law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
10 The Act provides that rulrs of procedure promulgated by tllis Court
t'sba.U not . , . enlarge or modify any aub$tantive right." 28 U. S, C.
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The Court's concern for putative class members wotild -be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. -- I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should be
addressed by measures short of u'lldercutting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to. have done today: The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from- the
denial of c1ass certification· in appropriate circumstances.17
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a -class-action
defendant undoubtedly wo~ld forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to· obtain an immediate
and final determination of the ·class certification question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a· class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. · In at
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort 'of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within 'the appea1 period. · Rule· 23 (d)-(2). -· The
availabpity of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974) ; Developments in the Law-'-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (l976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft : Consumer Class Actions and the SubstanceProcedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) .
17 In Coopers & Lybrand v·. Livesay, -437 u. S. 463 (1978), this Court
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 U. S. C: §1291. We relied in that ca.se on the
dangers
"indiscriminate" ·interlocutory review: -!d., at -474. Although
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in ·which it would be
• desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation.

of
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
deficiency.18

B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation in the case
can be intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims
asserted in this case. Respondents serve on their own motion-if indeed they serve at all. 10 Since no court has certified the class, there has been no considered determination
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
18 Congress currE-ntly has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(19'19). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some ot the problem11. of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certification under the propo~ed procedure~.
10 As noted above, p. 3, supra, respondPnts took no appeal in theill·
own names. One would think that this candid disclaimer of personal
interest would distroy the foundation upon which the Court prediet~te&:
Art. III jurisdict.ion. Ante, at 7; see p. 6, supra.
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Texas. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, ·431 U. S. 395,
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims "typical of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23 (a) (3)? 20
The Court's holding well may prevent future "forced settlements" of class action litigation~ .. Thus: the difficulties
faced by the Distri·c t Court on remand in this case may not
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the order denying class certification is
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand
will have no more continuing relationship to the putative
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation
of Rule 23. See p. 10, and n. 14, supra. · These tensions,
arising from the express terms of the Rule, undermine the
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.

III
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. "III jurisprudence. 21 It unnecesThe District Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents,
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class.
21 MR. JusTICE S'l'EVENS states, in his concurring opinion, that all persons
alleged to be members of a putative class "should be considered parties
to the case or controversy at least. for the limited purpo::;e" of Art.. III, and
that. they "remain parties until a final determination ha.s bC'en made that the
action may not. be maintained a;; a class act.ion." Ante, at - . This ·
novel view apparently derives from early cases in which the Court referred
t{) class member;; who would be bound by a judgment as ''absent parties," ·
Hansberry v. Lee, an U. S. 32; 42 (1940), or "parties in interest.,"
8mith v. 8wormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 (1853). Ante, a,t - , n. 3. But
these cases were decided before certification was e~tablished a.s the method
20
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case. 22
by which a cla,;s achieves judicial recognition . Under Rule 23, no member of a put~t.tive cla.s:s will be bound by a judgment, unless <L proper certification order i:; entered. Thil't the~· may be "intere:;ted parties," ibid.,
before that time doe:; not. make •them partie,.; to the litigation in any
sense, as this Court ha." recognized. In Indianapolis Sc-hool Comm'rs v.
Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), the Court. held that an oral certification
order was insuffici<>nt to identify the interest;; of n.b:sent cla:sl:l members for
Art. III purpo~es. The re:sult hardly could be different when the cia$
has not been ident.ilied at nil. Sre also Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft. 4~6 U.S. 1, 8 (HJ78); Baxter v. Palmigiano, .na U. S. :ms,
310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bmdford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) ; Pasadena
City Board of Erlu,.ation v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976) .
MH. Jus1'ICE Sn~VENS indi~tte" that. unnamed members of an uncertified clas..,: may be '·present" as parties for ~orne purpo::;e:; :md not for
other:;. No aut.hority is cited for i:>UCh selective "presrnee" in an achon.
Nor is any explanation offered as to how a court is to determine when
these unidentifird "parties" a.re prel:lent. If their pr<>sence i:s to be
limited to the S<Lt.i:sfact.ion of the Art. III case or con1roverl:ly requirement,
then tho rule of party st.at.u:s would have no content apart from Art. III
and could only be de,.;cribed ill' a legal fiction. If, on the other hand, the
proposed rule is to appl~· outside the Art.. III context, it may have troublesome and far-reaching implicationi'l that could prejudice the bringing of
cln~ action::; . Pn~umably, a purpos<> of t.he rule of party l:ltatus would be
to ns:<nre that satisfaction of the claims of named par•ties would not
terminate the litigation. Nor could the right~ of unnamed parties be
<>xtinguished by the failure of the named parties to appeal. Thus, if the
rule proposed by Mn. Jus1'JCB STEVENS is to accomplie:h its purpoi;e,
I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon named parties to
continue the litigation where-a;; here-the unnamed pa.rties remain
unidentifi·ed and fail t.o intervene. As fiduciaries, would the named
parties not only be required to continue to litign,t{', but to aSSIJme personal responsibility for costs a11d attorney's fees 'if the ca:sr u~timately is
lost? Would responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwit~
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our
sybtem.
22
The Court's resurrection of this dead conirover:;y may result in
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.

irreparable injury to hmocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank.
When the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, ·it
assigned as one of its reasons the possible !'destruction of the [petitioner]
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially
augmented by the accrual of interest. ·App.' 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The
possible destruction of the bank ·is ·irrelevant to 'the: jurisdictional issue,
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and· the community served.
It is said that 'this -is necessary to ·redress ii:Jhtries possibly suffered by
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward
in the · nearly nine · years that · have passed bince 'this action was filed.
Indeed, the challenged conduct was atithorized by statute almost six years
ago. As the ''District Court may be called ·upon to "determine whether the
equitable doctrine of "relation · back" permit.~ it -to toll the statute of
limitations on remand, ante, at' 3, n. 3, ·it will hardly be inappropriate for
that court· to con:oider the equities on· both sides. · In the circumstances
presented, the 'District Court may well· see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their·
rights these many years.
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/~

Mr. Jt•
Mr. Ju r.,'
Plr. Ju r:si.
Jlr. Ju c~

. "..ri.

•t,: tr~~.J-1

~

11

Mr. Juc;t ~
Yr. Juat ·

mn

ulrn
.ns

ILr. Jun dC'

3-11 ~ro

From: Mr. Just•

~

f

0

'1.

Pow<,ll

Circulated:

fl,th DltAFT

B~circulated· ~ 1 4 1960

BUPBEME COUBT OF THE UNITED STATFB

I

No. 78-904

Deposit Guaranty National Bank, On Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v,
of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
Robert L, Roper et al.
[February """/\' 1980]

/

MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents .
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation·
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ ,85,
86, which adopts t~e ~~~r~t li!llits set hr ~ta,te l!lw1 an~28 U. S. C.-
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7~. 6} This
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jtJriSdiction
of an Art. III court under established and controlling prece~
dents. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United
~tates Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - , in one
important respect: both require us to decide whether pu~
tive class representatives may appeal the denial of class cer~
tHication when they can derive no benefit whatever from
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, how~
ever, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It
states that the "right to employ Rule 23'' is a "procedural
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims."
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid.
Moreover, the C.tOurt acknowledges the familiar principle that
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals. Id., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles
unambiguously require a finding of mootness.

A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only dam~
ages; those dainages have been tendered in fulP Respond-/
Although respondent~ also asked for attorney's fees, their complaintii!lows tT1at, fees were· to be- granted only from the damages ultimately ·
11

~
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the
petitioner. 3 Their personal claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated ..••" App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have
no interest in the "individual and private case or controversy"
relied on by the Court toclay. Ante, at 5. But even without
such evidence, this and other courts routinely have held that
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome. California v. San Pablo &
Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill &
Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per
curiam); Larnb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968)
(per curiam) ; A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.
2d 89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid.
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully
satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judg~
ment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, ~
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. There is no possibility of
prospective relief because the Mississippi usury statute was amt'nded in
1974 to authorizP, inter alia, the charges at issue in this case. 1974 Miss.
Gen. Laws, ch. 564, § 7; sec Miss. Code A1111. § 75-17-1 (6) .
3 Neither the Court nor the rr:spondeuts have asserted that the petitioner's tender fails to include all costs and fee::; for which it could be held
liable. See Part li-B, infra.
4 The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself cannot supply ,<t
per~onal stake in th(l outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III

_/"'

TS-D04-DISSENT
4

~-/.

DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

-~~~~~~~o~f....;J~·u:.::d~g~n:;le::::n.:.:t~in favor of a party does not in

nte, at ~· There never has been any
itself moot his case.
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favora:ble judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practi·ce and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Pr~tctice ~ 203.06 (1975). But
the requirement of adverse effect is more than a rule "of
~
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante , at , r .
/
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is
at issue "throughout the entirety of the ·litigation." Sosn.a
v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,401-401 (1975) .
It is thjs constitutional limitation, and not any rule of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to require a
~
sJwwing of continuin ~se effect in order to co 1fer "standing to appeal." 15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 390~ _;
Marry v. Di~Bd. of Elections, . .
App. D. C.---,, 558800 F . 22dd 669955tl (1978); see Altvater v. Freemart, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. 'l'homas &
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football
League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz;
~
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. '748 (1943),/

'

limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realto1'1t
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
~United Airlines, Inc . v. McDonald, 432' U.S. 385 (1977), and Coopertt
& Lybrand v. Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), are not to the contrary.
Incidental dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class certification
is subject to appellate review aft.er final judgment at. the behest of the
named plaintiffs. Neither case di:scussed mootness, and neither analyzed
the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers
& Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., a.t 469, and the only
authority cited in United Airlines was a concession made by the defendant
and a list of case:; from the Courts of Appeals, not one of which dealt
with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432 U. S., at
393, and n. 14. Such statements, ca~-ually enunciated withotlt a word of
e~planation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are no~
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these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context,
Art. III asl<s but a single question: Is there a continuing
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite
stake in the outcome of the A.ction?
Electrical Fitt-ings v. 7'hornas & Betts Co., supra, is the case
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no
support for today's rtding. In Electrical Fittings, a limited
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the
existence of the District Court's order denying certification
has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus, the personal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not
present in this case. Absent sijch a stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy oonsiderrations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." /d. , at 9- 10.
Collateral rulings-like other r1.1lings-may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.

B
After recognizing that the right to &ppeal is subject to the
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that
only a "party '[who] retains a stake in the appeal [can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining
/
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." ld., at . /
oot1trolling or even persua~ive when they are shown on further reflection
to have been inconsistent. wit.h seWed law. A" the Court agrees today,
neither case creates an exception to the fundament<~ I rule that '' l f]ederal
appellate juriodict.ion is limited uy the appellan t'[<; perl)()nal sta ke in the
appettl." Ante, ut 10,

/
/
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Nevertheless, it holds that respondents retain a per·
sonal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they
Msert a continuing obligation." Id., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10.6
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the
record.
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, chargeable to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before·
the petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses"
relied upon as supplying the adverse interest essential to a live
eontrovf'rsy. 7 The only expense mentioned by respondents,
apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender, is
not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide secu~
rity for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief
for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attomey's f e e /
arrangement in this case create any obligatioil, present or

:g. ,c.t

l

\\-\l)f\.1.)

• The Court also mentions that "[t]lw use of the cia~. action procedure
for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for
named plaintiffs .. . ." Ante, at lJa>....,.,.. But. any such advantages
eannot accrue to these respondentl:i, who will not be litigating their own
elaims on remand. Indeed, the Court referl:i to respondents in this context
onl ' to point out that their total damages were so small that they "would
e unlikely to obtain
dress at an acceptable cost" if they could not
o so b means of a calss action. We may assume that. respondents had
some interest in the class-action procedure as a means of interesting the1r
lawyers in the case or obtaining a sa.tisfactory settlement. This may be
an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once respondents obtained
both access to court and full individual relief that interest disappeared.
' erhaps the strongest of r~pondents' statements is:
"Of course, the intere;;.t of the [respondents] in assertion of the right to
proceed on behalf of the class includes ~:~uch matters as the prospect for
~preading attorney's fees and expense:; among more claimants and thus
reducing the percentage that would otherwise be payable by them.''
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismi:;s Appeul a11d
Reply Brief, ffied in Rop~r v CaMurve (CA5, No. 76-3600), Jan. 10,
197~:
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future, that can be affected by the certification of a class.
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject
to court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the
amount of the final judgment. App. 14, 16.8 No arrangemept other than this custom~try type contingent fee is identified in the record or the briefs. Yet, no one has explained how
respondents' obligation to pay 25ro of their recovery to counsel could be reduced if a class is certified and its members
become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery.
Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees
and expenses" 11 relates to no present obligation. It is at
most an expectation--of the respondents' and particularly of
their counsel- that certain fees and expenses may become
payable in the event a class is eertified. That expectation is
wholly irrelevant to the existence of a present controversy
between petitioner and respondents.
rrhe C;0urt's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses cannot be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power." E. g., Simon v, Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particu(,
larly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor~
Respondents' "Demand for Judgment" asks the court. to award the
"[c]ost of t.his action as well as attorney fees in the amount of 25% as
hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may be deemed fit and
proper by the Court.." App. 16. The request for fees was clarified in
Paragra.ph VI of the amended complaint, Which reads as follows :
":Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court be designated custodian
of the funds and judgment to be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly
situated, by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a :mitable
depository and, upon proper order of this Court, disburse said funds
after deduction of necessary expenses and attorney fees to Plaintiff's
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the amount so paid,
the same being reasonable by all standards, including that alleged and
·n s y
utilized by Defendants in suing certain members in of [sic] the clas
State Courts for unpaid accounts." App. 13-14.
0 See n. 7, supra.
8
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever ·Will
be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the
American Rule would bar an award of ~:~-ttorney's fees against
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' "iiijury"-if an;y existsis not one that "fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. ld.,
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Yi-~lage of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91, 99 1
w Whatever may be the basis for the
respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expeHses with
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a byBtander. "[F]edcral courts are without power to decide questions that ·cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
before them." North Carolin(l v. l?.irc, 404 (T. R. 244. 24G
(1971). This elementary principle should diBpose of the case,
'.'

)

c
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g.,
Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam);
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam);
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per
curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per cu.riam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights,
404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972).11
/
J.o Far-reaching consequences could How from :t rule thai fees recoverable
from put~ttjve cl<llis membero; ma.y be "traced" t.o the class defendtmt
for purposes of t1H:1 ca.-::e or controvero;y requiremf'Tit.. At tlH" lenst., this
rule would support a claim t1mi a rerson who ha.~ acreptrcl li11l o;ettlemeni
of his individual cla.im is entitled to fi[p suit ou behalf of ~m unrreompC'm.:ed
clUb.~. Apparently, the putative plaintiff need only ''a&-;,-erft]," ante, at 7,
n . 6, tlmt fee~ incurred in aJ1ticipa.t.ion of t.h e litiga.tion ultimntrly nught be
sharrd with tt prevailing class.
11
These cast-\~ nre discussed more fully in Uniterl States Parule Cam,.
'fftisNion v. Geraghty, post, at - - - (PowHLL, .1., dis,;;cnting).

~
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are "capable
of repetition. yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).u ~t a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class members has s<>ught to intervene in the
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
atJpcal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought that the cla~s action would protect
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents' individual cla.ims. To be sure, respondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arra1~gement.
But I know of no deci~ion by any court that holds that a
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third person~
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome
required by Art. III.
II

Ard

Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated
by lawyers whose only "clients" are unidentified class mem~
hers who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.1 3

- -- -

12 If a cla<>S-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v.
Lincoln American Corp., 587 ;F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
l H I do not suggest that counsel acted improperly in pursuing this case,
Since they havo prev.Hed both in thi• Cooct and in tbe Court of Appeal/
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The Court appears to endorse this fonn of litigation for rea.
aons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective
"response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails to recognize
that allowing this action to proceed without an interested
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some
magnitude,
A
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of' a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
./"
the 1966' amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate. /
the respOllsibility for allowing client-less

courts.

litigation~

fall)r-o-:n""'7th
T:-:-e- l,'ed
....,.,e-n--.
ll--lf$

·

See Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Ce;;
tification, 40 Ohio St. L. J . 441, 470-471 (1979) . In actions brought und/
H

~
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, a.s petitioner did in this caee. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactie in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative .class membel'f$ and jeops.rdize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
~ general." Ante, at@12. The practical argument is not
· out force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
~ry claims/ 11 the Court's col1cern for compensation of putative ·class members in this case is at best misplaced and at,
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act/ 6
Rule 23 (b )(3) , a class member tl\Ust deci4e at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c)(2). This provision
was qesigned ·to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were permitted to intervene after a decillion on the merits
in order ro 1$00Ure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory
Committee o~ PropQfled Amendment!:! to Rule 23, 39 F . R . D . ~9, 105-106
(1966) .
1 6 LiddeU v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting bor..
rowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner ill a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Millllissippi'a interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C.
§ 85. B1.1t I do not understand that the National Bank Act displacet; state
. policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claim13. A primary purpose of
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or
undue penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
16 'l'he Act provides t.hat rules of procedure promulgated by this Court
''eb.aU no.t . , • enlarge ol' modify any aub$tantive right." 28 U. S, C.
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The Court's concern for putative class members would be
more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative· class. · · I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should be
addressed by measures short of u~dercutting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to, have done today. -·· The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.17
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C: § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law._ In many cases, a -class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to' obtain an immediate
and final determination of the' class certification .question on
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a· class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. -. In at
least some circumstances, it may require that putative ~ class
members receive some sort"of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within. 'the appeal period. .. Rule· 23 (d)-(2). ·· The
availabpity oT such· measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District /
§ 2072. See American Pipe & C~nstruction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-'-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1'976) . See generally Landers, Of Legalized l3lackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the SubstancePrQCedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974) .
17 In Coopers & Lybrand v·. Livesay, -43TU. S. ·463 (1978), this Court
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 U. S. C: § 1291. We relied in that case on the
dangers
i'indiscrimhiate" interlocutory review: -!d., at -474. Although
Coopers & Lybraiul now prevents review in cases in ·which it would b~ .
' desirable, Cong""' may remedy ·the problem by appropriate legislation/

of

~
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
deficiency.18

B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation iA tlu ease 0
can be intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims
asserted in this case. Respondents serve on their own motion-if indeed they serve at alP 0 Since no court has certified the class, there has been no considered determination
that respondents will fairly and adequa,tely represent its
____members. Nothing in Rule 2~ authorizes this novel procedure,
and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to ityCongress currt>ntly has before it a bill that attt>mpts to remedy the
difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1919). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, supra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of actjon for damages. The bill provides for
the enforcement of this right in some Instances through actions brought in
the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certification under the propo;;ed procedurefi!.
19 As not~d above, p. 3, supra, respondt>nts took no appeal in thei11:
own names. One would think t.hat this candid disclaimer of personal
distroy tho foundation upon which the Court predicateS.:
1 e, at ; see p. 6, supra.
Art. III jurisdiction.
18

o·)
'
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Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent?
See East Tex,as. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, ·431 U. S. 395,
403-404 ( 1977). Are their currently none)!:istent claims "typical of the claims ... of the class" within the meaning of Rule
23(a)(3)? 20
·
The Court's holding well may pr~vent future "forced settlements" of class action litigation: ~ Thus; the difficulties
faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not
arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today's
result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives
who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the order denying class certification is
reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand
will have no more continuing relationship to the putative
class than respondents have here. A remand for certification
could also lead to "one-way intervention" in direct violation
of Rule 23. See p. 10, and n. 14, supra. , These tensions,
arising from the express terms of the ltule, undermine the
Court's conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.

III
In sum, the Court's attempted solution to the problem of
forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from
settled principles of Art. III jurisprudence. 21 It unneces-/
20 The District Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents,
for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class.
21 MR. JusTICE S•rEVENS states, in his concurring opinion, that all persons ·
allegoo to be membt'rs of a putative class "should be considered parties
to the case or controversy at least for the limited purpOISe" of Art. III, a.nd
that. they "remain parties until a final determination has been made tha.t the
action may not be maintajned as a class action." Ante, at - . This ·
novel view apparently derives from early cases in which the Court reft•rred
to class members who would be bound by a judgment as "absent partirs,"
Han~berry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32; 42 (1940), or "parties in int ere.st.,"
Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 (1853). Ante, aJ. - , n. 3. But
these cases were decided before crrtification was e<1tabli~hed as the method

~
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earily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. And it mtl-Y work a serious injustice in this c,_a_e
s _._22_ __,r_~

_s /V~r/r

J-

"'b

which a chu,;s achieves judicial recognition. Under Rule 23, tt6'\ member of a pu a, v c ass wt be bound by a judgment unless <L proper certification order iH entered. Thaot t11er ma.y be "inter~ted parties," ibid.,
before that time does not. make •them parties to tl1e litigation in any
~ ' as tthis Court hw;; recognized. In Jndiaoopolis School Comm'rs v.
Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), the Comt. hPld tha.t an oral certification
order was insufficient to idPntify the interest.-; of absent rla.'Ss IPembers for
Art. III purpo:;es. The result lmrdly could be differPnt when the class
has not been identified at all. See al;;o Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft. 436 U.S. 1, 8 (HJ78); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 423 U.S. ao8,
310, n. 1 (1976); Weinstt>in v. Bmdford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Pasadena
City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976).
MH. Just•tcE STEVENS indicntes tha.t unnamed members of an uncertified clas.~ may be "present" as parties for some purposes and not for
others. No ttu t.l10rit>' is cited for such selective "pret;ence" in an actjon.
Nor is any explanation offered as to how a court is to determine when
theJSe unidentifjed '·parties" arE~ preJSent. If their presence is to be
limited to the satisfact.ion of the Art. III case or controversy requirement,
then t.he rule of party status would have no content apart. from Art.. Ill
and could only be drscribed a~< a legal fiction . If, on tho other hand, the
proposed rule is 'to apply outsidr the Art.. III context, it may have troublesome ~m el fa.r-rraching implication~;~ that could prejudice the bringing of
clal:lS actionti. Presumably, a purpos<> of the rule of party status would be
to a :;nre that satisfaction of the claims of named par;t.ie:; would not
terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of unnamed parties be
extinguished by the frulure of the named parties to appeal. Thus, if tthe
rule proposed by Mu. JusncE STJWENS is to accomplish its purpose,
I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon named part.ies to
continue the litiga.tion where-aH here-the unnamed })iLrties remain
unidentified and fail to intervenP. As fiduciarie;;, would the named
part.ie;; not only be rrquired to continue t.o litigate, but to assume personal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees 'if the case ultimately is
lost? Would responsible litiganta be willing to file class actions if they
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps u~1wit~
tingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our
system.
22
The Court's re~lUrrection of this dead controversy may result

i/
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I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.

irreparable injury to ilmocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank.
When the District Court denied cert.ification on September 29, 1975, ·it
assigned as one of its reasons the possible ,"destruction of the [petitioner]
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 1U1d now potentially
augmented by the accrual of interest. 'App.' 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The
possible destruction of the bank ·is ·irrelevant to 'the. jurisdictional issue,
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and· the community served.
It is said that 'this -is necessary to ·redress injuries possibly suffered by
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward
in the nearly nine · years that · have pa~ed since 'this action was filed.
Indeed, the challenged conduct was atithorized by statute almost six years
ago. As the ''District Court·may be called ·upon to ·determine whether the
equitable doctrine of "relation · back" permits it to toll the statute of
limitations on remand, ante, at· 3, n. 3, ·it will hardly be inappropriate for
that court· to consider the equities on· both sides. · In the circumstances
presented, the ' District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their
rights these many years.

3-17-80
6th DRAFT

SUPBEME COUBT OF THE UNITED STAn!
No. 78-904
Deposit Guaranty National Bank,IOn Writ of Certiorari to
Jackson, Mississippi, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appe.als for the Fifth
Robert L. Roper et al.
Circuit.
[March 19, 1980],
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART
joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit-card holders who claim that
petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the
National Bank Act and Mississippi law. 1 They filed this
action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty
equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30 and
$322.70. App: 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf
of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District
Court denied respondents' motion for class certification.
Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the
full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and
court costs. Over respondents' objection, the District Court
entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the clerk of the court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this
action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner's suggestion of mootness and reversed
the denial of class certification. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents
retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation
1 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U.S. C. §§ 85,
86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and on 28 U. S. C.
§ 1355.
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with members of the putative class. Ante, at 7, n. 6. 10. Thig
speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction
of an Art. III court under established and controlling precedents. Accordingly, I dissent.

I
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United
States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, at - , in one
important respect: both require us to decide whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever from
the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the
District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, however, the Court recognizes established Art. III doctrine. It
states that the "right to employ Rule 23" is a "procedural
right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims."
Ante, at 6. It also agrees that a federal court "retains no
jurisdiction over the controversy" when the parties' "substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense." Ibid.
Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that
a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action
presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of
appeals. !d., at 7, 10. These are indeed the dispositive
principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the
Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles
unambiguously require a finding of mootness.
A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to
intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present
in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the
injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in fulJ.2 RespondAlthough respondents also asked for attorney's fees, their complaint
shows that fees were to be granted only from the damages ultimately
2
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ents make no claim that success on the certification motion
would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the
petitioner. 8 Their personal claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own
names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court
recites that respondents appeal only "on behalf of all others
similarly situated. . . ." App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have
no interest in the "individual and private case or controversy"
relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 5. But even without
such evidence, this and other courts routinely have held that
a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff's injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome. California v. San Pablo &
Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill &
Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per
curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157 (CA2 1968)
(per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F.
2d 89 (CAS 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that
moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid.
Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the
plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully
satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result
should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes,
awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. There is no possibility of
prospective relief because the Mississippi usury statute was amended in
1974 to authorize, inter alia, the charges at issue in this case. 1974 Miss.
Gen. Laws, ch. 564, § 7; see Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-17-1 (6).
8 Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted that the petitioner's tender fails to include all costs and fees for which it could be held
liable. See Part 11-B, infra.
4 The "statutory right" to appeal, ante, at 7, itself cannot supply a
personal stake in the outcome, for Congress cannot abrogate Art. III
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that the entry of judgment in favor of a party does not in
itself moot his case. Ante, at 6- 7. There never has been any
doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally
favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 Wright,
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902
(1976); 9 Moore's Federal Practice 1f 203.06 (1975). But
the requirement of adverse effect is more than a rule "of
federal appellate practice." Ante, at 7. As we have held
repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 7, 10, Art. III
itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is
at issue "throughout the entirety of the litigation." Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-401 (1975).
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to require a
showing of continuing adverse effect in order to confer "standing to appeal." Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Electiorns, U. S. App. D. C. - , 580 F. 2d 695, 696 (1978);
15 Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 3902; see Altvater v.
Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings v. Thomas &
Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football
League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz,
133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943). 5
limi~ations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91 , 100 (1979).
5 United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay 437 U. S. 463 (1978), are not to the contrary.
Incidental dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class certilication
is subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the
named plaintiffs. Neither case discussed mootness, and neither analyzed
the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers
& Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. 8 ., at 469, and the only
authority cited in United Airlines was a concession made by the defendant
and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, not one of which dealt
with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432 U. S., at
393, and n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a word of
explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not
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As these cases show, the requirements of Art. III are not
affected by the "factual context" in which a suggestion of
mootness arises. See ante, at 6. Whatever the context,
Art. III asks but a single question: Is there a continuing
controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite
stake in the outcome of the action?
Electrical Fittings v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is the case
primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no
support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited
appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding
in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 10. Here, the
existence of the District Court's order denying certification
has no effect whatever on the respondents. Thus, the personal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not
present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrelevant that "policy considerations" sometimes may favor an
appeal from "a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of
a litigation." Nor is it significant that the ruling "stands as
an adjudication of one of the issues litigated." Id., at 9-10.
Collateral rulings-like other rulings-may be appealed only
when the requirements of Art. III are satisfied.

B
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the
"jurisdictional limitations of Art. III," the Court agrees that
only a "party [who] retains a stake in the appeal [can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III." Ante, at 7; see id., at
10. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining
stake in "the merits of the substantive controversy." Id., at
controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further reflection
to have been inconsistent with settled law. As the Court agrees today,
neither case creates an exception to the fundamental rule that "[f]ederal
appellate jurisdiction is limited by the appellant's personal stake in the
appeal." Ante, at 10.
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10. Nevertheless, it holds that respondents retain a personal stake in this appeal because they "desire to shift to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses
that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they
assert a continuing obligation." Id., at 7, n. 6; see id., at 10. 6
This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the
record.
The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, chargeable to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before
the petitioner's tender. Similarly, respondents have been
conspicuously vague in identifying the "fees and expenses"
relied upon as supplying the adverse interest essential to a live
controversy. 7 The only expense mentioned by respondents,
apart from court costs included in the petitioner's tender, is
not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide security for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief
for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney's fee
6 The Court also mentions that "[t]he use of the class action procedure
for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for
named plaintiffs .... " Ante, at 11. But any such advantages cannot
ac<ftj to these respondents, who will not be litigating their own claims
on remand. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents in this context only
to point out tha:t their total damages were so small that they "would
be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable cost" if they could not
do so by means of a class action. ld, at 11-12, n. 9. We may assume
that respondents had some interest in t,he class-action procedure as a
means of interesting their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory
se1Jtlement. This ma,y be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but
once respondents obtained both access to court and full individual relief
that interest disappeared.
7 Perhaps the strongest of respondents' statements is:
"Of course, the interest of the [respondents] in assertion of the right to
proceed on behalf of the class includes such matters as the prospect for
spreading attorney's fees and expenses among more claimants and thus
reducing the percentage that would otherwise be payable by them."
Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and
Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Cansurve (CA5, No. 76-3600), Jan. 10,
1977.
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arrangement in this case create any obligation, present or
future, that can be affected by the certification of a class.
Respondents' complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject
to court approval, as "twenty-five percent (25% )" of the
amount of the final judgment. App. 14, 16.8 No arrangement other than this customary type contingent fee is identified in the record or the briefs. Yet, no one has explained how
respondents' obligation to pay 25o/o of their recovery to counsel could be reduced if a class is certified and its members
become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery.
Thus, the asserted interest in "spreading [of] attorney's fees
and expenses" 9 relates to no present obligation. It is at
most an expectation-of the respondents' and particularly of
their counsel-that certain fees and expenses may become
payable in the event a class is certified. That expectation is
wholly irrelevant to the existence of a present controversy
between petitioner and respondents.
The Court's reliance on unidentified fees and expenses cannot be reconciled with the repeated admonition that "unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal
judicial power." E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particularly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor the
8 Respondents' "Demand for Judgment" asks the court to award the
"[c]ost of this action as well as attorney fees in the amount of 25% as
hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may be deemed fit and
proper by the Court." App. 16. The request for fees was clarified in
Paragraph VI of the amended complaint, which reads as follows:
"Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court be designated custodian
of the funds and judgment to be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly
situated, by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a suitable
depository and, upon proper order of this Court, disburse said funds
after deduction of necessary expenses and attorney fees to Plaintiff's
attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the amount so paid,
the same being reasonable by all standards, including that alleged and
utilized by Defendants in suing certain members in of [sic] the class in
State Courts for unpaid accounts." App. 13-14.
9 See n. 7, supra.
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respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will
be liable for the fees or expenses relied -qpon. Indeed, the
American Rule would bar an award of attorney's fees against
this petitioner. Thus, respondents' 11 injury"-if any existsis not one that 11 fairly can be traced" to the petitioner. ld.,
at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors. v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U. S. 91, 99 (1979). 10 Whatever may be the basis for the
respondents' asserted desire to share fees and expenses with
unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a bystander. "[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions that 'Cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
before them." North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246,
(1971). This elementary principle should disp()se of the case.

c
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the
outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this
Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g.,
Ashcroftv.Mattis,431 U.S.171, 172-173 (1977) (percuriam);
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1976) (per curiam);
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-404 (1975); Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per
curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per curiam); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights,
404 u.s. 403, 407 (1972).11
1 °Far-reaching consequences could flow from a rule that fees recoverable
from putative class members may be "traced" to the class defendant
for purposes of the case or controversy requirement. At the least, this
rule would support a claim that a person who has accepted full settlement
of his individual claim is entitled to file suit on behalf of an unrecompensed
class. Apparently, the putative plaintiff need only "asser[t]," ante, at 7,
n. 6, that fees incurred in anticipation of the litigation ultimately might be
shared with a prevailing class.
11 These cases are discussed more fully in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, post, a t - - - (PowELL, J., dissenting).
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Respondents do not suggest that their claims are 11 capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 110- 111, n. 11 (1975). 12 And not a single one of the
alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the
nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone
challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal complaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven
months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory
appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought that the class action would protect
his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this
has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents' individual claims. To be sure, respondents' counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged
recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arrangement.
But I know of no decision by any court that holds that a
lawyer's interest in a larger fee, to be paid by third persons
not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome
required by Art. III.
II
Despite the absence of an Art. III controversy, the Court
directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated
by lawyers whose only 11 clients" are unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone. 18
If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course
of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate
review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances
might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v.
Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 Wright, Miller &
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 171 (Supp. 1979);
Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.
18 I do not suggest that counsel acted improperly in pursuing this case.
Since they have prevailed both in this Court and in the Court of Appeals,
12
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The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for reasons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective
"'response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government." Ante, at 12. I am not
aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this
Court in determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences
of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as
the Court seems to fear. And the Court fails to recognize
that allowing this action to proceed without an interested
plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some
magnitude.
A
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily
in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who
fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to
a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent
attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification
generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences
of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would
not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were
granted, the absent members of the putative class would have
obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of
the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand,
damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of
the certification ruling would enable putative class members to
take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability
without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable
judgment. Thus, the Court's decision to allow appeals in
this situation will reinstate the "one-way intervention" that
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.14
the responsibility for allowing client-less litigation falls on the federal
courts.
14 See Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under
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Perhaps more commonly, the mootness question will arise
when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before
judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in
some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny
compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the
enforcement of certain legal rights by "private attorney[s]
general." Ante, at 12. The practical argument is not without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns
amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best
left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be
consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim.
Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of
usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of
usury claims,1 5 the Court's concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at best misplaced and at
worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling
Act.18
Rule 23 (b )(3), a. class member must decide at the time of certification
whether to "opt out" of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision
was designed to bring an end to the "spurious" class action in which class
members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits
in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F . R. D. 69, 105-106
(1966).
1 5 LiddeU v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrowers' class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941).
Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mississippi'3 interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U.S. C.
§ 85. But I do not understand that the National Bank Act displaces state
policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of
that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or
undue penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. § 86.
16 The Act provides that rules of procedure promulgated by this Court
"shall not . , . enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U. S. C.
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The Court's coneern for pytative class members would ba
more telling in a more appropriate cttse. A pattern of forced
settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the Iitiga..
tion of successive suits by members of the putative class. I
do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should be
addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step
should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the
denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances. 17
District Courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292
(b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action
defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle
with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate
and final determination of the class certification question o~
appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by
forced settlement, the District Court is not powerless. In at
least some circumstances, it may require that putative class
members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to
intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The
availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent
to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, District
§ 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft : Consumer Class Actions and the SubstanceProcedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974).
17 In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court
held that the denial of class certification is not a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the
dangers of "indiscriminate" interlocutory review. ld., at 474. Although
Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in which it would be
~irable, Congress may remedy the problem by approprjate legifl.lation.
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Court management of the problem by measures tailored to the
case at hand may well be preferable to the Court's open-ended
approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are
lacking, it is for Congress-not this Court-to correct the
rdefidency,18
B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before it,
'judicially fashioned "solutions" to legislative problems often
are attended by unfortunate practical consequences of their
own. Today's holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as "quasi-class representatives" solely for the
purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain
nothing more from the action, their participation can be
intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a
putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims
asserted in this case. Respondents serve on their own motion-if indeed they serve at all. 19 Since no court has certified the class, there has been no considered determination
that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its
members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure,
·and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it.
18 Congress currently has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the
'difficulties infecting this troubled area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). The bill, supported by the Department of Justice, proposes to
bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, seen. 17, 8Upra, and to eliminate
some of the problems of claims too small to justify individua:I lawsuits, by
creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for
· the enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in
' the nmne of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory
·appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certffication under the proposed procedures.
'1 9 As noted above, p. 3, supra, respondents took no appeal in their
own names. One would think that this candid disclaimer of personal
interest would distroy the foundation upon which the Court predicates
Art. III jurisdiction. Ante, at 10; seep. 6, supra.
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sarily creates significant problems in the administration of
Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case. 22
by which a claBs achieves judicial recognition. Under Rule 23, the members of a putative class will not be bound by a judgment unless a, proper
certification order is entered. That they may be "interest,ed parties,"
ibid., before that time does not make them parties to the lit,iga.tion in any
sense, a.'3 this Court has recognized. In Indianapolis School Comm'rs v.
Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), the Court held that an oral certification
order was insufficient t.o identify the interests of absent class members for
Art. III purposes. The result hardly could be different when t.he class
has not been identified at all. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft, 4313 U. S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 423 U. S. 308,
310, n. 1 (19713); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Pasadena
City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (19713).
Mn. JusTICE STEVENs indicates that unnamed members of an uncertified class may be "present" a.'3 parties for some purposes and not for
others. No authority is cited for such selective "presence" in an action.
Nor is any explanation offered a.'3 to how a court is to determine when
these unidentified "parties" are present. If their presence is to be
limited to the satisfaction of the Art. III case or controversy requirement,
then the mle of party status would have no content apart from Art. III
and could only be described as a legal fiction. If, on the other hand, the
proposed rule is to apply outside the Art. III context, it may have troublesome and far-reaching implications that could prejudice the bringing of
elMs actions. Presumably, a purpose of the rule of party status would be
to aBsure that satisfaction of the claims of named pa.rties would not
terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of unnamed parties be
extinguished by the failure of the named parties to appeal. Thus, if the
rule proposed by Mn. JusTICE S'l'EVENS is t.o accomplish its purpose,
I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon named parties to
continue the litiga.tion where-as here-the unnamed parties remain
unidentified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the named
parties not only be required to continue to litigate, but to assume personal responsibility for costs and attorney's fees if the case ultimately is
lost? Would responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they
thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like
questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe
they merit careful study by Congress before this Court-perhaps unwittingly-creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our
system.
22 The Court's resurrection of this dead controversy may result in

78-904-DISSENT

/

16

DEPOSIT GUARANTY NAT. BANK v. ROPER

I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.

irreparable injury to innocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank.
When the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, it
assigned as one of its reasons the possible "destruction of the [petitioner]
bank" by damages then alleged to total 12,000,000 and now potentially
augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47, see ante, at 2, n. 2. The
possible destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue,
but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community served.
It is said that this is necessary to redress injuries possibly suffered by
members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward
in the nearly nine years that have passed since this action was filed.
Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by statute almost six years
ago. As the District Court may be called upon to determine whether the
equitable doctrine of "relation back" permits it to toll the statute of
limitations on remand, ante, at 3, n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for
that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances
presented, the District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their
rights these many years.

